Psychopathology according to behaviorism: a radical restatement

This article is a radical restatement of the predominant psychopathology, which is characterized by nosological systems and by its approach towards a neurobiological conception of the so-called mental disorders. The "radical" sense of this restatement is that of radical behaviorism itself. As readers will recall, "radical" applied to behaviorism means total (not ignoring anything that interests psychology), pragmatic (referring to the practical sense of knowledge), and it also derives from the Latin word for "root" (and thus implies change beginning at a system's roots or getting to the root of things, in this case, of psychological disorders). Based on this, I introduce the Aristotelian distinction of material and form, which, besides being behaviorist avant la lettre, is used here as a critical instrument to unmask the hoax of psychopathology as it is presented. The implications of this restatement are discussed, some of them already prepared for clinical practice.     

Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism

This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenological data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers. Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the ‘Radical Enactivist’ handling of this issue, so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1–2, focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely heavily upon the endorsement of a particular explanatory constraint that I call the structural resemblance constraint (SRC), according to which the structure of our phenomenology ought to be mirrored in our cognitive science. Sections 3–5 delineate the nature of, and commitment to, SRC amongst enactivists, showing SRC’s warrant and implications. The paper then turns to Hutto and Myin’s (2013) handling of SRC in sections 6–7, highlighting irregularities within their programme for Radical Enactivism on this issue. Despite seeming to favour SRC, I argue that Radical Enactivism’s purported compatibility with the narrow (brain-bound) supervenience of perceptual experience is in fact inconsistent with SRC, given Hutto and Myin’s phenomenological commitments. I argue that enactivists more broadly ought to resist such a concessionary position if they wish to tackle the explanatory gap, for it is primarily the abidance to SRC that ensures progress is made here. Section 8 then concludes the paper with a series of open questions to enactivists, inviting further justification of the manner in which they apply SRC.     

Autonomy and radical evil: a Kantian challenge to constitutivism

Properly understood, Kant’s moral philosophy is incompatible with constitutivism. According to the constitutivist, being subject to the moral law cannot be a matter of free choice, and failure to comply with it is to be understood as a deficiency in one’s integrity as an intentional agent. I reconstruct Kant’s arguments to the conclusion that immorality, moral evil, consists in choosing to give one’s unity as an intentional agent supremacy over the moral law, and that one’s being subject to the moral law must be one’s own free choice. And I explain how Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, according to which we cannot be subject to the moral law without actually being morally evil, protects this conclusion from entailing the denial of the unconditionally binding character of moral principles, which character constitutivists correctly identify as the central concern of Kant’s – or any – moral philosophy.     

Power and formation: New Foundations for a radical concept of Power

A radical concept of power identifies social processes which (whether as ‘ideology’, ‘false consciousness’, or ‘the spectacle') influence people's actions by moulding their beliefs or desires. However, seeing people as deluded is to risk treating them as less than fully autonomous beings. Despite his libertarian intentions, Lukes fails to guard against this paternalistic implication. His view still implies that it is the social critic who is in the best position to identify the real interests of an oppressed group. Here it is argued that power should be conceived as an intrusion on the ‘formative practices’ of people. It is possible to identify power as an unwanted influence on the processes in which people ‘form and discover’ interests, while maintaining that interests can only be self‐ascribed. This solution requires a concept of formation as both irreducibly social and yet potentially free. Neither Foucault nor Habermas can provide such a solution, despite some valuable insights. In the end, we must look at the influences of power on formative practices which are actual rather than idealized, productive rather than reflective, and which involve the whole person rather than merely the intellect.     

Hans Loewald: A radical conservative

Hans Loewald's work was relatively marginalized in its day and it is little known outside the United States. It is, however, assuming increasing importance in American psychoanalysis. Loewald's attractiveness as a theoretician is due, in no small part, to his rigor and synthetic reach. He is able to accomplish the difficult feat of remaining non-sectarian and systematic at the same time. Indeed, Loewald's work contains an integrative vision that is unusual in today's fragmented psychoanalytic world. This author tries to show how Loewald attempts to reconcile many of the rigid oppositions that often become reified in analytic controversies: structural theory versus relational psychoanalysis, traditionalism versus revisionism, oedipal versus pre-oedipal, modernist versus postmodernist and hermeneutical versus scientific. The article examines how Eros, understood in terms of the psyche's synthetic strivings, plays a major role in Loewald's theory. The author also situates Loewald's position within contemporary psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology. These discussions tend to criticize the objectivism of modern science-and analysis in so far as it models itself on science-and stress countertransference and the subjectivity of the analyst. Loewald's argument, however, runs in the opposite direction. Because of his concern with the autonomy and individuality of the patient, he is concerned with the clinical dangers rising from an overemphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst.     

Herzen and James: Freedom as radical

The similarities and differences between Herzen and James as humanist theoreticians are very interesting in view of the roles which they played in their respective countries. Radical freedom was important to the theories of each.     

The personality assessment system: A radical hypothesis

Two stories are presented. The first story is about a clinical practitioner developing an assessment method beginning with a connection of test “signs” with behavior, and proceeding to a system that could mystify observers. The second story is about the application of scientific methods to explain how the system could work. Together the stories are an example of practice informing science, and science informing practice. The basic hypothesis used is that much of what we call personality is “caused” by differential aptitudes as modified by long-term learning. It is also assumed that people would prefer to use those aptitudes they feel are their better ones and avoid those in which they feel weaker.     

The personality assessment system: A radical hypothesis

Two stories are presented. The first story is about a clinical practitioner developing an assessment method beginning with a connection of test “signs” with behavior, and proceeding to a system that could mystify observers. The second story is about the application of scientific methods to explain how the system could work. Together the stories are an example of practice informing science, and science informing practice. The basic hypothesis used is that much of what we call personality is “caused” by differential aptitudes as modified by long-term learning. It is also assumed that people would prefer to use those aptitudes they feel are their better ones and avoid those in which they feel weaker.     

Similarity-based cognition: radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience

Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on—in order to perform some cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is argued that there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as representations (even if contentless) in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally, with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radical enactivism can commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of neurodynamics.

     

Special issue on radical views on cognition: introduction

In this paper we present the results of a simulation study of credence developments in groups of communicating Bayesian agents, as they update their beliefs about a given proposition p. Based on the empirical literature, one would assume that these groups of rational agents would converge on a view over time, or at least that they would not polarize. This paper presents and discusses surprising evidence that this is not true. Our simulation study shows that these groups of Bayesian agents show group polarization behavior under a broad range of circumstances. This is, we think, an unexpected result, that raises deeper questions about whether the kind of polarization in question is irrational. If one accepts Bayesian agency as the hallmark of epistemic rationality, then one should infer that the polarization we find is also rational. On the other hand, if we are inclined to think that there is something epistemically irrational about group polarization, then something must be off in the model employed in our simulation study. We discuss several possible interfering factors, including how epistemic trust is defined in the model. Ultimately, we propose that the notion of Bayesian agency is missing something in general, namely the ability to respond to higher-order evidence.

     

Nietzsche's radical experimentalism

The literary complexity of Nietzsche's writings is by now largely familiar; it needs no further display. Instead, I try to reconstruct some of his ideas such that they amount to a sustained philosophical argument and promising project, namely, an attempt to understand — after the Kantian and Darwinian turns — the very possibility of the formation and continuation of infinite varieties of forms of life.I demonstrate that such a project could make good sense only as a transcendental experiment in which the idea of a reality which is ready-made, immutable, and fixed in itself must not only be dismissed as something incomprehensible, but as something not in the least worth striving for, and replaced by the idea of synergetic processes (of self-organization) and what Nietzsche called art without an artist. Read as an empirical-historical narrative we would have to reject Nietzsche's account as a mere rhapsody and arrogant fantasy.Abbreviations AS Attempt at a Self-Criticism. 1886 Preface, BT. - BG Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1966. - BT The Birth of Tragedy. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967. - GM On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. W. Kaufmann & R. J. Holingdale. New York: Vintage books, 1967. - GS The Gay Science. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974. - HH Human, All Too Human. Volume 1. Trans. M. Faber, with S. Lehmann. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. - HI On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life. Trans. P. Preuss. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980. - NF Nachgelassene Fragmente.Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe. Volumes 7–13. Edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari. Berlin: dtv-W. de Gruyter, 1980. - PT On the Pathos of Truth.Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870s. Trans. and ed. D. Breazeale. Atlantic Heights: Humanities Press, 1979. - TL On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. Ibid. - UM Untimely Meditations. - WP The Will to Power. Trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Holingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.