42nd Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society Orlando, Florida November 15–18, 2001

Notices and Announcements

42nd Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society Orlando, Florida November 15–18, 2001     

Is Psychology a Cognitive Science?

ABSTRACT Since the 1970s there has been a significant paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviourism and towards cognitive psychology. Indeed a recent survey discovered that by 1983 more than half American psychologists were describing their approaches as cognitive. However, while behaviourism has had an identifiable philosophical 'line' in positivism, reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive model, such a framework has been noticeably lacking from cognitive psychology. A view of cognitive psychology based on functionalism and ideas from systems analysis is put forward.     

Theoretische Lücken der Cognitive Science

Theoretical gaps of the cognitive science. First of all the gap-thesis is based on a criticism 1. of the computer-orientated cognitive science (it confuses information with the information carrier), 2. of connectivism (its linguistic borrowing from the neurobiology is not appropriate), 3. of Varelas production model (the elimination of the function of representation results in the loss of the cognitive ability). From the context of meaning and time, then the author sketches a cognitive theoretical approach, in which thinking as a (symbolic and/or subsymbolic) representation of meaning is introduced, which develops in a three-digit relation between world, language and substrate on the basis of isomorphy of time. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Models of Public Engagement: Nanoscientists’ Understandings of Science–Society Interactions

This paper explores how scientists perceive public engagement initiatives. By drawing on interviews with nanoscientists, it analyzes how researchers imagine science–society interactions in an early phase of technological development. More specifically, the paper inquires into the implicit framings of citizens, of scientists, and of the public in scientists’ discourses. It identifies four different models of how nanoscientists understand public engagement which are described as educational, paternalistic, elitist, and economistic. These models are contrasted with the dialog model of public engagement promoted by social scientists and policymakers. The paper asks if and in what ways participatory discourses and practices feed back into scientists’ understandings, thus co-producing public discourses and science.