The Russian Cusanus: S. L. Frank and the Russian reception of Nicholas of Cusa

During the intense philosophical and theological renaissance of the Russian Silver Age, the German Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) received a unique appraisal in the work of Semyon Liudwigovich Frank (1877–1950), hailed by some as ‘the greatest Russian philosopher’. This paper will show that five of Frank's central philosophical arguments can be traced directly to Cusa's writings. Once these key arguments are taken together with Frank's own comments about Cusa, it can be concluded that Frank saw himself as Cusa's modern successor, presenting his ideas in a different intellectual context. In this sense, we can speak of Frank as the ‘Russian Cusanus’. The arguments in question include Cusa's docta ignorantia, our knowledge of being, the recognition of absolute being as ‘non-other’, the identity of possibility and actuality in the absolute, and finally the coincidentia oppositorum.     

Can Science Cope with More Than One World? A Cross-Reading of Habermas, Popper, and Searle

The purpose of this article is to critically assess the ‘three-world theory’ as it is presented—with some slight but decisive differences—by Jürgen Habermas and Karl Popper. This theory presents the philosophy of science with a conceptual and material problem, insofar as it claims that science has no single access to all aspects of the world. Although I will try to demonstrate advantages of Popper’s idea of ‘the third world’ of ideas, the shortcomings of his ontological stance become visible from the pragmatic point of view in Habermas’s theory of communicative acts. With regard to the critique that the three-world theory has met in both its pragmatic and ontological versions, I will take a closer look at John Searle’s naturalistic counter-position. By teasing out some problematic implications in his theory of causation, I aim to show that Searle’s approach is, in fact, much closer to Popper’s than he might think. Finally, while condoning Habermas’s distinction between the natural world and the lifeworld, I will opt for a pragmatically differentiated view of ‘the real’, rather than speaking of different worlds.     

The Privilege of the Present: Time and the Trace from Heidegger to Derrida

ABSTRACT

One of the starting points of Derrida’s deconstruction is the idea that metaphysics is dominated by an ontological primacy of the present. It is well known that Derrida took up this thesis of the ‘privilege of the present’ in metaphysics from Heidegger. However, this thesis is mentioned without being developed by Heidegger. What is the meaning of this ontological position? How did it originate? Should we try to go beyond it? And if so, how? In this paper, I would like to start out from Heidegger’s view that the understanding of Being, in the metaphysical tradition, is dominated by the ontological primacy of the present: according to this approach, which goes back to Aristotle’s theory of substance (ousia), Being means constant presence; only that which is constantly present really exists. I will then show that Heidegger himself, in his conception of the past, has renewed the privilege of the present, favoring the ‘having been’ (Gewesenheit) over the past as ‘by-gone-ness’ (Vergangenheit). Finally, I will show how Derrida’s concept of trace may help us to go beyond the privilege of the present.     

On the motivations for Merleau-Ponty’s ontological research

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research.     

Sibley on ‘Beautiful’ and ‘Ugly’

Abstract

Frank Sibley's ideas have been particularly influential among contemporary philosophers interested in aesthetics. Most studies, however, have focused only on his earlier works. In this essay, I explore Sibley's account of the adjectives ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’, paying particular attention to three papers that have only recently been published and that have not yet received adequate attention. In particular, I discuss his account of the adjective ‘beautiful’, which relies on the controversial notion of an aesthetic ideal. In addition, I discuss an account of how aesthetic judgements may change in relation to our coming to know the kind of object being judged and whether, as Sibley maintains, ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ are asymmetric in the sense specified by the author.     

Secular Spirituality and the Hermeneutics of Ontological Gratitude

In his 2010 article, ‘Secular Spirituality and the Logic of Giving Thanks’, John Bishop recalls a striking theme in a recent address by Richard Dawkins in which he appeared to enthusiastically endorse the appropriateness of a ‘naturalised spirituality’ that involved ‘existential gratitude’, and this led him to investigate the notion of a naturalised or secular spirituality with particular reference to Robert Solomon’s Spirituality for the Skeptic (2002). This essay looks to pick up on Bishop’s engagements with both Dawkins and Solomon, but to extend the conversation well beyond them in order to defend the credibility and integrity of secular spirituality in its movement of ontological gratitude. In this way it looks to offer a first sketch of what might be termed a ‘hermeneutics of ontological gratitude’. To this end – and via a distinction between gratitude for existence and life – the essay considers Dawkins’ argument and Solomon’s work in further detail, before turning to consider various other perspectives on the problem including Kenneth Schmitz’s existential Thomist notion of ontological contingency, Hannah Arendt’s concept of primary natality, and Emmanuel Levinas’ sketch of the self in its interiority and economy. My claim is that any serious naturalistic spirituality needs to take into account not only a gratitude for one’s existence per se, but for the whole context of individual and collective being.     

Sartre and the Doctors

Abstract

This paper considers how the experience of illness fits within Sartre’s account of embodiment in Being and Nothingness. Sartre makes some remarks about illness, but does not develop a full account. I show that the anti‐naturalistic ontological framework in which Sartre’s discussion of the body is placed, which opposes my ‘being‐for‐Others’ to my ‘being‐for‐myself’, imposes a revisionary account of illness, and how Sartre’s model of interpersonal relations affects his view of doctors, and their role in the illness experience. I note and discuss the connection Sartre draws between illness and bad faith. I also point out that recent phenomenologically inspired criticisms of the medical establishment that draw on Sartre’s account of the body are limited by their failure to engage with Sartre’s ontology.     

An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology

Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in the early twentieth century. Developing a systematic, post-Kantian critical ontology ‘this side’ of idealism and realism, he subverted the widespread impression that philosophy must either exhaust itself in foundationalist epistemology or engage in system-building metaphysical excess. This essay provides an introduction to Hartmann’s approach in light of the recent translation of his early essay ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’ (1923) In it Hartmann criticizes both the pretensions of epistemology as well as the principal errors of classical ontology, and he proposes a series of correctives that lead to his development of a highly original and elaborate stratified categorial ontology. This introduction explains the most important errors of the ‘old’ ontology, his correctives to them, and further fleshes out these correctives with reference to his mature ontological work.     

Fallen or Unfallen? Christ's Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness

Abstract: Because Christ's sinlessness is a matter of virtual consensus among Christians, debates over whether the human nature he assumed was fallen or unfallen turn on the ontological conditions of his being ‘without sin’ (Heb. 4:15). The claim that Christ assumed a fallen nature can be defended by distinguishing between fallenness and sinfulness as properties of nature and hypostasis, respectively. Moreover, by highlighting the peculiar place of the will in human nature, this christological analysis helps counter the charge that an Augustinian understanding of original sin entails a dualism inconsistent with belief in the goodness of creation and human moral accountability.     

The Great Mandate,Sages and Sufism: Expounding Ma Dexin and his Sino-Muslim predecessors

Abstract: Ma Dexin (1794–1874), the prestigious Sino-Muslim philosopher, bridged Sufi ideas and Neo-Confucian philosophy by his handling of the concept of the Great Mandate. For Ma, the Sufi idea of ‘the Muhammadan Reality’, namely the reality of the perfect human, could be understood through an adoption and exploration of an ontological and cosmological interpretation of the Confucian concepts ‘sage’ and ‘ming’. The paper explains how Ma departed from the Neo-Confucian conceptual framework by holding that the Non-Ultimate had more ontological significance than the Supreme Ultimate. It is proposed that Ma's difference from the Neo-Confucians on that point explains his identification of the Great Mandate with the Non-Ultimate.     

Shaping the Enemy: Foundational Labelling by L.E.J. Brouwer and A. Heyting

The use of the three labels (logicism, formalism, intuitionism) to denote the three foundational schools of the early twentieth century are now part of literature. Yet, neither their number nor their adoption has been stable over the twentieth century. They were not introduced by the founding fathers of each school: namely, neither Frege nor Russell spoke of ‘logicism’; and even Hilbert did not use the word ‘formalism’ to introduce his foundational programs. At a certain point, only Brouwer used the label ‘intuitionism’ in his scientific production to personify his philosophy of mathematics and he used the label ‘formalism’ for Hilbert’s foundational viewpoint. Starting with Brouwer, the origin of the use of the three labels to represent a foundational meaning, will be analysed in this paper. Thereafter, the role that Brouwer’s pupil Arend Heyting had in the production and use of foundational labels will be considered. On the basis of the comparison of the attitudes of these two scholars I will finally advance the thesis that not only the creation but also the use of labels, far from being a mere gesture of academic reference to literature, can be a sign of the cultural operation each scholar wanted to do.     

A challenge to ‘self’ centred ‘psycho’: Therapy as an introduction to an ‘inter-relational therapy’

This paper focuses on ‘psychotherapy’, particularly exploring the emphasis on the ‘psyche’. The term ‘psyche’ is described as potentially having different interpretations depending on the underlying ontological assumptions that influence its understanding and these, it is suggested, will have considerable implications for the therapy that identifies with the label ‘psychotherapy’. Two very different ontological perspectives are highlighted in this paper in order to illustrate the different conception of the term ‘psyche’; firstly, Freud’s interpretation of what is meant by ‘psyche’, which is then contrasted with a phenomenological perspective, with reference to the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. Both the Freudian and phenomenological approaches are then criticised for focusing on, what is described here as, an egocentric perspective and it is suggested that the term ‘psycho-therapy’ will inevitably lead to a preoccupation with putting the ‘self’ first as a basis for relating to the external world. An alternative term, ‘Inter-relational therapy’, is presented based on the ideas of Levinas and MacMurray, both of who are critical of a cultural preoccupation with focusing on the ‘self’ and suggest a need to acknowledge relationships with the external world, including the other people that populate it, prior to a ‘self’ reflective process.     

Commentary on Rosefeldt: Should Metaphysics Care About Ontological Commitment from Casual Utterances?

Tobias Rosefeldt argues that in order to reconcile a physics-based fundamental ontology with the ontological implications of our everyday utterances, philosophers should pursue a ‘linguistics-based conciliatory’ strategy: They should refer to the results of linguistic research in order to avoid ontological commitment to problematic entities. Whereas Rosefeldt is not an advocate of radical forms of naturalized metaphysics, his argument is driven by the motivation behind pleas for a naturalization of the discipline. I claim that although there is a need for reconciliation, Rosefeldt’s favored account falls short of this goal. More generally, I argue that so-called ‘conciliatory accounts’ fail to do justice to the motivation that necessitated them in the first place, as the role they assign to analyses of everyday speech in search of ontological commitments is at odds with said motivation. ‘Conciliatory accounts’, hence, sit uneasily between radically naturalistic and traditional armchair approaches to metaphysics.     

Configurations of Rape: Some Issues for ConversationConfigurations of Rape in the Hebrew Bible: A Literary Analysis of Three Rape Narratives – By Frank M. Yamada

While I am in much agreement with Frank Yamada's analysis and reading of the Genesis 34, Judges 19, and 2 Samuel 13 as rape narratives, in that all three texts show a ‘family resemblance’, this review essay is an attempt to engage his work in a conversation by discussing the following issues: (1) his use of ‘family resemblance’; (2) common authorship; (3) insider–outsider category; (4) 2 Samuel 11 as a rape narrative; (5) theological and ethical implications of such readings.     

The “concept of time” and the “being of the clock”: Bergson, Einstein, Heidegger, and the interrogation of the temporality of modernism

The topic to be addressed in this paper, that is, the distinction between the “concept” of time and the being of the clock, divides into two parts: first, in the debate between Albert Einstein and Henri Bergson, one discovers the ground for the diverging concepts of time characterized by physics in its opposing itself to philosophy. Bergson’s durée or “duration” in opposition to Einstein’s ‘physicist’s time’ as ‘public time,’ one can argue, sets the terms for Martin Heidegger’s extending, his ontological analysis of Da-sein, as human being-in-the-world. Second, in this the ‘concept of time’ gives way to the analysis of the ‘being of the clock.’ What is this being of the clock that makes evident the fundamental temporality of Da-sein? This question is rehearsed in Division Two of Being and Time. My claim is that the fundamental insight into the nature of time revealed by the encounter between Bergson and Einstein is that time extemporizes itself. Temporality “is” not a being but a process that temporalizes itself, precisely because it “is not.”     

Objectivity and the supernormal: the limitations of bracketing approaches in providing neutral accounts of supernormal claims

This paper contends that bracketing approaches to the sociological study of supernatural, paranormal, and occult proponents do not truly ‘bracket’ the reality-claims made by those being studied, but instead impose ontological limits on what can be considered ‘supernormal’. It is argued that such boundaries and definitions tend to rule out alternative ontological perspectives of the kind that researchers typically encounter among religious, paranormal, and occult proponents. It is also argued that, unlike earlier reductionist approaches to the supernormal, the bias of bracketing approaches is not necessarily based on an underlying sceptical outlook of researchers, but rather reflects an inherent ontological limitation within the sociological enterprise itself. It is recommended that bracketing should be replaced by a reflexive, dialogical approach that emphasises the ontological positioning of social analyses with respect to supernormal claims.     

‘There is no brute world,only an elaborated world’: Merleau-Ponty on the intersubjective constitution of the world

In his later works, Merleau-Ponty proposes the notion of ‘the flesh’ (la chair) as a new ‘element’, as he put it, in his ontological monism designed to overcome the legacy of Cartesian dualism with its bifurcation of all things into matter or spirit. Most Merleau-Ponty commentators recognise that Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’ is inspired by Edmund Husserl's conceptions of ‘lived body’ (Leib) and ‘vivacity’ or ‘liveliness’ (Leiblichkeit). But it is not always recognised that, for Merleau-Ponty, the constitution of the world of perception, the problem of embodiment or incarnation, is at the very same time one with the problem of the experience of others in what Husserl called Einfühlung or Fremderfahung and indeed one with the problem of the constitution of the commonly shared world ‘for all’. As Merleau-Ponty put it in his late essay ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’ in Signs, ‘the problem of Einfühlung, like that of my incarnation, opens on the meditation of sensible being, or, if you prefer, it betakes itself there’. In other words, the problem of the apprehension of the other is part of the overall apprehension of the transcendent world. In this paper I want to meditate on the relations between embodiment, experience of others, and experience of the world in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I will take particular note, as in the title of this presentation, of the claim made by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible that ‘there is no brute world, only an elaborated world’ (il n'y a pas de monde brut, il n'y a qu'un monde élaboré).     

Kant's Argument that Existence is not a Determination

In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non‐existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant's target is not merely ontological arguments as such but the larger ‘ontotheist’ metaphysics they presuppose: the view that God necessarily exists in virtue of his essence being contained in, or logically entailed by, his essence. I show that the ontotheist explanation of divine necessity requires the assumption that existence is a determination, and I show that Descartes and Leibniz are implicitly committed to this in their published versions of the ontological argument. I consider the philosophical motivations for the claim that existence is a determination and then I examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason against it.