A common sense approach to value inquiry

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Transcending common sense in psychological theorizing: A developmental perspective

The necessity for transcendence of any particular system of common sense in psychologists' theorizing is reiterated in the process of analyzing Smedslund's response to the author's previous (Valsiner, 1985) critical analysis of the role of common sense in psychology. It is emphasized that the ways of how personally unique construction of meaning in individuals' ontogenies proceed are directed by social canalization, which guarantees sufficient (but not absolute) similarity in persons' individual thinking and acting. Such similarity forms the basis for intelligibility of interpersonal communication. A developmental perspective can overcome two opposite traditions in non-developmental psychologies which either disregard common sense, or make it the criterion of adequacy of thinking towards which psychological theories should strive. In contrast, it is suggested that common sense be studied in conjunction with research on psychological phenomena for which it serves as their context, and that generalizations about psychological phenomena retain information about the common-sense frames of the phenomena.     

Bandura's theory of self-efficacy: A set of common sense theorems

Bandura's (1977) theory of self-efficacy is translated into non-technical language and is shown to consist of logically necessary rather than empirically testable statements. As an alternative to the dominant empiricist view, it is argued that valid theories in psychology are explications of conceptual relationship imbedded in ordinary language (common sense). This conceptual network is anterior to both observation and theorizing. The analogy between the tasks of pre-Euclidean geometry and contemporary psychology is explored. The tasks are seen as involving explication of our implicit concepts of respectively space and people. One consequence of the stated view is that much psychological research is pointless since it attempts to verify logically necessary statements by empirical methods.     

Science and common sense: perspectives from philosophy and science education

Synthese - This paper explores the relation between scientific knowledge and common sense intuitions as a complement to Hoyningen-Huene’s account of systematicity. On one hand,...     

Interrogating emotions: A dyadic task for exploring the common sense of feeling states

This paper describes an innovative investigation of commonsense conceptions of emotion using a two-person game where one player asked questions intended to determine the nature of an emotional state imagined by the other player. All questions used by players were then sorted into categories by expert judges. Based on cluster analysis, questions were categorized as relating to ‘causes’, ‘characteristics’, and ‘consequences’ of emotional states. Potential advantages and applications of this technique are discussed.     

Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. We report six experiments that investigate the nature of the relations we represent between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and its other properties. The experiments provide evidence that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g. having four legs for dogs), but not other properties (t-properties; e.g. being brown for dogs). Principled connections are different from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections, (i) license the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess the k-property, (ii) license explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is, and (iii) license normative expectations concerning the presence of the k-property in tokens of the type. The experiments provide evidence for all three of these aspects of principled connections. The experiments also demonstrate that principled connections must be distinguished from merely strong statistical connections. We suggest that principled connections are one of the fundamental types of relations (in addition to logical, statistical, and causal relations) in terms of which our conceptual knowledge is structured. We argue that principled connections reveal a formal mode of understanding and explanation. This mode of understanding complements other modes of understanding that have been studied within the theory-based approach to conceptual representation. Finally, we suggest that kind representations are distinguished from representations of mere types by the representation of principled connections to k-properties.     

Deci and Ryan's cognitive evaluation theory of intrinsic motivation: A set of common sense theorems

Cognitive evaluation theory as put forward by Deci and Ryan (1985) is examined. The theory, which deals with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, has inspired considerable amount of empirical research in the last two decades. However, contrary to the mainstream view and that of its authors, it is argued here that the theory consists of necessary truths of common sense (folk) psychology, rather than contingent and empirically testable hypotheses. As such the theory spells out what must necessarily be the case in human motivation and the empirical evidence amassed to test its validity is irrelevant. Such testing should be abandoned if its purpose is to appraise the truth value of the theory's propositions. To empirically test necessary true propositions is not only redundant in such cases, but also a waste of time and resources.     

The root delusion enshrined in common sense and language

This paper is a critique of certain arguments given by the Milindapanha and Jay Garfield for the conventional nature of reality or existence. These arguments are of interest in their own right. They also are significant if they are presumed to attack an obstacle we all face in achieving non‐attachment, namely, our belief in the inherent or substantial existence of ourselves and the familiar objects of our world. The arguments turn on a distinction between these objects, and some other way of conceiving of them, in terms of which their conventional existence becomes apparent. After the distinction and the arguments that depend on it are shown to be problematic, the paper concludes with some reflections on the doctrine of skillful means and its applicability to Buddhist philosophical argument.     

Revising explications of common sense through dialogue: Thirty-six psychological theorems

An explication of common sense is an attempt to formulate a part of the ordinarily unformulated system of implications shared by all members of a given culture, familiar with a given context. Thirty-six alleged common sense formulations relating to Bandura's theory of self-efficacy were used. Students were asked 1) to give a prediction involving each theorem, 2) to judge whether or not an alternative prediction is conceivable, 3) to judge whether or not an explanation based on the theorem is acceptable, and 4) to judge whether or not an explanation based on the negation of the theorem is acceptable. The average consensus on these four types of judgments was respectively 93%, 80%, 92%, and 96%. A group of respondents were interviewed about the shortcomings of the formulations. The theorems were revised to incorporate these criticisms and, hence, are expected to yield higher consensus.     

Common sense and the common morality in theory and practice

The unfinished nature of Beauchamp and Childress’s account of the common morality after 34 years and seven editions raises questions about what is lacking, specifically in the way they carry out their project, more generally in the presuppositions of the classical liberal tradition on which they rely. Their wide-ranging review of ethical theories has not provided a method by which to move beyond a hypothetical approach to justification or, on a practical level regarding values conflict, beyond a questionable appeal to consensus. My major purpose in this paper is to introduce the thought of Bernard Lonergan as offering a way toward such a methodological breakthrough. In the first section, I consider Beauchamp and Childress’s defense of their theory of the common morality. In the second, I relate a persisting vacillation in their argument regarding the relative importance of reason and experience to a similar tension in classical liberal theory. In the third, I consider aspects of Lonergan’s generalized empirical method as a way to address problems that surface in the first two sections of the paper: (1) the structural relation of reason and experience in human action; and (2) the importance of theory for practice in terms of what Lonergan calls “common sense” and “general bias.”