Facilitation and analogical transfer in the THOG task

This study was concerned with Wason's THOG task, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning problem for which performance is typically very poor (<20% correct). Recently, however, Needham and Amado (1995) and Koenig and Griggs (2004) have observed both facilitation and spontaneous analogical transfer effects for the Pythagoras version of this task. Based on their findings, Koenig and Griggs concluded that in addition to the separation of the data (the properties of the designated THOG) from the hypotheses that need to be generated (the possible combinations of properties written down), an explicit request to generate these hypotheses is necessary to obtain significant analogical transfer. In the present study we extended the generalisability of this conclusion in three experiments with 214 undergraduate participants using O'Brien et al.'s (1990) Blackboard version of the task. We discuss the relationship of the results to dual process theories of reasoning and propose that analogical transfer may be a better criterion than task facilitation for judging participants' task understanding.     

Reducing cognitive complexity in a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task

The confusion/non-consequential thinking explanation proposed by Newstead, Girotto, and Legrenzi (1995) for poor performance on Wason's THOG problem (a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task) was examined in three experiments with 300 participants. In general, as the cognitive complexity of the problem and the possibility of non-consequential thinking were reduced, correct performance increased. Significant but weak facilitation (33-40% correct) was found in Experiment 1 for THOG classification instructions that did not include the indeterminate response option. Substantial facilitation (up to 75% correct) was obtained in Experiment 2 with O'Brien et al.'s (1990) one-other-THOG classification instruction. In Experiment 3, a revised version of O'Brien et al.'s pre-test problem format also led to substantial facilitation, even with the use of the standard three-choice THOG classification instruction. These findings are discussed in terms of Newstead et al.'s theoretical proposal and possible attentional factors.     

Elementary, my dear Wason: The role of problem representation in the THOG task

The present study was concerned with Wason's THOG problem, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task for which performance over the past 20 years has typically been very poor (<20% correct). We examined the hypothesis that incorporating a quasi-visual context into the problem statement would make both the binary, symmetric tree structure and solution principle of the THOG task clearer and thus facilitate performance. A version of O'Brien et al.'s (Q J Exp Psychol 42A:329–351) Blackboard THOG problem, that specifies each branch of the tree by describing a specific location for each possible color-shape combination, was used to test this hypothesis. Substantial facilitation was both observed (68% correct) and replicated (73% correct), and it was also shown that it is necessary to provide a representation of both sides of the tree to obtain this level of facilitation. The implications of these results for human deductive reasoning are considered. Received: 1 November 2000 / Accepted: 4 May 2001     

Analogical transfer in the THOG task

The influences of surface and structural similarity on analogical transfer were examined with 318 undergraduate participants in four experiments using Needham and Amado's (1995) Pythagoras THOG problem as the source problem and Wason's standard abstract THOG task as the target problem. In Experiments 1-3, systematic changes in surface similarity between the source and target problems were introduced by changing the named exemplar, the dimensional values, and the dimensions, respectively, in the target problem. Significant transfer was obtained in all three experiments. In Experiment 4, we explored the basis of this transfer by examining three versions of the Pythagoras THOG problem, factorially combining its facilitating features as source problems. Results indicated that the inclusion of a hypothesis generation request was necessary for significant transfer. The implications of our findings for using transfer versus facilitation as the performance criterion for deductive reasoning are considered.     

De-confusing the THOG problem: the Pythagorean solution.

Sources of facilitation for Needham and Amado's (1995) Pythagoras version of Wason's THOG problem were systematically examined in three experiments with 174 participants. Although both the narrative structure and figural notation used in the Pythagoras problem independently led to significant facilitation (40-50% correct), pairing hypothesis generation with either factor or pairing the two factors together was found to be necessary to obtain substantial facilitation (> 50% correct). Needham and Amado's original finding for the complete Pythagoras problem was also replicated. These results are discussed in terms of the "confusion theory" explanation for performance on the standard THOG problem. The possible role of labelling as a de-confusing factor in other versions of the THOG problem and the implications of the present findings for human reasoning are also considered.     

Temporal delays can facilitate causal attribution: Towards a general timeframe bias in causal induction

Does reasoning occur on the Wason selection task, or are card selections determined purely on the basis of heuristic processes? To answer this question two relevance-based theories of reasoning are compared: (1) the theory of Evans (1984, 1989; Evans &; Over, 1996), which takes the heuristic viewpoint, and (2) the theory of Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995), which takes the reasoning viewpoint. In three experiments, the effect of removing matching cards from the selection task array is examined. It is argued that the Sperber et al. theory makes clearer predictions about the results of these manipulations, which are confirmed, and that the Evans theory can only accommodate them if it allows the operation of reasoning processes. The results are also discussed in relation to Roth's (1979) account of the selection task, mental models theory, and information gain theory.     

Sources of difficulty in deductive reasoning: The THOG task

The THOG task presents four designs constructed from two shapes and two colours. Subjects are told that the experimenter has written down one of the shapes and one of the colours and are provided the rule that if, and only if, any design has either the shape or the colour, but not both, written down, then it is a THOG. Finally, they are given an exemplar and are asked to classify the remaining designs. Successful solution requires construction of hypotheses, reasoning under each hypothesis, and comparison of the results under each to reach a final conclusion. Few subjects are able to provide adequate responses on the standard version of the task. We present the results of four experiments, with 160 undergraduates each presented with one of eight versions of the task. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that (1) some subjects think that the properties that are written down are identical to those of the exemplar, although these are not the same subjects who exhibit the modal error pattern, (2) many subjects correctly understand the disjunction of the rule but fail to consider the hypotheses, and (3) poor initial encoding of the problem is not easily corrected. Experiment 3 investigates the sufficiency of the claim of Griggs and Newstead (1982) that appropriate problem solution follows from explicit presentation of all problem information (including use of positive labels for properties that are not written down), and Experiment 4 investigates the necessity of the claim. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 show that presenting positive category labels does increase the frequency of correct solution; however, positive category labels are not necessary for such improvement. Separation of the labels of the THOG rule from those of the exemplar, or informing subjects that only one other design is a THOG, also increases the frequency of successful solution. The results suggest that many people have some fairly sophisticated reasoning skills. but application of these skills is easily discouraged when the features of the task lead to poor initial encoding.     

Semantic priming occurs for word but not location pronunciation in the postcue task

Semantic priming refers to the finding that a word response is facilitated if it is preceded by a related word compared to when it is preceded by an unrelated word. Dallas and Merikle (Can J Psychol 30: 15–21 1976a; Bull Psychon Soc 8: 441–444 1976b) demonstrated that semantic priming occurred under conditions in which a pair of simultaneously displayed words was previewed for over a second prior to the onset of a cue indicating which of the words should be pronounced aloud (postcue task). In contrast, semantic interference effects have been reported for postcue picture-naming tasks (Dean et al. in J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 27: 733–743, 2001; Humphreys et al. in J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 21: 961–980, 1995). According to Dean et al., the semantic interference effects in postcue picture naming occur because the integration of the object and the cued attribute in memory is more difficult for categorically related pictures than for unrelated pictures. The aim of this experiment was to determine whether this idea was true for postcue word pronunciation tasks. Participants completed two postcue tasks, one requiring pronunciation of the target word indicated by a locational cue and another requiring pronunciation of the location of a centrally presented word. Results indicated a semantic priming effect only for the locational cue condition suggesting that the integration of the cue and identity information was unaffected by word context. These data suggest that priming in a postcue word pronunciation task may be due to feedback from residual activation within the semantic system facilitating access to the target word’s phonology.     

Comparisons of Online Reading Paradigms: Eye Tracking, Moving-Window, and Maze

This study compares four methodologies used to examine online sentence processing during reading. Specifically, self-paced, non-cumulative, moving-window reading (Just et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 111:228–238, 1982), eye tracking (see e.g., Rayner in Q J Exp Psychol 62:1457–1506, 2009), and two versions of the maze task (Forster et al. in Behav Res Methods 41:163–171, 2009)—the lexicality maze and the grammaticality maze—were used to investigate the processing of sentences containing temporary structural ambiguities. Of particular interest were (i) whether each task was capable of revealing processing differences on these sentences and (ii) whether these effects were indicated precisely at the predicted word/region. Although there was considerable overlap in the general pattern of results from the four tasks, there were also clear differences among them in terms of the strength and timing of the observed effects. In particular, excepting sentences that tap into clause-closure commitments, both maze task versions provided robust, “localized” indications of incremental sentence processing difficulty relative to self-paced reading and eye tracking.     

Focusing effects in predecisional information acquisition

Legrenzi et al. [Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1993). Focusing in reasoning and decision making. Cognition, 49, 37-66] showed that when a single option is proposed for consideration the decision makers limit their information acquisition to this one option, failing to take into account potential alternatives. Unfortunately, the evidence supporting this focusing effect is weak and its determinants are largely unknown. In three experiments, we provided stronger support for the reality of the focusing effect and we identified two significant determinants of this phenomenon. The results show that both representational and value-related manipulations are able to reduce the effect. Results also suggest the need to distinguish between two different types of focusing: representational focusing and search-related focusing.     

Anticipation of cognitive demand during decision-making

An abundance of evidence indicates that action selection is guided, at least in certain contexts, by anticipation of action outcomes. In one particularly clear demonstration of this principle, Bechara and colleagues, studying a gambling task, observed phasic skin conductance responses just prior to actions associated with a relatively high risk of monetary loss (Bechara et al. in J Neurosci 19:5473–5481, 1999; Bechara et al. in Science 275:1293–1295, 1997; Bechara et al. in Cereb Cortex 6:215–225, 1996). In the present work, we tested for the same effect in a paradigm where choices resulted not in differential monetary outcomes, but in differential requirements for subsequent mental effort. In two experiments, we observed an anticipatory skin conductance response prior to actions resulting in a high level of cognitive demand. This finding indicates that requirements for effortful cognitive control are anticipated during action selection. We argue, based on convergent evidence, that such anticipation may not only trigger preparation; it may also play a direct role in effort-based decision-making.     

Testing Multicultural Robustness of the Child Behavior Checklist in a National Epidemiological Sample in Uruguay

Comparisons of Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) scores from 31 societies (Rescorla et al. Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders 15:13–142 2007) supported the instrument’s multicultural robustness, but none of these societies was in South America. The present study tested the multicultural robustness of the 2001 CBCL using data from a national epidemiological survey in Uruguay. Participants were 1,374 6- to 11-year-olds recruited through 65 schools nationwide; 1,098 (80%) had received no mental health or special education services in the past year (non-referred group), whereas 276 (referred group) had been referred for mental health services, had repeated ≥2 grades, or had significant developmental disabilities. Mean item ratings, factor structure, and scale internal consistencies were very similar to findings reported by Rescorla et al. (Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders 15:13–142 2007) and Ivanova et al. (Journal of Clinical Child and Adoloescent Psychology 36: 405–417 2007). Children from low SES school environments obtained higher problem scores, especially in the referred group. Gender, age, and referral status effects paralleled those in the U.S. Non-referred children obtained somewhat higher mean problem scores in Uruguay than in the U.S., but mean score differences between non-referred and referred children were smaller in Uruguay than the U.S. Findings supporting the CBCL’s multicultural robustness in a South American country extend the generalizability of findings reported by Rescorla et al. (Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders 15:13–142 2007) for 31 societies.     

Permission schemas and the selection task

Cheng and Holyoak's abstract permission schema version of Wason's selection task and the standard abstract version of the task were examined in two experiments, each a factorial design with type of problem (permission vs. standard), presence or absence of a checking context, explicit or implicit negatives on the not-p and not-q cards, and presence or absence of a rule clarification statement as factors. The original permission problem violation-type instruction was employed in Experiment 1, and Margolis's not-p and not-q violation instruction (Griggs & Jackson, 1990) was used in Experiment 2. Subjects were 640 university undergraduates, with each subject solving only one problem. The major findings for permission tasks were: (1) facilitation for the abstract permission version was replicated but found to be dependent upon the presence of explicit negatives on the not-p and not-q cards; and (2) this facilitation was enhanced by the Margolis not-p and not-q instruction. Per Girotto, Mazzocco, and Cherubini (1992), these findings and the observed error patterns are consistent with pragmatic schema theory. The major findings for the standard version of the task were: (1) none of the factors significantly impacted proportion correct [performance was poor, ≦10% correct in 15 of 16 conditions] and (2) the number of not-p & not-q incorrect selections was increased significantly for the not-p and not-q instruction. These results are discussed in terms of Manktelow and Over's argument that the standard abstract task and the permission schema version are actually different problems.     

Contrast class cues and performance facilitation in a hypothesis-testing task: evidence for an iterative counterfactual model

Hypothesis-testing performance on Wason’s (Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12:129–140, 1960) 2–4–6 task is typically poor, with only around 20% of participants announcing the to-be-discovered “ascending numbers” rule on their first attempt. Enhanced solution rates can, however, readily be observed with dual-goal (DG) task variants requiring the discovery of two complementary rules, one labeled “DAX” (the standard “ascending numbers” rule) and the other labeled “MED” (“any other number triples”). Two DG experiments are reported in which we manipulated the usefulness of a presented MED exemplar, where usefulness denotes cues that can establish a helpful “contrast class” that can stand in opposition to the presented 2–4–6 DAX exemplar. The usefulness of MED exemplars had a striking facilitatory effect on DAX rule discovery, which supports the importance of contrast-class information in hypothesis testing. A third experiment ruled out the possibility that the useful MED triple seeded the correct rule from the outset and obviated any need for hypothesis testing. We propose that an extension of Oaksford and Chater’s (European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 6:149–169, 1994) iterative counterfactual model can neatly capture the mechanisms by which DG facilitation arises.     

Social Cognition and the So-Called Conjunction Fallacy

The so-called ‘conjunction effect’, in which participants incorrectly assert that an instance from the conjunction of two sets is more probable than an instance from one of the two conjoining sets alone, has been a source of debate as to whether it is a genuine fallacy of individual thinking or not. We argue that reasoning about individuals follows a different process than reasoning about sets. 35 participants took part in 3 tasks: a) one involving blocks of different sizes and colours designed to evoke set-based reasoning, b) one where a particular block was ‘individuated’ by stating that it represented a particular person, and c) the original Tversky and Kahneman (Psychological Review 90(4):293–315, 1983) ‘Linda’ problem. As predicted, set-based reasoning was significantly more prevalent for the blocks task than for the other two tasks. Participants’ reasons for their choices suggest that some individuals correctly use set-based logic in one task and a social reasoning process for the other tasks.     

Does familiarity or conflict account for performance in the word-stem completion task? Evidence from behavioural and event-related-potential data

The conflict monitoring theory (CMT) assumes that word-stems associated with several completions should lead to crosstalk and conflict due to underdetermined responding situation (Botvinick et al. in Psychol Rev 108(3):624–652, 2001). In contrast, the Multiple-Read-Out-Model (MROM) of Jacobs and Grainger (J Exp Psychol 20(6): 1311–1334, 1994) predicts a high level of general lexical activity (GLA) for word-stems with many completions, indicating a higher stimulus familiarity because these stems are more probable to be read. We compared word-stems with several completions against word-stems with one possible completion while measuring response times and electrophysiological recordings. Slowest response times and a distinct FN400 component, which has previously been related to the concept of familiarity (Curran in Memory Cogn 28(6):923–938, 2000), were apparent for word-stems that could only be associated with a single response. These findings support the claims of the MROM. Furthermore, the lack of the N2-component for word-stems with several completions continues to challenge the EEG-extension of the CMT (Yeung et al. in Psychol Rev 111(4):2004).     

Focus on the essential: all great apes know when others are being attentive

When begging for food, all great ape species are sensitive to a human’s attention. However, studies investigating which cues are relevant for chimpanzees to assess the attentional state of others have produced highly inconsistent results. Some have suggested chimpanzees differentiate attention based on the status of the face or even the eyes, while others have indicated that body posture alone is the relevant cue. Kaminski et al. (Anim Cogn 7:216–223, 2004) compared the behaviour of chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans while begging for food from a human experimenter who systematically varied his face and body orientation. Their results indicated that both factors, face and body orientation, affect apes’ begging behaviour. The authors claimed that while body orientation provides information about the experimenter’s general disposition to offer food, the visibility of the face provides information about the human’s attentional state. In the current study, we tested this hypothesis with all four great apes species. However, unlike Kaminski et al. (Anim Cogn 7:216–223, 2004), the experimenter was able to hand over food regardless of body orientation. The results show that as soon as the offering of the food was no longer restricted, the orientation of the face became the key factor. Therefore, we present the first evidence that all great ape species are able to assess the attentional state of a recipient based on the orientation of the face.     

Working memory limitation as a source of confusion in the abstract THOG task

Limitations of working memory are proposed as a major determinant of problem difficulty in the THOG task. This task is a logical reasoning task which uses an exclusive disjunction and requires hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Four experiments with students of mathematics or psychology were used to test the hypotheses that, first, guiding participants' attention facilitates the task and, second, the use of paper and pencil as external problem representation reliefs working memory load. Focusing participants' attention upon a critical aspect of the task does not improve solution rates. Students of mathematics were better than students of psychology, but only if they were allowed to use paper and pencil or to work on the task repeatedly. These results partially support the working memory hypothesis. They point toward the importance of training and practice in relatively simple meta-cognitive skills in logical reasoning. Received: 20 March 2000 / Accepted: 22 January 2001     

The redundancy of recursion and infinity for natural language

An influential line of thought claims that natural language and arithmetic processing require recursion, a putative hallmark of human cognitive processing (Chomsky in Evolution of human language: biolinguistic perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 45–61, 2010; Fitch et al. in Cognition 97(2):179–210, 2005; Hauser et al. in Science 298(5598):1569–1579, 2002). First, we question the need for recursion in human cognitive processing by arguing that a generally simpler and less resource demanding process—iteration—is sufficient to account for human natural language and arithmetic performance. We argue that the only motivation for recursion, the infinity in natural language and arithmetic competence, is equally approachable by iteration and recursion. Second, we submit that the infinity in natural language and arithmetic competence reduces to imagining infinite embedding or concatenation, which is completely independent from the ability to implement infinite processing, and thus, independent from both recursion and iteration. Furthermore, we claim that a property of natural language is physically uncountable finity and not discrete infinity.     

Feature integration and spatial attention: common processes for endogenous and exogenous orienting

Briand (J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 24:1243–1256, 1998) and Briand and Klein (J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 13:228–241, 1987) demonstrated that spatial cueing effects are larger for detecting conjunction of features than for detecting simple features when spatial attention is oriented exogenously, and not when attention is oriented endogenously. Their results were interpreted as if only exogenous attention affects the posterior spatial attention system that performs the feature binding function attributed to spatial attention by Treisman’s feature integration theory (FIT; 1980). In a series of 6 experiments, we attempted to replicate Briand’s findings. Manipulations of distractor string size and symmetry of stimulus presentation left and right from fixation were implemented in Posner’s cueing paradigm. The data indicate that both exogenous and endogenous cueing address the same attentional mechanism needed for feature binding. The results also limit the generalisability of Briand’s proposal concerning the role of exogenous attention in feature integration. Furthermore, the importance to control the effect of unintended attentional capture in a cueing task is demonstrated.