An Outline of a Theory of Action Systems

It is argued that the traditional psychological construal of the distinction between central (“open loop”) and peripheral (“closed loop”) neural processes is no longer tenable. A review of the relevant psychobiological research on the control of movement shows that both the central-peripheral dichotomy and the distinction between sensory and motor systems derived from that dichotomy are incompatible with what is known about the processes underlying action. Based on experimental and comparative data, a new theory of action is proposed. The basic concept of this new theory is the action system: Unlike motor systems, action systems involve sensory as well as motor processes; action systems are not organized into response hierarchies, but rather in coalitional structures of adjustable movements and postures. The phylogeny of action systems is discussed, and the eight most important action systems are distinguished in terms of their evolved distinctive functions. The difficulties of developing a taxonomy of actions for functionally specific types of behavior made up of units that can be controlled is resolved by showing how kinds of action are differentiated by the kinds of affordances their components help to realize.     

Egocentrism, allocentrism, and Asperger syndrome

In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric ("you") or an allocentric ("he/she/they") stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person needs to be represented as independent from the self. We suggest here that people with Asperger syndrome suffer from a disconnection between a strong na?ve egocentric stance and a highly abstract allocentric stance. We argue that the currently used distinction between first-person and third-person perspective-taking is orthogonal to the distinction between an egocentric and an allocentric stance and therefore cannot serve as a critical test of allocentrism.     

Increasing the distance of an external focus of attention enhances learning

Previous studies (e.g., Wulf, H?ss, & Prinz, 1998) have shown that motor learning can be enhanced by directing performers' attention to the effects of their movements ("external focus"), rather than to the body movements producing the effect ("internal focus"). The purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that increasing the distance between the body and the action effects might further enhance the learning advantages associated with an external focus of attention. The distance of the external effect was manipulated by instructing three groups of participants learning to balance on a stabilometer to focus on markers attached to the platform located at different distances from their feet. Specifically, two groups were to focus on distant markers on the outside ("far-outside") or inside ("far-inside") of the platform, respectively, whereas another group was instructed to focus on markers close to their feet ("near"). In a retention test administered after two days of practice, all three external-focus groups showed generally more effective balance learning than an internal-focus control group. In addition, the far-outside and far-inside groups demonstrated similar performances, and both were more effective than the near group. Furthermore, the far-outside and far-inside groups showed higher-frequency movement adjustments than the near group. These results suggest that focusing on more distant effects results in enhanced learning by promoting the utilization of more natural control mechanisms. The findings are in line with a "constrained action" hypothesis that accounts for the relatively poorer learning associated with an attentional focus directed towards effects in close proximity to the body, or towards the body itself.     

Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered

The sense of agency ("I did that") is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects (the "I" of "I did that") or on its motoric aspects (the "did" aspect of "I did that"). Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W. (2002a). Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance (Vol. XIX, pp. 266-285). Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects, but did directly not study the relation between them. In three experiments, time estimates of an interval between an action and its subsequent sensory effect were obtained. The actions were either voluntary key press actions performed by the participant or kinematically identical movements applied passively to the finger. The effects were either auditory or visual events or a passive movement induced to another finger. The results first indicated a shortening of the interval between one's own voluntary action and a subsequent effect, relative to passive movement conditions. Second, intervals initiated by observed movements, either of another person or of an inanimate object, were always perceived like those involving passive movements of one's own body, and never like those involving active movements. Third, this binding effect was comparable for auditory, somatic and visual effects of action. Our results provide the first direct evidence that agency involves a generalisable relation between actions and their consequences, and is triggered by efferent motor commands.     

Exploration in outbred mice covaries with general learning abilities irrespective of stress reactivity, emotionality, and physical attributes

Across multiple learning tasks (that place different sensory, motor, and information processing demands on the animals), we have found that the performance of mice is commonly regulated by a single factor ("general learning") that accounts for 30-40% of the variance across individuals and tasks. Furthermore, individuals' general learning abilities were highly correlated with their propensity to engage in exploration in an open field, a behavior that is potentially stress-inducing. This relationship between exploration in the open field and general learning abilities suggests the possibility that variations in stress sensitivity/responsivity or related emotional responses might directly influence individuals' general learning abilities. Here, the relationship of sensory/motor skills and stress sensitivity/emotionality to animals' general learning abilities were assessed. Outbred (CD-1) mice were tested in a battery of six learning tasks as well as 21 tests of exploratory behavior, sensory/motor function and fitness, emotionality, and stress reactivity. The performances of individual mice were correlated across six learning tasks, and the performance measures of all learning tasks loaded heavily on a single factor (principal component analysis), accounting for 32% of the variability between animals and tasks. Open field exploration and seven additional exploratory behaviors (including those exhibited in an elevated plus maze) also loaded heavily on this same factor, although general activity, sensory/motor responses, physical characteristics, and direct measures of fear did not. In a separate experiment, serum corticosterone levels of mice were elevated in response to a mild environmental stressor (confinement on an elevated platform). Stress-induced corticosterone levels were correlated with behavioral fear responses, but were unsystematically related to individuals' propensity for exploration. In total, these results suggest that although general learning abilities are strongly related to individuals' propensity for exploration, this relationship is not attributable to variations in sensory/motor function or the individuals' physiological or behavioral sensitivity to conditions that promote stress or fear.     

Is that what I wanted to do? Cued vocalizations influence the phenomenology of controlling a moving object

The phenomenology of controlled action depends on comparisons between predicted and actually perceived sensory feedback called action-effects. We investigated if intervening task-irrelevant but semantically related information influences monitoring processes that give rise to a sense of control. Participants judged whether a moving box "obeyed" or "disobeyed" their own arrow keystrokes (Experiments 1 and 2) or visual cues representing the computer's choices (Experiment 3). During 1s delays between keystrokes/cues and box movements, participants vocalized directions ("up", "down", "left", or "right") cued by letters inside the box. Congruency of cued vocalizations was manipulated relative to previously selected keystrokes and upcoming box movements. In Experiment 1, reported obey moves and feelings of control reflected the true frequency of obey moves, but were also modulated by vocalizations. Incongruent vocalizations reduced reported obey moves, whereas congruent vocalizations increased them. In Experiment 2, vocalizations had stronger effects when their congruence with primary-task box movement was consistent for several consecutive moves before congruence changed. In Experiment 3, analogous impacts of vocalizations occurred when the computer selected the directions and participants judged whether the computer had control of the box. We conclude that predicted and perceived action-effects associated with semantically related but separate and ostensibly irrelevant actions can be conflated with one another. This interference is not restricted to actions performed with the same effector or within the same modality, or even by the same actor. Thus in estimating degrees of control, the mind integrates across ongoing action systems, whether or not they are logically task-relevant.     

Forgetting in recognition memory with and without recollective experience

Retention interval was manipulated in two recognition-memory experiments in which subjects indicated when recognizing a word whether its recognition was accompanied by some recollective experience ("remember") or whether it was recognized on the basis of familiarity without any recollective experience ("know"). Experiment 1 showed that between 10 min and 1 week, "remember" responses declined sharply from an initially higher level, whereas "know" responses remained relatively unchanged. Experiment 2 showed that between 1 week and 6 months, both kinds of responses declined at a similar, gradual rate and that despite quite low levels of performance after 6 months, both kinds of responses still gave rise to accurate discrimination between target words and lures. These findings are discussed in relationship to current ideas about multiple memory systems and processing accounts of explicit and implicit measures of retention.     

This cat has nine lives? Children's memory for genericity in language

Generic noun phrases ("Birds lay eggs") are important for expressing knowledge about abstract kinds. The authors hypothesized that genericity would be part of gist memory, such that young children would appropriately recall whether sentences were presented as generic or specific. In 4 experiments, preschoolers and college students (N = 280) heard a series of sentences in either generic form (e.g., "Bears climb trees") or specific form (e.g., "This bear climbs trees") and were asked to recall the sentences following a 4-min distractor task. Participants in all age groups correctly distinguished between generic and specific noun phrases (NPs) in their recall, even when forgetting the details of the NP form. Memory for predicate content (e.g., "climb trees") was largely unaffected by genericity, although memory for category labels (e.g., "bear") was at times better for those who heard sentences with generic wording. Overall, these results suggest that generic form is maintained in long-term memory even for young children and thus may serve as the foundation for constructing knowledge about kinds.     

SARA: A cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

SARA: a cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

Aversive for Me,Wrong for You: First‐person Behavioral Aversions Underlie the Moral Condemnation of Harm

Many studies attest to the critical role of affect in the condemnation of harmful actions, but few attempt to identify the precise representations underlying this affective response. We propose a distinction between two potential sources of affect: an aversion to the negative outcomes of an action versus an aversion grounded in the action itself. Whereas previous models have focused on outcome‐oriented processes (e.g. empathy and victim perspective‐taking), we argue that moral judgment is also strongly influenced by action‐based aversions. Specifically, we propose that individuals engage in a process of ‘evaluative simulation’ when judging others, imagining how much it would bother them to perform the same action. Furthermore, we present evidence that this aversion can be based in superficial sensory or motor properties of the action. We consider how such ‘action aversions’ might be acquired, and we highlight important areas for future research.     

Merleau–Ponty on the Body

The French philosopher Maurice Merleau–Ponty claims that there are two distinct ways in which we can understand the place of an object when we are visually apprehending it. The first involves an intentional relation to the object that is essentially cognitive or can serve as the input to cognitive processes; the second irreducibly involves a bodily set or preparation to deal with the object. Because of its essential bodily component, Merleau–Ponty calls this second kind of understanding 'motor intentional'. In this paper I consider some phenomenological, conceptual, and cognitive neuro–scientific results that help to elucidate and defend the distinction between intentional and motor intentional activity. I go on to argue that motor intentional activity has a logical structure that is essentially distinct from that of the more canonical kinds of intentional states. In particular, the characteristic logical distinction between the content and the attitude of an intentional state does not carry over to the motor intentional case.     

Associative memory or algorithmic search: a comparative study on learning strategies of bats and shrews

Two common strategies for successful foraging are learning to associate specific sensory cues with patches of prey ("associative learning") and using set decision-making rules to systematically scan for prey ("algorithmic search"). We investigated whether an animal's life history affects which of these two foraging strategies it is likely to use. Natterer's bats (Myotis nattereri) have slow life-history traits and we predicted they would be more likely to use associative learning. Common shrews (Sorex araneus) have fast life-history traits and we predicted that they would rely more heavily on routine-based search. Apart from their marked differences in life-history traits, these two mammals are similar in body size, brain weight, habitat, and diet. We assessed foraging strategy, associative learning ability, and retention time with a four-arm maze; one arm contained a food reward and was marked with four sensory stimuli. Bats and shrews differed significantly in their foraging strategies. Most bats learned to associate the sensory stimuli with the reward and remembered this association over time. Most shrews searched the maze using consistent decision-making rules, but did not learn or remember the association. We discuss these results in terms of life-history traits and other key differences between these species. Our results suggest a link between an animal's life-history strategy and its use of associative learning.     

The neural bases of complex tool use in humans

The behaviors involved in complex human tool use cut across boundaries traditionally drawn between social, cognitive, perceptual and motor processes. Longstanding neuropsychological evidence suggests a distinction between brain systems responsible for representing: (1) semantic knowledge about familiar tools and their uses, and (2) the acquired skills necessary for performing these actions. Contemporary findings in functional neuroimaging support and refine this distinction by revealing the distributed neural systems that support these processes and the conditions under which they interact. Together, these findings indicate that behaviors associated with complex tool use arise from functionally specialized networks involving temporal, parietal and frontal areas within the left cerebral hemisphere.     

Response: Clinical wisdom and evidence-based medicine are complementary

A long-debated question in the philosophy of health, and contingent disciplines, is the extent to which wise clinical practice ("clinical wisdom") is, or could be, compatible with empirically validated medicine ("evidence-based medicine"--EBM). Here we respond to Baum-Baicker and Sisti, who not only suggest that these two types of knowledge are divided due to their differing sources, but also that EBM can sometimes even hurt wise clinical practice. We argue that the distinction between EBM and clinical wisdom is poorly defined, unsupported by the methodology employed, and ultimately incorrect; crucial differences exist, we argue, not in the source of a particular piece of clinical knowledge, but in its dependability. In light of this subtle but fundamental revision, we explain how clinical wisdom and EBM are--by necessity--complementary, rather than in conflict. We elaborate on how recognizing this relationship can have far-reaching implications for the domains of clinical practice, medical education, and health policy.     

Dimension-specific attention directs learning and listening on auditory training tasks

The relative contributions of bottom-up versus top-down sensory inputs to auditory learning are not well established. In our experiment, listeners were instructed to perform either a frequency discrimination (FD) task ("FD-train group") or an intensity discrimination (ID) task ("ID-train group") during training on a set of physically identical tones that were impossible to discriminate consistently above chance, allowing us to vary top-down attention whilst keeping bottom-up inputs fixed. A third, control group did not receive any training. Only the FD-train group improved on a FD probe following training, whereas all groups improved on ID following training. However, only the ID-train group also showed changes in performance accuracy as a function of interval with training on the ID task. These findings suggest that top-down, dimension-specific attention can direct auditory learning, even when this learning is not reflected in conventional performance measures of threshold change.     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

Creation, Co-operation, and Causality: A Reply to Gregersen

Niels H. Gregersen seeks to illuminate the nature of continuing divine action in the world and to show that the classical theistic doctrine of continuous creation is consonant with some recent scientific theories of self-productive ("autopoietic") systems. Central to these theories is the concept of co-operation; central to Gregersen's theological appropriation of these theories is also the notion of structuring causality developed by philosopher Fred Dretske. While supportive of Gregersen's overall aims and emphases, we find significant disanalogies between co-operation as a theological construct and as an evolutionary strategy. We also doubt the utility of Dretske's notion for his project.     

A learning system for adjustment processes based on human sensory perceptions

Creating, designing and adjusting products are essential decision processes underlying creative industries, such as painting, perfume, food and beverage industries. These processes require the participation and continuous supervision of professionals with highly-developed expert sensory abilities. Training of these experts is very complex due to the difficulty of transmitting intuitive knowledge obtained from perception. A new methodology for capturing this sensory expert knowledge that relies on a machine learning tool, previously trained with ‘state-action’ type patterns, jointly with an actions generator module, is proposed in this work. The method is based on a closed loop architecture together with the decomposition of complex sensory knowledge into basic elements capable of being handled by standard machine learning systems. A real case application to color-adjustment in the automotive paint manufacturing industry is presented showing the potential benefits of the method.     

Dual systems Competence ←-→ Procedural processing: A relational developmental systems approach to reasoning

Many current psychological models of reasoning minimize the role of deductive processes in human thought. In the present paper, we argue that deduction is an important part of ordinary cognition and we propose that a dual systems Competence ←-→ Procedural processing model conceptualized within relational developmental systems theory offers the most coherent and productive framework for integrating and explaining the sometimes conflicting findings on the development of deductive reasoning across the lifespan. This model invokes a distinction that is quite similar to, though not identical with, the system 2–system 1 dichotomy employed in other dual systems models. In addition, the Competence ←-→ Procedural processing model maintains the more specific distinction between algorithmic and reflective subsystems of system 2. In this account, the algorithmic system is represented as a kind of mental logic while the reflective system is the seat of practical and epistemic self-regulation, including emergent epistemic and metalogical norms. While the proposed systems of mind often appear as split-off component features in other dual systems models, relational developmental systems theory conceives of them as the highly complex and relationally integrated outcome of a self-organizing and self-regulating adaptive developmental process.