PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY, FISSION, AND THE NON-BRANCHING CONSTRAINT

Abstract: Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission , one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005 ) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is first presented in connection with perdurantist versions of PCA. The difficulty is then shown to apply to endurantist versions as well.     

“Either a medal or a corporal”: The effects of success and failure on the evaluation of decision making and decision makers

This paper is concerned with judgment by outcomes—justifying decisions and rewarding decision makers in case of success, and condemning both in case of failure. Officers in the Israel Defense Forces evaluated four versions of the same case of decision making in a military setting. In two versions the decision maker obeys his orders, in two he disobeys them to take a normatively appropriate action; one of each decision is successful, one of each fails. Though the cases are identical except for the above differences, successful decisions are considered more justified and to follow from superior decision making processes; decision making processes are perceived as more satisfactory when they lead to success, and successful decision makers are perceived more favorably than their unsuccessful counterparts. Role expectations regarding appropriate action influenced the justification of decisions and perceived favorability of decision makers and interacted with outcome valence in determining the allocation of reward and punishment and the evaluation of the decision making process. The paper discusses implications of the findings to Behavioral Decision Theory, Attribution Theory, and Organizational Learning.     

Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls ‘Infotel-semantics’), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off than standard teleosemantics.     

What is bioethics without Christianity?

The author uses the essays in this issue as a springboard for making three points. First, he argues that most, if not all, current institutional versions of Christianity have failed to provide a meaningful framework for the spiritual life. Second, he argues that there is no ethics other than Judeo-Christian ethics and that there can be no bioethics other than Judeo-Christian bioethics. Finally, he argues that the overriding issue we face is not whether to address bioethical issues from a Christian perspective or from a non-Christian perspective, but rather whether we shall address biological and medical issues from an ethical or a scientific-technological perspective.     

On Kim’s exclusion principle

In this paper we explore Jaegwon Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion. Kim’s support for the principle is clarified and we critically evaluate several versions of the dual explananda response authors have offered to undermine it. We argue that none of the standard versions of the dual explananda reply are entirely successful and propose an alternative approach that reveals a deep tension in Kim’s metaphysics. We argue that Kim can only retain the principle of explanatory exclusion if he abandons his longstanding critique of nonreductive physicalism.     

Intentions are mental states

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the ‘mental state’ theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.     

Judgments about Felony‐Murder in Hindsight

The purpose of this research was to investigate the role of hindsight bias in application of the felony‐murder law, a controversial rule stating that felons can be held responsible for any foreseeable deaths that occur as a result of their felony. Some versions of the rule involve notions of proximate cause requiring legal decision makers to determine foreseeability and assess case evidence. Those judgments may be biased by outcome information and the process of cognitive sense‐making. Jury eligible participants read a crime vignette modeled on an actual felony‐murder case manipulated with regard to outcome information and relevant case facts. They made likelihood judgments and rated felons on intent and culpability. Results indicated that outcome information biased death likelihood ratings in hindsight but did not significantly affect assessments of case evidence. Implications for further applied cognitive research regarding the felony‐murder rule are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral realism and program explanation

Alexander Miller has recently considered an ingenious extension of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit's account of ‘program explanation’ as a way of defending non-reductive naturalist versions of moral realism against Harman's explanatory criticism. Despite the ingenuity of this extension, Miller concludes that program explanation cannot help such moral realists in their attempt to defend moral properties. Specifically, he argues that such moral program explanations are dispensable from an epistemically unlimited point of view. I show that Miller's argument for this negative claim is inadequate, and that he has, in spite of himself, identified a promising defence of moral realism.     

Good to the last drop? Millikan stories as “canned” pedagogy

In recent literature, the famous Millikan oil-drop experiment appears as a case of “good scientific judgment” on the one hand, and scientific misconduct on the other. This article discusses different interpretations of the fact that Nobel laureate Robert Millikan’s notebooks show that he eliminated a number of oildrops in his published 1913 paper on the charge of the electron, while reporting that he had included all the drops. Starting with the common source of all Millikan stories, historian of physics Gerald Holton’s 1978 paper, I discuss recent “canned” versions of Millikan-as-misbehaver in books on scientific fraud. Then I examine some versions of Millikan-as-good-scientist, particularly the reconstruction by historian of physics Allan Franklin, and the views of some practicing physicists. Finally, we have an instructive head-on collision between the two standard treatments of Millikan. The problem with canned stories is not only insufficient information; we also lack a realistic evaluation of the role of ethics in science. As a fundamentally knowledge-seeking enterprise, science may harbor an inherent, perhaps irresolvable, conflict between scientific and ethical concerns. The author’s special interests include standards for “good science”, science and values, and social psychology.     

Effects of pretraining intrastriatal administration of p-chloroamphetamine on inhibitory avoidance

Pretraining systemic administration of p-chloroamphetamine (PCA) consistently produces retention deficits of inhibitory avoidance. This drug causes a widespread acute release of serotonin from cerebral neuronal terminals, but it is not known where in the brain PCA exerts its disruptive cognitive effects. The present experiment was aimed at determining whether the striatum is a site of action of this drug. PCA (5 microg) was infused, bilaterally, into the striatum of rats at 30, 15, or 5 min before training of inhibitory avoidance, and retention of the task was measured 24 h later. An inversely related time-dependent deficit was found. Together with the results from appropriate control groups, this result strongly suggest that systemic PCA produces its reported cognitive effects, at least in part, through its pharmacological action within the striatum.     

Audience perceptions of candidates' appropriateness as a function of nonverbal behaviors displayed during televised political debates

Compared to televised debates using a single-screen format, such debates using a split screen presenting both debaters simultaneously show viewers the nonverbal reactions of each debater's opponent. The authors examined how appropriate or inappropriate such nonverbal behaviors are perceived to be. Students watched one of four versions of a televised debate. One version used a single-screen format, showing only the speaker, whereas the other three versions used a split-screen format in which the speaker's oppodent displayed constant, occasional, or no nonverbal disagreement with the speaker. Students then rated the debaters' appropriateness. Analysis indicated that the opponent was perceived to be less appropriate when he displayed any background disagreement compared to when he did not. The students perceived the speaker as most appropriate when his opponent displayed constant nonverbal disagreement.     

From analytic pragmatism to historical materialism: Frankfurt school critical theory and the Quine-Duhem thesis

My aim in this paper is to explore an affinity between early critical theory and analytical philosophy. The affinity is in a fairly unexpected area: philosophy of science. I argue that early critical theory embraces a view of science which is a natural if somewhat unfamiliar extension of the pragmatist one defended by Quine. In particular, I argue that Horkheimer has a version of the Quine-Duhem thesis (“underdetermination of theory choice by the evidence”). How do the Frankfurt and analytical versions of the underdetermination thesis differ? Quine and others have taken the thesis to motivate a form of pragmatism. What this means is that it is certain interests that ultimately determine the choice of theory: chief among them, an interest in simplicity of our theories. However, the Critical Theorists offer us a distinctly historical materialist version of the underdetermination thesis, in which it is the imperatives of the prevailing mode of production, for example, capitalism, which are decisive. The result is an unfamiliar Marxist version of an otherwise familiar thesis from the analytic tradition.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

McDowell on Kant: Redrawing the Bounds of Sense

John McDowell's Mind and World is a notable attempt to redirect the interest of analytic philosophers toward certain themes in Kantian and more recent continental thought. Only thus, he believes, can we move beyond the various failed attempts – by Quine, Davidson, Rorty, and others – to achieve a naturalised epistemology that casts off the various residual "dogmas" of old-style logical empiricism. In particular, McDowell suggests that we return to Kant's ideas of "spontaneity" and "receptivity" as the two jointly operative powers of mind which enable thought to transcend the otherwise unbridgeable gulf between sensuous intuitions and concepts of understanding. However, this project miscarries for several reasons. Chief among them is the highly problematical nature of Kant's claims, taken over by McDowell without reference to their later treatment at the hands of subjective and objective idealists. Hence he tends to fall back into different versions of the same mind/world dualism. I then question McDowell's idea that Kant can be "naturalised" by reinterpreting those claims from a more hermeneutic or communitarian standpoint with its sources in Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Gadamer. For the result is to deprive Kant's philosophy of its distinctively critical dimension not only with regard to epistemological issues but also in relation to matters of ethical and sociopolitical judgement.     

Basic‐Know And Super‐Know

Sometimes a proposition is ‘opaque’ to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the ‘Opaque Proposition Principle’. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term ‘know’ as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic‐know or super‐know. I use this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then to similarly construct plausible versions of the Reflection Principle and the Sure‐Thing Principle.     

Construct validity and case validity in assessment

Clinical assessment relies on both construct validity, which focuses on the accuracy of conclusions about a psychological phenomenon drawn from responses to a measure, and case validity, which focuses on the synthesis of the full range of psychological phenomena pertaining to the concern or question at hand. Whereas construct validity is grounded in understanding causal influences of a distinct phenomenon on responses to various measures and life contexts, case validity encompasses the joint influences of multiple phenomena on individuals' responses. Two sets of distinctions essential to understanding psychological phenomena, hence to understanding construct validity, are (a) implicit and explicit versions of personality constructs and (b) ability and personality as versions of constructs measured by performance tests presenting maximal and typical conditions, respectively. Since both implicit and explicit versions of constructs interface with maximal or typical performance conditions, case validity requires systematic inclusion of these distinctions in assessment protocols.     

Bootstrapping while barefoot (crime models vs. theoretical models in the hunt for serial killers)

Investigating random homicides involves constructing models of an odd sort. While the differences between these models and scientific models are radical, calling them models is justified both by functional and structural similarities. Serial homicide investigations illustrate the marked difference between theoretical models in science and the models applied in these criminal investigations. This is further illustrated by considering Glymourian bootstrapping in attempts to solve such homicides. The solutions that result differ radically from explanations in science that are confirmed or disconfirmed by occurrences. Unlike the scientist, the flatfoot gumshoe is also barefoot: he is bereft of a general, determinative theoretical frame. This result shows that criminal investigations do not apply science in the Galilean sense.I wish to thank philosophers Keith Cooper, William Wimsatt, and, especially, Jay Bachrach for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Waiting for the bus: when base-rates refuse to be neglected

The paper reports the results from 16 versions of a simple probability estimation task, where probability estimates derived from base-rate information have to be modified by case knowledge. In the bus problem [adapted from Falk, R., Lipson, A., & Konold, C. (1994). The ups and downs of the hope function in a fruitless search. In G. Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.), Subjective probability (pp. 353-377). Chichester, UK: Wiley], a passenger waits for a bus that departs before schedule in 10% of the cases, and is more than 10 min delayed in another 10%. What are Fred's chances of catching the bus on a day when he arrives on time and waits for 10 min? Most respondents think his probability is 10%, or 90%, instead of 50%, which is the correct answer. The experiments demonstrate the difficulties people have in replacing the original three-category 1/8/1 partitioning with a normalized, binary partitioning, where the middle category is discarded. In contrast with typical studies of "base-rate neglect", or under-weighing of base-rates, this task demonstrates a reversed base-rate fallacy, where frequentistic information is overextended and case information ignored. Possible explanations for this robust phenomenon are briefly discussed.