Can Beck's theory of depression and the response style theory be integrated?

There are obvious similarities between the cognitive constructs of A. T. Beck's (1976) cognitive theory and the response style theory (S. Nolen-Hoeksema & J. Morrow, 1991). Different propositions of J. A. Ciesla and J. E. Roberts (2007) and S. Lyubomirsky and S. Nolen-Hoeksema (1993, 1995) concerning associations of 2 response styles, brooding and reflection, with constructs of Beck's cognitive theory (schemata, cognitive errors, cognitive triad, automatic thoughts) were tested. Model comparisons were based on a 4-week study in which 397 participants completed self-report instruments at 2 time points. A model allowing schemata to influence brooding and reflection that influence the other cognitive variables of Beck's cognitive theory fits the data better than the other integrated models. However, although schemata were significant predictors of both response styles, neither response style did significantly predict other cognitive variables. A comparison of the integrated model with Beck's original cognitive theory revealed that Beck's original theory fits the data better than the integrated model, whereas both models explain about the same amount of variance. Thus, an integration of Beck's theory and the response style theory are not supported.     

The importance of theory: response to Brenner (2000)

L. Brenner's (2000) critique of I. Erev, T. S. Wallsten and D. V. Budescu (1994) focuses on their (a) use of a model to explain the paradox of the same data appearing to suggest over- and underconfidence, depending on how they are analyzed; (b) definitions of true judgment and error; and (c) specific use of judgments transformed to log-odds and a model formulated in those terms. The authors of the present article strongly disagree with the first point and discuss the importance of using models to interpret data. With regard to the second, the authors admit that the constructs of true judgment and error are poorly named but dispute L. Brenner's specific criticisms. Concerning the third, the authors had not claimed that the log-odds metric has any special status in judgment research and thus agree with L. Brenner's basic point.     

Countertransference as a prototype: The development of a measure

Countertransference is a concept that is widely acknowledged, but there exists little definitional consensus, making research in the area difficult. The authors adopted a prototype theory (E. H. Rosch, 1973a, 1973b; see C. B. Mervis & E. Rosch, 1981, for a review) to examine this construct because it conceptually fits well with constructs that elude explicit definition. In Study 1, 45 experienced psychologists highly agreed with the prototypicality of 104 different examples of countertransference providing support for the presence of a prototype. In Study 2, the usage of this prototype in a sample of 35 trainees was related to ability to perceive countertransference in a case example drawn from the literature and positively correlated with self-reports of their experiences of countertransference but not with their self-reported ability to manage countertransference once it was manifest. Implications for training and research are discussed.     

Perception in chess and beyond: Commentary on Linhares and Freitas (2010)

Linhares and Freitas (2010; LF) argue that experts use analogical or semantic similarity, similarities that are not available from direct surface representations. LF make their case using a critique of Chase and Simon (1973b) and the presentation of a few chess positions and examples from other domains. Their conclusion is that models such as CHREST (Gobet et al., 2001) and theories such as the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973b) and the template theory ( [Gobet and Simon, 1996a] and [Gobet and Simon, 1996b]) are inadequate for dealing with these issues. They propose an alternative paradigm, which they call “experience recognition.” Although we find this issue an interesting one, the separation between pattern recognition and problem solving is a lot more complex than LF portray. We instead suggest that a “revolution” in our to date successful modelling is not necessary. Especially in the chess domain, LF’s examples do not make the point they claim. Furthermore, their criticisms of CS are incorrect, and they have failed to mention a large number of experimental results that have supported the hypothesis of location-specific encodings. Although we agree that experts use semantic information and similarities, these ideas already possess analogues in CHREST, which can form the basis of further evolution of the theory.     

Consequential validity of the implicit association test: comment on Blanton and Jaccard (2006)

Numeric values of psychological measures often have an arbitrary character before research has grounded their meanings, thereby providing what S. J. Messick (1995) called consequential validity (part of which H. Blanton and J. Jaccard now identify as metric meaningfulness). Some measures are predisposed by their design to acquire meanings easily, an example being the sensitivity measure of signal detection theory. Others are less well prepared, illustrated by most self-report measures of self-esteem. Counter to Blanton and Jaccard's characterization, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has properties that predispose it to acquire consequential validity rapidly. With the IAT as the subject of over 250 publications since 1998, there is now much evidence for its consequential validity. The IAT has attracted more scholarly criticism than have other measures designed for similar purposes. The authors speculate as to why the IAT is an attractive target.     

How the rich (and happy) get richer (and happier): relationship of core self-evaluations to trajectories in attaining work success

In this study, the authors linked core self-evaluations to job and work success. Utilizing a dynamic design from participants in the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY79), core self-evaluations were hypothesized to predict individuals' intercepts (starting levels of success), and their growth trajectories (slope of individuals' success over time) with respect to job satisfaction, pay, and occupational status. Results indicated that higher core self-evaluations were associated with both higher initial levels of work success and steeper work success trajectories. Education and health problems that interfere with work mediated a portion of the hypothesized relationships, suggesting that individuals with high core self-evaluations have more ascendant jobs and careers, in part, because they are more apt to pursue further education and maintain better health.     

The validity and appropriateness of methods, analyses, and conclusions in Rind et al. (1998): A rebuttal of victimological critique from Ondersma et al. (2001) and Dallam et al. (2001).

The authors respond to 2 victimological critiques of their 1998 meta-analysis on child sexual abuse (CSA). S. J. Dallam et al. (2001) claimed that B. Rind, P. Tromovitch, and R. Bauserman (1998) committed numerous methodological and statistical errors, and often miscoded and misinterpreted data. The authors show all these claims to be invalid. To the contrary, they demonstrate frequent bias in Dallam et al.'s criticisms. S. J. Ondersma et al. (2001) claimed that Rind et al.'s study is part of a backlash against psychotherapists, that its suggestions regarding CSA definitions were extrascientific, and that the moral standard is needed to understand CSA scientifically. The authors show their suggestions to have been scientific and argue that it is Ondersma et al.'s issue-framing and moral standard that are extrascientific. This reply supports the original methods, analyses, recommendations, and conclusions of Rind et al.     

How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing

Quantitative theories with free parameters often gain credence when they closely fit data. This is a mistake. A good fit reveals nothing about the flexibility of the theory (how much it cannot fit), the variability of the data (how firmly the data rule out what the theory cannot fit), or the likelihood of other outcomes (perhaps the theory could have fit any plausible result), and a reader needs all 3 pieces of information to decide how much the fit should increase belief in the theory. The use of good fits as evidence is not supported by philosophers of science nor by the history of psychology; there seem to be no examples of a theory supported mainly by good fits that has led to demonstrable progress. A better way to test a theory with free parameters is to determine how the theory constrains possible outcomes (i.e., what it predicts), assess how firmly actual outcomes agree with those constraints, and determine if plausible alternative outcomes would have been inconsistent with the theory, allowing for the variability of the data.     

Risky choice with heuristics: reply to Birnbaum (2008), Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Willemsen (2008), and Rieger and Wang (2008)

E. Brandst?tter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig (2006) showed that the priority heuristic matches or outperforms modifications of expected utility theory in predicting choice in 4 diverse problem sets. M. H. Birnbaum (2008) argued that sets exist in which the opposite is true. The authors agree--but stress that all choice strategies have regions of good and bad performance. The accuracy of various strategies systematically depends on choice difficulty, which the authors consider a triggering variable underlying strategy selection. Agreeing with E. J. Johnson, M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and M. C. Willemsen (2008) that process (not "as-if") models need to be formulated, the authors show how quantitative predictions can be derived and test them. Finally, they demonstrate that many of Birnbaum's and M. O. Rieger and M. Wang's (2008) case studies championing their preferred models involved biased tests in which the priority heuristic predicted data, whereas the parameterized models were fitted to the same data. The authors propose an adaptive toolbox approach of risky choice, according to which people first seek a no-conflict solution before resorting to conflict-resolving strategies such as the priority heuristic.     

Detecting small taxa using simulated comparison data: A reanalysis of Beach, Amir, and Bau's (2005) data

On the basis of taxometric analyses of data sets that they created to pose interpretive challenges, S. R. H. Beach, N. Amir, and J. J. Bau (2005) cautioned that using comparison data simulated by J. Ruscio's programs can lead to inaccurate conclusions. Careful examination of S. R. H. Beach et al.'s methods and results plus reanalysis of their data fails to substantiate this concern: Using comparison data identified the taxonic structure of S. R. H. Beach et al.'s data sets, even when the taxon base rate was very low. The authors show that J. Ruscio's simulation programs generate comparison data appropriately and that analyzing these data provides a useful interpretive aid. Additionally, the authors discuss and illustrate the effective use of the inchworm consistency test to disambiguate taxometric results for small taxa and dimensional constructs with positively skewed indicators.     

Why aggregated learning follows the power law of practice when individual learning does not: comment on Rickard (1997, 1999), Delaney et al. (1998), and Palmeri (1999)

The power law of practice is often considered a benchmark test for theories of cognitive skill acquisition. Recently, P. F. Delaney, L. M. Reder, J. J. Staszewski, and F. E. Ritter (1998), T. J. Palmeri (1999), and T. C. Rickard (1997, 1999) have challenged its validity by showing that empirical data can systematically deviate from power-function fits. The main purpose of the present article is to extend their explanations in two ways. First, the authors empirically show that abrupt changes in performance are not necessarily based on a shift from algorithm to memory-based processing, but rather and more generally, that they occur whenever a more efficient task strategy is generated. Second, the authors show mathematically and per simulation that power functions can perfectly fit aggregated learning curves even when all underlying individual curves are discontinuous. Therefore, the authors question conclusions drawn from fits to aggregated data.     

Information seeking by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Animal metacognition is an active, growing research area, and one part of metacognition is flexible information-seeking behavior. In Roberts et al. (2009), pigeons failed an intuitive information-seeking task. They basically refused, despite multiple fostering experiments, to view a sample image before attempting to find its match. Roberts et al. concluded that pigeons’ lack of an information-seeking capacity reflected their broader lack of metacognition. We report a striking species contrast to pigeons. Eight rhesus macaques and seven capuchin monkeys passed the Roberts et al. test of information seeking—often in their first testing session. Members of both primate species appreciated immediately the lack of information signaled by an occluded sample, and the need for an information-seeking response to manage the situation. In subsequent testing, macaques demonstrated flexible/varied forms of information management. Capuchins did not. The research findings bear on the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition across the vertebrates, and on the underlying psychological requirements for metacognitive and information-seeking performances.     

Emotional intelligence as an aspect of general intelligence: what would David Wechsler say?

R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) have carefully examined the controversial issue of whether emotional intelligence (EI) should be classified as an intelligence and whether EI's constructs meet the same psychometric standards as general intelligence's constructs. This article casts their efforts into the framework of both historical and modern IQ-testing theory and research. It details David Wechsler's attempts to integrate EI into his tests and how his conception of a good clinician would be that of an emotionally intelligent clinician. Current theories and research on IQ also have a role in EI beyond what Roberts et al. described, including J. L. Horn's (1989) expanded model and A. R. Luria's (1966) neuropsychological research, and better criteria than the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery should be used in future EI studies. The authors look forward to more research being conducted on EI, particularly in future performance-based assessments.     

needed: more evaluation,not research

The mandate for greater and more thorough accountability is here. The authors of this article point out that more traditional kinds of research per se are not needed; what is needed is more evaluation. They briefly clarify some of the terminology (namely, accountability, evaluation, and research) and illustrate some of the characteristic differences between evaluation and research. The authors point to some reasons that little evaluation is taking place and, with tongue in cheek, mention some of the more commonly used evaluative approaches. Finally, they provide five basic steps to good evaluation, along with examples.     

Kurt Lewin's early intentions (dedicated to his 100th birthday)

This article deals with Lewin's early intentions to promote applied psychology, especially with his essay ‘Die Sozialisierung des Taylorsystems’ (The Socialisation of the Taylor System). The authors point out that certain characteristics of Lewin's social psychological approach can already be seen in this early article. Furthermore, they want to show how important the role of applied psychology has been in the development of Lewin S scientific work.     

Studies on spontaneous attention to number (SAN) are based on spontaneous focusing on numerosity (SFON)

Li and Baroody presented a study in which they investigate children’ spontaneous attention to exact quantity without acknowledging how previous studies of spontaneous focusing on numerosity (SFON) are related to their concept and methods. The authors’ reaction to our pointing this out makes it is clear that SFON research has had foundational role in the development of Baroody and his colleagues spontaneous attention to number (SAN) idea. Thus the authors must acknowledge the SFON literature as the substantial part of their theoretical and methodological construct. The latest definition of SAN states this undeniably. “SAN is the attentional process that underlies exact number recognition initiated by the mathematical thinking triggered by SFON (e.g., attention to “threeness” directed by conceptual knowledge of “three” activated by SFON).” Furthermore, in their response, Dr Baroody and Dr Li admit that “An awareness of the SFON literature did help us explicitly recognize that, given the ambiguous instructions that do not explicitly direct a child’s attention to number, both the nonverbal production and matching tasks were useful in assessing unguided or spontaneous attention to a number.” It is surprising that in their response to the European Journal of Educational Psychology, the authors maintain their claim that they have cited the SFON literature adequately in their study about SAN.     

Reexamining the vocabulary spurt

The authors asked whether there is evidence to support the existence of the vocabulary spurt, an increase in the rate of word learning that is thought to occur during the 2nd year of life. Using longitudinal data from 38 children, they modeled the rate of word learning with two functions, one with an inflection point (logistic), which would indicate a spurt, and one without an inflection point (quadratic). Comparing the fits of these two functions using likelihood ratios, they found that just 5 children had a better logistic fit, which indicated that these children underwent a spurt. The implications for theories of cognitive and language development are considered.     

Tests of Objectification Theory in Gay, Lesbian, and Heterosexual Community Samples: Mixed Evidence for Proposed Pathways

Objectification theory (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997) proposes that women are especially vulnerable to eating disordered behavior when they live in cultures in which their bodies are a constant focus of evaluation. The current study examined whether predictions of objectification theory involving the associations among sexual objectification, body surveillance, body shame, and eating disordered behavior were supported in groups that varied by both gender and sexual orientation. Adults from a U.S. community sample in the Chicago area (92 heterosexual women; 102 heterosexual men; 87 gay men; and 99 lesbian women) completed self-report measures of these constructs. Results suggest that group differences in experiences of sexual objectification and body surveillance may partially explain gender and sexual orientation-based differences in eating disordered behavior.     

Reassessing working memory: comment on Just and Carpenter (1992) and Waters and Caplan (1996)

M. A. Just and P. A. Carpenter's (1992) capacity theory of comprehension posits a linguistic working memory functionally separated from the representation of linguistic knowledge. G. S. Waters and D. Caplan's (1996) critique of this approach retained the notion of a separate working memory. In this article, the authors present an alternative account motivated by a connectionist approach to language comprehension. In their view, processing capacity emerges from network architecture and experience and is not a primitive that can vary independently. Individual differences in comprehension do not stem from variations in a separate working memory capacity; instead they emerge from an interaction of biological factors and language experience. This alternative is argued to provide a superior account of comprehension results previously attributed to a separate working memory capacity.     

Strategy planning in cats (Felis catus) in a progressive elimination task

Domestic cats (Felis cans) were administered a progressive elimination task in which they had to visit and deplete 3 baited sites. Cats were brought back to the starting point after each visit to any site whether the visit represented a correct or an incorrect choice. The results revealed that cats organized search as a function of the least distance principle whether they had to assess starting point to target distances (Experiment 1, n = 12) or adjacent bowl distances (Experiment 2, n = 12). The results also revealed that the starting point to target distance factor was the most influential in determining the initial choice (Experiment 3, n = 6) and in producing errors. Errors were also linked to the antero-posterior bodily axis of the cat. Results are discussed in terms of the predatory behavior of the cat.