The Virtues in their Place: Virtue Ethics in Medicine

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - We are currently in the midst of a revival of interest in thevirtues. A number of contemporary moral philosophers havedefended a virtue-based approach to...     

Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue

Contemporary virtue ethicists widely accept thethesis that a virtuous agent's feelings shouldbe in harmony with her judgments about what sheshould do and that she should find virtuousaction easy and pleasant. Conflict between anagent's feelings and her actions, by contrast,is thought to indicate mere continence – amoral deficiency. This ``harmony thesis' isgenerally taken to be a fundamental element ofAristotelian virtue ethics.I argue that the harmony thesis, understoodthis way, is mistaken, because there areoccasions where a virtuous agent will findright action painful and difficult. What thismeans is that the generally accepteddistinction between continence and virtue isunsupportable. This conclusion affects severalwell-known accounts of virtuous action,including those of Philippa Foot and JohnMcDowell. A closer look at Aristotle, however, providesanother way of distinguishing betweencontinence and virtue, based in hiscategorization of goods as noble or base. Iargue that virtue is exhibited when anagent's feelings harmonize with his correctjudgments of value, while discrepancies betweenfeelings and correct judgments of valueindicate continence. This understanding ofcontinence and virtue enables us to accommodatethe problem cases I raise.     

爱国主义是首要的公民美德

适逢金秋时节,在我们伟大的祖国即将迎来60华诞的前夕,第六届全国公民道德论坛在中原重镇郑州隆重召开,这无疑是我国社会主义道德文化建设的又一盛事.在此,请允许我代表中国伦理学会,向本届公民道德论坛的举行表示热烈祝贺!     

When Ignorance Is Bliss The Role of Motivation to Reduce Uncertainty in Uncertainty Reduction Theory

Three studies were conducted with the goal to articulate and test models for integrating the concept of motivation to reduce uncertainty into the axiomatic structure of uncertainty reduction theory. Multiple models were considered, each model defining motivation to reduce uncertainty in a different way. Motivation to reduce uncertainty was defined as a scope condition (Model 2), as tolerance for uncertainty (Model 3), as a weighted function of uncertainty by its importance (Model 4), and as the difference between one's uncertainty level and one's tolerance for uncertainty (Models 5a and 5b). Each of these models was compared to the baseline model (Model 1) derived from the original presentation of the theory where level of uncertainty, by itself, serves as a determinant of various communication behaviors. Tests of these models in terms of their ability to predict information seeking and attraction reveal that none of the models provides a consistent integration of motivation to reduce uncertainty into uncertainty reduction theory. Rather, tolerance for uncertainty (Model 3) is one of three determinants of information seeking, while level of uncertainty (Model 1) is one of three determinants of attraction. This inability to integrate motivation to reduce uncertainty into uncertainty reduction theory can be attributed to the consistent failure to find support for deviance and incentive value as determinants of tolerance for uncertainty, the rejection of Axiom 3 in uncertainty reduction theory (which specifies a positive relationship between uncertainty and information seeking), and the rejection of Theorem 17 (which specifies a negative relationship between information seeking and liking).     

When a Mother Is Depressed

Abstract

The literature related to mother-child interaction when a mother is depressed and a framework for addressing mother-child co-occupations for mothers with depression and their young children is provided. An in-depth case example that spans mother-infant occupation- based intervention during a short-term psychiatric hospitalization through home-based occupation-based intervention is provided.     

When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live

I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here's a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize it, you have to be able to neutralize it to know P; so you don’t know P. But the skeptical hypotheses I plug into it are “real, live” scientific‐philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, unlike any of the outrageous traditional skeptical hypotheses (e.g., ‘You’re a brain in a vat’). So I call the resulting skepticism Live Skepticism. Notably, the Live Skeptic's argument goes through even if we adopt the clever anti‐skeptical fixes thought up in recent years such as reliabilism, relevant alternatives theory, contextualism, and the rejection of epistemic closure. Furthermore, the scope of Live Skepticism is bizarre: although we don’t know the simple facts noted above, many of us do know that there are black holes and other amazing facts.     

Virtues,Values, and the Good Life: Alasdair MacIntyre's Virtue Ethics and Its Implications for Counseling

The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of modern ethics and his virtue‐centered alternative suggest that counseling can be considered a form of applied virtue ethics, helping clients cultivate the qualities necessary to live the good life. Although similar to developmental theory and positive psychology, this perspective also questions whether counseling is value neutral and suggests that counseling should account for the (often hidden) traditions, virtues, and practices of the good life it promotes. Comparison with spiritual direction suggests ways counseling can apply the insights of this model ethically within a pluralistic setting.     

The Virtue of Dialogue,Dialogue as Virtue in Plato's Protagoras

Abstract

This article interprets Plato's Protagoras as a defense, against the claim of the sophists to possess a skill of teaching virtue, of Socrates’ claim in the Apology (38a) that the greatest good for a human being is examining oneself and others every day with regard to virtue. Attention to the often-neglected complex series of prologues as well as the dispute about method at the dialogue's center shows both the erotic and the dialogical character of Socratic virtue. Specifically, human virtue turns out to be a process of becoming as opposed to being good that can be carried out only in constant dialogue with others. In this context, the ‘science of measurement’ Socrates describes on behalf of Protagoras and the other sophists is exposed for what it is: a delusion that continues to exert its power over us today on account of the recurrent human wish to possess a skill or technique that could save us by guaranteeing the goodness and happiness of our lives.     

The Virtues of Evidence

Evidence-based medicine has been defined as the conscientious and judicious use of current best evidence in making clinical decisions. This paper will attempt to explicate the terms "conscientious" and "judicious" within the evidence-based medicine definition. It will be argued that "conscientious" and "judicious" represent virtue terms derived from virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. The identification of explicit virtue components in the definition and therefore conception of evidence-based medicine presents an important starting point in the connection between virtue theories and medicine itself. In addition, a unification of virtue theories and evidence-based medicine will illustrate the need for future research in order to combine the fields of virtue-based approaches and clinical practice.     

When Virtues,Roles and Duties Fail: Early Greek and Chinese Accounts of Akrasia

Both the Mohist canon and the works of Aristotle recognize that people sometimes fail to act according to virtues, roles and duties, what in a Western context is called akrasia or “weakness of will,” an important topic in both Greek and contemporary philosophy. I argue that questions of akrasia are treated different in the early Chinese and ancient Greek philosophy. Greek accounts focus on issues of will and control, while some Chinese thinkers treat akrasia as a lack of a skill, and the failure to act in the right way is less lack of will than lack of skill. I begin with a brief account of the problem of akrasia as first presented by Plato in the “Protagoras” and Republic, and developed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. I then turn to akrasia in an early Chinese context, focusing on a very different Mohist view of akrasia as lack of a skill. Finally, I contrast the “skill” the Mohists find lacking with a very different account of skill in the Zhuangzi.     

野外休闲的美德

A.利奥波德的土地伦理,作为环境美德伦理的一个实例,已经越来越受到关注。古典的对休闲的看法,最初在亚里士多德的《政治学》中表明,为检查野外休闲提供了一个好的出发点。利奥波德认为野外休闲是重要的,而且与他的土地伦理有关系。利奥波德对野外休闲的看法,集中在对生态学教育和对美德习惯的感知作用上。当野外休闲习惯于古典克制力的美德时,就变成了生态学道德心所必需的主要美德。野外休闲正是培养那些有智力的,以及优雅的感知和审慎所必需的科学美德。这种美德在好的公民身份与土地公民身份之间提供了诸种关系。