Distracting stimuli: Do they elicit or inhibit counterargumentation and attitude shift

Studied the effects of distracting stimuli, presented simultaneously with a persuasive but counterattitudinal communication, on subvocal counterargumentation and attitude shift. All subjects were first-year undergraduate male students at Birmingham University, England. The 80 experimental Ss who formed ten different treatment groups, responded to distracting sequences of numbers by performing visual, auditory, vocal and manual tasks, and combinations thereof, while listening to the message. The base-line group of 28 Ss merely listened to the same communication, which advocated compulsory male sterilisation. After task completion, all Ss were given a six-item Likert-type attitude measurement questionnaire, a counterargumentation measurement similar to that devised by T. C. Brock (1967) and a three-item comprehension test of the arguments used in the communication. The results suggest that distracting stimuli which are greater in intensity or which require a more ‘active’ response from the recipient (up to a certain level of activity) are more likely to inhibit counterargumentation and thus elicit shift toward agreement with the message (while leaving comprehension levels unaffected) than those which are lower in intensity, or which require either a ‘passive’ or a ‘high-active’ response.     

COGNITIVE TUNING AND DIFFERENTIATION OF ARGUMENTS IN COMMUNICATION

In an experiment examining the effects of cognitive tuning and attitudinal position upon individuals’ cognitive differentiation in generating arguments supporting and opposing an attitude issue, 162 undergraduate students were “tuned” either as potential sources (transmission tuning) or potential receivers (reception tuning) of a persuasive communication on one of two issues. They then prepared two lists of arguments, one positive and one negative for one of the attitude issues, after which they completed an attitude measure in both issues. As predicted, the subjects made salient and reported significantly more arguments consistent with than inconsistent with their attitudes toward the issues. More importantly, those persons prepared to function as communication sources generated significantly more arguments consistent with and fewer arguments inconsistent with their attitudes than did subjects expecting to receive persuasive communications on the issues.     

BASIC PREMISES OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL ATTITUDE CHANGE THEORY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

Multidimensional attitude change models propose that (1) stimuli defining the domain of attitudes may consist of a multidimensional rather than unidimensional pattern; (2) stimuli associated with each other in the persuasion process will converge with each other in the multidimensional attitude domain. These two propositions receive clear support from three of the hypotheses tested in four-panel cohort data, which analyses show to be multidimensional. The sources of a persuasive message converge on the position they advocate. Multiple sources converge on each other. The findings provided partial support for two other hypotheses on the convergence of self-concept with advocated position and with sources of a persuasive message. A final, somewhat tangential hypothesis also receives clear support: existential associations of concepts are more effective than hortatory associations. These results support further development of multidimensional attitude change models.     

Initial attitude,source credibility,and involvement as factors in persuasion

Source credibility was manipulated in factorial combination with the measured variables of initial attitude, issue involvement, and sex, using Japanese university students as subjects. A significant credibility × initial attitude interaction replicated previous findings and was attributed to disparagement of the less credible of two communicators by subjects whose initial attitudes were extremely discrepant from the position advocated. The significant involvement × initial attitude interaction reflected the greater resistance of highly involved subjects to persuasion under extreme rather than under moderate communicator-recipient discrepancy.     

Novel argumentation and attitude change: The case of polarization following group discussion

This study is concerned with attitude polarization as a function of two properties of a persuasive message: (a) its validity or acceptability and (b) its novelty. The latter is defined as the extent to which the message contains new arguments unlikely to have been already considered by the individual. Acceptability is assumed to be a necessary condition for inducing attitude change; the impact of novelty, therefore, was expected to be most pronounced for arguments of high validity. This hypothesis was tested in two related studies using arguments produced in response to choice dilemma items, widely used in research on polarization. First, it was shown that arguments rated as both valid and novel were perceived as more persuasive than arguments rated either as highly valid but obvious (non-novel) or as low in validity (non-valid) but novel. Second, when subjects read samples of valid arguments, their attitudes polarized in the direction advocated by the novel arguments rather than by the non-novel ones. These findings are considered relevant to the polarization of attitudes in groups. Other research demonstrates that this phenomenon is the result of persuasive arguments raised during group discussion, The present study suggests why such arguments may be persuasive.     

Processing of persuasive in-group messages

Two studies investigated the processes mediating the persuasive impact of messages representing in-group opinions. In the 1st study, subjects read either a strong or a weak message attributed to either an in-group member or to another group. Subjects were more persuaded by a strong message from the in-group than a weak one, suggesting content-focused processing of the in-group message. Subjects were equally unpersuaded by either a strong or a weak message from the other group, and showed little sign of message processing. In the 2nd study, Ss listened to in-group or other-group messages about issues that varied in their relevance to in-group membership. When the issue was relevant to the in-group, subjects were persuaded by a strong message from the in-group, unpersuaded by a weak message from the in-group, and equally unimpressed by strong and weak messages from the other group. When the issue was irrelevant to the in-group, subjects accepted the position advocated by the in-group regardless of message quality, and again ignored messages from the other group. These results suggest that increased message processing, and not merely the impact of source persuasion cues, can underlie in-group-mediated attitude change.     

Matching the message source to attitude functions: Implications for biased processing

A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching (vs. mismatching) the source of a persuasive message to the functional basis of recipients’ attitudes may lead to positively biased processing. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, high and low self-monitors were presented with a persuasive message ascribed to a source that either matched or mismatched the functional basis of their attitudes (i.e., an expert source for low self-monitors and an attractive source for high self-monitors). The message content was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, given an ambiguous message biased processing led to more agreement when the source matched (vs. mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message regardless of source matching (unbiased processing). Results are discussed with respect to the role of the activation and use of heuristics in biased processing.     

Beyond attitude consensus: The social context of persuasion and resistance

The current research presents a new type of social context effect on attitude certainty. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, they appraise their attitudes not only in terms of whether they are shared or not shared by others, but also in terms of whether they are based on similar or dissimilar assessments of the information presented. In two experiments, participants were presented with persuasive messages. In Experiment 1, they were induced to perceive that they responded favorably (persuasion) or unfavorably (resistance) to the message arguments. In Experiment 2, they were allowed to vary in their actual message responses. In both experiments, message response similarity—the degree to which people perceived that their evaluations of persuasive arguments were shared or unshared by others—moderated the classic effect of attitude similarity on attitude certainty. In particular, attitude similarity only affected attitude certainty under conditions of message response similarity. When message responses were believed to be dissimilar, attitude similarity had no effect on attitude certainty.     

Is politician A or politician B more persuasive? recipients' source preference and the direction of biased message processing

Participants' preference for one of two politicians running for the post of Chancellor in Germany was measured. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, participants were then presented with a persuasive message ascribed to one of these two sources. The message was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. Different from previous research on the role of message ambiguity for attitude change, the ambiguous message consisted of arguments rated as moderately convincing in a pretest rather than of a mixture of strong and weak arguments. The results were in line with predictions derived from the heuristic‐systematic model (HSM). Indicating unbiased systematic processing, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message. In the case of an ambiguous message, in line with the HSM's bias hypothesis, more agreement was found among participants preferring the source politician as compared to participants preferring the other politician. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

FRIENDLY OR UNFRIENDLY PERSUASION

Expectancy theory suggests that people develop normative expectations about appropriateness of communication behavior that differ for males and females. Support was found for an interaction hypothesis predicting that males would be expected to use more verbally aggressive persuasive message strategies and would negatively violate expectations and be less persuasive when they deviated from such strategies. Moreover, females are expected to be less verbally aggressive and use more prosocial message strategies and are penalized for deviations from such an expected strategy. Manipulation checks indicated that people have clear differences in expected strategy use by males and females and that neither the psychological sex role nor biological sex of receivers alters those expectations. Results are discussed in terms of similarity to prior language research, as an extension of expectancy theory and as added knowledge about the effects of specific compliance-gaining message strategies.     

Caffeine, Cognition, and Persuasion: Evidence for Caffeine Increasing the Systematic Processing of Persuasive Messages

Caffeine is known to increase arousal, attention, and information processing–all factors implicated in facilitating persuasion. In a standard attitude-change paradigm, participants consumed an orange-juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not (placebo) prior to reading a counterattitudinal communication (anti-voluntary euthanasia). Participants then completed a thought-listing task and a number of attitude scales. The first experiment showed that those who consumed caffeine showed greater agreement with the communication (direct attitude: voluntary euthanasia) and on an issue related to, but not contained in, the communication (indirect attitude: abortion). The order in which direct and indirect attitudes were measured did not affect the results. A second experiment manipulated the quality of the arguments in the message (strong vs. weak) to determine whether systematic processing had occurred. There was evidence that systematic processing occurred in both drink conditions, but was greater for those who had consumed caffeine. In both experiments, the amount of message-congruent thinking mediated persuasion. These results show that caffeine can increase the extent to which people systematically process and arc influenced by a persuasive communication.     

The Effects of Argument Quality and Involvement Type on Attitude Formation and Attitude Change: A Test of Dual‐Process and Social Judgment Predictions

Involvement has long been theoretically specified as a crucial factor determining the persuasive impact of messages. In social judgment theory, ego‐involvement makes people more resistant to persuasion, whereas in dual‐process models, high‐involvement people are susceptible to persuasion when argument quality is high. It is argued that these disparate predictions might be reconciled by either different involvement types (i.e., value relevant vs. outcome relevant) or different attitude modification processes (i.e., attitude change vs. attitude formation). An experiment (N = 684) varying topic, position advocated, outcome relevance, and argument quality tested these moderators. The data were consistent with existence of two different types of involvement, but none of the theoretical predictions were consistent with the data. Instead, a main effect for argument quality had the largest impact on attitude change. Regardless of value‐relevant involvement, outcome‐relevant involvement, and attitude modification process, participants were more persuaded by high‐ rather than low‐quality arguments, with boomerang effects observed for low‐quality arguments. These findings highlight the importance of sound message design in persuasion.     

Distraction,counterarguing and the internalization of attitude change

The hypothesis that distraction during a persuasive communication enhances the resulting attitude change by disrupting counterarguing was critically examined. Although previous research using Brock's postcommunication counterarguing index has shown that distraction inhibits counterarguing, the relationship was re-evaluated in the present experiments with a more direct measure of counterarguing. In these experiments, the direct measure of counterarguing was shown to increase with distraction, contradicting hypotheses that attribute the distraction effect to counterarguing disruption. Furthermore, with a wide range of distraction, Brock's measure was nonmonotonically related to distraction. Since observed attitude change is also predicted to be nonmonotonically related to distraction, Brock's index was interpreted us a correlate rather than a mediator of measured attitude change. The results suggested that distraction actually inhibits the internalization of the message and that the apparently enhancing effects of distraction are a result of the demand characteristics and/or evaluation apprehension created by the experimental task of paying attention to both a message and a distractor. The implications of the results for the theoretical role of counterarguing in mediating the internalization of persuasive communications were discussed.     

Effects of caffeine on persuasion and attitude change: The role of secondary tasks in manipulating systematic message processing

Two experiments are reported that examine the effects of caffeine consumption on attitude change by using different secondary tasks to manipulate message processing. The first experiment employed an orientating task whilst the second experiment employed a distracter task. In both experiments participants consumed an orange‐juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not contain caffeine (placebo) prior to reading a counter‐attitudinal communication. The results across both experiments were similar. When message processing was reduced or under high distraction, there was no attitude change irrespective of caffeine consumption. However, when message processing was enhanced or under low distraction, there was greater attitude change in the caffeine vs. placebo conditions. Furthermore, attitudes formed after caffeine consumption resisted counter‐persuasion (Experiment 1) and led to indirect attitude change (Experiment 2). The extent that participants engaged in message‐congruent thinking mediated the amount of attitude change. These results provide evidence that moderate amounts of caffeine increase systematic processing of the arguments in the message resulting in greater agreement. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Different Sides: Investigating the Persuasive Effects of Anger Expression in Political News Messages

Anger expression is increasingly prevalent in political news messages. However, the persuasive effects of expressing anger in a political context have received scant attention from researchers. We conducted two experiments to investigate the hypothesis that anger expression is detrimental to persuasion because it runs counter to well‐established social norms for the polite expression of opinions. We created political news messages including a persuasive appeal by a politician that was supported either with an expression of anger or with an expression of nonemotional disagreement. The results of Experiment 1 (N = 120) showed that anger messages were perceived as less appropriate than control messages, and that politicians expressing anger were perceived as less likable and less competent than politicians who disagreed in nonemotional terms. In Experiment 2 (N = 1,005), the negative effects of anger expression on perceived likability and competence were replicated. Also in line with Experiment 1, anger messages were perceived as less appropriate, but this time only for those with negative a priori attitudes toward the advocated position. In contrast, those with positive a priori positions toward the advocated position perceived anger messages as more appropriate than the control messages.     

Is the Medium the Message? A Study of the Effects of Media,Communicator, and Message Characteristics on Attitude Change1

The present study examined the interactive effects of type of media, communicator, and position of message on persuasiveness of the communication. Subjects received a communication over television, radio (audio tape), or written medium, which either agreed with a position they held or strongly disagreed with it. The communicator was either a newscaster or a candidate for political office. The results indicated that subjects felt the newscaster to be more trustworthy than the candidate. In line with previous research, there was no main effect of media on persuasiveness. However, media interacted with the other variables so that when the communication disagreed with the audience, television was the most persuasive medium with the newscaster but the least persuasive with the untrusted candidate. There was no effect for media when the message agreed with the audience. Further, the candidate taking a position congruent with the audience's was rated as more attractive but less trustworthy than a candidate taking the opposite position. It was suggested that television may be the most involving medium and that either a counterargument theory or reactance theory could explain why it was not effective with the candidate.     

Reactance and the dynamics of disagreement: multiple paths from threatened freedom to resistance to persuasion

Many experiments show that threats to attitudinal freedom create reactance, but the underlying dynamics of reactance‐based disagreement have not received much attention. The present experiments identified two paths from threats to disagreement. In one path, threats to attitudinal freedom directly motivate disagreement; in the other, negative cognitive responses mediate the threat's effect on disagreement. Two experiments demonstrated the causes and consequences of each path from threat to persuasion. When a communicator threatened freedom at the beginning of the message, unfavorable cognitive responses (counterarguing, negative perceptions of the source's credibility) fully mediated the effect of threat on disagreement. When the threat appeared at the end of the message however, threat had a direct, unmediated effect on disagreement (Experiment 1). The two paths had different consequences for sleeper effects: disagreement rooted in negative cognitive responses persisted, whereas disagreement directly motivated by the threat declined when the threat was removed (Experiment 2). Implications for reactance and for threat‐based sleeper effects are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Temporal delay,type of forewarning,and resistance to influence

Previous researchers have manipulated forewarning by providing premessage information about the topic and position of the upcoming communication, or the communicator's persuasive intent. Subjects in the present experiment were force-warned either 10 min prior to the communication, or just before the message began of the speaker's topic and position, persuasive intent, or topic only. As hypothesized, forewarning of the communicator's persuasive intent inhibited persuasion regardless of the length of the delay period, but forewarning of the topic and position required a delay in order to confer resistance to subsequent persuasion, suggesting that although both manipulations have been called “forewarning they may lead to reduced persuasion through different mechanisms. Foreknowledge of the source's topic, but not his position also increased resistance to persuasion when followed by a delay period. The results were discussed in terms of both cognitive and motivational mechanisms that may underly the persuasion inhibiting effects of forewarning.     

Attitude accessibility and message processing: The moderating role of message position

Past research suggests that pre-message attitude accessibility can influence the amount of processing of persuasives messages (with highly accessible attitudes eliciting higher levels of processing than attitudes lower in accessibility). The current research suggests that the previous conclusions are only partly true—effects of accessibility on message processing are moderated by the extent to which the persuasive message is proattitudinal versus counterattitudinal. In two experiments, pre-message attitudes and attitude accessibility were measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) prior to receiving a strong or weak persuasive message. When messages were counterattitudinal, increased pre-message accessibility was associated with greater message processing (as in past research). However, when messages were proattitudinal, increased pre-message accessibility was associated with decreased message scrutiny. Potential underlying mechanisms and implications are discussed.