天理与人文的统一——朱熹论礼、理关系

朱熹的礼学追求秩序重建与内圣之道的和谐,其礼学思想的最大特色在于:既重视高明的形上学理论建构,又强调下学工夫的践履。所以,清儒认为宋儒只讲理而不言礼不确,朱熹不但重视理的本体理论综合,又特别重视礼的工夫论,是天理与人文的统一。     

以理论孝：儒家孝道正当性的哲学辩护

在朱熹思想体系中,“理”既是宇宙起源之实然,又是人伦道德应然之本源。人伦道德源于天理,是天理的社会化外现。“理便是性”,仁、义、礼、智、孝等伦理道德观念先验性地包容于理本体之中,并因为“理”之先验存在而获得形而上证明,儒家孝论从而实现了“实质上的系统”．     

从伦理之道到本体之道——韩愈、二程道论与唐宋道学之发展

唐宋时期的儒学道论存在着由伦理之道向本体之道发展的趋势,这在韩愈、二程的道论上尤为明显。韩愈复兴儒学,建构的是以仁义为核心的伦理之道,具体表现在为政、为人等方面。韩愈以此为依据,从伦理道德入手批判了佛教;其"文以载道"以及"道统"论等思想,又阐述了伦理之道如何传承的问题。二程以"天理"为本体,"道"作为天理的表现形式,具有本体色彩;本体之道外化为具体的生生不息的自然之道以及仁义礼智信等伦理之道。二程还以本体之道为基础,批判了韩愈的人性论以及佛教之道,延续和发展了韩愈文以载道以及道统论思想,建构了以"格物"为核心的致知论和以"诚""敬"为核心的修养论。从韩愈的伦理之道到二程的本体之道,是儒学之道本体化的过程,同时也是儒学为迎接佛老本体论的挑战而做的自我调节。     

内圣心性之学与科学民主新外王所面临的困境

<正> 儒家人文主义从群体的批判的自我意识这个层面来理解,从孔子、孟子所认识和掌握的时代精神来诠释,主要是对人的问题的穷究底蕴的思考,心性问题是其思考的核心之一。所谓心性之学,简言之是关于人的本心、本性的整体性学说。它以道德理性对人的生理现象(生命、食色)、心理现象(知识、情感、意志)、伦理现象(仁、义、礼、智、信)进行自我调整和超越,以凸显人的道德生命和自我价值,而发展为心性本体的道德形上学。凡是哲学都是讲人或包含人的内容的,都是讲现实世界或包含现实世界内涵的,脱离人和现实世界的内容,何以讲哲学?然而哲学形上学存在论(本体论)把人抽象化而失落了人,把人的现实世界的矛盾抽象化而瓦解了人的现实世界,这又是不可避免的。这是因为作为哲学形上学本体论所蕴涵的直觉本体思维方式,是一种从抽象原则出发而走向空虚玄想的     

从“原心定罪”到“以礼为断”——清代公羊学的伦理转向

清代公羊学以常州之学为代表，而礼学考据一脉也有参与公羊学研究的倾向，以扬州学者凌曙为代表。凌曙的《公羊礼疏》开创了以礼说公羊的研究方法，将基于心性的公羊大义落实到实践层面，在学术史上有其独到的价值，引领了清代公羊学的伦理转向。     

朱熹哲学中的欲望与秩序

为建设理想社会,儒家一直集中关注以下几个问题:哪种社会秩序是更为合理的?它合理的依据是什么?怎样才能实现并维持这种社会秩序?同时,与此问题相关的是,怎么去定义人的欲望,怎么去解决秩序与欲望之间可能发生的冲突和矛盾。关于这些问题,朱熹用"天理之节文"定义了"礼",认为在"公"的价值观视角上,"礼"是具体而现实的表现"天理之节文"的秩序体系。他把公和理同天理结合起来,在为这些概念提供存在论背景的同时,又赋予了其不可违背的绝对的道德权威。恰恰与之相反,朱熹又把人欲望中与公对立的私、与礼对立的欲,定义为私欲,认为"私"及"私欲"是为了维护社会"公"的秩序,强调为了保存天理一定要克服"私"及"私欲"。朱熹认为,尊卑、上下、长幼、亲疏作为礼的主要构成内容,它们依据于天理,是社会秩序的重要规范;"私"与"公"、"人欲"与"礼"的关系以及天理的特点,不是以社会秩序的重组为中心,而是通过"礼"所表现的社会秩序,寻求构建社会秩序的正确方向。     

朱熹哲学中“自然”概念的内涵和角色

"自然"不仅是道家哲学的重要术语,也是包括朱子在内的儒家哲学的重要术语。在朱熹看来,"自然"是指没有人欲掺杂或造作的,天理本体完全实现自己或者被实现的状态。这包括三种情形:形上本体的先天存在、动植物的当下和人符合天理的行为和实践。"自然"与"天理"的这种密切关系决定了只有符合"自然"的才可能是符合"天理"的,因此"自然"成为我们各类行为的参照标准、过程要求和境界目标,这是自然概念在朱子哲学中的重要意义。但是在"天理"的内涵和特性中,朱熹认为"当然"更切近人事,所以"当然"比"自然"更为重要,这决定了"自然"最终无法拥有像在道家哲学中一样显赫的地位。     

礼理之变对中国画的影响

封建贵族社会"礼"就是法,把贵族小社会之"礼"推向集权平民大社会,显然不匹配,对"礼"的简化,对儒学终极的解释便产生"宋理"。"天理至善",人性有"天理"一面,也有人肉体之"气"一面。"气"是善恶之源,孔子的人本是被动的"克己复礼",孟子的人本是主动的"养浩然之气"。是固,"礼"时代的绘画是"成教化,助人伦"之作,"理"时代的绘画是"心源"之作。"礼""理"之变使中国画入俗外,更塑造着中国画色形之彩。     

《周易程氏传》礼法思想简论

《周易程氏传》礼法思想的核心是以天理与人性重构正统法律思想的理论基础。二程继承了先秦以来以礼治国的思想,并把"礼"由有形的天地作为其直观依据提升为把至高至善的"天理"作为"礼"的终极依据,使"礼"具有了终极意义上的本体论意义。同时程颐也非常重视法的作用,但程颐重"刑"重"法",为刑重新定位,重点讲的是刑罚对维护天理五常、伦理礼法所起的作用。在德礼和政刑之间,德礼是政刑之本,而政刑有着平治天下的重要功能,刑罚的使用是为了去恶扬善,有益于道德的张扬。程颐礼法思想的基础是其通过性、理、气关系提出的人性论观点。对于程颐来说,礼法思想并不是绝对的,而是当维护则维护,当损益则损益,随时变易以从道。     

心性之学的界定与其主题

<正> 心性之学从何时起,到何时才可称得上一门学问,释、道两家可否称为心性之学,这在学术界大体有一致的看法。在先秦时代,虽然也谈心论性,如孟子、荀子、《管子》之《心术》等四篇,都有较深入讨论,但不能说已构成心性之学,真正的心性之学,应该说成熟于宋明时期,宋明理学中的各种学派,都细致入微地讨论心性问题,所以后来有“无事袖手谈心性”之说,心性之学成为理学的代名词。宋明时期,是中国传统哲学的高峰期,其标志在于此时的哲学家对哲学概念都有相对的界定,并深入地探索概念的联系,并自觉地建立体系。宋明时期心性之学的最主要的特点是把心性本体化,并通过工夫来完善本体,本体与工夫是这时期思想的主旋律。关于宋明理学的主旨,我已在《孔子研究》1992年第一期《本体与工夫》一文中作了探讨,我指出从本体上看,有四种类型,一为气本体论,一为理本体     

Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self-consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre-systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.     

Cultivating the Arts of Inquiry, Interpretation, and Criticism: A Peircean Approach to our Educational Practices

Peirce was a thinker who claimed that his mind had been thoroughly formed by his rigorous training in the natural sciences. But he was also the author who proclaimed that nothing is truer than true poetry. In making the case for Peirce’s relevance to issues of education, then, it is necessary to do justice to the multifaceted character of his philosophical genius, in particular, to the experimentalist cast of his mind and his profound appreciation for the aesthetic, the imaginative, and (more narrowly) the metaphorical in their myriad guises. My aim in this paper is to go some distance, however small, toward doing such justice to Peirce.     

Intensities

Aquinas has mostly been read in the twentieth century in terms of a duality between reason and faith, philosophy and theology. However a careful reading of his texts will not support this position. All knowledge for Aquinas is by participation in the divine mind, analogically mediated, and faith and reason are simply differing degrees of intensity of this mediation. There is for Aquinas no secure ontology outside the orientation to the beatific vision, and his account of esse belongs more to sacra doctrina than to metaphysics. Because esse is equally in substance and accident, general and particular, it opens up to an ontology of event congruent with revelation (though the latter is always mediated by human reason). In accord with this Aquinas stresses, beyond Aristotle, emanation, relation and accidental supplementations as belonging as much to things as their substances. All this provides him with a fundamentally Trinitarian ontology. A mind renewed through the incarnation and the sacraments can once more infer the Trinity from creation. Theology builds up towards the vision of Christ as true theologian and passes beyond theory to sacramental and liturgical enactment.     

The ontology of musical works: A philosophical pseudo-problem

A bewildering array of accounts of the ontology of musical works is available. Philosophers have held that works of music are sets of performances, abstract, eternal sound-event types, initiated types, compositional action types, compositional action tokens, ideas in a composer’s mind and continuants that perdure. This paper maintains that questions in the ontology of music are, in Rudolf Carnap’s sense of the term, pseudo-problems. That is, there is no alethic basis for choosing between rival musical ontologies. While we have no alethic basis for choosing any ontology of music, pragmatic reasons can be given for favoring certain ontologies of musical works over others.     

Minding Rachlin's Eliminative Materialism

Rachlin's teleological behaviorism eliminates the first-person ontology of conscious experience by identifying mental states with extended patterns of behavior, and thereby maintains the materialist ontology of science. An alternate view, informed by brain-based and externalist philosophies of mind, is shown also to maintain the materialist ontology of science, but without eliminating the phenomenology of consciousness. This view implies that to be judged human, machines not only must exhibit complicated temporally structured patterns of behavior, but also must have first-person conscious experience. Although confirming machine sentience is likely to be problematic, extended contact with a machine that results in a person interacting with it as if it were conscious could reasonably lead to the conclusion that for all intents and purposes it is.     

基于贡献原则的幼儿分配公平性

分配公平性是指个体如何以公平的方式对资源进行分配, 其主要依据3个原则：贡献(equity)、平等(equality)和需要(need)。最新研究表明, 幼儿很早就已经具有基于贡献原则的分配公平性判断与行为, 双加工理论对于该研究结果能够给出更为适当的解释, 心理理论与情境卷入水平分别从认知和情绪方面对幼儿分配公平性的发展有着重要影响。未来研究应注重研究内容的具体化, 对幼儿基于贡献原则的分配公平性发展特点、相关影响因素及其内部动机进行深入探究。     

Neuroscience and Whitehead II: Process-Based Ontology of Brain

While neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain, the implications of these empirical findings for ontological questions in philosophy including the mind–body problem remain yet unclear. In the first paper, I discussed the model of brain that as implied and supported by the empirical data. This leads me now to the question of an empirically plausible ontology of brain. Therefore, the aim in this second paper is the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of a process-based ontology that avoids what Whitehead described as “simple location” and “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. The discussion of the model of the brain is complemented by developing a process-based ontological characterization of the brain. Specifically, as based on Whitehead, I argue that “simple location” of the brain as thing or object in time and space amounts to nothing but an abstraction rendering what Whitehead described as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. Instead of describing the brain as static, non-temporal and isolated thing or object, I characterize the brain ontologically by dynamic, temporal, and relational processes. This leads me to a process-based ontology of brain which may be specified in spatiotemporal terms. Since the world’s larger spatiotemporal range or scale contains, e.g., nests, the smaller one of the brain, I characterize their ontological relationship by “spatiotemporal nestedness” and “spatiotemporal directedness”. Such spatiotemporal relationship between world and brain precludes the confusion between the world as whole and the brain as part, e.g., “mereological confusion”. I conclude that process-based or better, more specifically, spatiotemporal ontology of the brain and its relationship to the world may offer novel views on the question for the ontological relationship between mind and brain, e.g., the mind–brain problem, by converting or reformulating it as “world-brain problem”.     

孟子王道理想的心性向度

王道理想是孟子政治哲学的核心,作为一套超乎现实却又对现实具有普遍导向意义的治国理念,其践行的基石被孟子归结在人的心性之上。立足于“心”孟子提出王道缘起于“仁”,基于“性”孟子断言王道的落实在于“义”;由“心”“性”的统一确立了仁义一体的构想,据此认为,“居仁由义”是王道理想得以向现实转化的基本思路。     

LOVE,JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL ESCHATOLOGY

In this paper, we explore the ontological and theological ground of political institutions in order to then reflect upon the eschatological calling of society. The paper builds on Tillich's ontological insight that love does not simply transcend justice, but that it permeates and drives justice, that justice gives form to love's reunion of the separated. This relation between love and justice is at play in political institutions: these unite human beings under forms of justice that must be transformed ever anew if they are not to lose touch with the dynamic power of love and freeze into increasingly unjust juridicalism. The modern history of Western civilisation bears witness to this ontological tension, and the phenomenon of globalisation is yet another instance of human society's mystical calling. Thus, love heads the dynamic movement that transforms political institutions ever anew. Yet society as a whole must become conscious of its ontology for humanity to truly reach its eschatological potential, and this will require both that theology recovers its ground and that political theory thinks theologically.     

The Informational Fallacy in the Philosophy of Consciousness

This article argues that theories which regard the mind as merely a form of information processing are guilty of a fallacious conflation of the informational contents of consciousness with consciousness itself, with the consciousness of those contents. Such theories lie behind the thought that a consciousness could be transferred or uploaded onto a substrate other than the brain it initially occurred in. It is argued here that the ontology of information is that of a formal structure that can be instantiated in physical reality innumerable times, whereas the ontology of consciousness is that of an irreducibly singular subjective experience of being alive.