Operationism in psychology: what the debate is about, what the debate should be about

I offer an analysis of operationism in psychology, which is rooted in an historical study of the investigative practices of two of its early proponents (S. S. Stevens and E. C. Tolman). According to this analysis, early psychological operationists emphasized the importance of experimental operations and called for scientists to specify what kinds of operations were to count as empirical indicators for the referents of their concepts. While such specifications were referred to as "definitions," I show that such definitions were not taken to constitute a priori knowledge or be analytically true. Rather, they served the pragmatic function of enabling scientists to do research on a purported phenomenon. I argue that historical and philosophical discussions of problems with operationism have conflated it, both conceptually and historically, with positivism, and I raise the question of what are the "real" issues behind the debate about operationism.     

The gifts of culture and of eloquence: An open letter to Michael J. Mahoney in reply to his article, "Scientific psychology and radical behaviorism"

In what seems to be a response to a paper by Skinner (1987), Mahoney (1989) provides evidence of unfamiliarity with and intellectual intolerance toward radical behaviorism by presenting a critique of it that includes a variety of improper and counterfactual attributions. For example, he argues that radical behaviorism is Cartesian rather than Baconian when the historical record shows the opposite, that it is fundamentally associationist when in fact it is selectionist, and that its philosophy of science is essentially that of operationalism and logical positivism when instead it moved on to other criteria decades ago. The details of Mahoney's history are sometimes flawed and sometimes unsubstantiated, as when he provides a distorted account of the origins of the Association for Behavior Analysis or when he makes undocumented claims about the banning of books. On examination, many of his arguments are couched in stylistic terms that share their rhetorical features with racial, ethnic, and religious stereotyping.     

Pragmatism,Bohr, and the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

In this article, we argue that although Bohr's version of the Copenhagen interpretation is in line with several key elements of logical positivism, pragmatism is the closest approximation to a classification of the Copenhagen interpretation, whether or not pragmatists directly influenced the key figures of the interpretation. Pragmatism already encompasses important elements of operationalism and logical positivism, especially the liberalized Carnapian reading of logical positivism. We suggest that some elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, which are in line with logical positivism, are also supported by pragmatism. Some of these elements are empirical realism, fallibilism, holism, and instrumentalism. However, pragmatism goes beyond logical positivism in espousing some other key elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, though imperfectly, such as the correspondence principle, complementarity, and indeterminism.     

Humanistic and Positive Psychology: The Methodological and Epistemological Divide

Humanistic and positive psychology both focus on similar concerns, but have differences regarding methodology and epistemology. In terms of methodology, humanistic psychologists tend to prefer qualitative over quantitative approaches, whereas positive psychologists tend to hold the opposite preference. Likewise, in terms of epistemology, humanistic psychologists tend to prefer postpositivism, whereas positive psychologists tend to prefer logical positivism. However, much of the perceived differences between humanistic and positive psychology have been based on generalizations that do not hold in every case, notably that humanistic psychology has rich quantitative research traditions, and positive psychology does contain some qualitative approaches. Methodological and epistemological pluralism is presented as a way to bring together these closely related, but now largely separate, areas of psychology.     

Laudan's normative naturalism: a useful philosophy of science for psychology

Logical positivism, widely regarded as the received epistemology of psychology in the first half of the 20th century, was supplanted in the 1960s by various postpositivistic, relativistic philosophies of science, most notably that of Kuhn. Recently, Laudan, a major figure in the philosophy of science, developed a novel approach called normative naturalism that provides an alternative to positivism and relativism. His central thesis is that the two are not always on opposite ends of a continuum but rather have many assumptions in common. This article brings Laudan's important views to the attention of psychologists and describes some of the unique implications of these views for the conduct of research and theory in psychology. These implications, which follow from a number of closely reasoned pragmatic arguments, include more realistic and appropriate evaluation of theory and methodology than has been suggested by logical positivism or relativism.     

Some more similarities between Peirce and Skinner

C. S. Peirce is noted for pioneering a variety of views, and the case is made here for the similarities and parallels between his views and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism. In addition to parallels previously noted, these similarities include an advancement of experimental science, a behavioral psychology, a shift from nominalism to realism, an opposition to positivism, a selectionist account for strengthening behavior, the importance of a community of selves, a recursive approach to method, and the probabilistic nature of truth. Questions are raised as to the extent to which Skinner's radical behaviorism, as distinguished from his S-R positivism, may be seen as an extension of Peirce's pragmatism.     

B. F. SKINNER'S RADICAL BEHAVIORISM Historical Misconstructions and Grounds for Feminist Reconstructions

Feminist critiques of traditional psychological approaches have generated feminist revisions, most notably in psychoanalytic and develop mental theory. Although behaviorism has attracted strong objections from feminist critics, claims of its antithetical positioning vis-à-vis feminist theory construction have generally remained unchallenged. A preliminary step in formulating grounds for a synthesis is to clarify multiple meanings of behaviorism. Specifically, the fusion of Watson's methodological behaviorism and Skinner's radical behaviorism in the literature must be disentangled in order to address the latter's potential as a conceptual framework for constructing feminist theory. Key conceptual features of radical behaviorism that suggest its potential as a vehicle for building a feminist epistemology include: radical behaviorism's contextualistic world view, its interpretation of agency, its treatment of private experience and self knowledge, and its understanding of the pivotal functions of the verbal community.     

Psycholinguistics: a half century of monologism

The contention of this article is that, since its inception in the mid-twentieth century, mainstream psycholinguistics has been monologistic, that is, has concentrated on monologue as its source of empirical material and has, largely implicitly, involved a monologistic epistemology. The article is not a comprehensive history of psycholinguistics but does attempt to establish a historical perspective. Monologism has been the historical bias of Cartesianism, positivism, behaviorism, and cognitivism. Monologism is concerned only with the person in whom cognition takes place and from whom communication proceeds. It is essentially asocial. By contrast, the merits of dialogism include an openness to the sociocultural, interactive nature of all cognition and communication and an empirical engagement of contextualized discourse situations. Dialogism is presented here not as a supplement to mainstream psycholinguistics but as a radical innovation that construes mainstream psycholinguistics as "strongly misleading if presented as a full theory of communication through spoken interaction" (Linell, 1998, p. 23). Some approaches to dialogism and research on dialogue are critically reviewed.     

Some early similarities and later differences between Bertrand Russell and B. F. Skinner

B. F. Skinner credited Bertrand Russell with converting him to behaviorism and with writing one of the books that most influenced him. Particularly in Skinner's early work, there are similarities between Skinner and Russell that extend across mathematics, determinism, positivism, verbal behavior, future communities, evolution, and pragmatism. Later, Skinner's views changed, and he parted company with Russell in most of these areas. Perhaps the most dramatic and fundamental departure came when Skinner embraced pragmatism, which Russell said he "hated." However, there was a time during which Russell wrote favorably of pragmatism as a view for science. Although the similarities between Skinner and Russell may have resulted from common cultural influences, Russell appears to deserve credit for leading Skinner into the stimulus-response behaviorism of two-term necessities; he may also deserve some credit for helping to lead him out of it and into the selectionist behaviorism of three-term contingencies.     

Operants Were Never "Emitted," Feeling Is Doing, And Learning Takes Only One Trial: A Review Of B. F. Skinner's Recent Issues In The Analysis Of Behavior

This final collection of Skinner's papers was intended for the professional, although other readers will find much of interest. The first five chapters are devoted to what Skinner called “theoretical issues” and include clear presentations of his positions on “feelings” and on the “self” as an apparent agent of volition. Skinner skillfully discusses thinking, the origins of cognitive-mediational theories, and a favorite topic: the similarity of processes occurring in the histories of species and of individuals. The next four chapters cover what he called “professional issues,” including the often-misunderstood philosophy known as radical behaviorism as well as the operant aspects of behavior therapy and attempts to influence educational practices. He seemed disappointed in the lack of acceptance of programmed learning methods and pessimistic about the possibility of improving education practices. This pessimism was evident in the final section, “personal issues,” in which he expressed doubt that the powerful and self-serving forces of government, business, and religion will ever permit the changes that could be wrought by the application of behavior analysis to the great problems of society. Two other chapters in the last section will be useful to historians who are curious about the influence of logical positivism on Skinner's thinking (apparently there was not much influence) and to sophisticated readers who are interested in Skinner's retrospective consideration of his work.     

Observing a client's grieving process: bringing logical positivism into qualitative grief counselling research

This positional paper originates from our need as researcher/practitioners to establish a meaningful epistemological framework for research into bereaved people's journey through loss and grief over time. We describe how the field of grief research has a long and established biological basis, in keeping with a positivist epistemology. However, there has been a diminution of the influence of logical positivism in twenty-first-century counselling research. We argue that in grief counselling research, naturalistic observation of the grieving process within a logical positivist paradigm, remains a valid and valuable construct. We posit an observational protocol for the grief counselling process which minimises the intrusion of research method into the therapeutic process. We offer this as a means of conducting qualitative research within a bereavement counselling service. Further, we suggest that the development of an observational protocol for a client's grieving process has potential implications for developing good practice in grief work.     

Logical Positivism, Analytic Method, and Criticisms of Ethnophilosophy

Abstract: I argue that the analytic method has been circularly used to analyze the concept of “philosophy,” and that the result of this analysis has also been used to criticize African ethnophilosophy as nonphilosophical. I critically examine the criticism that ethnophilosophy implies cognitive relativism and the criticism that it implies authoritarianism. I defend ethnophilosophy against these criticisms, arguing that they are rooted in logical positivism, the view that philosophy essentially involves the use of the methods of science and logical analysis. I argue that such analysis and criticisms, given their pedigree, do not provide an adequate or accurate picture of the nature of philosophy.     

The confusion about epistemology and "epistemology"--and what to do about it

The epistemology debates within the field of family therapy have become relatively infrequent in the last year or so, perhaps as a consequence of the confusion they have generated for many family therapists. This article maintains that the primary reason for the confusion is a failure to distinguish clearly between the conventional meaning of the term epistemology, which concerns the nature of knowledge, and the unconventional meaning given the term in family therapy, which concerns the nature of what we know. It is proposed that the confusion can be diminished by understanding the relationship between the two meanings, which are here distinguished as epistemology (meaning 1) and epistemology (meaning 2) respectively. Particular attention is given to the logical consequences of adopting a position on epistemology (meaning 1)—e.g, is the knower capable of knowing an independent reality, or does the act of knowing make its own reality?—or on epistemology (meaning 2)—e.g., is causality linear or nonlinear?. The relevance and implications of these problems for the theory and practice of family therapy are discussed.     

A Developmental Approach to Social Science: A Model for Analyzing Charles Alexander's Scientific Contributions

A seven-paradigm developmental model of social science is presented (behaviorism, gestalt sociologism, empirical positivism, multi-method eclecticism, postmodern interpretivism, cooperative ecological inquiry, and developmental action inquiry). Charles Alexander's research is interpreted as bridging aspects of several paradigms, using third-person empirical positivist experiments to demonstrate the effects of a first-person research/practice called Transcendental Meditiation. The author suggests the possibility of complementing current research on TM with explicit double- and triple-loop research on the second- and third-person practices within the TM movement.     

Radical behaviorism: A productive and needed philosophy for education

Radical behaviorism is the philosophy of the science of behavior originating in the work of B. F. Skinner and elaborated over the years by a community of researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Radical behaviorism is a complete, or thoroughgoing behaviorism in that all human behavior, public and private, is explained in terms of its functional relations with environmental events. Radical behaviorism is often misrepresented in the literatures of education and psychology. Two fundamental misconceptions of radical behaviorism are that its followers (1) are logical positivists who require that a phenomenon be observed by two or more people before it qualifies for scientific analysis, and (2) either will not or cannot incorporate private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings) into their analyses of human behavior. This paper offers an advocacy perspective on contemporary radical behaviorism. In particular, we define radical behaviorism and briefly outline the history of the term's use in psychological literature, discuss the scientific practice of behavior analysts, explain the intolerance exhibited by radical behaviorists, and comment on the use of popularity as a criterion for good science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent shift in educational research and practice from empiricism and outcome-oriented intervention toward a holistic/constructivist philosophy described by its advocates as incompatible with behaviorally-based instruction.     

On privacy, causes, and contingencies

Radical behaviorism may be distinguished from other varieties of behaviorism, notably methodological behaviorism, by the way it accommodates private events in causal explanations of behavior. That is, in an operational sense, radical behaviorism accommodates private phenomena in the context of the three term contingency of reinforcement with regard to their discriminative function, their nature as responses, or their reinforcing function. In any case, any contribution of a private phenomenon is presumably linked at some point to a prior public event that has endowed the private phenomenon with its functional significance.     

Ernst Mach and B. F. Skinner: Their similarities with two traditions for verbal behavior

Ernst Mach is most closely associated with a positivism that demanded a language of close contact with reality. Mach linked this view with the tradition of the quest for an ideal language in which meaning is a property of a word. Logical positivism and the S-R psychology of the early B. F. Skinner also participated in this ideal-language positivism. In addition, Mach showed an affinity with another tradition-a pragmatic-selectionist tradition-although that tradition and Mach's similarities with it were not as well developed. Mach showed no difficulty in jointly maintaining both of these traditions although they have been regarded as deeply incompatible. When the later Skinner adopted a pragmatic selectionism for his later views on verbal behavior, he rejected his earlier views that were aligned with S-R psychology as well as with logical positivism and its sympathizers. Nevertheless, some statements consistent with "meaning is a property of a word" remained for some time in Skinner's writing.