Individual Religiosity,Moral Community,and Drug User Treatment

Some scholars have suggested that individual religiosity inhibits deviant behavior. Others have suggested that behavior is more responsive to the influence of religiously‐oriented moral communities than to the religiosity of individuals. Still others have suggested that non‐religious moral communities, such as sports teams or self‐help recovery groups, are just as effective as religious moral communities. The current article examines the associations between addicts' reductions in drug and alcohol use and religiosity, increase in church attendance, and increase in addiction self‐help recovery group attendance, following participation in publicly funded treatment programs. Results indicate that increase in self‐help recovery group attendance and church attendance were independently associated with reduction in alcohol use. Only increase in church attendance was significantly associated with reduction in cocaine use. Self‐assessed religious conviction was not associated with changes in drug use.     

Religiosity enhances emotion and deontological choice in moral dilemmas

While early psychological theories debated the relation between religiosity and moral decision making, more recent work approached this relation on empirical grounds using multidimensional measures of religiosity and moral dilemmas. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in religious thoughts and feelings, social desirability and mood on emotions and decisions in moral dilemmas that pit social welfare against harming another person. In order to increase emotional salience, moral dilemmas were framed as personal choices. Results indicated that the tendency to seek religious guidance in everyday life, and social desirability positively predicted deontological choices (i.e., refusing to harm one person in order to save several people). In addition, individual differences in religious feelings positively predicted negative emotion presence in these moral dilemmas. These results highlight the motivational and emotional dimensions of religiosity that influence moral choice and emotional experience in moral dilemmas.     

Religion and Drinking in the Retirement Community

ABSTRACT

The effect of religiosity on drinking patterns of retirement community residents is examined. Based on a systematic random sample, residents of seven West Coast retirement communities were interviewed. Data on religiosity were categorized into social religious activity, and personal religious behavior. It was found that retirement community residents drink more than senior Americans living in other locations; conservative Protestants, identified as those claiming affiliation with denominations that prohibit alcohol consumption, drink less than Roman Catholics or liberal Protestants; and those who score low on religiosity drink more than those who score high on religiosity regardless of denominational affiliation. It was also shown that for conservative Protestants private religiosity predicts drinking behavior, and for liberal Protestants social religious behavior is a predictor variable. The influence of religiosity on drinking behavior was found to be significant.     

Does religious belief promote prosociality? A critical examination

Numerous authors have suggested that religious belief has a positive association, possibly causal, with prosocial behavior. This article critiques evidence regarding this "religious prosociality" hypothesis from several areas of the literature. The extant literature on religious prosociality is reviewed including domains of charity, volunteering, morality, personality, and well-being. The experimental and quasi-experimental literature regarding controlled prosocial interactions (e.g., sharing and generosity) is reviewed and contrasted with results from naturalistic studies. Conceptual problems in the interpretation of this literature include separating the effects of stereotypes and ingroup biases from impression formation as well as controlling for self-report biases in the measurement of religious prosociality. Many effects attributed to religious processes can be explained in terms of general nonreligious psychological effects. Methodological problems that limit the interpretation of religious prosociality studies include the use of inappropriate comparison groups and the presence of criterion contamination in measures yielding misleading conclusions. Specifically, it is common practice to compare high levels of religiosity with "low religiosity" (e.g., the absence of denominational membership, lack of church attendance, or the low importance of religion), which conflates indifferent or uncommitted believers with the completely nonreligious. Finally, aspects of religious stereotype endorsement and ingroup bias can contribute to nonprosocial effects. These factors necessitate a revision of the religious prosociality hypothesis and suggest that future research should incorporate more stringent controls in order to reach less ambiguous conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The religion paradox: if religion makes people happy, why are so many dropping out?

As we estimate here, 68% of human beings--4.6 billion people--would say that religion is important in their daily lives. Past studies have found that the religious, on average, have higher subjective well-being (SWB). Yet, people are rapidly leaving organized religion in economically developed nations where religious freedom is high. Why would people leave religion if it enhances their happiness? After controlling for circumstances in both the United States and world samples, we found that religiosity is associated with slightly higher SWB, and similarly so across four major world religions. The associations of religiosity and SWB were mediated by social support, feeling respected, and purpose or meaning in life. However, there was an interaction underlying the general trend such that the association of religion and well-being is conditional on societal circumstances. Nations and states with more difficult life conditions (e.g., widespread hunger and low life expectancy) were much more likely to be highly religious. In these nations, religiosity was associated with greater social support, respect, purpose or meaning, and all three types of SWB. In societies with more favorable circumstances, religiosity is less prevalent and religious and nonreligious individuals experience similar levels of SWB. There was also a person-culture fit effect such that religious people had higher SWB in religious nations but not in nonreligious nations. Thus, it appears that the benefits of religion for social relationships and SWB depend on the characteristics of the society.     

Religion and suicide acceptability: a cross-national analysis

Four perspectives (moral community thesis, religious integration, religious commitment, and social networks) guide the selection of variables in this study. Data are from the combined World Values/European Values Surveys for 2000 (50,547 individuals nested in 56 nations). The results of a multivariate hierarchical linear model support all four perspectives. Persons residing in nations with relatively high levels of religiosity, who are affiliated with one of four major faiths, are religiously committed, and are engaged with a religious network are found to be lower in suicide acceptability. The religious integration perspective, in particular, is empirically supported; affiliation with Islam is associated with low suicide acceptability. The findings provide strong support for an integrated model and demonstrate the usefulness of the moral community thesis in understanding suicide acceptability.     

Religiosity and agency and communion: their relationship to religious judgmentalism

The present study is an introduction to the construct of religious judgmentalism, defined as a willingness to make religious or moral judgments of others based on a limited period of observation; the study offers a prediction about which individuals will engage in such judgmental behavior. It was predicted that agency motives would significantly predict religious judgmentalism in a religious population but that communion motives and intrinsic religiosity would moderate this effect. Overall, the findings supported these predictions. Agency motives were positively correlated with religious judgmentalism. Intrinsic religiosity predicted a general unwillingness to make religious evaluations of others. Both intrinsic religiosity and communion motives did moderate the effects of high agency motives. Specifically, increases in communion motive and intrinsic religiosity, at high levels of agency motives, significantly predicted lower scores for religious judgmentalism. These findings were conceptualized as preliminary evidence for the position that interpersonal motives, rather than religiousness or religious motivation, predict social intolerance and criticism in religious individuals.     

The Religious Institutional Base and Violent Crime in Rural Areas

Research on the relationship between religion and crime has typically focused on individual religiosity and delinquency, or moral communities and crime at the macro level. This study extends prior research by delineating the sociological implications of a strong religious institutional base, and investigating the ties between the religious institutional base and violent crime across rural communities. Multivariate regression analysis of Uniform Crime Report data on violent crime, Census of Churches and Church membership data, and U.S. Census data circa 2000 reveal that rural violent crime rates on average are consistently lower where there are more churches per capita. This relationship holds net of the overall adherence rates, the presence of civically engaged religious adherents, and the presence of conservative Protestant adherents. Moreover, regional variations are evident, with the South and the Midwest—two highly religious regions of the country—sustaining most of the observed institutional effects.     

Religiosity and life satisfaction across nations

This paper investigates the relationship between religiosity and life satisfaction in 79 nations using World Values Survey data. Extant literature analyzes religiosity and life satisfaction at person level. But religiosity is an attribute of both, persons and societies. To solve methodological problems evident in previous work a random coefficient multilevel model is employed to account for the fact that individuals are nested within countries. This study shows that the relationship between religiosity and life satisfaction is bimodal. Religious people tend to be either very satisfied or dissatisfied with life. The relationship between religiosity and life satisfaction is also two-dimensional. Forms of religiosity that promote social capital predict high life satisfaction. People have so called “need to belong” and religion helps to satisfy it. On the other hand, forms of religiosity that do not promote social capital do not predict high life satisfaction. Religiosity is also context-dependent. Religious people are happier in religious nations. In other words, it is not only religiosity per se that makes people happy, but rather a social setting it offers.     

Religiosity Reduces the Negative Influence of Injustice on Subjective Well-being: A Study in 121 Nations

National injustice has been linked to lower national happiness. We predict that national religiosity will mitigate this negative influence of injustice on happiness. We test this hypothesis analyzing national-level data from 121 nations, using a single-level moderated regression analysis. To capture various aspects of national injustice, we combine four national measures associated with injustice, namely: indexes of group grievances, political terror, rule of law, and corruption perceptions. The results show that national religiosity has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between injustice and happiness, such that higher levels of religiosity mitigate more of the negative effects of injustice on happiness than lower levels do. The results hold when religious affiliation and indexes of economic prosperity, education, and social support are controlled for. These results indicate that people in religious cultures may successfully utilize religious faith to deal with adverse conditions.     

Crime and religion: An international comparison among thirteen industrial nations

At the individual level of analysis, evidence has accumulated in support of the hypothesis that persons who are most religious commit crimes at lower rates than those who are least religious. This study examined the relationship at a societal level, based on 1990–1991 data from 13 industrial nations. Overall, the findings revealed that more religious countries have lower crime rates than less religious countries, at least regarding property crimes (as opposed to either aggressive or victimless offenses). As has been reported when comparing individuals, this relationship was more pronounced in the case of “overt” aspects of religiosity (especially church attendance and church membership) than in the case of any specific religious beliefs. The results were discussed in the context of four theories that predict an inverse religiosity-criminality relationship: control theory, rational choice theory, moral reasoning theory, and arousal theory. Findings from the present study seemed most consistent with moral reasoning theory and arousal theory.     

RELIGIOUS SCHEMA AND VALUES*

Past research has consistently shown marked differences between religious believers and non-believers. Such differences were suggested in this study to be due to the presence of religious schema in believers. It was hypothesized that non-believers would be less schematic, or aschematic with respect to religion. This hypothesis was examined by comparing the value system of college student believers (Protestants and Catholics) and non-believers (those indicating no religious faith). Extensive differences were found. Consistent with the hypothesis, the differences were found mainly on the schema-relevant values. In essence, believers showed greater preference for and possession of the moral and relational values, and lesser on the personal-extrinsic, competency, and egoistic values. As predicted, no difference was found on the social and intellectual types of values which are basically schema-irrelevant. The notion of schema availability was also supported. When subjects' religiosity (as indicated by their preference for the salvation value and their self-rated possession of the religiousness value) was controlled for, all the above differences were removed. When high and low religiosity believers were compared, great differences were found. The differences between the high and low religiosity non-believers were however much less extensive.     

Are Muslims a Distinctive Minority? An Empirical Analysis of Religiosity,Social Attitudes,and Islam

Scholarly and public discourses on Muslim immigrants in Europe have questioned if Islam is an impediment to sociocultural adaptation and whether Muslims are a distinctive group in their religiosity and social values. We use a new survey of 480 British Muslims in conjunction with the British Social Attitudes Survey to examine differences between Muslim and non‐Muslim Britons on religiosity (practice, belief, salience) and moral and social issues regarding gender, abortion, and homosexuality. Muslims are more religious than other Britons, including both British Christians and religious “nones.” Muslims also are more conservative than other Britons across the range of social and moral attitudes. Multivariate analysis shows, however, that much of the difference on moral issues is due to socioeconomic disadvantage and high religiosity among Muslims. Although being a highly religious group in an otherwise secular country renders Muslims distinctive, factors that predict social conservatism among all Britons—high religiosity and low SES—apply similarly to Muslims.     

Explaining Cross‐National Variation in the Effect of Higher Education on Religiosity

While sociologists have long argued that higher education has a secularizing influence, recent research emphasizes the moderating role of social contexts in the relationship between social class and religion. I extend this line of research by examining sources of cross‐national variation in the association between higher education and religiosity using survey data from more than 46,000 respondents in 39 nations. Multilevel models of a religiosity scale show (1) in the aggregate, higher education has a moderate, negative effect on the religiosity scale, (2) this effect varies considerably across nations, and (3) the negative effect of higher education on religiosity is most robust in relatively religious nations. These results demonstrate the importance of national contexts in moderating the effect of education on religiosity. The results also support a cultural diffusion argument that suggests that the highly educated are innovators and early adopters of secular behaviors but that low levels of religiosity then diffuse to less‐educated segments of a population as secularity becomes more common.     

Perceptions of Religious and Nonreligious Targets: Exploring the Effects of Perceivers' Religious Fundamentalism

While research has shown that religious individuals are perceived as being more moral than the nonreligious, the present studies suggest that these findings are affected by in‐group bias. Participants low and high in religious fundamentalism (RF) were asked to form an impression of a target's moral and social dimensions. The target's religious identity was presented either explicitly (in Studies 1 and 2) or implicitly (Study 3). Participants high in RF consistently rated the religious target more favorably than the nonreligious target on both dimensions. In contrast, LF individuals' morality ratings did not differ as a function of target religiosity across all 3 studies. Our results suggest that future research exploring the religion–morality link must control for perceiver religiosity.     

Influence of Religiosity and Alcohol Use on Personal Well-Being

ABSTRACT

A study of some correlates of life satisfaction among residents of two retirement communities. One community represents retired secular professionals, and the other is made up of retired religious professionals. Based on 156 interviews, data were examined dealing with life satisfaction, religiosity, social interaction extent of alcohol use, death anxiety, and perceived health. A comparison between the two communities shows that residents or the religious community score higher on measures of life satisfaction, social activity, and religiosity, lower on death anxiety, and alcohol consumption. Another statistical analysis shows that religiosity plays a direct role in feelings of personal well-being.     

Religion and Democratic Commitment: A Unifying Motivational Framework

There is no easy answer to the question of whether religiosity promotes or hinders commitment to democracy. Earlier research largely pointed to religiosity as a source of antidemocratic orientations. More recent empirical evidence is less conclusive, however, suggesting that the effect of religiosity on democratic commitment could be positive, negative, or null. We review the existing approaches to the study of religiosity and democratic commitment, focusing on support for the democratic system, political engagement, and political tolerance, by distinguishing accounts that examine a single dimension of religiosity from accounts that adopt a multidimensional approach. We show that multidimensional approaches, while effective in accounting for the effect of religiosity on discrete democratic norms, fall short of accounting for some of the inconsistencies in the literature and in identifying the mechanisms that may be responsible for shaping how religiosity affects endorsement of democratic norms as a whole. To fill this gap, we propose the Religious Motivations and Expressions (REME) model. Applying theories of goal constructs to religion, this model maps associations between three religious expressions (belief, social behavior, and private behavior) and the religious motivations that underly these expressions. We discuss how inconsistent associations between religiosity and elements of democratic commitment can be rendered interpretable once the motivations underlying religious expressions, as well as contextual information, are accounted for. We contend that applying goal constructs to religion is critical for understanding the nature of the religion-democracy nexus.     

Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel

Two important theories of religiosity are the secularization hypothesis and the religion-market model. According to the former, sometimes called a demand-side theory, economic development reduces religious participation and beliefs. According to the latter, described as a supply-side theory, religiosity depends on the presence of a state religion, regulation of the religion market, suppression of organized religion under Communism, and the degree of religious pluralism. We assess the theories by using survey information for 68 countries over the last 20 years, measuring attendance at formal religious services, religious beliefs, and self-identification as religious. In accordance with the secularization view, overall economic development—represented by per capita GDP—tends to reduce religiosity. Moreover, instrumental estimates suggest that this link reflects causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse. The presence of an official state religion tends to increase religiosity, probably because of the subsidies that flow to organized religion. However, in accordance with the religion-market model, religiosity falls with government regulation of the religion market and Communist suppression. Greater religious pluralism raises attendance at formal services but has no significant effects on religious beliefs or self-identification as religious. Although religiosity declines overall with economic development, the nature of the interaction varies with the dimension of development. For example, religiosity is positively related to education and the presence of children and negatively related to urbanization.     

Which Societies Provide a Strong Religious Socialization Context? Explanations Beyond the Effects of National Religiosity

Religious socialization occurs within the immediate family as well as in the broader social context. Previous research has shown that parents’ religiosity matters less for the transmission of religious beliefs in devout than in secular nations, implying smaller costs of religious socialization. In this article we test which other societal factors affect the transmission of religious beliefs: anti‐religious policies in formerly socialist countries, economic development, and income inequality. Our results indicate that societies with high levels of income inequality seem to provide the most favorable context for religious socialization. Individuals develop strong religious beliefs even if they only received little religious socialization within the family. Formerly socialist nations increased socialization costs through the overall suppression of religious practice. Economic development has no impact on socialization effects, suggesting that inequality is a more important driver of religious change than previously thought.     

Trust in God: The COVID-19 Pandemic's Impact on Religiosity in China

Emerging research shows the COVID-19 pandemic has made substantial changes to the religious climate of several nations. Surprisingly, China, the outbreak center of the pandemic, has been scarcely researched. Our study investigates how the COVID-19 pandemic has evoked new religious disaster responses and provided psychological coping mechanisms during the pandemic. We also explore how the pandemic explains surprising rates of religiosity in China. Scholars have long proposed that religious resurgence in China has been a result of individuals seeking stability in turbulent times. We bridge parallel Literatures in these areas and treat the pandemic as a natural experiment for evaluating religious behavior over time as conditioned by heightened risk perception. Utilizing a difference-in-differences estimation strategy with panel data, our study reveals that the pandemic has led to a significant increase in religiosity in China, particularly in religious areas most affected by the pandemic. We propose that even in a highly regulative religious environment, with most of its population being religiously unaffiliated, religion is a significant resource for coping in China. We take an innovative approach to demonstrate this by utilizing online search data. Our research speaks to the sociology of religion, the social psychology of risk perception, and makes application to emerging research on the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic.