Pragmatic,Existentialist and Phenomenological Interpretations of Marxism

In his book, Hermeneutics and Reflection (2013), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann outlines what he sees as the fundamental differences between Edmund Husserl’s “theoretical” phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s “a-theoretical” phenomenology, which he frames in terms of the distinction between “reflective observation” and “hermeneutic understanding”. In this paper, I will clarify the sense of these terms in order to elucidate some of the crucial similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger. Against von Herrmann’s characterization of the Husserlian project, I argue that we should not consider these differences in terms of “reflection”, since this runs the risk of misconstruing Husserlian phenomenology with the philosophical tradition he was striving against. Taken together, by way of a close reading of von Herrmann, the following discussion will serve as a brief sketch of the early Heidegger’s turn away from Husserlian phenomenology and toward his own hermeneutic phenomenology.     

The Term “Self-Directed Learning”—Back to Knowles,or Another Way to Forge Ahead?

The term self-directed learning has since its seminal definition in 1975 by Malcolm S. Knowles acquired a range of meanings, which has led to communication difficulties about this subject. Examination of self-directed learning from a biblical ontological–anthropological perspective reveals that, although the notion of self-directed learning as a mechanistic or deterministic process should be questioned, Knowles and colleagues were correct in ameliorating the “process part” of the definition of self-directed learning by emphasizing the freedom and agency of the learner as steward of creation. Researchers wishing to deviate from the approach by Knowles and colleagues are compelled to explain what the term designates in their particular project.     

THE ART OF WAR CORPUS AND CHINESE JUST WAR ETHICS PAST AND PRESENT

The idea of “just war” is not alien to Chinese thought. The term “yi zhan” (usually translated as “just war” or “righteous war” in English) is used in Mencius, was renewed by Mao Zedong, and is still being used in China today (zhengyi zhanzheng). The best place to start exploring this Chinese idea is in the enormous Art of War corpus in premodern China, of which the Seven Military Classics is the best representative. This set of treatises served as the military bible in imperial China from 1078 CE. Ideas analogous to ius ad bellum and ius in bello can be found in these texts. These norms are present in these military texts, elaborated in subsequent commentaries, understood as a matter of fact in Chinese political history, and recently and briefly acknowledged by a few Chinese military scholars in the mainland and in Taiwan. This Chinese just war ethics has its distinctiveness vis‐à‐vis James Turner Johnson's articulation of the Western classic view. It differs from Johnson's claims that military lethal violence is intrinsically morally neutral and that last resort is not a primary consideration in deciding for war. Contemporary Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) military publications show that the PLA understands the general idea of just war, but they acknowledge only the ad bellum part, not the in bello components.     

Concepts of Creativity: Similarities and Differences among Mainland,Hong Kong and Taiwanese Chinese

Aspects of creativity concepts across different Chinese populations were examined. A Likert style questionnaire consisting of 60 adjectives was administered to 451 undergraduates from Beijing, Guangzhou, Taipei and Hong Kong. The results show that: (a) the core characteristics of creativity identical in all the samples are: “originality”, “innovativeness”, “thinking” and “observational skills”, “flexibility”, “willingness to try”, “self confidence”, and “imagination”; (b) the Taipei sample, unlike the other three samples, does not associate “wisdom”, “assertiveness”, and “individualism” with creativity; (c) in all Chinese populations the three factors labeled innovative, dynamic, and intellectual were distinguishable in the concept of creativity; (d) “artistic” and “humorous” were missing in the Chinese perception of creativity; (e) creativity characteristics received relatively low ratings on the desirability scale.     

Intentionalism,defeasibility, and justification

According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).     

Kierkegaard’s Notion of a Divine Name and the Feasibility of Universal Love

Kierkegaard's well‐known analysis of the self, in the first part of his work The Sickness unto Death (1849), presents, even if only in passing, the somewhat enigmatic notion of “divine name.” In this article I offer an interpretation of Kierkegaard's analysis and suggest that the notion of a divine name be understood as expressing the conception of human beings as possessing (what I call) “individual essence.” I further demonstrate that it is this quality that makes a human being a self, namely, the individual that he or she is. In addition to defending the exegetical and substantial plausibility of this conception, I show how it opens the way to affirming the feasibility of universal love.     

Helen and Heidegger: Disabled Dasein,Language and Others

Abstract

Both Heidegger’s Being and Time and Helen Keller’s The Story of my Life address the problem of what it means for humans to be optimally human. In reading these texts together, I hope to show that Helen’s life-story confirms Heidegger’s existential analyses to some extent, but also, importantly, poses a challenge to them with respect to the interrelated issues of disability, language and others. Heidegger’s hermeneutic explication of what it means to be human is intended to uncover supposedly basic human existential structures. As a fore-structure for this explication, Heidegger projects an already able-bodied, self-sufficient adult, resolutely engaged in daily activity. I shall argue, however, that it is due to this starting-point in adult-Dasein that Heidegger’s existential analyses miss important insights concerning the meaning of being human to be gained from Helen’s experience. Starting from the essentially disabled child-Dasein, Helen describes her struggle to achieve the very condition that Heidegger assumes from the start, first through rescue by the other as teacher, who offered the gift of language and community, and thereafter in her grasp of language as a “pharmakon.” I hope to show in the end that Helen’s experience of a struggle for humanity offers the model for an alternative projection, that of an essentially disabled and needy Dasein, which, I believe, provides a more viable fore-structure than Heidegger’s for a hermeneutics of humanity.     

Voice of responsibility: Dahlia Ravikovitch's ‘Egla ‘Arufa (Felled Heifer)

In a cycle of poems, Sugeyot beyahadut bat zemanenu, “Issues in Contemporary Judaism,” Dahlia Ravikovitch protests against human suffering and fatalities that occur during war and conflicts of attrition involving Israel's indigenous peoples and contiguous populations. Among the poetry, ‘Egla ‘arufa, with its cryptic title and densely encoded contents, requires textual “demystification” for its central message to be heard. First, this article identifies the most crucial pair of Hebrew sources underlying this poem and discusses their intertextual influence and the transition between them for an enriched reading. Second, through textual analysis this study applies a postmodern literary poetic – a “hermeneutic lag” – to a unique dynamic in the dimensions of the writing. In general, I relate to selected poems by Dahlia Ravikovitch as self-portraits, and regard “Felled Heifer” as an abstract figuration of the voice of the speaker: the voice of responsibility.     

Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness

In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of character that we do not create but can only discover. This determinate, non-representational stratum of perceptual consciousness also serves as a bridge between consciousness and the world beyond it. I articulate and defend this conception of perceptual consciousness. I locate the view in the space of contemporary positions on phenomenal character and argue for its superiority. I close by briefly arguing that the Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism (this involves disarming the Grain Problem).     

“Dignity was the First to Leave”:* Godinez V. Moran,Colin Ferguson,and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants

This article considers the Colin Ferguson trial in the context of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran, establishing a unitary standard for the determinations of competence to stand trial, competence to plead guilty, and competence to waive counsel. The Ferguson trial was widely seen as a “charade.” I argue that the Ferguson spectacle was the inevitable denouement of the Godinez decision. I then look at the Ferguson trial (through contemporaneous press and television coverage) under the filters of “sanism” and “pretextuality.” I conclude that the “dignity” value—a prerequisite for a constitutionally-acceptable fair trial—was, as a result of Godinez, lacking in the Ferguson case.     

Do students really prefer repeated rereading over testing when studying textbooks? A reexamination

ABSTRACT

Experimental studies have shown that testing promotes better long-term retention than repeated rereading. Regarding implications for educational practice, based on a survey study seemingly showing that students prefer repeated rereading over testing when studying [Karpicke, J. D., Butler, A. C., & Roediger, H. L. (2009). Metacognitive strategies in student learning: Do students practise retrieval when they study on their own? Memory, 17, 471–479. doi:10.1080/09658210802647009], it has been concluded that increasing the number of tests may boost students’ achievement. However, a closer look at the survey study reveals that “repeated rereading” has been operationalised in terms of “restudying” which represents a term that may subsume a variety of study strategies. We reexamined the study behaviour of students in a more fine-grained way by surveying both their hypothetical (Study 1) and real (Study 2) study behaviour when restudying texts. Results showed that rereading is preferred only by few students early in the learning process, with almost all shifting to testing late in the learning process, and that rereading is mainly performed in terms of “rereading not understood parts”, and rarely in terms of “repeated rereading”. These results indicate that the implications of the testing effect for educational practice may have to be reconsidered.     

Implications of Learning Style,Age Group,and Gender for Developing Online Learning Activities

ABSTRACT

This study explores the effects of learning style, age and gender on preferences for online educational activities. David Kolb's Experiential Learning Theory (Kolb, 1984 Kolb, D. A. 1984. Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  [Google Scholar]) is used as a lens to examine the responses of online learners to five types of educational activities. Results indicate that learning style influences preference for learning activity. The relationship is stronger among adults than among children aged 10–13 (middle school). The four learning styles were not evenly distributed. “Practical” (likes to solve problems and find solutions) was the most frequent style among both children and adults (37%). “Creative” (enjoys brainstorming and open-ended exploration) was the least frequent (8%). These data have particular relevance to the development of educational activities, suggesting that open-ended exploration with “no right answers” may not be the most satisfying and appealing approach for many learners. The results of this study provide new insight into online audiences and can help developers of multimedia activities to create experiences that will appeal to all kinds of learners.     

Kant's Schematism of the categories: An interpretation and defence

The aim of the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason is to solve the problem posed by the “inhomogeneity” of intuitions and categories: the sensible properties of objects represented in intuition are of a different kind than the properties represented by categories. Kant's solution is to introduce what he calls “transcendental schemata,” which mediate the subsumption of objects under categories. I reconstruct Kant's solution in terms of two substantive premises, which I call Subsumption Sufficiency (i.e., that subsuming an object under a transcendental schema is sufficient to subsume it under the corresponding category) and Real Possibility (i.e., that it is really possible to subsume objects under each of the transcendental schemata). These two principles, together with a trivial modal one (the Subsumption-Possibility Link), entail that it is possible to subsume objects under categories; in other words, the argument of the Schematism is valid. The main work of the paper consists in reconstructing Kant's arguments for, and explanations of, these premises. I argue that they hinge on Kant's claim that transcendental schemata are “time-determinations,” which I interpret to mean: rules for reflexively representing the temporal relations among our own representational states. On the basis of this reading, I reconstruct Kant's argument for Subsumption Sufficiency, category by category. I also explain why Real Possibility follows almost immediately. Granting Kant the argument up to this point in the Critique, the argument of the Schematism is sound.     

The self and the person as treated in some Buddhist texts[1]

The theme of our conference is “The Concept of a Person”. One of the most original attitudes of the Buddha towards this problem was to have dissuaded his followers from clinging to the concept of “person”. The word “person” in Pāli is puggala (= individual), which represents in early middle Indian dialect puthakala, a derivation of Sanskrit: prithak (= prith or prath+ añc = separately, one by one). [2] Puggala means person or man, an individual as opposed to a group. Its equivalent in Sanskrit is pudgala., which means a personal entity or an individual. If there were any unique and permanent substance unifying this personal entity, it would be the self or the soul, attan in Pali and ātman in Sanskrit. The self and the person are closely related to each other. I will trace the evolution of these two notions as treated in some Buddhist texts, firstly in the primitive basic Buddhist texts in verse or in short sentences, secondly in the prose part of some sūtras and finally in later developed Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. Then I will confront these notions with the experience of their followers, by taking the example of Zen master Dōgen (1200–1253).     

THE EARLIEST SYRIAC RECEPTION OF DIONYSIUS1

This essay examines the earliest Syriac reception of the Corpus Dionysiacum in the first decades of the sixth century. This reception is earlier than the standard Greek reception and moves us closer, I hypothesize, to the original text and context of the CD than do the subsequent Greek edition and commentaries of John of Scythopolis. The principal texts associated with the earliest Syriac reception all betray the influence of “Origenism,” which, I argue, reflects the original milieu of the author of the CD. I conclude this essay with some thoughts on how an acknowledgement of the Origenism of the CD complicates our understanding of “orthodoxy” and “heresy” during this period.     

In the Beginning Was the Deed

Winch's readings of Wittgenstein and Weil call for a significant rethinking of the relation between “metaphysics” and “ethics.” But there are confusions, perhaps to be found in all three of these writers, that we may slip into here. These are linked with the tendency to see idealist tendencies in Wittgenstein, and with his remark that giving grounds comes to an end, not in a kind of seeing on our part, but in our acting. The sense that we think we see in this suggestion is dependent on a distorted conception of “justification.” Getting clear about this involves coming to appreciate just how much of our nature as ethical beings is engaged when we do philosophy.     

Quantum information in an evolutionary perspective

An approach to quantum phenomena is reviewed that deals with the possibility of their realistic interpretation in the sense that they represent manifestations of hermeneutic circles between quantum “objects” and their experimental boundary conditions. Quantum cybernetics provides an evolutionary perspective in that all higher‐level organizations like molecules, cells, living systems, etc., can be discussed under one and the same systemic viewpoint: a hermeneutic circularity between a “core” (or “nucleus") and a relevant “periphery” (or “environment") which constitutes the systems’ organization and information potential.

Generally, in realistic theories, an individual quantum system is analyzable into a local “particle‐like” nonlinearity of a generally nonlocal “wave‐like” mode of some sub‐quantum structure of the vacuum ("Dirac ether"). In this view, a “particle” can be considered as being “guided” along one specific route by the (generally nonlocal) configurations of superimposed waves, which spread along all possible paths of an experimental setup. Moreover, in the approach of Quantum Cybernetics, an additional focus is given on the fact that the energy and momentum of a particle also determine the wave behavior. Thus, “waves” and “particles” are mutually and self‐consistently defined, and Quantum Cybernetics puts particular emphasis on the circular relationship—mediated by plane waves—between a quantum system and its macroscopically defined boundary conditions.