Naturalism and Normativity

Synthetic naturalism is a form of moral realism which holds that we can discover a posteriori that moral properties exist and are natural properties. On this view moral discourse earns the right to be construed realistically because it meets the conditions that license realism about any discourse, that properties it represents as existing pull their weight in empirical explanations of our observations of the world. I argue that naturalism is an inadequate metaphysics of moral value, because parallel arguments to those used by the naturalist to establish the reality of 'moral' properties and their normativity for persons of sympathetic temperament can be constructed, which would equally demonstrate the reality of normatively antagonistic value properties, and their normativity for differently psychologically constituted agents. Since moral discourse implicitly denies that there are such diverse and competing normative truths the strategy fails to establish moral realism.     

Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy

abstract   Normative argument is supposed to guide ways in which we might change the world, rather than to fit the world as it is. This poses certain difficulties for the notion of applied ethics. Taken literally the phrase 'applied ethics' suggests that principles or standards with substantial philosophical justification, in particular ethical and political principles with such justification, are applied to particular cases and guide action. However, the 'cases' which applied ethics discusses are themselves indeterminate, and the relation of principles to these 'cases' differs from the relation of principles to cases in naturalistic, truth-oriented inquiry. Writing in 'applied ethics', I shall argue, does not need elaborate case histories or scenarios, since the testing points for normative principles are other normative principles rather than particular cases. Normative principles and contexts to which they are applicable are indeed needed for any reasoning that is practical, but they are not sufficient. Practical ethics needs principles that can not merely be applied in certain cases or situations, but also enacted in certain ways, and requires an account of practical judgement and of the public policies that support that judgement .     

Property Dualism,Epistemic Normativity and the Limits of Naturalism*

This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi‐)epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought‐experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subject’s epistemic norms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of bridging laws between the physical/functional and phenomenal domains. The stronger claim has it that the ontology of property dualism is not properly able to account for the certainty I have of being phenomenally conscious. The problem is viewed as resulting from the neglect of the intensional context involved in a proper representation of the argument for property dualism. It is argued that only a transcendental move can do justice to this certainty I have.     

当代唯物论的自然主义锚定——评徐英瑾新著《唯物论者何以言规范》

当代唯物论之复兴与自然主义或自然化的哲学密切相关,通过对非还原式物理主义在科学和哲学上的发生及其旨趣的追溯,不难看到作者将唯名论与现代科学相结合以及将非还原式物理主义作为唯物论的升级版等基本立场。但由此也带来了一些需要澄清的问题,如为何选择非还原式物理主义的理由以及在形而上学层面这种立场所强调的是先验性还是后验性等。同时,以"蕴相殊"理论为马克思主义奠定形而上学基础、将规范性建立在随附式物理主义之上等论述也可能会面对一些理论困难,诸如哲学概念与科学事实之间的落差、二个层级以上的随附性关系框架中不同层级之间的随附关系的权重问题等。最后,在信息技术哲学的构建中,倡导节俭理性而拒斥大一统的哲学理论颇富洞见,但问题是,其所倡导的小数据和数据儒家何以应对由知识权力结构与资本控制导致的数据贪婪。     

规范性、唯物论与历史唯物论——评徐英瑾的新著《唯物论者何以言规范》

如何从自然主义或唯物论的角度刻画规范性,是当代哲学的许多领域都共同关心的议题。徐英瑾提出,唯物论所需要的规范性理论,就是将其刻画为"功能实现的完成度"。这样既肯定了规范性是自然律和因果性存在的逻辑衍生物,同时又保证其相对独立性。然而,对规范性的功能主义解释将不可避免地深陷于"结构"与"行动"的不平衡关系,在呈现人类的理性能动性方面有所缺漏。一种更为优越的规范性理论,将不能仅仅奠基于一般的唯物论视角,而须以历史唯物论的眼光处理个体与整体、结构与行动之间的张力关系。     

进化,从自然主义到自由主义

生物进化体现了生物世界从简单到复杂,从低级到高级的普遍现象,整个进化史可以人类社会出现的界划发为自然状态的进化和人类智慧,意志指导下逐渐展开的人工进化或自由进化,人类的进步必须要和自然环境和谐发展科学必将吸取系统论,理性论和人文精神而成为人类迈向自由地的有力武器。     

Normativity,naturalism and perspectivity

Abstract

Normative links have been considered a problem for reductionist theories of mind, primarily because of lack of isomorphism between intentional and non‐intentional conceptual schemes. The paper suggests a more radical tension between normative rationality and scientific naturalism. Normative explanations involve the recognition that agents are also subjects of experience. The distinctive form of intelligibility they bestow requires engagement with such subjectivity.     

Non-Cogntivism, Normativity, Belief

I argue that the (widely accepted) normative constraints on belief raise a serious problem for non-cognitivism about normativity.     

Normativity,Guardianship, and the Elderly

The concept of guardianship, its associated principles, distinctions, and articulation of the legal needs of the elderly are introduced via a review of well-canvassed criticisms of Canadian guardianship legislation. Claims that the reformed legislation of Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia represent models of adequate adult guardianship compared with traditional (archaic lunacy) law are examined. This paper argues that these renovated models exhibit a dubious normative advance over traditional legislation. Specifically, the normative presuppositions of the reformed legislation, such as, restriction to an autonomy-paternalism framework, and the norms of the liberal individual and state, obscure important issues in at least two key areas which challenge the models' assumptions; namely, assessment and legal competence and assessment and need. The development of guardianship laws and of social arrangements that are more responsive to the life experiences of the elderly requires critical re-articulation of the nature of individuals and their communities.     

Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies

In Biro and Siegel (1992) we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.