共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Espinosa JM 《The Behavior analyst / MABA》1992,15(1):51-60
The concept of probability appears to be very important in the radical behaviorism of Skinner. Yet, it seems that this probability has not been accurately defined and is still ambiguous. I give a strict, relative frequency interpretation of probability and its applicability to the data from the science of behavior as supplied by cumulative records. Two examples of stochastic processes are given that may model the data from cumulative records that result under conditions of continuous reinforcement and extinction, respectively. 相似文献
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H Rachlin 《The American psychologist》1992,47(11):1371-1382
A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms. 相似文献
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William O'Neill Ph.D. George D. Demos Ph.D. 《The American journal of family therapy》2013,41(2):29-36
Abstract t “Everything begins with subjective states,” is the basic position of Phenomenology, and only through subjectivity imate reality be reached. Behaviorism, on the contrary, sees “mind” as part of the material world—the and behavior as determining man's essence (man is what he does). “Change,” which is the goal of every therapy, is attend by altering behavior which leads to changes in attitudes. The best way to alter beliefs is by controlling the behavioral cognition itself. 相似文献
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Frederick E. Mosedale 《Philosophical Investigations》2010,33(2):126-141
Frank B. Ebersole died recently. Here I remind philosophers of the thinking of this reclusive philosopher who brought out the value of Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophers should “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” I illustrate Ebersole's singular thinking by focusing on his philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance metaphor. 相似文献
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Elizabeth H. Wolgast 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(1-4):348-366
An essay to develop some of Wittgenstein's remarks about the notion of ‘criteria’ and to give the concept clarity even at the expense of some features Wittgenstein claimed for it. This effort was made because of the important role ‘criteria’ plays in Wittgenstein's discussions of feelings and mental states, and it is hoped that a defense of ‘criteria’ will make those discussions more coherent. An attempt is made to relate this notion of ‘criteria’ to the definition and expression of mental states, following some of Wittgenstein's suggestions, and to rebut skepticism about other minds. 相似文献
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Beth Savickey 《Philosophical Investigations》2014,37(3):185-194
In his article “It's a Wonderful Life,” Ronald Hall connects Wittgenstein's last words with Frank Capra's 1946 film. His analysis focuses on the concept of wonder, but he misses one of the most important aspects of both the film and Wittgenstein's last words: the significance of friendship. This is philosophically (and biographically) important because it raises questions about aspect‐seeing, friendship and everyday life. Wittgenstein's final words provide a striking example of the philosophical complexity of his life and work. 相似文献
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Montgomery Link 《Synthese》2009,166(1):41-54
In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical
but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting
the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead
revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his
philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental. 相似文献