临床医学教育中的医学哲学

医学哲学是现代医学教育中的重要组成部分,医学科学必须与医学哲学相结合才是未来医学教育的发展方向。在以岗位胜任能力为导向的医学教育转型中,培养医学生的哲学思维无疑是其重要环节之一。为适应全球卫生事业的迅猛发展,医学教育务必在临床思维上进行整合。本文从培养合格医学毕业生的角度出发,阐述了医学与哲学的关系、医学教育中的哲学地位及哲学在临床医学教育中的具体应用。旨在提高医学生的哲学理念,促进现代医学教育的转型发展。     

哲学理论的历史感与历史叙述的哲学性——哲学与历史学的关系研究

哲学与历史学存在互补共生的关系。哲学理论的历史感揭示了哲学靠近历史学的方式,历史叙述的哲学性则揭示了历史学靠近哲学的特点。历史在哲学理论中的作用主要表现为:历史是人的存在方式和根本特征;历史是哲学研究的逻辑起点;历史性是哲学看待事物的基本方式;历史是哲学的服务目标。哲学在历史学研究中的作用主要表现为:超越偶然的普遍史;超越局部的全球史;历史研究方法的系统总结;作为理论框架和宏观指导的历史观;导向哲学是历史研究的最高境界。哲学与历史学相统一的方法论原则是逻辑与历史相统一的原则,在这一点上,马克思与黑格尔不同,马克思强调在现实生活世界的基础上通过实践实现二者的统一。     

科学哲学对西方经济学思想发展演化的影响

哲学与经济学在古代、近代就有着密切的关系,哲学对经济学的思想演化发展有着重要的启迪、调节和引导作用。在近代,许多哲学家如穆勒同时又是经济学家,对古典经济学的发展作出了实质性的贡献。进入本世纪后,随着科学哲学从逻辑主义向历史主义及后现代主义的发展和经济学从新古典向新古典综合及现代的发展,科学哲学以自己在方法论原则和科学理     

李焕诚:毛泽东的社会哲学方法论

毛泽东的社会哲学方法论李焕诚马克思主义的社会哲学方法论,是以历史唯物主义方法为核,Ｃ,研究社会实践如何获得更大功利的一般方法的学科。毛泽东对社会哲学方法论做出了重大贡献,突出反映在：一、首倡立场、观卢、、方法的统一,确立了社会哲学方法论的地位和功能。毛泽东将立场、观点、方法三者联系起来使用,并深刻揭示了三者的内在关系,确立了社会哲学方法论的地位。他强调为达目的,必讲实效,“不解决方法问题,任务也只是瞎说一顿,”这就是哲学方法论的功能。二、深刻阐发发扬自觉能动性理论,奠定了社会哲学方法的理论基础。毛泽东重视人民群众创造历史的作用．强调自觉能动性是改造世界的力量。敢于和善于斗争,开拓创新,是能动性的表现,也是社会哲学方法论的核心。三、确立的实事求是原则,是社会哲学方法论的根本原则。实事求是是毛泽东思想的根本点。它在社会生活中的运用,就成为社会哲学方法论的根本原则。在这里,所求的“是”,一是认识和解释世界,即求真理;二是要顺理成章地按照人们的意愿去改造世界,满足人们的物质文化生活的需要,它是实事求是方法论原则的归宿。（作者工作单位：河北师大）李焕诚:毛泽东的社会哲学方法论@李焕诚$河北师大     

近年来国内哲学方法论研究概述

苏联哲学界将哲学意义上的方法论定义为:“根据研究对象的运动规律,从实践和理论上掌握现实的形式;改造的、实践的活动或认识的、理论的活动的调节原则的体系。”(《哲学百科全书》[苏],Ⅲ)对于这样一种表述,我国哲学界似乎没有提出什么争议。然而对于如何限定哲学的方法论和世界观的界线,如何认识哲学方法论的分类和功能,却有着一些不尽相同的见解。与此同时,随着科学和实践的大步迈进,一些崭新的哲学方法论也不断充     

论医学哲学的特征

医学哲学也称为医学辩证法,是在总结医学科学成就的基础上,通过对医学理论和实践中一般、普遍、共性问题的研究,揭示医学认识主体思维活动普遍规律的科学：是人们认识和处理健康和疾病问题的一般方法论。无论是与医学还是与哲学相比。医学哲学都有着显著的区别,运用对比分析的方法。对医学哲学的研究对象、理论体系特别是思维方式等不同方面的特征,进行理论探讨。     

马克思的历史科学与方法论的哲学变革

马克思的历史唯物主义理论作为分析社会历史的科学指南,在观念层面以及现实层面触动了资本主义经济规律对现实世界的统治权,"历史科学"作为对共产主义现实运动的理论表达,在对市民社会积极扬弃的基础上开展出对人类社会之重建。本文通过"否思"现代知性科学的哲学信念与方法论基础,以资本主义世界体系的展开、形成与制序化为背景,澄清19世纪社会科学范式的形而上学性质与普遍主义取向;以历史唯物主义的新科学观为视角,阐明马克思的历史科学与方法论的哲学变革。而"具体的历史原则"作为把握既定社会自我运动的科学方法,与黑格尔抽象的历史原则有着本质区别,它在思想基础与方法论层面为中国特色哲学社会科学超越现代知性科学提出了可能的方向。     

系统方法不只是一般科学方法

我在拙作《论系统方法与唯物辩证法的关系》一文中曾指出,系统方法是在科学方法论三个层次(哲学层次、一般科学层次、具体科学层次)上都有所体现的方法论体系,其中,作为一般科学方法,是为人们所公认的,作为具体科学方法,也不难为人们所接受,问题是作为哲学方法,却不为人们普遍认可.本文拟就此提出一些不成熟的见解,以期引起讨论,明辨是非.     

逻辑科学方法论的哲学反思

逻辑科学方法论的哲学反思沙青逻辑科学方法论的对象乃是理论思维中带普遍性的认知观念与认知规范。它是一种历史的科学,存在着旧观念、旧规范同新观念、新规范之间的竞争与演进。逻辑科学方法论的发生与发展,导源于科学的发生与发展。离开科学,逻辑科学方法论就失去生存的基地和发展的动力。另一方面,逻辑科学方法论又总是作为一种哲学工具,它的发展也同社会的某种哲学思潮的兴衰相关连。它既是科学的工具,又是哲学的工具。可以说,逻辑科学方法论乃是科学与哲学的中介;科学的发展为哲学的发展提供新的思想资料,哲学的发展则又为科…     

心理学的方法论问题

我们认为,当代科学研究的方法论体系,按其从高到低的水平结构,可以分为三个不同的、但又紧密联系的层次,即:哲学方法论、一般科学方法论和具体的科学方法技术.某一科学的哲学方法论,即以马克思主义唯物辩证法作为向导,来探讨这一科学研究中最普遍的思想方法论问题,其出发点是辩证唯物主义关于物质与运动的关系的思想,它认为,世界上没有不运动的物质,也没有离开物质的运动.唯心主义否认运动是物质的属性;机械唯物主义或者否认事物的运动、发展变化,或者否认运动形式的多样性、复杂性,从而把物质运动归结为线性的决定关系或还原论.     

关于另类科学哲学的思考

A prominent phenomenon in contemporary philosophy of science has been the unexpected rise of alternative philosophers of science. This article analyses in depth such alternative philosophers of science as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Michel Foucault, summarizing the similarities and differences between alternative philosophies of science and traditional philosophy of science so as to unveil the trends in contemporary philosophy of science. With its different principles and foundation, alternative philosophy of science has made breakthroughs in terms of its field of vision, scope, and methodology, and its relationship with science has become more humanistic and pluralistic. Attention should be given to alternative perspectives in the contemporary philosophy of science, and research should be expanded into the fields of the epistemology of science and cognitive science, the sociology of scientific knowledge and scientific anthropology, the scientific cultural philosophy, and scientific ethics.     

从皮亚杰到柯尔伯格——兼论道德认知理论的哲学问题

从皮亚杰到柯尔伯格的道德认知理论是富有创新性的心理学理论 ,它以实证的方法研究了道德认知的发生和发展 ,对道德教育实践产生了巨大的影响。道德认知理论与现代唯物主义的精神实质相一致 ,并体现了丰富的辩证思维。但其理论在哲学世界观和方法论方面 ,存在一些自身不能解决的问题 ,对这些问题进行分析 ,有助于道德科学研究和伦理哲学研究的发展。     

Technik und Erkenntnis

The distinction between sociology of science on the one hand and methodology and systematics on the other, is an established historical fact. Thus, even in modern methodologically orientated philosophy, epistemological analyses still tend to disregard the pragmatic contexts within which scientific knowledge is produced, processed and applied. This situation also reflects the well-known fact that philosophy of science has largely ignored the conceptual and methodological foundations of technology, that is, those disciplines directly and explicitly linked to the practical implications and intended applications of scientific research. The following considerations suggest that the methodology of technology provides useful and generally applicable criteria of the evaluation and acceptance of the hypotheses and theories of empirical science.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework

The scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects-of-causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method.     

Whose social values? Evaluating Canada’s ‘death of evidence’ controversy

With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of evidence controversy. The worry, raised by Stathis Psillos, is that as constructivist accounts of science demoted the previously secure status of evidence for drawing justified conclusions in science, we were left with no rational delineation between the right and wrong values for science. The implication for the death of evidence controversy is that we may have no rational grounds for claiming that the Canadian Government is wrong to interfere with scientific enterprise. But he does offer another avenue for reaching the conclusion that the wrong social values are directing the current stifling of some sectors of Canadian science. Psillos draws from standpoint epistemologies to devise a salient defence of ‘valuing evidence’ as a universalizable social value. That is, government bodies ought to enable scientific research via adequate funding as well as political non-interference. In this paper, I counter that (i) non-epistemic values can be rationally evaluated and that (ii) standpoint epistemology’s universalizable standpoint provides an inadequate framework for negotiating social values in science. Regarding (i), I draw from the evidence-based medicine debate in philosophy of medicine and from feminist empiricist investigations into the science–values relationship in order to make the argument for empirically driven value arbitration. If social values can be rationally chosen in the context of justification, then we can have grounds for charging the Canadian leadership with being ‘at war with science’. (ii) I further argue that my recommended empiricist methodology is preferable to Psillos’s search for universalizable perspectives for negotiating social values in science because the latter method permits little more than the trivial conclusion that evidence is valuable to science.     

Philosophy of science in Estonia

This paper presents a survey of the philosophy of science in Estonia. Topics covered include the historical background (science at the 17th century Academia Gustaviana, in the 19th century, during the Soviet period) and an overview of the current situation and main areas of research (the problem of demarcation, a critique of the traditional understandings of science, φ-science, classical and non-classical science, the philosophy of chemistry, the problem of induction, the sociology of scientific knowledge, semiotics as a methodology).     

The New Alliance Between Science and Education: Otto Neurath’s Modernity Beyond Descartes’ ‘Adamitic’ Science

Starting from a suggestion of Stephen Toulmin and through an interpretation of the criticism to which Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle, submits Descartes’ views on science, the paper attempts to outline a pattern of modernity opposed to the Cartesian one, that has been obtaining over the last four centuries. In particular, it is argued that a new alliance has to be established between science and education, overcoming Descartes’ banishment against education. In a Neurathian perspective education is a key-moment of the scientific enterprise without which science itself is in danger of going astray and no scientific outlook is promoted in the society at large. Such an anti-Cartesian attitude is a leitmotiv of the whole Neurath’s production and characterizes his fundamental approach to the sense of modernity. For this reasons, despite all its shortcomings, Neurath’s proposal represents a very promising option for a new agenda of the modernity away from Descartes’ spell. By elaborating on Neurath’s (and Dewey’s) insights, the paper puts forward the idea that philosophy of science (such as it was originated by neopositivism in its Reichenbachian version) should give way to an educational philosophy of science which could allow us “to bring the genuine modern into existence”.     

Identification of Matrices in Science and Engineering

Engineering science is a scientific discipline that from the point of view of epistemology and the philosophy of science has been somewhat neglected. When engineering science was under philosophical scrutiny it often just involved the question of whether engineering is a spin-off of pure and applied science and their methods. We, however, hold that engineering is a science governed by its own epistemology, methodology and ontology. This point is systematically argued by comparing the different sciences with respect to a particular set of characterization criteria. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.