The contingency of composition

There is widespread disagreement as to what the facts are concerning just when a collection of objects composes some further object; but there is widespread agreement that, whatever those facts are, they are necessary. I am unhappy to simply assume this, and in this paper I ask whether there is reason to think that the facts concerning when composition occurs hold necessarily. I consider various reasons to think so, but find fault with each of them. I examine the theory of composition as identity, but argue that the version of this doctrine that entails universalism is unwarranted. I consider the claim that the a priority of such facts leads to their necessity, but give a defence of substantial contingent a priori truths. I ask whether the contingency of such facts would lead to unwelcome possibilities, but argue that it does not. Next, I argue against the thought that the Lewis–Sider argument against restricted composition might give us reason to accept the necessity of universalism. Lastly, I respond to two objections from the 2006 BSPC. I conclude in favour of the contingency of the facts concerning when some things compose some thing.

The counselor as contingency manager

Aspects of contingency management are discussed as they relate to counseling. Three case studies illustrate the role of a counselor as a contingency manager and adviser to teachers in the application of behavior modification techniques to common classroom problems.     

The limits of non-standard contingency

Philosophical Studies - Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial...     

The psychophysics of contingency assessment

The authors previously described a procedure that permits rapid, multiple within-participant evaluations of contingency assessment (the "streamed-trial" procedure, M. J. C. Crump, S. D. Hannah, L. G. Allan, & L. K. Hord, 2007). In the present experiments, they used the streamed-trial procedure, combined with the method of constant stimuli and a binary classification response, to assess the psychophysics of contingency assessment. This strategy provides a methodology for evaluating whether variations in contingency assessment reflect changes in the participant's sensitivity to the contingency or changes in the participant's response bias (or decision criterion). The sign of the contingency (positive or negative), outcome density, and imposition of an explicit payoff structure had little influence on sensitivity to contingencies but did influence the decision criterion. The authors discuss how a psychophysical analysis can provide a better understanding of findings in the literature such as mood and age effects on contingency assessment. They also discuss the relation between a psychophysical approach and an associative account of contingency assessment.     

The analysis of group contingency data

The data analyses utilized in group contingency projects are reviewed. Previous studies are cited to emphasize advantages of nonconsolidated ("individual") over consolidated analyses. Several procedures are described that enable applied researchers to incorporate nonconsolidated data analyses in group contingency studies.     

The rejection-rage contingency in borderline personality disorder

Though long-standing clinical observation reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.) suggests that the rage characteristic of borderline personality disorder (BPD) often appears in response to perceived rejection, the role of perceived rejection in triggering rage in BPD has never been empirically tested. Extending basic personality research on rejection sensitivity to a clinical sample, a priming-pronunciation experiment and a 21-day experience-sampling diary examined the contingent relationship between perceived rejection and rage in participants diagnosed with BPD compared with healthy controls. Despite the differences in these 2 assessment methods, the indices of rejection-contingent rage that they both produced were elevated in the BPD group and were strongly interrelated. They provide corroborating evidence that reactions to perceived rejection significantly explain the rage seen in BPD.     

The role of contingency in classical conditioning

The assumption that classical conditioning depends on a contingent relation between the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US), which was proposed some decades ago as an alternative to the traditional contiguity assumption, still is widely accepted as an empirical generalization, if no longer as a theoretical postulate. The first support for the contingency assumption was provided by experiments in which occasional CS-US pairings produced no response to the CS in random training--i.e., training in which the probability of the US was the same in the presence and absence of the CS. Those early experiments, the results of which too often are taken at face value, are reconsidered along with various later experiments that show conditioning, both of the CS and its context, in random training. The evidence suggests that CS-US contingency is neither necessary nor sufficient for conditioning and that the concept has long outlived any usefulness it may once have had in the analysis of conditioning.     

The response-stimulus contingency and reinforcement learning as a context for considering two non-behavior-analytic views of contingency learning

This paper introduces a special section on the contingency. Bower and Watson were invited to present their views of contingency learning in human infants from outside the context of behavior analysis, and Cigales, Marr, and Lattal and Shahan provided commentaries that point out some of the more interesting and controversial aspects of those views from a behavior-analytic perspective. The debate turns on how to conceptualize the response-stimulus contingency of operant learning. The present paper introduces the contingency concept and contingency detection by subjects, as well as research practices in behavior analysis, in a context in which the dependency between infant responding and the presentation of environmental consequences may be disrupted through procedures in which ordinarily consequent events occur before the response or in its absence. These points can relate to and serve as an introduction to the Bower and Watson papers on infant contingency learning as well as to the three commentaries that follow.     

Necessity and contingency

The paper considers the question of when the operator L of necessity in modal logic can be expressed in terms of the operator meaning it is non-contingent that.This paper was presented by title at the 1986 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Logic in Auckland, 9–12 July, 1986.     

The role of the response-reinforcer contingency in negative automaintenance

When a response key is briefly illuminated before a grain reinforcer is presented, key pecking is reliably developed and maintained in pigeons, even if pecking prevents reinforcement (negative automaintenance). This experiment demonstrated that pigeons are sensitive to a negative response-reinforcer contingency, even though it does not eliminate responding. Within individual pigeons, two kinds of trials were compared: red key trials, in which reinforcement was negatively contingent on responding, and white key trials, in which reinforcement was unrelated to responding. Reinforcement frequency in non-contingent trials was yoked to the obtained reinforcement frequency in negatively contingent trials. All eight pigeons pecked substantially more on the non-contingent key than on the negative key, and preferred the non-contingent key to the negative key on occasional “choice” trials where both were presented together. When the stimuli correlated with the two conditions were reversed, the pigeons' behavior also shifted. These response differences are taken as evidence that pigeons are sensitive to the negative response-reinforcer contingency.     

The role of CS-US contingency in human evaluative conditioning

Recent studies suggest that in Pavlovian conditioning, two different processes may be operative: signal learning and evaluative learning, resulting in two qualitatively different associative structures. Signal-learning is hypothesized to be responsible for providing us with genuine predictors (CS) for significant events (US). This proposition logically entails that the statistical-correlational relation, i.e. the contingency between CS and US should be a crucial determinant of signal learning. Evaluative conditioning, on the other hand, refers to the observation that the mere pairing of neutral with (dis)liked stimuli changes the valence of the originally neutral stimuli in a (negative) positive direction. As argued elsewhere, evaluative conditioning is probably based on the CS acquiring a mere referential value to the US, without any genuine CS-US expectancy being involved. From this, it was hypothesized that evaluative conditioning might not be dependent on CS-US contingency. Using the standard evaluative conditioning paradigm, four different levels of CS-US contingency were created on a between-subject base. The overall effect of evaluative conditioning was strongly significant, and was not mediated by awareness of the CS-US relation. Of crucial importance, this conditioning effect did not interact with the level of contingency, supporting the hypothesis that CS-US contingency is not a crucial determinant of evaluative conditioning. Moreover, this effect was obtained in a situation in which Ss simultaneously evidenced to have consciously registered quite accurately the different levels of CS-US contingency.     

The problem of extras and the contingency of physicalism

Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the doctrine does not allow possible worlds that physically duplicate the actual world while differing mentally. By revealing what physicalism (regarding the mind) does not allow, this essay helps us get clear on what the view really amounts to and why it is contingent.     

The role of the peck-food contingency on fixed-interval schedules

Pigeons were trained to peck on a fixed-interval schedule of food reinforcement and then exposed to three schedules in which there was either no, or an indirect, relation between pecking and food delivery: (a) a conjunctive schedule in which food was delivered at fixed intervals, providing at least one peck was emitted in the interval; (b) a recycling version of the conjunctive schedule that essentially eliminated occasional peck-food contiguities (recycling conjunctive); (c) delivery of food at fixed intervals independently of the birds' behavior (fixed time). The rates and patterns of pecking sustained by these procedures depended on interfood interval and relative proximity of pecks to food.     

Strategy changes in human contingency judgments as a function of contingency tables.

Judgment strategies of 169 undergraduate students on problems to judge the contingency between two binary events were identified by the method of rule-based analysis to clarify whether or not the strategies the subjects used would be affected by the concrete nature of the contingency table. Problems were constructed along two factors: total cell frequency and width of range of objective contingencies. Although the factor of total cell frequency had no effect on subjects' strategies, the number of subjects who changed strategies corresponding with problem instances increased when the objective contingencies were set closer to zero or when problems became more difficult. These results are discussed in the context of previous studies of this issue in the literature.     

The analysis of three-way contingency tables by three-mode association models

TheRC(M) association model (Goodman, 1979, 1985, 1986, 1991) is useful for analyzing the relationship between the variables of a 2-way cross-classification. The models presented here are generalizations of theRC(M) association model for 3-way tables. The family of models proposed here, 3-mode association models, use Tucker's 3-mode components model (Tucker, 1964, 1966; Kroonenberg, 1983) to represent either the three factor interaction or the combined effects of two and three factor interactions. An example from a study in developmental psychology (Kramer & Gottman, 1992) is provided to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed models.I thank Stanley Wasserman, Laurie Kramer, Ulf Böckenholt, Larwence Hubert, Jeffrey Tanaka, and five anonymous reviewers for valuable comments.     

The role of age and prior beliefs in contingency judgment

This experiment investigated how prior beliefs affect young and older adults' ability to detect differences in objective contingency. Participants received new evidence that the objective contingency between two events was positive, negative, or zero when they believed that there was a positive or negative relationship between events, when they believed that the events were unrelated, and when they had no knowledge of the relationship between the events. They were then asked to estimate the objective contingency and recall the contingency evidence. Beliefs that events were or could be related improved young adults' contingency discrimination. Moreover, these beliefs did not produce biases in young adults' memory for the contingency evidence, but rather affected how they weighted this evidence at judgment. In contrast, these same beliefs did not improve older adults' contingency discrimination, but did produce biases in their memory for the evidence that were similar to those seen in their judgment. These findings are discussed in terms of age-related changes in working memory executive processes that impair older adults' ability to fully evaluate both belief-confirming and disconfirming contingency evidence and update their beliefs with this information.