Authoritarianism without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary

Since the publication of Adorno, Frenkel‐Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950 ) classic study, considerable debate has developed concerning the political and ideological correlates of authoritarianism. This paper examines relationships between authoritarianism, on the one hand, and self‐identification with ideological labels, attitudes toward political extremists, and party preferences, on the other hand. The survey data have been collected in Hungary between 1994 and 2002. Findings indicate that it is the center‐right ideology and political orientation that attracts most authoritarians, yet authoritarian extreme‐left also survives. The findings also show that liberal orientation and center‐left identification constitute the political counter‐pole of authoritarianism. Extreme‐right supporters are found to be attracted only to particular aspects of authoritarianism.     

Facets of Right‐Wing Authoritarianism Mediate the Relationship Between Religious Fundamentalism and Attitudes Toward Arabs and African Americans

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, hate crimes against Arabs have increased in the United States. Despite recent increases in anti‐Arab attitudes, little psychological research has been conducted to understand this prejudice. Across two studies, we tested a theoretical model of Arab and African‐American prejudice. We found the aggression facet of right‐wing authoritarianism mediated the relationship between religious fundamentalism (RF) and prejudice toward Arabs and African Americans. Results are interpreted in light of previous research on cognitive rigidity, RF, and prejudice, and implications are made for political leaders conversing about Arab nations and peoples.     

Does authoritarianism imply ethnocentric national attitudes: A revised look at the “authoritarian triad” and right‐wing ideology

Dozens of studies have shown that authoritarian people are ethnocentric. They are described as nationalistic, prejudiced, and hostile toward ethnic/national out‐groups. However, it can be argued that this critical claim remains unproven, as researchers do not take into consideration the very conservative right‐wing views typical of authoritarian people. To address this problem, two theoretical approaches were contrasted: the most commonly used right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) approach and the group authoritarianism approach. Both approaches define authoritarianism as the covariance of submission, aggression, and conventionalism, but they differ in that the former is inextricably related to right‐wing ideology while the latter is not. This paper presents the results of two survey studies conducted on samples of 600 and 400 respondents. In Study 1, it was found that RWA and group authoritarianism had different patterns of relationships with in‐group and out‐group national attitudes, providing strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the right‐wing ideology generated ethnocentric national attitudes. Study 2 showed a strong direct effect of right‐wing ideology on ethnocentric national attitudes, while the impact of “pure” authoritarian covariance is marginal and sometimes even seems to be negative (e.g., ethnic prejudices). These findings suggest that authoritarianism has little to do with ethnocentric national attitudes. It is not the covariance of authoritarian attitudes that results in growing ethnocentrism. The true perpetrator can be found in the large component of right‐wing ideology contained in such measurement instruments as the RWA scale.     

Replacing the Moral Foundations: An Evolutionary‐Coalitional Theory of Liberal‐Conservative Differences

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains liberal‐conservative differences as arising from different moral intuitions, with liberals endorsing “individualizing” foundations (Harm and Fairness) and conservatives also endorsing “binding” foundations (Authority, Respect, and Purity). We argue these labels misconstrue ideological differences and propose Evolutionary‐Coalitional Theory (ECT) as an alternative, explaining how competitive dynamics in the ancestral social environment could produce the observed ideological differences. We test ECT against MFT across three studies. Study 1 shows the so‐called “binding” orientation entails the threat‐sensitivity and outgroup antagonism predicted by ECT; that is, an authoritarian motive. Similarly, Study 2 shows the so‐called “individualizing” orientation is better described as a universalizing motive, one reflecting a broader set of moral commitments (e.g., to nature) and a broader sociality than the egocentrism implied by MFT. Study 3 provides a factor analysis reducing “binding” to authoritarianism and “individualizing” to universalism, with the latter loading against social dominance orientation (SDO). A hierarchical regression then provides additional evidence for ECT, showing this dominating motive (SDO) accounts for variance in conservatism that MFT leaves unexplained. Collectively, these three studies suggest that ECT offers a more accurate and precise explanation of the key psychological differences between liberals and conservatives.     

Authoritarian reactions to terrorist threat: Who is being threatened,the Me or the We?

Endorsement of authoritarian attitudes has been observed to increase under conditions of terrorist threat. However, it is not clear whether this effect is a genuine response to perceptions of personal or collective threat. We investigated this question in two experiments using German samples. In the first experiment (N = 144), both general and specific authoritarian tendencies increased after asking people to imagine that they were personally affected by terrorism. No such effect occurred when they were made to think about Germany as a whole being affected by terrorism. This finding was replicated and extended in a second experiment (N = 99), in which personal and collective threat were manipulated orthogonally. Authoritarian and ethnocentric (ingroup bias) reactions occurred only for people highly identified with their national ingroup under personal threat, indicating that authoritarian responses may operate as a group‐level coping strategy for a threat to the personal self. Again, we found no effects for collective threat. In both studies, authoritarianism mediated the effects of personal threat on more specific authoritarian and ethnocentric reactions. These results suggest that the effects of terrorist threat on authoritarianism can, at least in part, be attributed to a sense of personal insecurity, raised under conditions of terrorist threat. We discuss the present findings with regard to basic sociomotivational processes (e.g., group‐based control restoration, terror management) and how these may relate to recent models of authoritarianism.     

Terrorist threat,dehumanization, and right‐wing authoritarianism as predictors of discrimination

This study analyzed the relationship between terrorist threat and discrimination, operationalized by support for retributive justice against Islamic groups suspect of terrorist crimes. Two experimental studies were performed. Study 1 (N = 215) showed that the terrorist threat against the ingroup raises the support for the retributive procedures through the dehumanization of the outgroup. Study 2 (N = 304) analyzed how the mediating role of dehumanization in the relationship between terrorist threat and support for retributive justice is moderated by right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). In addition, the study aimed to verify if the dehumanization of outgroup and RWA could explain the relationship between terrorist threat and discrimination of Muslim immigrants. The results indicated that adherence to RWA favors dehumanization of the outgroup and, consecutively, the discrimination, operationalized as support for the use of retributive justice. The adherence to RWA has been identified as the mechanism that explains the discrimination against Muslim immigrants.     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

Patriotism or Nationalism? Understanding Post‐September 11, 2001, Flag‐Display Behavior1

People reacted to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in a number of different ways. One reaction was to display the American flag on one's home, car, or person. The goal of this research was to understand the underlying motivations that led to this widespread behavior. Specifically, to what extent was post‐9/11 flag‐display behavior motivated by patriotism (love of country and in‐group solidarity), nationalism (uncritical acceptance of national, state, and political authorities and out‐group antipathy), or a combination of both? Results of a national survey (N= 605) provided much stronger support for the hypothesis that post‐9/11 flag‐display behavior was an expression of patriotism, not nationalism. Other results supported the notion that patriotism can exist without nationalism, even in the context of people's reactions to a terrorist attack.     

Support for Anti‐Muslim Policies: The Role of Political Traits and Threat Perception

We explored how political beliefs and attitudes predict support for anti‐Muslim policies and extremist behavior in the United States following the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. A large sample completed measures of authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (SDO), generalized prejudice, identification with all humanity (IWAH), perceptions of Muslim threat, and support for anti‐Muslim policies and behaviors. These measures accounted for 73% of the variance in moderate anti‐Muslim policies and 55% of the variance in extreme anti‐Muslim policies. Authoritarianism and SDO directly and indirectly predicted support for anti‐Muslim policies, with their effects partially mediated by generalized prejudice, IWAH, and perceptions of Muslims as threatening. Threat both mediated and moderated the relationship between authoritarianism and anti‐Muslim policies. A negative interaction between authoritarianism and perceptions of Muslims as threatening predicted moderate anti‐Muslim policies, but a positive interaction predicted extreme anti‐Muslim policies. A tentative explanation is offered. Perceptions of Muslim threat was consistently a powerful predictor of anti‐Muslim policies and willingness to engage in extremist behaviors targeting Muslims. Programs to combat anti‐Muslim prejudice should consider the role of threat‐related stereotypes in expressions of anti‐Muslim prejudice.     

Conservatives Anticipate and Experience Stronger Emotional Reactions to Negative Outcomes

The present work examined whether conservatives and liberals differ in their anticipation of their own emotional reactions to negative events. In two studies, participants imagined experiencing positive or negative outcomes in domains that do not directly concern politics. In Study 1, 190 American participants recruited online (64 male, M_age = 32 years) anticipated their emotional responses to romantic relationship outcomes. In Study 2, 97 Canadian undergraduate students (26 male, M_age = 21 years) reported on their anticipated and experienced emotional responses to academic outcomes. In both studies, more conservative participants predicted they would feel stronger negative emotions following negative outcomes than did more liberal participants. Furthermore, a longitudinal follow‐up of Study 2 participants revealed that more conservative participants actually felt worse than more liberal participants after receiving a lower‐than‐desired exam grade. These effects remained even when controlling for the Big Five traits, prevention focus, and attachment style (Study 1), and optimism (Study 2). We discuss how the relationship between political orientation and anticipated affect likely contributes to differences between conservatives and liberals in styles of decision and policy choices.     

Political Conservatism,Need for Cognitive Closure,and Intergroup Hostility

Two studies examined the interaction of political conservatism and the need for cognitive closure in predicting aggressiveness in intergroup conflict and hostility toward outgroups. In the first study, Polish participants indicated their preference for coercive conflict strategies in the context of a real‐life intergroup conflict. Only among participants who identify themselves as conservative, need for cognitive closure was positively and significantly related to preference for aggressive actions against the outgroup. In the second study, the predicted interaction was investigated in the context of the terrorist threat in Poland. The findings indicated that high in need for closure conservatives showed greater hostility against Arabs and Muslims only when they believed that Poland was under threat of terrorist attacks inspired by Islamist fundamentalism.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

Emotional Responses to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks: Addressing the Authoritarianism Puzzle

The finding that threat boosts the public's preferences for authoritarian policies has been well established in the research literature. Why this shift occurs remains open as the extant literature reports contradictory findings regarding the interaction of dispositions, such as conservatism and authoritarianism, with threat. One line of research argues that threat increases authoritarian preferences among those who are more prone to authoritarianism. Another argues that it is those with a nonauthoritarian ideology who switch in response to threat. By using a two‐wave panel study of the French population taken before and after the January 2015 twin attacks in Paris, we find that both trends occur simultaneously. Our results show that the factors that drive the impact of ideological dispositions on support for authoritarian policies are emotional reactions. On the one hand, anxiety led left‐wing respondents to move towards adopting authoritarian policy preferences following the attacks, yet produced no such change among right‐wing respondents. On the other hand, anger did not turn left‐wing voters more authoritarian but strengthened authoritarian policy preferences among right‐wing respondents.     

The Impact of Social Threat on Worldview and Ideological Attitudes

Research has shown that social threat correlates with ideological authoritarianism, but the issues of causal direction and specificity of threat to particular ideological attitudes remain unclear. Here, a theoretical model is proposed in which social threat has an impact on authoritarianism specifically, with the effect mediated through social worldview. The model was experimentally tested with a sample of undergraduates who responded to one of three hypothetical scenarios describing a future New Zealand that was secure, threatening, or essentially unaltered. Both threat and security influenced social worldview, but only threat influenced authoritarianism, with differential effects on two factorially distinct subdimensions (conservative and authoritarian social control attitudes) and with the effects of threat mediated through worldview. There was a weak effect of threat on social dominance that was entirely mediated through authoritarianism. The findings support the proposed theoretical model of how personal and social contextual factors causally affect people's social worldviews and ideological attitudes.     

National Threat and Political Culture: Authoritarianism, Antiauthoritarianism, and the September 11 Attacks

This paper uses published letters to the editor of major U.S. newspapers to investigate the cultural effects of a major national threat: the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. It is based on a hand-coded, stratified random sample of 1,100 letters to the editor published in 17 major papers in the United States (544 pre-September 11, 556 post-September 11). The letters are drawn from a population of 8,101 published letters. Degrees of both authoritarianism and antiauthoritarianism, as well as the general salience of questions of authoritarianism, rose significantly in the post-attack period. The paper suggests that, instead of a simple threat-authoritarianism causal link, authoritarianism and antiauthoritarianism are paired elements of political culture that are invoked together in the face of a national threat.     

Belief, motivational, and ideological correlates of human rights attitudes

Many people believe that an informed and thoughtful citizenry is essential to the maintenance of democratic ideals within the United States and the spread of those ideals abroad. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the evidence that Americans consider issues of human dignity and rights when making judgments about the U.S. government's war on terror has been mixed. In our study, we assessed the relative contributions of ideological, belief, and cognitive-motivational factors to the prediction of human rights and civil liberties attitudes. Individuals scoring high on measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and the belief that the structure of knowledge is simple were the most likely to support restrictions on human rights and civil liberties as part of the war on terror. In a subsequent regression analysis, individuals scoring higher on personal need for structure or exhibiting lower levels of epistemological belief complexity tended to score higher on RWA. Additionally, men were generally more likely to support restrictions on rights and liberties and to score higher on RWA than were women.     

System Justification and Affective Responses to Terrorism: Evidence from the November 2015 Paris Attacks

A large stream of research has shown that emotional reactions have a powerful impact on political choices and decision-making processes. Yet little is known about individual-level differences in experiencing specific emotions in the light of threatening events. In this article, we argue that system justification, or the endorsement and bolstering of existing social and political arrangements, is positively associated with the experience of positive emotions and negatively associated with the experience of negative emotions in the light of threat. We test our hypotheses using a study conducted a few days after the November 13, 2015, Paris terror attacks on a large sample in France. Our results show that system justification was positively associated with experiencing hope in the light of the attacks and negatively associated with experiencing fear and anger. Moreover, the size of these effects exceeded the respective size of other psychological characteristics such as authoritarianism, conservatism, and national attachment. These findings extend research on the palliative function of system justification to the domain of emotional responses to terrorist shocks.     

Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms

Abstract

The belief bias in reasoning occurs when individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than conclusions that are inconsistent. The present study examined a belief bias in syllogisms containing political content. In two experiments, participants judged whether conclusions were valid, completed political ideology measures, and completed a cognitive reflection test. The conclusions varied in validity and in their political ideology (conservative or liberal). Participants were sensitive to syllogisms’ validity and conservatism. Overall, they showed a liberal bias, accepting more liberal than conservative conclusions. Furthermore, conservative participants accepted more conservative conclusions than liberal conclusions, whereas liberal participants showed the opposite pattern. Cognitive reflection did not magnify this effect as predicted by a motivated system 2 reasoning account of motivated ideological reasoning. These results suggest that people with different ideologies may accept different conclusions from the same evidence.     

A prospective investigation of the relationship between just-world beliefs and the desire for revenge after September 11, 2001

We prospectively examined the relationship between individuals' belief in a just world and their desire for revenge against the perpetrators of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Eighty-three undergraduate students who had completed a measure of just-world beliefs prior to the terrorist attacks were assessed approximately 2 months following the attacks. The more strongly they had endorsed just-world beliefs prior to the attacks, the more distressed they felt about the attacks and the more they desired revenge. Furthermore, the relationship between belief in a just world and the desire for revenge was mediated by feelings of distress in response to the terrorist attacks. The results point to the importance of justice beliefs in understanding responses to the terrorist attacks.     

Wild Analysis in Politics

This commentary provides a critical discussion of Crouse and Stalker's (2007) attempt to psychoanalyze right‐wing authoritarian beliefs. The psychological inventory used by Crouse and Stalker for this purpose, The Right‐Wing Authoritarian Scale (Altemeyer, 1998), has dubious validity characteristics, and the conclusions reached by Crouse and Stalker regarding the origins and characteristics of right‐wing political beliefs and attitudes may be more reflective of the authors' political prejudices than of a serious psychoanalytic study of different personality structures. In the present article, the author demonstrates not only the flaws associated with the measuring instrument used, but also the left‐wing biases in the Crouse and Stalker analysis. Unfortunately, these prejudices against individuals with conservative political beliefs may be extensively present in the psychology and psychoanalytic communities and serve neither an appropriate clinical nor scientific purpose.