Aversive conditioning under conditions of restricted awareness: Effects on spatial cueing

In the literature on aversive conditioning there is still debate on the role of awareness. According to some authors, affective learning can occur with or without contingency learning (dual-process model), whereas others argue that a single process produces both affective responses and contingency knowledge. Although many studies have investigated these models, the results to date are inconclusive. Based on a review of the literature, a new series of experiments was designed to examine aversive conditioning in the absence of contingency awareness. In the present study we examined the effects of subliminal aversive conditioning on a spatial cueing task. Awareness was stringently tested after conditioning. Three kinds of awareness were distinguished: contingency awareness (awareness of the CS?US contingencies, where CS is the conditioned stimulus, and US is the unconditioned stimulus), perceptual awareness (awareness of the perceptual differences between the CSs), and US expectancy (awareness of a threat feeling when confronted with the CS+, but not when confronted with the CS?). The results of three experiments demonstrated that responses on the spatial cueing task were modulated by subliminal aversive conditioning. Importantly, none of the participants was contingency aware or able to perceptually discriminate between the conditioned stimuli. However, in Experiment 3, only those participants showing some level of postconditioning expectancy awareness exhibited conditioning effects. These experiments suggest that subliminal aversive conditioning produces small but significant effects, which may be modulated by expectancy awareness.     

Contingency learning with evaluative stimuli: testing the generality of contingency learning in a performance paradigm

In two experiments, we tested the generality of the learning effects in the recently-introduced color-word contingency learning paradigm. Participants made speeded evaluative judgments to valenced target words. Each of a set of distracting nonwords was presented most often with either positive or negative target words. We observed that participants responded faster on trials that respected these contingencies than on trials that contradicted the contingencies. The contingencies also produced changes in liking: in a subsequent explicit evaluative rating task, participants rated positively-conditioned nonwords more positively than negatively-conditioned nonwords. Interestingly, contingency effects in the performance task correlated with this explicit rating effect in both experiments. In Experiment 2, all effects reported were independent of subjective and objective contingency awareness (which was completely lacking), even when awareness was measured at the item level. Our results reveal that learning in this type of performance task extends to nonword-valence contingencies and to responses different from those emitted during the performance task. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories about the processes that underlie contingency learning in performance tasks and for research on evaluative conditioning.     

Parallel acquisition of awareness and differential delay eyeblink conditioning

There is considerable debate about whether differential delay eyeblink conditioning can be acquired without awareness of the stimulus contingencies. Previous investigations of the relationship between differential-delay eyeblink conditioning and awareness of the stimulus contingencies have assessed awareness after the conditioning session was finished using a post-experimental questionnaire. In two experiments, the point at which contingency awareness developed during the conditioning session was estimated from a button-press measure of expectancy of the unconditioned stimulus (US). In both experiments, knowledge of the stimulus contingencies and acquisition of differential delay eyeblink conditioning developed approximately in parallel. In Experiment 1 it was shown that predicting the US facilitated eyeblink conditioning compared with predicting the eyeblink response. In Experiment 2, a masking task was used that slowed down the emergence of awareness, and it was shown that differential conditioning only occurred in participants who were able to predict the US. The current findings challenge the hypothesis that differential delay eyeblink conditioning is entirely mediated by a functionally and neurally distinct nondeclarative learning system.     

Both trace and delay conditioning of evaluative responses depend on contingency awareness

Whereas previous evaluative conditioning (EC) studies produced inconsistent results concerning the role of contingency knowledge, there are classical eye-blink conditioning studies suggesting that declarative processes are involved in trace conditioning but not in delay conditioning. In two EC experiments pairing neutral sounds (conditioned stimuli; CSs) with affective pictures (unconditioned stimuli; USs), we tested whether the type of conditioning procedure affects the relationship between awareness and EC. Auditory CSs and visual USs were either overlapping and co-terminating (Delay Conditioning Group), or they were separated by a short temporal gap (Trace Conditioning Group). In both groups, contingency awareness was manipulated by varying the duration at which the US was presented during conditioning. Furthermore, in addition to a post-conditioning measure of awareness, US detectability was measured concurrently during the learning phase in Experiment 2. US exposure duration affected both measures of awareness. The data of both experiments demonstrate that EC does not occur if the USs are presented at very brief durations, but reliable EC effects can be observed at longer US exposure durations. As there were no differences between trace and delay conditioning, the data suggest that contingency awareness plays a crucial role in trace and in delay conditioning of evaluative responses. These results challenge automatic association-formation accounts of EC, but they are in line with ‘single-process’ accounts assuming EC to be dependent on conscious declarative knowledge about CS–US contingencies.     

Contingency awareness in a symptom learning paradigm: necessary but not sufficient?

In previous studies, we found that bodily symptoms can be learned in a differential conditioning paradigm, using odors as conditioned stimuli (CSs) and CO2-enriched air as unconditioned stimulus (US). However, this only occurred when the odor CS had a negative valence (a selective conditioning effect), and tended to be more pronounced in persons scoring high for Negative Affectivity (NA). This paper considers the necessity and/or sufficiency of awareness of the CS-US contingency in three studies using this paradigm. The relation between contingency awareness and the selective conditioning effect, and between contingency awareness and NA was also considered. Both self reported symptoms and respiratory physiology served as dependent variables. A learning effect on symptoms was found only for participants aware of the CS-US contingency, but not all participants reporting contingency awareness showed a learning effect. No conditioning effects appeared on the physiological measures. Also contingency awareness did not account for the selective conditioning effect, and did not interact with NA. Overall, the necessity but insufficiency hypotheses can only be withhold for group data and not for individual data.     

Evaluative conditioning may occur with and without contingency awareness

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is considered to play an important role in the attitude formation. One of the ongoing debates in this field concerns the impact of contingency awareness (i.e., awareness of the contingent relationship between conditioned and unconditioned stimulus, CS–US) on the EC occurrence. Despite the claims that EC does not require awareness of CS–US contingencies, the recent studies have claimed just the opposite. However, a number of methodological issues can be raised to undermine those claims. In two experiments, we tried to eliminate potential faults and sought to learn whether EC occurs with or without contingency awareness of either US identity or US valence. We report significant EC effects both with and without contingency awareness. These results provide support for the claim that the EC effects might be produced by independent mechanisms linked to awareness. We also argue that those mechanisms are differently captured by available measures of EC.     

Revisiting the relation between contingency awareness and attention: Evaluative conditioning relies on a contingency focus

Although evaluative conditioning has occasionally been demonstrated in the absence of contingency awareness, many recent studies imply that its acquisition depends on the availability of attentional resources during conditioning. In previous experiments attention has typically been manipulated in a general way rather than looking at the particular focus of attention. The present study investigated the role of a focus on the CS–US contingency. Two separate distraction tasks were designed that either diverted attention from the stimuli or directed it to the stimuli while drawing attention away from the contingency between the stimuli. Both types of distraction were shown to eliminate evaluative conditioning. Significant evaluative conditioning was observed in a third group of participants who were required to attend the contingencies. A mediation analysis showed that the observed discrepancy in evaluative conditioning effects between groups was mediated by contingency awareness. The results imply that attention in terms of a stimulus focus is not sufficient for evaluative conditioning to occur. Rather, attention to the contingencies between stimuli appears to be crucial in evaluative conditioning, because it is supposed to foster the acquisition of contingency awareness.     

I like it, but I'm not sure why: can evaluative conditioning occur without conscious awareness?

There is good evidence that, in general, autonomic conditioning in humans occurs only when subjects can verbalize the contingencies of conditioning. However, one form of conditioning, evaluative conditioning (EC), seems exceptional in that a growing body of evidence suggests that it can occur without conscious contingency awareness. As such, EC offers a unique insight into what role contingency awareness might play in associative learning. Despite this evidence, there are reasons to doubt that evaluative conditioning can occur without conscious awareness. This paper aims to critically review the EC literature and to draw some parallels to what is known about autonomic conditioning. In doing so, some important general issues about measuring contingency awareness are raised. These issues are illustrated with a brief report of an experiment in which a sensitive measure of contingency awareness is compared against a commonly used measure.     

Conscious knowledge of CS-UCS contingency information affects extinction retrieval of conditioned disgust responses: Findings from an online de novo disgust conditioning task

ObjectiveThe present study aimed to establish and develop an online de novo conditioning paradigm for the measurement of conditioned disgust responses. We further explored the effects of explicit instructions about the CS-UCS contingency on extinction learning and retrieval of conditioned disgust responses.MethodThe study included a sample of 115 healthy participants. Geometric figures served as conditioned stimuli (CS) and disgust-evoking pictures as unconditioned stimuli (UCS). During disgust conditioning, the CS+ was paired with the UCS (66% reinforcement) and the CS- remained unpaired; during extinction and retrieval, no UCS was presented. Half of the participants (n = 54) received instructions prior to the disgust extinction stating that the UCS will not be presented anymore. 1-2 days or 7-8 days later participants performed a retrieval test. CS-UCS contingency, disgust and valence ratings were used as dependent measures.ResultsSuccessful acquisition of conditioned disgust response was observed on the level of CS-UCS contingency, disgust and valence ratings. While some decline in valence and disgust ratings during the extinction stage was observed, contingency instructions did not significantly affect extinction performance. Retrieval one week later revealed that contingency instructions increased the discrimination of the CSs.ConclusionsExtinction of conditioned disgust responses is not affected by explicit knowledge of the CS-UCS contingencies. However, contingency instructions prior to extinction seem to have a detrimental effect on long-term extinction retrieval.     

Effects of transcranial direct current stimulation on neural activity and functional connectivity during fear extinction

Background/ObjectiveAnxiety disorders are highly prevalent and negatively impact daily functioning and quality of life. Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) targeting the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), especially in the right hemisphere impacts extinction learning; however, the underlying neural mechanisms are elusive. Therefore, we aimed to investigate the effects of cathodal tDCS stimulation to the right dlPFC on neural activity and connectivity patterns during delayed fear extinction in healthy participants.MethodsWe conducted a two-day fear conditioning and extinction procedure. On the first day, we collected fear-related self-reports, clinical questionnaires, and skin conductance responses during fear acquisition. On the second day, participants in the tDCS group (n = 16) received 20-min offline tDCS before fMRI and then completed the fear extinction session during fMRI. Participants in the control group (n = 18) skipped tDCS and directly underwent fMRI to complete the fear extinction procedure. Whole-brain searchlight classification and resting-state functional connectivity analyses were performed.ResultsWhole-brain searchlight classification during fear extinction showed higher classification accuracy of threat and safe cues in the left anterior dorsal and ventral insulae and hippocampus in the tDCS group than in the control group. Functional connectivity derived from the insula with the dlPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and inferior parietal lobule was increased after tDCS.ConclusiontDCS over the right dlPFC may function as a primer for information exchange among distally connected areas, thereby increasing stimulus discrimination. The current study did not include a sham group, and one participant of the control group was not randomized. Therefore, to address potential allocation bias, findings should be confirmed in the future with a fully randomized and sham controlled study.     

Ontogenetic changes in the neural mechanisms of eyeblink conditioning

The rodent eyeblink conditioning paradigm is an ideal model system for examining the relationship between neural maturation and the ontogeny of associative learning. Elucidation of the neural mechanisms underlying the ontogeny of learning is tractable using eyeblink conditioning because the necessary neural circuitry (cerebellum and interconnected brainstem nuclei) underlying the acquisition and retention of the conditioned response (CR) has been identified in adult organisms. Moreover, the cerebellum exhibits substantial postnatal anatomical and physiological maturation in rats. The eyeblink CR emerges developmentally between postnatal day (PND) 17 and 24 in rats. A series of experiments found that the ontogenetic emergence of eyeblink conditioning is related to the development of associative learning and not related to changes in performance. More recent studies have examined the relationship between the development of eyeblink conditioning and the physiological maturation of the cerebellum, a brain structure that is necessary for eyeblink conditioning in adult organisms. Disrupting cerebellar development with lesions or antimitotic treatments impairs the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning. Studies of the development of physiological processes within the cerebellum have revealed striking ontogenetic changes in stimulus-elicited and learning-related neuronal activity. Neurons in the interpositus nucleus and Purkinje cells in the cortex exhibit developmental increases in neuronal discharges following the unconditioned stimulus (US) and in neuronal discharges that model the amplitude and time-course of the eyeblink CR. The developmental changes in CR-related neuronal activity in the cerebellum suggest that the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning depends on the development of mechanisms that estavlish cerebellar plasticity. Learning and the induction of neural plasticity depend on the magnitude of the US input to the cerebellum. The role of developmental changes in the efficacy of the US pathway has been investigated by monitoring neuronal activity in the inferior olive and with stimulation techniques. The results of these experiments indicate that the development of the conditioned eyeblink response may depend on dynamic interactions between multiple developmental processes within the eyeblink neural circuitry.     

Invariants and Information Pickup in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems: Implications for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior

ABSTRACT

Although Gibson focused his agenda on the study of perception and Skinner on learning as contingencies of reinforcement, they shared a nonrepresentational approach. We propose that the ecological concept of invariants developed in Gibson's book The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966) could underlie Skinner's notion of contingencies of reinforcement as environmental opportunities for behaving. The proposal is divided in 3 parts: the concept of stimulus for perception, the role of the notion of invariants in the operant contingency, and the information for perception and behavior. We conclude that approximating contingencies of reinforcement as instances of environmental invariants can be fruitful for studying a number of phenomena within the context of operant conditioning.     

The role of CS-US contingency in human evaluative conditioning

Recent studies suggest that in Pavlovian conditioning, two different processes may be operative: signal learning and evaluative learning, resulting in two qualitatively different associative structures. Signal-learning is hypothesized to be responsible for providing us with genuine predictors (CS) for significant events (US). This proposition logically entails that the statistical-correlational relation, i.e. the contingency between CS and US should be a crucial determinant of signal learning. Evaluative conditioning, on the other hand, refers to the observation that the mere pairing of neutral with (dis)liked stimuli changes the valence of the originally neutral stimuli in a (negative) positive direction. As argued elsewhere, evaluative conditioning is probably based on the CS acquiring a mere referential value to the US, without any genuine CS-US expectancy being involved. From this, it was hypothesized that evaluative conditioning might not be dependent on CS-US contingency. Using the standard evaluative conditioning paradigm, four different levels of CS-US contingency were created on a between-subject base. The overall effect of evaluative conditioning was strongly significant, and was not mediated by awareness of the CS-US relation. Of crucial importance, this conditioning effect did not interact with the level of contingency, supporting the hypothesis that CS-US contingency is not a crucial determinant of evaluative conditioning. Moreover, this effect was obtained in a situation in which Ss simultaneously evidenced to have consciously registered quite accurately the different levels of CS-US contingency.     

Ontogenetic Changes in the Neural Mechanisms of Eyeblink Conditioning

The rodent eyeblink conditioning paradigm is an ideal model system for examining the relationship between neural maturation and the ontogeny of associative learning. Elucidation of the neural mechanisms underlying the ontogeny of learning is tractable using eyeblink conditioning because the necessary neural circuitry (cerebellum and interconnected brainstem nuclei) underlying the acquisition and retention of the conditioned response (CR) has been identified in adult organisms. Moreover, the cerebellum exhibits substantial postnatal anatomical and physiological maturation in rats. The eyeblink CR emerges developmentally between postnatal day (PND) 17 and 24 in rats. A series of experiments found that the ontogenetic emergence of eyeblink conditioning is related to the development of associative learning and not related to changes in performance. More recent studies have examined the relationship between the development of eyeblink conditioning and the physiological maturation of the cerebellum, a brain structure that is necessary for eyeblink conditioning in adult organisms. Disrupting cerebellar development with lesions or antimitotic treatments impairs the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning. Studies of the development of physiological processes within the cerebellum have revealed striking ontogenetic changes in stimulus-elicited and learning-related neuronal activity. Neurons in the interpositus nucleus and Purkinje cells in the cortex exhibit developmental increases in neuronal discharges following the unconditioned stimulus (US) and in neuronal discharges that model the amplitude and time-course of the eyeblink CR. The developmental changes in CR-related neuronal activity in the cerebellum suggest that the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning depends on the development of mechanisms that establish cerebellar plasticity. Learning and the induction of neural plasticity depend on the magnitude of the US input to the cerebellum. The role of developmental changes in the efficacy of the US pathway has been investigated by monitoring neuronal activity in the inferior olive and with stimulation techniques. The results of these experiments indicate that the development of the conditioned eyeblink response may depend on dynamic interactions between multiple developmental processes within the eyeblink neural circuitry.     

Direct and continuous measurement of relational learning in human pavlovian conditioning

Three experiments were conducted employing a continuous measure of conditional stimulus/unconditional stimulus (CS/US) contingencies as perceived by the subject (i.e., subjective contingency or SC). It is argued that direct measurement of relational learning, as indexed by SC, can lead to a better understanding of Pavlovian conditioning processes. The first two experiments applied this approach to a methodologic controversy, raising the debate from a procedure-based argument to testing what the subject actually learns about CS/US relationships. While the issue was not resolved, testable hypotheses for future research were generated from the data. The third experiment contrasted the contingency stimulus-stimulus (S-S) account of Pavlovian conditioning with an earlier stimulus-response (S-R) continguity-reinforcement account. In this experiment, both SC and skin resistance were measured. Evidence for the existence of both cognitive-propositional and response-learning processes in conditioning was obtained.     

Does evaluative learning rely on the perception of contingency?: manipulating contingency and US density during evaluative conditioning

An experiment is reported studying the impact of objective contingency and contingency judgments on cross-modal evaluative conditioning (EC). Both contingency judgments and evaluative responses were measured after a contingency learning task in which previously neutral sounds served as either weak or strong predictors of affective pictures. Experimental manipulations of contingency and US density were shown to affect contingency judgments. Stronger contingencies were perceived with high contingency and with low US density. The contingency learning task also produced a reliable EC effect. The magnitude of this effect was influenced by an interaction of statistical contingency and US density. Furthermore, the magnitude of EC was correlated with the subjective contingency judgments. Taken together, the results imply that propositional knowledge about the CS-US relationship, as reflected in contingency judgments, moderates evaluative learning. The data are discussed with respect to different accounts of EC.     

Dissociating contingency awareness and conditioned attitudes: evidence of contingency-unaware evaluative conditioning

Whether human evaluative conditioning can occur without contingency awareness has been the subject of an intense and ongoing debate for decades, troubled by a wide array of methodological difficulties. Following recent methodological innovations, the available evidence currently points to the conclusion that evaluative conditioning effects do not occur without contingency awareness. In a simulation, we demonstrate, however, that these innovations are strongly biased toward the conclusion that evaluative conditioning requires contingency awareness, confounding the measurement of contingency memory with conditioned attitudes. We adopt a process-dissociation procedure to separate the memory and attitude components. In 4 studies, the attitude parameter is validated using existing attitudes and applied to probe for contingency-unaware evaluative conditioning. A fifth experiment incorporates a time-delay manipulation confirming the dissociability of the attitude and memory components. The results indicate that evaluative conditioning can produce attitudes without conscious awareness of the contingencies. Implications for theories of evaluative conditioning and associative learning are discussed.     

Revisiting the relation between contingency awareness and attention: evaluative conditioning relies on a contingency focus

Although evaluative conditioning has occasionally been demonstrated in the absence of contingency awareness, many recent studies imply that its acquisition depends on the availability of attentional resources during conditioning. In previous experiments attention has typically been manipulated in a general way rather than looking at the particular focus of attention. The present study investigated the role of a focus on the CS-US contingency. Two separate distraction tasks were designed that either diverted attention from the stimuli or directed it to the stimuli while drawing attention away from the contingency between the stimuli. Both types of distraction were shown to eliminate evaluative conditioning. Significant evaluative conditioning was observed in a third group of participants who were required to attend the contingencies. A mediation analysis showed that the observed discrepancy in evaluative conditioning effects between groups was mediated by contingency awareness. The results imply that attention in terms of a stimulus focus is not sufficient for evaluative conditioning to occur. Rather, attention to the contingencies between stimuli appears to be crucial in evaluative conditioning, because it is supposed to foster the acquisition of contingency awareness.     

What do memory data tell us about the role of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning?

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to the effect that pairings of a conditioned stimulus (CS) with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US) lead to changes in the evaluation of the CS. There have been recurring debates about whether EC requires awareness of the contingency between CSs and USs during learning. We argue that the memory performance data obtained in the standard paradigm remain ambiguous about the role of contingency awareness during the encoding of CS–US pairings. First, memory performance data are unable to distinguish between encoding-related versus retrieval-related effects. Second, the relation between memory performance and evaluation is correlational, which limits conclusions about causal relations between memory performance and EC effects. These ambiguities imply that any possible data pattern can be interpreted in at least two different ways. It is concluded that a resolution of the current debate requires alternative approaches in which contingency awareness is experimentally manipulated during the encoding of CS–US pairings.     

EYEBLINK CLASSICAL CONDITIONING AND AWARENESS REVISITED

Abstract— Dual-task performance was assessed in 140 adults during eyeblink classical conditioning (EBCC) and one of several secondary tasks (timed-interval tapping, recognition memory choice reaction time, video viewing). Four groups received paired-EBCC stimulus presentation and three groups received explicitly unpaired EBCC stimuli. Although the subjects were not laid about the conditioning task, they acquired conditioned responses (CRs) as normal levels. Postsession interviews probed participants' awareness of EBCC stimulus contingencies and production of CRs. Reported awareness of paired-EBCC stimulus contingencies and CK production was not related to actual EBCC performance Twenty-seven percent of the participants receiving explicitly unpaired stimuli reported a stimulus contingency when none existed. The dissociation between awareness and performances provides additional support for the categorization of simple EBCC as a form of nondeclarative learning.