RADICAL ORTHODOXY AND THE NEW CULTURE OF OBSCURANTISM

Centering around a careful, sustained critique of John Milbank's polemic against Kant, this essay connects the growing anti‐philosophical sentiments in theology to a wider anti‐rational trend in the human sciences generally. What most visibly unifies these new obscurantist outlooks is their reliance on free‐floating, unapologetically self‐perpetuating ideological historiographies, which are advanced via a kind of “co‐opt‐and‐plunder” approach to historical texts. However, the rejection of rational integrity also entails a rejection of the traditional intellectual virtues—attentiveness, consistency, modesty, charity etc.—virtues which any theological claim to orthodoxy cannot do without. Radical Orthodoxy therefore risks a worrying slide into new forms of esoteric gnosticism.     

ROBERT JOHN RUSSELL VERSUS THE NEW ATHEISTS

This essay compares Robert John Russell's work in his recent book Cosmology from Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of Theology and Science (2008) to that of the authors known collectively as "the new atheists." I treat the latter as recent contributors to the modern tradition of scientific naturalism. This tradition makes claims to legitimacy on the basis of its close relations to the natural sciences. The purpose of this essay is to show up the poverty of the naturalist tradition's scientific credentials by contrasting it with Russell's careful account of positive relations between science and Christian theology.     

ORTHODOXY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM

Traditional Jewish theology and practice are predicated on belief in the divinity of the Torah. Biblical criticism has posed increasingly formidable challenges to this belief in modern times. To the extent that Modern Orthodoxy has addressed the problem, it has generally attempted to refute the findings of scientific scholarship on its own terms. This article will suggest that such an approach represents a misplaced framing of the question, by viewing all religious truth claims cognitively as simple statements of fact. Instead of questioning whether the doctrine of Torah from Heaven is true empirically, its “truth” is established via its function within the context of the “form of life” (in the Wittgensteinian sense) that it engenders.     

THE ROMANTIC CONNECTION: NEURATH,THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL,AND HEIDEGGER

James Bradley (ed.), Philosophy after F. H. Bradley. Thoemmes Press Idealism Series, 1996, Bristol, Thoemmes Press; pp. 368 plus x. Hb. 1–85506–484–7 (£48.00), pb. 1–85506–485–5 (£16.95).

W. J. Mander (ed.), Perspectives on the Logic and Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley. Thoemmes Press Idealism Series, 1996, Bristol, Thoemmes Press; pp. 290 plus xxvii. Hb. 1–85506–433–2 (£45.00), pb. 1–85506–432–4 (£14.95).     

CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: THE OTHER NATURALISM

This essay compares and contrasts pragmatic naturalism with the more well known position of epistemological naturalism on several pivotal issues, in the process offering a pragmatic critique of the latter. It highlights their common rejection of both foundationalism and a priori methods and their positive claims that: what needs examination is not our concept of knowledge but knowledge itself; knowledge must be understood as tied to the world and as a natural phenomenon to be examined in its natural setting; the epistemic endeavor involves unifying its three traditional projects of giving an account of what knowledge is, explaining how knowledge is possible, and providing useful epistemic advice, thus involving normative considerations; and the method of gaining knowledge in general is continuous with the method of science. Yet, there are very great divergences between the two naturalisms concerning the answers offered, and these are explored and evaluated in the development of the essay.     

GOD AND CHAOS: THE DEMIURGE VERSUS THE UNGRUND

Abstract. The human quest for meaning is an attempt to bring experience into conjunction with illuminating concepts. The second law of thermodynamics is of wide human concern, because it touches experience which is existentially charged and therefore which humans must interpret in broad metaphysical terms. Five types of experience have been incorporated into the second law: running down, degeneracy, mixed-up-ness, irreversibility of time, and emergence of new possibilities. The dominant Western tradition (Plato) places these experiences within a metaphysical scheme that evaluates them negatively, whereas a minority tradition (Berdyaev) evaluates them positively. The former makes entropy anti-God; the latter places entropy within God.     

PHILIP HEFNER AND THE MODERNIST/POSTMODERNIST DIVIDE

Abstract Philip Hefner is part of neither the dominant Western paradigm nor the usual postmodernist reaction against it. He belongs within an Anglo‐American viewpoint that also is within neither the dominant Western nor the postmodernist paradigm. Herein I sketch the differences between these paradigms. I elaborate Hefner's theology of the created co‐creator to show where Hefner constrasts with them and then contrast his ideas with those of two contemporary theologians who fit into the second paradigm, George Lindbeck and Mark C. Taylor.     

ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS AT WORK:

This study focuses on those features of organizations and individuals that are associated with the development of romantic relationships among employees. Likelihood of romantic involvement was found to be negatively related to formalization and curvilinearly related to organizational size. Neither participativeness nor climate were associated with organizational romance. In addition, the data showed that women who were younger, newer, and of lower rank were most likely to enter into a relationship. Education was positively related to likelihood of romance for males, but not for females.     

THE ROMANTIC CONNECTION: NEURATH,THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL,AND HEIDEGGER,PART TWO

Commentators commonly assume that Descartes regards it as a function of the passions to inform us or teach us which things are beneficial and which are harmful. As a result, they tend to infer that Descartes regards the passions as an appropriate guide to what is beneficial or harmful. In this paper I argue that this conception of the role of the passions in Descartes is mistaken. First, in spite of a number of texts appearing to show the contrary, I argue that Descartes does not regard it as the role of the passions to inform us about what is beneficial or harmful. Second, although Descartes calls the passions good and useful, I argue that Descartes does not think we should allow ourselves to be guided by them. When we recognize that the function of the passions is largely motivational and not informative, we can more easily understand Descartes's practical advice in The Passions of the Soul that happiness requires us to guide our passions instead of letting our passions guide us.