Gender Differences in Personality and Interests: When,Where, and Why?

How big are gender differences in personality and interests, and how stable are these differences across cultures and over time? To answer these questions, I summarize data from two meta-analyses and three cross-cultural studies on gender differences in personality and interests. Results show that gender differences in Big Five personality traits are ‘small’ to ‘moderate,’ with the largest differences occurring for agreeableness and neuroticism (respective ds = 0.40 and 0.34; women higher than men). In contrast, gender differences on the people–things dimension of interests are ‘very large’ (d = 1.18), with women more people-oriented and less thing-oriented than men. Gender differences in personality tend to be larger in gender-egalitarian societies than in gender-inegalitarian societies, a finding that contradicts social role theory but is consistent with evolutionary, attributional, and social comparison theories. In contrast, gender differences in interests appear to be consistent across cultures and over time, a finding that suggests possible biologic influences.     

Reimagining gender in psychology: What can critical psychology offer?

In this article, I argue that gender is a complex sociocultural construct, yet how gender is accounted for in psychological research is limited. Specifically, psychologists conflate sex with gender, rely on quantifying gender differences and, by implication, conceptualise gender as merely a participant characteristic. To illustrate, I apply this viewpoint to the topic of gender differences in tobacco use/cessation using on a feminist quality appraisal tool. I show how these three issues promote the narrow study of sex/gender differences, despite problems surrounding this inquiry, and reduce insights into the intersection of gender and behaviour. To offer a way forward for psychology, I describe how a critical psychology perspective attends to the complexities of gender and its influence on behaviour. I showcase diverse ways of attending to gender as a sociocultural construct, inviting psychologists to engage with, and reflect on, their gender analyses.     

Goal congruence in project teams: does the fit between members' personal mastery and performance goals matter?

Research on team goals rarely considers the impact of congruence in perceptions of personal goals of self versus other members. In this study of 324 members of 64 short-term project teams, polynomial regression analysis was used to explore how congruence in personal and perceived team mastery and performance goals affected individual outcomes. Results indicated that congruence in perceived performance goals elicited greater individual satisfaction and contributions, regardless of goal strength (i.e.. high or low personal performance goals). Conversely, perceived team mastery goals had a greater effect on individual outcomes than did perceived congruence in self-other mastery goals. Congruent self-actual team goals showed weaker but similar relationships to individual outcomes, but contrary to hypotheses, this effect was not mediated by congruence in perceived self-other goals.     

How does the expectancy-value model in psychology explain human action?

The topic discussed is how the expectancy-value model in psychology can be interpreted. A causal interpretation of the model implies that intentions, wants, and beliefs are independent mental causes of human action. A number of arguments against this way of conceptualizing mental events in relation to action are presented. On the basis of these arguments it is concluded that the concepts of 'intention', 'want', 'belief', and the like, cannot be thought of as referring to events that are extrinsic to, and independent of, action and linguistic usage. Intending, wanting, believing, comprise saying and doing things in certain ways and contexts, as well as other events (imagery, feeling, experience) with which action and language belong and are intrinsically related. Relating what people say and do to intentions, wants, beliefs, serves to illuminate or interpret words and deeds, not to point out their independent, extrinisic causes. A causal interpretation of the expectancy-value model, it is concluded, is not tenable.     

How does one speak of social psychology in a nation in transition?

Abstract: Although South Africa's transition into nationhood has been remarkable by all measures, persistent inequalities remain. These are directly traceable to the impact of the social engineering of apartheid which has left a legacy of poverty and a lack of education. In this talk, I focus on three key dilemmas for South Africans: identity as a nation of citizens with multiple identities, capacity for self‐knowledge and self‐acceptance and openness to new impulses. Acceptance of multiple identities is widespread but how deep is the acceptance of difference, especially when conflicts of opinion emerge? Finding a language of self‐knowledge and acceptance requires a language that enables us to gain greater mastery of the complexities of living in a diverse society. How can psychology help with this task? In African cultures illness is described as a visitation from the ancestors: affected persons become wounded healers whose healing powers come from their acknowledged weakness. To what extent might you, as analytical psychologists, help find the ritual processes and language to be effective healers of your own nation?     

Community psychology in Europe: More needed,less wanted?

In this paper, we first contend that community psychology in Europe is facing a particularly challenging situation: On the one hand we witness an increase in complex social problems, which would require a community approach in order to be tackled; on the other hand socio‐economic and cultural changes in the era of globalization diminish the demand and the sources of public funding needed to promote and implement community intervention programs. We then outline the main achievements of community psychology in Europe, and discuss future challenges. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How does cognition evolve? Phylogenetic comparative psychology

Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species. Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition. In particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test whether specific cognitive abilities are correlated with life history (e.g., lifespan), morphology (e.g., brain size), or socio-ecological variables (e.g., social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from extant species. Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting). Here, we explain how an integration of comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the evolutionary processes that drove their evolution.     

Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go?

Cultural psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and indigenous psychology are three approaches to the psychology of culture. The author begins by comparing the three approaches – conceptually, methodologically; and historically. She concludes that each approach has contributed knowledge of the "deep structure" of culture to the field of psychology. This "deep structure" consists of the framework of individualism and collectivism; particular cultures are therefore surface forms of one or the other of these basic cultural frameworks. Rather than being universal, classical social and developmental psychology are seen as reflecting a particular indigenous psychology. For the future, a truly universal psychology must offer a theoretical framework that encompasses alternative indigenous psychologies.     

Why teach ethics in science and engineering?

The following views were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993 organized by Stephanie J. Bird (M.I.T.), Penny J. Gilmer (Florida State University) and Terrell W. Bynum (Southern Connecticut State University). Opragen Publications thanks the AAAS, seminar organizers and authors for permission to publish extracts from the conference. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of AAAS or its Board of Directors.     

How does evidence-based practice in psychology work? – As an ethical demarcation

Evidence-based practice in psychology (EBPP) is ordinarily understood to demarcate between legitimate and illegitimate psychotherapy practice, based upon the epistemic demarcation distinguishing scientific from non-scientific knowledge. EBPP emphasizes the value of effective and efficient interventions identified through randomized controlled trials and cost-benefit analyses. Basing the template for choice of action or strategy on randomized controlled trials and cost-benefit analyses create a deceptive appearance of ethical neutrality. However, there is an implicit ethical demarcation at work in EBPP, which favors a non-articulated specific position in normative ethics. More particularly, evidence-based practice in psychology is structured according to a utilitarian framework, severely limiting the kinds of ethical perspectives available to assess psychotherapy practice. The latter point is illustrated through a new mode of delivering psychotherapy services called “Internet-based guided self-help” (IBGSH). In EBPP the only relevant ethical question is to what extent any intervention, such as IBGSH, is effective and efficient. Some of the limiting effects of the ethical, utilitarian, demarcation are showcased by presenting three alternative ethical perspectives by which psychotherapy practice in general and IBGSH in particular can be analyzed. The analysis concludes that EBPP is not suited to ethically regulate the practice of psychotherapy.