Iconic store and partial report

The iconic store has recently been challenged on the grounds that data in its favor may have resulted from some procedural artifacts. The display-instruction compatibility and perceptual grouping hypotheses were reexamined in two experiments with the partial-report paradigm. When care was taken to rectify some procedural problems found in Merikle’s (1980) study, it was established that the iconic store (as a hypothetical mechanism) can still be validly entertained. This report demonstrates one important procedural point in studying the iconic store with the partial report task, namely, that subjects must be given more than token training on the partial-report task.     

Iconic memory of dot patterns: preliminary report.

Pairs of complementary dot-pattern stimuli whereby each stimulus pair forms a bigram were used in an iconic memory paradigm. The variables of stimulus duration, interstimulus interval, dot density, and letter field were all shown to affect recognition performance of 15 naive college students.     

Iconic memory and visible persistence

There are three senses in which a visual stimulus may be said to persist psychologically for some time after its physical offset. First, neural activity in the visual system evoked by the stimulus may continue after stimulus offset (“neural persistence”). Second, the stimulus may continue to be visible for some time after its offset (“visible persistence”). Finally, information about visual properties of the stimulus may continue to be available to an observer for some time after stimulus offset (“informational persistence”). These three forms of visual persistence are widely assumed to reflect a single underlying process: a decaying visual trace that (1) consists of afteractivity in the visual system, (2) is visible, and (3) is the source of visual information in experiments on decaying visual memory. It is argued here that this assumption is incorrect. Studies of visible persistence are reviewed; seven different techniques that have been used for investigating visible persistence are identified, and it is pointed out that numerous studies using a variety of techniques have demonstrated two fundamental properties of visible persistence: theinverse duration effect (the longer a stimulus lasts, the shorter is its persistence after stimulus offset) and theinverse intensity effect (the more intense the stimulus, the briefer its persistence). Only when stimuli are so intense as to produce afterimages do these two effects fail to occur. Work on neural persistences is briefly reviewed; such persistences exist at the photoreceptor level and at various stages in the visual pathways. It is proposed that visible persistence depends upon both of these types of neural persistence; furthermore, there must be an additional neural locus, since a purely stereoscopic (and hence cortical) form of visible persistence exists. It is argued that informational persistence is defined by the use of the partial report methods introduced by Averbach and Coriell (1961) and Sperling (1960), and the term “iconic memory” is used to describe this form of persistence. Several studies of the effects of stimulus duration and stimulus intensity upon the duration of iconic memory have been carried out. Their results demonstrate that the duration of iconic memory is not inversely related to stimulus duration or stimulus intensity. It follows that informational persistence or iconic memory cannot be identified with visible persistence, since they have fundamentally different properties. One implication of this claim that one cannot investigate iconic memory by tasks that require the subject to make phenomenological judgments about the duration of a visual display. In other words, the so-called “direct methods” for studying iconic memory do not provide information about iconic memory. Another implication is that iconic memory is not intimately tied to processes going on in the visual system (as visible persistence is); provided a stimulus is adequately legible, its physical parameters have little influence upon its iconic memory. The paper concludes by pointing out that there exists an alternative to the usual view of iconic memory as a precategorical sensory buffer. According to this alternative, iconic memory is post-categorical, occurring subsequent to stimulus identification. Here, stimulus identification is considered to be a rapid automatic process which does not require buffer storage, but which provides no information about episodic properties of a visual stimulus. Information about these physical stimulus properties must, in some way, be temporarily attached to a representation of the stimulus in semantic memory; and it is this temporarily attached physical information which constitutes iconic memory.     

Iconic memory and central processing capacity

Three experiments were conducted to assess whether or not iconic memory is influenced by demands placed upon central processing capacity. In Experiment 1 S was required to store material in short-term memory while performing an iconic memory task. In Experiments 2 and 3 S performed an auditory classification task concurrently with iconic storage. The three experiments did not reveal any significant impairment of iconic memory as a function of performing a subsidiary task. Similarly, performance on the subsidiary tasks did not suffer as a result of the concurrent iconic memory task.     

Iconic memory and its relation to perceptual processing and other memory mechanisms

Research on iconic memory is reviewed. Specific issues discussed include the duration of the icon, effects of stimulus variables, types of information lost, selection, processing capacity, and scanning. More general issues include the level of encoding in the icon and its relation to short-term memory. It is also argued that a number of experiments do not show what they were intended to show because of possible methodological problems. The view is developed that iconic memory is postretinal but uncoded; nor is it influenced directly by strategies or subsequent mechanisms.     

Iconic memory: A reply to Professor Holding

Professor Holding has argued that the partial report superiority normally taken as evidence for the existence of iconic memory might instead be due to cue anticipation or output interference. I have suggested that both of these alternative explanations are inconsistent with the finding that the partial report superiority diminishes rapidly with increasing cue delay. In addition, Sperling’s original partial report experiment was designed in such a way that cue anticipation could not have occurred; and both his results with selection by letter vs number and Averbach and Coriell’s bar-marker results indicate that output interference effects are absent or negligible in tachistoscopic experiments. Consequently, I have concluded that the partial report superiority, and especially its decline with increasing delay, remains as strong evidence in favor of the conventional view of iconic memory. Furthermore, if this view were wrong, there would remain no way of giving a satisfactory account of (a) Averbach and Coriell’s results, (b) “direct” investigations of visual persistence, or (c) integration and interruption effects in backward visual masking.     

Recognition memory of spatial location information: Another failure to support automaticity

Hasher and Zacks (1979) claimed that spatial location information is automatically encoded. Evaluation of the empirical basis for this claim, however, casts doubt on some of the evidence for the automaticity position. This evaluation led to four experiments in which five criteria for testing the automaticity of cognitive processes were examined using a recognition task. Results of these experiments clearly show thatrecognition memory for spatial location information is influenced by intention, age of subjects, competing task loads, practice, and individual differences. The reported results, which extend those reported by Naveh-Benjamin (1987) for spatial locationrecall memory, are at odds with the claim that memory for spatial location information is exclusively mediated by automatic encoding processes. The concept of automaticity and the appropriateness of the criteria suggested for testing the automaticity of cognitive processes are discussed in light of the current results and recent findings on other features of the environment (e.g., frequency of occurrence) previously claimed to be automatically encoded.     

Distortions in location memory

Memory for the location of a briefly presented target is often distorted in systematic ways. When people remember dot locations within a circular space, they typically show memory biases that appear to reflect a categorical strategy. However, memory for a target location can also be biased toward visible markers or landmarks. In the present study, we investigated the interaction of categorical and landmark effects by providing sectioning lines in a circular space. In the absence of lines, response biases showed categorical effects, whereas in the presence of lines, response biases suggested that participants used a landmark-based scheme. Possible relations between the strategies are discussed.     

Contributions of category and fine-grained information to location memory: When categories don't weigh in

Several studies have shown that people's memory for location can be influenced by categorical information. According to a model proposed by Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan (1991), people estimate location by combining fine-grained item-level information in memory with category-level information. When the fine-grained information is inexact, category-level information is given greater weight, which leads to biased responses. We manipulated the distribution of locations presented in order to alter the usefulness of category information, and we manipulated background texture in order to alter accuracy of fine-grained memory. The distributional information reduced bias without altering overall accuracy of responding, whereas the background texture manipulation affected accuracy without changing bias. Our results suggest that category information may weigh in only when it is actively processed.     

Iconic memory for natural scenes: Evidence using a modified change-detection procedure

ABSTRACT

Change blindness for the contents of natural scenes suggests that only items that are attended while the scene is still visible are stored, leading some to characterize our visual experiences as sparse. Experiments on iconic memory for arrays of discrete symbols or objects, however, indicate observers have access to more visual information for at least several hundred milliseconds at offset of a display. In the experiment presented here, we demonstrate an iconic memory for complex natural or real-world scenes. Using a modified change detection task in which to-be changed objects are cued at offset of the scene, we show that more information from a natural scene is briefly stored than change blindness predicts and more than is contained in visual short-term memory. In our experiment, a cue appearing 0, 300, or 1000?msec after offset of the pre-change scene or at onset of the second scene presentation (a Post Cue) directed attention to the location of a possible change. Compared to a no-cue condition, subjects were significantly better at detecting changes and identifying what changed in the cue condition, with the cue having a diminishing effect as a function of time and no effect when its onset coincided with that of the second scene presentation. The results suggest that an iconic memory of a natural scene exists for at least 1000?msec after scene offset, from which subjects can access the identity of items in the pre-change scene. This implies that change blindness underestimates the amount of information available to the visual system from a brief glance of a natural scene.     

Schematic information, attention, and memory for places

Recall and recognition of various aspects of three places were studied under incidental and intentional conditions. Data showed that subjects passing through a place incidentally remembered structural features such as walls better than variable features such as furniture. On the other hand, subjects passing through a place knowing they will be tested for memory of its remembered the variable elements better than the structural elements. The results are interpreted in terms of intentionally governed coding.     

Cued shifts of attention and memory encoding in partial report: A dual-task approach

This study explores how cued shifts of visual attention and rapid encoding of visual information relate to limited-capacity processing mechanisms. Three experiments were conducted placing a partial-report task within a dual-task paradigm. Experiments 1 and 2 involved a simple speeded visual discrimination (Task 1) and then an unspeeded partial-report task (Task 2). Generally, Task 2 accuracy declined as the temporal overlap between the two tasks increased. In addition, in Experiment 1, varying the number of items in the partial-report display had an effect on performance regardless of overlap. In contrast, in Experiment 2, varying the type of probe had an effect only at long task overlap. The generality of the interference effect was tested in Experiment 3 using an auditory discrimination as Task 1. Again, Task 2 accuracy declined as the temporal overlap between the two tasks increased. In all cases, the observed interference had the properties of a processing bottleneck. It is argued that encoding information into memory and response selection for the first task both require general-purpose processing. The results are discussed in terms of the functional relationship between attention and memory.     

Early declarative memory for location

The abilities of 7.5-month-old infants to recall the location of hidden objects after delays averaging 90 seconds were investigated in three experiments. Various kinds of events were introduced during the delays in order to examine the stability of early location memory. Recall, as shown by reaching towards the correct location, was most clearly found when the infants were allowed either to remain seated facing the hiding locations (Expt 1) or were turned around and immediately re-seated (Expt 2) during the delays. In both experiments, the infants’ attention was diverted from the hiding places, but during all or most of the delay the infants were facing the locations. Recall was dampened when infants were removed from the immediate location of the hiding and engaged in other activities such as looking at a picture during the delay (Expt 3). Further analyses indicated an effect for age that coincides with other research on location memory: evidence for recall was more clearly found for the older, but not the younger, 7-month-olds.     

Trauma films, information processing, and intrusive memory development

Three experiments indexed the effect of various concurrent tasks, while watching a traumatic film, on intrusive memory development. Hypotheses were based on the dual-representation theory of posttraumatic stress disorder (C. R. Brewin, T. Dalgleish, & S. Joseph, 1996). Nonclinical participants viewed a trauma film under various encoding conditions and recorded any spontaneous intrusive memories of the film over the following week in a diary. Changes in state dissociation, heart rate, and mood were also measured. As predicted, performing a visuospatial pattern tapping task at encoding significantly reduced the frequency of later intrusions, whereas a verbal distraction task increased them. Intrusive memories were largely unrelated to recall and recognition measures. Increases in dissociation and decreases in heart rate during the film were also associated with later intrusions.     

Adaptive memory: enhanced location memory after survival processing

Two experiments investigated whether survival processing enhances memory for location. From an adaptive perspective, remembering that food has been located in a particular area, or that potential predators are likely to be found in a given territory, should increase the chances of subsequent survival. Participants were shown pictures of food or animals located at various positions on a computer screen. The task was to rate the ease of collecting the food or capturing the animals relative to a central fixation point. Surprise retention tests revealed that people remembered the locations of the items better when the collection or capturing task was described as relevant to survival. These data extend the generality of survival processing advantages to a new domain (location memory) by means of a task that does not involve rating the relevance of words to a scenario.     

Visual working memory for global,object, and part-based information

We investigated visual working memory for novel objects and parts of novel objects. After a delay period, participants showed strikingly more accurate performance recognizing a single whole object than the parts of that object. This bias to remember whole objects, rather than parts, persisted even when the division between parts was clearly defined and the parts were disconnected from each other so that, in order to remember the single whole object, the participants needed to mentally combine the parts. In addition, the bias was confirmed when the parts were divided by color. These experiments indicated that holistic perceptual-grouping biases are automatically used to organize storage in visual working memory. In addition, our results suggested that the bias was impervious to top-down consciously directed control, because when task demands were manipulated through instruction and catch trials, the participants still recognized whole objects more quickly and more accurately than their parts. This bias persisted even when the whole objects were novel and the parts were familiar. We propose that visual working memory representations depend primarily on the global configural properties of whole objects, rather than part-based representations, even when the parts themselves can be clearly perceived as individual objects. This global configural bias beneficially reduces memory load on a capacity-limited system operating in a complex visual environment, because fewer distinct items must be remembered.