Philosophical Methodology and Conceptions of Evil Action

There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Employing empirical research the authors undertook, this article suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, the authors argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of evil action we have prudential or moral (or both) reason to deploy and, second, in determining whether we could feasibly come to adopt that conception as the single shared conception given our psychological make‐up and the content of the conceptions currently deployed.     

Two Conceptions of Inequality

Abstract

Following Temkin's Inequality I take my point of departure in an individualistic approach according to which a situation is bad in respect of inequality to the extent individuals in it have egalitarian complaints. After having criticised some of Temkin's notions of inequality, I argue that there are two proper egalitarian conceptions, the Equal Share Conception and the Place Conception. The first concerns how much welfare an individual can claim to have in order to have what she should have in virtue of equality. The second concerns an individual's egalitarian complaint in so far as it depends on her place in a situation's distribution of welfare. I argue that the first conception can be employed in a defence of Telic Egalitarianism against Derek Parfit's Levelling Down Objection and that the second one can explain why this objection may seem so convincing. I also argue that Telic Egalitarianism, understood according to the first conception, in one respect is preferable to Parfit's Priority View.     

Two Conceptions of Response-dependence

The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.     

西方民主理论视野下的两种政治道德观

政治道德是政治哲学的核心范畴,它回答了政治权力运用的合法性以及道德证明的问题,民主作为人类历史上迄今为止最为合理的政治统治形式和治理方式,必然也面临着道德合法性及道德证明的问题.按保护型民主与发展型民主的划分,西方民主理论本身蕴含着消极政治道德与积极政治道德两种政治道德观.     

Two Conceptions of the Physical

The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception , it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object-based conception , it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. the paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.     

Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity

Abstract

In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the ‘orthodox’ conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.     

Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties*

Abstract: Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature. The issue has direct bearing on reductionism. If the sparse properties are drawn from all the levels of nature, then macro‐scientific properties are just as primary as micro‐scientific properties, and do not need to be reduced to them.     

Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject’s undergoing experiences with those contents requires them to possess the concepts that characterize those contents. I maintain that these ways of understanding conceptualism and nonconceptualism are orthogonal to one another. This is revealed by the conceptual coherence of positions in which the contents of experiences have both conceptual and nonconceptual features; positions which possess their own distinctive sources of philosophical motivation. I argue that the fact that there is a place in conceptual space for such positions, and that there may be good reason for theorists to adopt them, creates difficulties for both the central argument for nonconceptualism and the central argument for conceptualism. I set out each of these arguments; the Argument from Possession-Independence and the Epistemically-Driven Argument. I then try to show how the existence of mixed positions about perceptual content derived from a clear distinction between compositional and possessional considerations constitutes a significant obstacle for those arguments as they stand. The takehome message of the paper is that unless one clearly acknowledges the distinction between issues about the composition of perceptual content and issues about how subject’s capacities to undergo certain experiences relates to their possession of concepts one runs the risk of embracing unsatisfying philosophical arguments in which conclusions relevant to one conception of nonconceptual and conceptual content are grounded on arguments that concern only the other; arguments that cannot, in themselves, sustain them.     

对物理学之几何化发展的哲学思考

物理学与几何学的关系密切:几何不仅是物理学家描述物理的数学手段,而且是启发他们物理思想的源泉。当物理学家重新考察几何学与物理学的关系时,物理学就会发生一次重大进步甚至革命。伽利略、牛顿的物理学革命将欧几里得几何引入,确立了描写我们世界的数学法则,奠定了经典物理     

Against Two Modest Conceptions of Hard Paternalism

People in our liberal pluralistic society have conflicting intuitions about the legitimacy of coercive hard paternalism, though respect for agency provides a common source of objection to it. The hard paternalist must give adequate reasons for her coercion which are acceptable to a free and equal agent. Coercion that fails to meet with an agent’s reasonable evaluative commitments is at least problematic and risks being authoritarian. Even if the coercer claims no normative authority over the coercee, the former still uses coercion to replace the latter’s reasons or will with his own reasons or will. But does every hard paternalistic view have to invite such objection? Throughout I will assume that defenders of what I will call “Neutral Paternalism” (NP) and “Commonsense Paternalism” (CP) aim to offer reasons for coercion all can reasonably endorse despite evaluative diversity, in opposition to more objectionable forms of coercive paternalism, such as those which defend it on religious or perfectionist grounds. I will argue, nonetheless, that Gerald Dworkin’s defense of NP and Danny Scoccia’s defense of CP succumb to the same problems of objectionable imposition that saddle other forms of coercive paternalism. The shortcomings in their views suggest that even modest hard paternalism is nonetheless problematic for liberals.     

肝脏缺血预处理研究中的哲学思考

1　预处理研究与原型启示1 1　预处理发展史1 986年 ,Ｍｕｒｒｙ等首次报道结扎犬冠状动脉 5ｍｉｎ,再灌注 1 0ｍｉｎ ,重复进行 4次 ,不仅未产生累加性缺血损伤 ,反而可以减轻随后 45ｍｉｎ缺血所致的心肌损伤 ,他们将心脏遭受短暂缺血后能耐受随后较长时间缺血损伤的现象称为缺血预处理 (ｉｓ ｃｈｅｍｉｃｐｒｅｃｏｎｄｉｔｉｏｎｉｎｇ ,ＩＰＣ) [1] 。该现象已在不同种属动物与临床病人以及不同的实验模型 (在体心脏、离体心脏、培养的心肌细胞)、心脏以外组织器官(如肝、小肠、大脑、视网膜 )得到证实[2 ] 。整体动物进行肝脏缺血预…     

病理诊断中的思维特点浅议

1　客体的图像性及主客体交错性病理诊断是病理医生对病变组织进行肉眼观察及 /或制成切片进行镜下观察 (主要的 )以判断病变部位、病变性质 ,即医生进行观察的对象是病理切片(在这里暂称显微图像 )。也就是医生在思维时以显微图像信息为主要依据进行认识理解、分析综合 ,是思维的第一客体。但病理诊断思维的对象不只是显微图像 ,还有病史、症状、体征等临床资料 ,因而思维的客体是集中各种信息于一体的患者。诚然 ,在分析显微图像时 ,病理医生是思维的主体 ,对显微图像材料详细分析、综合、判断。但再多的显微图像也只是病变发展过程中的瞬…     

Explanation and Two Conceptions of the Physical

Any position that promises genuine progress on the mind-body problem deserves attention. Recently, Daniel Stoljar has identified a physicalist version of Russells notion of neutral monism; he elegantly argues that with this type of physicalism it is possible to disambiguate on the notion of physicalism in such a way that the problem is resolved. The further issue then arises of whether we have reason to believe that this type of physicalism is in fact true. Ultimately, one needs to argue for this position by inference to the best explanation, and I show that this new type of physicalism does not hold promise of more explanatory prowess than its relevant rivals, and that, whether it is better than its rivals or not, it is doubtful whether it would furnish us with genuine explanations of the phenomenal at all.     

以"法天不息"的精神贯通伦理与人生--文山精神世界结构层次的哲学阐释

文天祥虽然较少哲学方面的专门著作,但是我们却不能忽略他在中国伦理学史上的重要地位。他以“法天不息”作为自己精神的核心,建构了广阔的精神空间,贯通了伦理和人生,自强不息地进行修养。爱国主义是他的最高伦理成就,他还超越伦理与宇宙大道合一,达到了人生的大自由境界。他以生命验证了儒家文化的内在尊严和精神高度。     

The Two Sides of Love

Abstract The kind of love under consideration here is that between equal persons as it typically occurs within the context of a friendship. It is assumed that love opens the way to a sense of meaning or purpose for the individual, the difficulty addressed being that of how to pursue or recognise love. Is it primarily a form of action or of feeling? Can love be said to consist of giving? How does love relate to freedom and dependence? The consideration of these questions leads to the argument that love necessarily involves the creation of needs and therefore of vulnerability. The essay closes with a conception of how the conflict between love as action and love as feeling (‘the two sides of love’) may be resolved.     

关于药物临床试验伦理问题的思考

医学伦理学是伴随着科学技术的发展而产生的事物,药物临床试验在促进人类健康事业发展的同时,也涉及到与之相驳的伦理学问题,运用哲学的矛盾原理,浅析药物临床试验与医学伦理之间存在的矛盾及矛盾的两面性,以求解决目前药物临床试验中遇到的困难和问题.