Hermeneutics of Clinical Practice: The Question of Textuality

In this article I scrutinize the question whetherclinical medicine, in order to be considered ahermeneutical enterprise, must be thought of as areading of different texts. Three differentproposals for a definition of the concept of text inmedicine, suggested by other hermeneuticians, arediscussed. All three proposals are shown to beunsatisfying in various ways. Instead of attempting tofind a fourth definition of the concept of textsuitable to a hermeneutics of medicine, I then try toshow that the assumption that one needs to operatewith the concept of text in order to develop ahermeneutics of medicine is false. Clinicalinterpretation can be shown to essentially consist ina dialogical hermeneutics, the pattern of which can befound in the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Thiskind of hermeneutics is not a methodology of textreading, but an ontological, phenomenologicalhermeneutics in which understanding is a necessaryfeature of the being-together of human beings in theworld. This being-together in and through languagetakes on a peculiar form in the clinical encounter,since the medical meeting is typically characterizedby an asymmetrical enstrangement and has a specificgoal – health for the patient – absent in other formsof hermeneutics. Central issues of Gadamer'sphilosophy, e.g. fusion of horizons, are shown tofit the structure of clinical practice.     

UNDERSTANDING THROUGH APPROPRIATION IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE ON ETHICS

In today's globalized world, we need to communicate values clearly and constructively across cultures and religions to avoid misunderstanding and conflict and to find shared solutions to the issues affecting human communities across the world. This communication is not easy to implement and requires a considerable amount of commitment and empathy. To be effective, intercultural and interreligious dialogues on ethics demand, first of all, an accommodation of different epistemologies coupled with a sincere respect for their richness and internal coherence. Furthermore, our values are so closely rooted in our identity that expressing them becomes a cultural act—even an act of faith in the case of interreligious dialogue. In this paper, I argue that we need to reiterate or embrace this act of faith in the other's values if we are to properly understand them. How is this possible? The answer calls for a theoretical discussion of the hermeneutics of interreligious dialogue. When applied to intercultural and interreligious dialogues, I contend that the theory of hermeneutics needs a specific epistemological dimension—namely that of “appropriation”—that entails that we borrow the other's epistemological outlook, adopt the other's ad hoc modes of communication or transmission of values, and integrate the other's values into the constellation of our sources of meaning.     

‘I love you’. How to understand love in couple therapy? Exploring love in context

Acknowledging the place of love in couple therapy requires therapists to reflect upon what love means to them. We propose that love defines the couple relationship and in turn the relationship defines love. In this article we explore and focus on our conceptualization of love and its influence on couple therapy. Exploring love in the context of the phrase ‘I love you’ leads us to consider built‐in contradictions. These contradictions can be contextualized and understood in a relational dialectic framework. Implications for therapy are explored and briefly illustrated in a case vignette.     

Thingly hermeneutics/Technoconstructions

Within the Euro-American community of philosophers relating hermeneutics to science there is a considerable disagreement about where hermeneutics may be located. The older traditions hold that hermeneutics apply to and are limited to the social, cultural, and historical dimensions of science. But newer approaches claim that hermeneutics applies to the very praxis of science and to the constitution of scientific objects. This paper sides with the latter perspective and argues that a tendency to retain vestigial positivist interpretations of science keeps the older tradition from seeing hermeneutics as deeply embedded in science praxis. After arguing this point historically, I turn to a hermeneutic recuperation of science, first by drawing from the hermeneutic approach of Joseph Rouse, and then by the hermeneutic constructionism of Bruno Latour. I finally turn to what I term technoconstruction in science, particularly in imaging processes, to show concrete cases of the hermeneutic preparation of scientific objects. I conclude that contemporary science has exceeded its earlier modernist framework and now operates in a constructionist-hermeneutic framework.     

THE KENOSIS OF THE CREATOR AND OF THE CREATED CO-CREATOR

Abstract I comment on moral and theological aspects of human technology, which I consider as an evolutionary moment of our cultural and genetic variation. It is an important moment both scientifically and theologically. Starting from Philip Hefner's theological program of the human being as created co‐creator, I distinguish between the limitations and responsibilities of the human being as a created agent and the possibilities and ideals as a co‐creator. I develop the idea of the kenosis (self‐emptying) of the Creator, which as the root of God's love principle should be reenacted by the created co‐creators. I analyze elements of this kenosis presented by Jürgen Moltmann in relation to creation and eschatology.     

The Dialogue between Science and Religion and the Dialogue between People of Different Faiths: Areopagus Revisited

Christianity finds itself in a new situation, one that resembles its first-century experience in that it will be shaped by a new dominant world culture. This culture is marked by three factors-the economy, the multireligious situation, and science. The author's discussion deals with the issues that arise in this engagement with culture under three rubrics: dialogue between science and religion, globalization of the religious encounter, and interreligious dialogue in a globalized world. The major assertions are: (1) Science and religions must avoid restrictive and expansionist relationships and work for reciprocal interaction. (2) Globalization is an unavoidable, but ambiguous, historical development; religions should reject responses of "ethnification" and "primitivism" and rather engage in strategies that encourage both productive encounter and critical distance. (3) Interreligious dialogue includes dialogues of life, of intellectual exchange, of religious experience, of common action, and of confrontation; this dialogue will seek to embrace truth (which involves science) and wisdom (which includes the various religious traditions) in the reciprocal interaction that is marked by love.     

THE LOVE RACKET: DEFINING LOVE AND AGAPEFOR THE LOVE‐AND‐SCIENCE RESEARCH PROGRAM

Abstract. Scholars of religion and science have generated remarkable scholarship in recent years in their explorations of love. Exactly how scholars involved in this budding field believe that love and science should relate and/or be integrated varies greatly. What they share in common is the belief that issues of love are of paramount importance and that the various scientific disciplines—whether natural, social, or religious—must be brought to bear upon how best to understand love. I briefly introduce the emergence of the love‐and‐science research program and note that scholars have not done well defining what they mean by love. I suggest that the present surge in love scholarship will fail to produce the positive results that it otherwise might if love is not defined well. I provide and defend a definition of love adequate for those doing love‐and‐science research: To love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic response to others (including God), to promote well‐being. To explain better what this simple definition entails, I explore its three main phrases. Love is said to have many forms, but agape is the form to which the love‐and‐science literature most commonly refers. I comment briefly on the debates about how to best understand agape, noting sixteen different definitions proposed by major scholars. I identify weaknesses in many of them and then offer what I argue is a more adequate definition of agape as intentional response to promote well‐being when confronted by that which generates ill‐being. In short, agape repays evil with good. While research on love and science requires much more than adequate definitions, I believe that the definitions I proffer can prove useful in furthering the love‐and‐science research program.     

Can there be a science of the symbolic?

Science means not just 'knowing', but knowing verified by replicability. Science is particularly hard to bring to depth psychology because the individual uniquenesses that can't be repeated are what make people most deeply themselves. Everyone, including the analytic investigator, however, has a science, in the sense of a world-view that is replicated by experience. Jung offered hermeneutics as an alternative mode to science for getting to know the psychological subject. But as Heidegger emphasized, hermeneutics always begins with the projection of a world-view, i.e., the science of the would-be interpreter. In the analytic situation, dialogue is available to test the world-view and enlarge its horizon, in accord with Gadamer's expansion of hermeneutics, 'the classical discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts', into a method of inquiry open to the possibilities of otherness. An example is given from an analytic training seminar, in which the author began by projecting his version of the theory of psychological types onto the dream material a candidate offered in response to the seminar. A dialogue with the candidate ensued which enabled the teacher to correct his original, somewhat rigid, application of his scientific viewpoint. In such a dialogue, psyche emerges as the final interpreter of what is, generating hypotheses that can fruitfully be applied to the understanding of other cases.     

The Break-Up Check: Exploring Romantic Love through Relationship Terminations

People who experience love often experience break-ups as well. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an insight on the nature of break-ups, but also make a specific claim about the nature of love. I argue that the object that is universally lost in all break-ups is a person with certain intrinsic qualities, who is in a relationship characterised by certain shared activities and recognized as romantic. That means that, at least in romantic terminations, the beloved and the relationship are not independent objects of grief. So, plausibly, they may not independent objects of value in love. Hence, those who state otherwise (within the property view and the relationship view) should face up to this objection coming from the study of break-ups.     

Reading the Lives of Others: Biography as Political Thought in Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir

In this essay, I focus on two biographical works by Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir that I read as political texts: Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess (Arendt 1957 ) and “Must We Burn Sade?” (Beauvoir 2012 ). Reading Arendt's Varnhagen and Beauvoir's “Sade” side by side illuminates their shared preoccupation with lived experience and their common political premises: the antagonism between freedom and sovereignty, and the centrality of action and constructive relations with others. My argument is that these texts constitute an original style of political thinking, which I call politico‐biographical hermeneutics, or reading the life of others as exercises in political theory. Politico‐biographical hermeneutics, as I take it, is not a systematic methodology, but an approach to interpreting sociopolitical forces as they come to bear and are embodied and inscribed in the lived experiences, struggles, and works of representative or exemplary individuals. This approach identifies the political lessons of lived experience and supports one of the central claims of feminist philosophy, namely, that the personal and the political are not antithetical, but relational.     

Volo ut sis: Arendt and Augustine

This article focuses on Hanna Arendt's use of love in her writings. More specifically, I contend that Arendt's use of volo ut sis (I want you to be) and labeling of this type of love as Augustinian, takes what Augustine meant by "love" too far.     

Words that reveal: Jean-Yves Lacoste and the experience of God

Much of the contemporary discussion of religion seems to do away with the very possibility of revelation. In this article, I use Lacoste’s phenomenology of la parole to rethink a theology of revelation in terms of God’s personal self-giving in experience. After examining Lacoste’s views of the relationship between philosophy and theology, his liturgical reduction and what this means for an understanding of experience and knowledge, and his thought of la parole more broadly, I give critical consideration to how he thinks the possibility of God’s address to humanity. Lacoste maintains that God’s presence in experience may be known through affection, and, indeed, that the word may so move us that we are able to recognise that presence. He uses the notion of self-evidence rather than the usual phenomenological category of evidence to evince the reasonableness of this response. I argue that while Lacoste accords due deference to a traditional understanding of revelation as the repetition or unfolding of a word addressed to us in the past, his thought also allows us to think revelation as a contemporary event, the hermeneutics of which allow us to know God in ways that are new.     

Heideggerian hermeneutics and its application to sport

Whilst hermeneutics had been traditionally associated with the interpretation of texts, Martin Heidegger gave it a new meaning, associating it with the interpretation of the existence (the ‘being’) of Dasein. This paper will explain the Heideggerian understanding of hermeneutics, based on the early work of Heidegger (especially Being and Time and other related works from this period) which focuses on the analysis of the being of Dasein. His main contribution was a shift of focus from the interpretation of an unknown object (a text) to the interpretation of the human being (Dasein), which Heidegger sees as primary, since it is on the basis of Dasein’s understanding that other things and beings are interpreted. Firstly, the paper discusses hermeneutics in relation to human being (Dasein), with a brief introduction to the main characteristics of Dasein (including the ‘existentialia’), showing the place of hermeneutics within Dasein’s existence, together with Heidegger’s re-interpretation of the hermeneutic circle. Secondly, this understanding is applied to sport, focusing on the experience of athletes and on the possibilities for interpretations towards authentic existence, including its ethical aspect.     

THE EMPATHIC EMOTIONS AND SELF-LOVE IN BISHOP JOSEPH BUTLER AND THE NEUROSCIENCES

In Joseph Butler, we have an account of human beings as moral beings that is, as this essay demonstrates, being supported by the recently emerging findings of the neurosciences. This applies particularly to Butler's portrayal of our empathic emotions. Butler discovered their moral significance for motivating and guiding moral decisions and actions before the neurosciences did. Butler has, in essence, added a sixth sense to our five senses: this is the moral sense by means of which we perceive what we ought or ought not do. The moral sense yields relatively reliable moral perceptions when we love our neighbors as ourselves, and when our love for ourselves is genuine. Accurate moral perceptions will be thwarted by self-deceit—that is, by a self-partiality devoid of neighbor love, a condition that thwarts genuine self-love. This essay explores the parallels between Butler's understanding of self-deceit and Robert J. Lifton's understanding of "doubling."     

Confusion of Horizons: Gadamer and the Christian logos

This paper argues for Gadamer's indebtedness to logs Christology. Gadamer's language philosophy and hermeneutic experience both depend on theological insights gleaned mainly from St. Augustine and German Pietism. In Truth and Method , Gadamer uses Augustine's rewriting of Platonism to establish his language philosophy and employs the Pietist formula of application to describe the hermeneutical experience as word event. Gadamer's silence about these influences in his later works leave his interpreters and critics (such as Jürgen Habermas) puzzled about his seeming naïve trust in philosophical hermeneutics as a means to improve human interaction. This article tries to contribute to an understanding of Gadamer's hermeneutics by arguing that Gadamer's optimism in language and reason make sense when seen in the theological context from which crucial elements of his philosophy are derived.     

Confucian love and global ethics: how the cheng brothers would help respond to christian criticisms

There is an increasing awareness that we are living in a global village, which demands a global ethics. In this article, I shall explore what contributions Confucianism, particularly its conception of love, can make. It has often been claimed that Confucian love is love with distinction, as a natural feeling, and as merely human love and so it is inferior to the Christian love, which is universal, commanded, and based on divine love. Drawing on the resources of the Cheng brothers’ neo-Confucianism, I shall explore how Confucianism can make creative responses to such criticisms and thus make a unique Confucian contribution to the emerging global ethics.     

‘Undecidability’ or ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ Caputo in conversation with Heidegger

In this article I will consider John D. Caputo’s hermeneutics of deconstruction or what he calls ‘radical hermeneutics’, with ‘undecidability’ as its major theme, in conversation with Martin Heidegger’s notion of ‘resolute existence’. Through an examination of the different positions of Caputo, Heidegger, and also Kierkegaard, Derrida and Meister Eckhart on the possibility of repetition, the hermeneutical circle and the mystical way of prayer and faith, I am arguing that deconstruction is not the end of hermeneutics, it is not the final destination of an interpretative task, and thus deconstructive hermeneutics has to concede a reconstructive process. Further, I am arguing that Caputo’s ‘radical hermeneutics’ is too reductionist to keep any meaning for the hermeneutic enterprise to aspire to. I am contending, rather, that it is resolute existence that theology aspires to as it is a move beyond ‘undecidability’.     

On the Subjectivity of Lustful States of Mind

This paper explores certain subjective dimensions of sexuality by proposing that erotic experience is predicated on an experience of otherness within the self. I suggest that the ability to lust where one loves is contingent on the capacity to bring this otherness of self forward in the context of attachment. The dampening or deadening of desire in long-term relationships may be understood, counterintuitively, not as a failure of the integration of lust with love but as a breakdown of the normative dissociative processes on which the emergence of lust depends. I theorize that the otherness of lustful states of mind emerges via the impact and dynamic interplay of social regulatory intrusions on identity formation. This understanding helps explain both the psychic tensions and potential sources of breakdown present in combining lust with love.     

THE VARIETIES OF NON‐RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

I want to consider the suggestion that certain essential components of human experience are by their nature distinctively religious, and thus that the atheist is either debarred from participating fully in such experiences, or fails to understand their real nature. I am going to look at five kinds of experience:

• ? the experience of the moral ‘ought’;
• ? the experience of beauty;
• ? the experience of meaning conferred by stories;
• ? the experience of otherness and transcendence;
• ? the experience of vulnerability and fragility.

These seem to me to be integral features of any meaningful human life. They are aspects of what it is to be human. Some theists would simply agree with that statement. Others, however, would say that though essentially human they are also essentially religious, and that the secular humanist's participation in such experiences is in some way defective. That is the claim which I want to consider and contest.