Basis of metamemory judgments for text with multiple‐choice,essay and recall tests

Accuracy of metamemory for text was compared for multiple‐choice, essay and recall tests. Essay and recall tests were scored with Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), number of correct idea units and number of word matches. Each measure was correlated with college students' predictions and posttest confidence judgments across texts to determine metamemory accuracy. Metamemory accuracy varied for different types of tests with multiple‐choice tests generally producing greater accuracy than essay tests. However, metamemory accuracy for essay and recall tests depended on the measure used to score them. Number of correct idea units produced the highest metamemory accuracy, word matches produced an intermediate level, and LSA produced the lowest accuracy. Students used the quantity of output in their judgments, so performance measures that related most strongly to quantity matched judgments better than measures based on answer quality. The results are compatible with an accessibility account of judgments about performance on text. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eyewitness Memory and Metamemory in Product Identification: Evidence for Familiarity Biases

Research on the reliability of eyewitness memory for criminal events has been extensively studied, but eyewitness memory in civil cases has not. However, many of these civil cases revolve around eyewitness memory for events that transpired decades ago. We have developed a paradigm with which to study memory for specific product brand identification, a common question in civil cases involving product liability. Participants were asked to follow recipes and were then given surprise memory tests on the specific brands of products used. In addition, they were asked to report their subjective confidence for each response. Memory and performance was poor after even a brief delay, as was metamemory accuracy: Confidence regarding brand name recall was a poor indicator of accuracy. Participants also displayed a strong familiarity bias. They frequently reported using familiar, common brands, when no such products were actually used. This was especially true at longer delays, after which false identification of familiar products was twice as common as correct responses.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

Repetition and Reconfiguration: Demand‐Based Confabulation in Initial Eyewitness Memory

Repeated recall, as a result of repeated questioning, is typical of situations involving eyewitness evidence. The present study addressed questions of eyewitness performance with reference to repeated questioning in an initial interview, in a format based on actual police procedures. This experiment focused on eyewitness accuracy, eyewitness confidence, and the addition of false details to eyewitness accounts. Ninety‐two adult respondents were asked to recall all the information they could from a single viewing of a scene depicting an assailant aiming a handgun at a victim. This initial question was followed by three additional questions, in which respondents were asked to report any additional details they could recall. On average, respondents provided several times as many correct as false details to the initial question. However, performance deteriorated significantly to the three subsequent questions; on average, across the three subsequent questions, witnesses recalled nearly as much false as accurate information. Witness confidence was positively related to amount of accurate information recalled. However, confidence was also positively related to the number of instances of erroneous recall. These results indicate that reconfigurative dynamics begin to operate, producing confabulated responses in response to questioning demands, as early as the initial interview. This work may also help to clarify the critical relationship between accuracy and confidence in eyewitness reportage, at least within the framework reflected by the present research. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Change Blindness and Eyewitness Testimony

The authors explored the relevance of research on change blindness to eyewitness identification and testimony under intentional and incidental memory conditions. Participants (N = 80, 40 men and 40 women) viewed a video enactment of a burglary in which the identity of the burglar changed at the halfway point of the film. Half of participants were briefed to remember the content, and the other half were not. All were tested for the recall of the content, awareness of the change, and ability to identify either or both of the burglars. Some 61% of participants did not notice the identity change. Rates of detection were significantly higher in participants in the intentional condition, who also recalled significantly more detail from the film. Awareness of change was also significantly related to content recall scores and accuracy of identification of both burglars. The results illustrate the interrelation between the eyewitness and change blindness literatures.     

Predictive Feeling of Knowing Judgements and Postdictive Confidence Judgements in Eyewitness Memory and General Knowledge

Recent accounts of feeling of knowing (FOK) judgements assume that they arise from an assessment of cue familiarity, whilst retrospective confidence judgements arise from an assessment of the retrieval process. An experiment was conducted to extend this laboratory work to the area of eyewitness memory, in order to examine whether subjects are able to make accurate feeling of knowing judgements and retrospective confidence judgements for eyewitness memory (EM), in contrast to general knowledge (GK). For confidence judgements there was a reliable within-subject assessment of confidence for both GK and EM, but reliable between-subjects confidence—accuracy correlations for general knowledge only. For FOK a different pattern emerged, with no evidence of FOK accuracy for eyewitness memory at all. The theoretical implications of this pattern are discussed.     

Memory and metamemory for semantic information in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Several studies have been conducted on OCD patients' memory and metamemory performance in episodic tasks. However, there is a clear lack of research addressing these issues for semantic memory (i.e., retrieval of information from long-term memory). Although findings regarding a memory deficit is somewhat equivocal, the empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that OCD patients with primarily checking compulsions show reduced confidence in their memory performance. The purpose of the present study was to investigate memory and metamemory performance of checkers in semantic memory domain. We compared checker OCD patients, non-checker OCD patients and normal controls on their ability to retrieve answers to general knowledge questions with a recall as well as a recognition test. We also investigated prospective (feeling-of-knowing (FOK)) and retrospective (confidence) metamemory judgments. Checker OCs were not poorer in retrieving semantic information from long-term memory. Neither were they less confident about their ability to remember currently unrecallable information in the future (FOK judgments) or about the accuracy of retrieved information (confidence judgments). Moreover, accuracy of metamemory judgments were comparable across groups. Overall, our results revealed that checker OCs do not show a memory or metamemory deficit when semantic memory was concerned, suggesting that any memory and metamemory deficit may be special to recently experienced materials.     

The Influence of Perpetrator Exposure Time and Weapon Presence/Timing on Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy

Crimes can occur in a matter of seconds, with little time available for an eyewitness to encode a perpetrator's face. The presence of a weapon can further exacerbate this situation. Few studies have featured mock crimes of short duration, especially with a weapon manipulation. We conducted an experiment to investigate the impact of weapon presence and short perpetrator exposure times (3 vs. 10 seconds) on eyewitness confidence and accuracy. We found that recall concerning the perpetrator was worse when a weapon was present, replicating the weapon focus effect. However, there was no effect on eyewitness identification accuracy. Calibration analyses revealed that all conditions produced a strong confidence–accuracy relationship. Confidence–accuracy characteristic curves illustrated almost perfect accuracy for suspect identifications at the highest levels of confidence. We conclude that weapon presence during a brief crime does not necessarily result in negative consequences for either eyewitness identification accuracy or the confidence–accuracy relationship. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Change blindness and eyewitness testimony

The authors explored the relevance of research on change blindness to eyewitness identification and testimony under intentional and incidental memory conditions. Participants (N = 80, 40 men and 40 women) viewed a video enactment of a burglary in which the identity of the burglar changed at the halfway point of the film. Half of participants were briefed to remember the content, and the other half were not. All were tested for the recall of the content, awareness of the change, and ability to identify either or both of the burglars. Some 61% of participants did not notice the identity change. Rates of detection were significantly higher in participants in the intentional condition, who also recalled significantly more detail from the film. Awareness of change was also significantly related to content recall scores and accuracy of identification of both burglars. The results illustrate the interrelation between the eyewitness and change blindness literatures.     

How do we judge our confidence? Differential effects of meta-memory feedback on eyewitness accuracy and confidence

According to the cue–belief model, we assess confidence in our memories using self-credibility cues that reflect beliefs about our memory faculties. We tested the influence of meta-memory feedback on self-credibility cues in the context of eyewitness testimony, when feedback was provided prior to “testifying” via a memory questionnaire (Experiment 1) and after an initial memory questionnaire but before participants had to retake it (Experiment 2). Participants received feedback (good score, bad score, or none) on a fictitious scale purported to predict eyewitness memory ability. Those given good score feedback before testifying were more confident (but no more accurate) than those given bad score feedback. Feedback also affected confidence (good increased and bad decreased) and accuracy (good increased) after testifying but only on leading questions. These differential effects of meta-memory feedback on confidence for normal and leading questions are not explained by the cue–belief model. Implications for our confidence judgments are discussed.     

Immediate judgments of learning are insensitive to implicit interference effects at retrieval

We conducted three experiments to determine whether metamemory predictions at encoding, immediate judgments of learning (IJOLs) are sensitive to implicit interference effects that will occur at retrieval. Implicit interference was manipulated by varying the association set size of the cue (Experiments 1 and 2) or the target (Experiment 3). The typical finding is that memory is worse for large-set-size cues and targets, but only when the target is studied alone and later prompted with a related cue (extralist). When the pairs are studied together (intralist), recall is the same regardless of set size; set size effects are eliminated. Metamemory predictions at retrieval, such as delayed JOLs (DJOLs) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments accurately reflect implicit interference effects (e.g., Eakin & Hertzog, 2006. In all three experiments, we found that DJOLs and FOKs accurately predicted set size effects on retrieval but that IJOLs did not. The findings provide further evidence that metamemory predictions are inferred from information other than direct access to the state of the memory trace, as well as indicate that inferences are based on different sources depending on when in the memory process predictions are made.     

Exploring the boundaries of memory distrust from repeated checking: increasing external validity and examining thresholds

Checking behavior is among the most common forms of compulsions in OCD. Recent research suggests that repeated checking decreases memory confidence, and supports theoretical models of how repeated checking is maintained. The current paper presents findings from two studies exploring the boundaries of memory distrust from repeated checking. Results of study 1 show that repeated checking of a real stove decreases memory confidence, vividness, and detail (i.e., metamemory), and leads to a greater reliance on knowing as a source of memory, without meaningfully altering memory accuracy. Results of study 2 suggest that these changes in metamemory are observed after performing a relatively low number of checks on one occasion. The findings are considered within the context of theoretical models of checking and future directions are delineated.     

高难度材料的元记忆监测更受记忆广度的制约

以不同难度(有、无意义联系)的两种中文词对为记忆材料,随机选取在校大学生200名,采用经典的回忆-判断-再认(recall-judgement-recognition,RJR)范式,考察短时记忆广度和一般自我效能感对个体在不同难度材料上元记忆监测的影响。结果发现,相比于无意义联系的材料,个体在有意义联系的材料上,JOL、FOK和JOC判断等级更高,线索回忆测验成绩更好。但是,个体在不同材料上的JOL判断和线索回忆受短时记忆广度的调节。不同短时记忆广度的个体在有意义联系材料上的JOL判断等级和线索回忆测验成绩无显著差异,但是在无意义联系材料上,高短时记忆广度个体的JOL判断等级和线索回忆测验成绩均显著高于低短时记忆广度个体。同时,相关分析结果也发现,相比于低短时记忆广度的个体,高短时记忆广度的个体,其线索回忆测验成绩和再认测验成绩与JOL、FOK和JOC判断等级之间更加相关。实验结果表明,作为一种人格变量,一般自我效能感对个体元记忆监测的影响可能并不明显。而短时记忆广度,很大程度上反映了个体的记忆能力,是个体元记忆监测的一个重要影响因素,尤其是对难度较大的材料。     

Proactive interference and cuing effects in short-term cued recall: Does foil context matter?

Tehan and Humphreys's (1995, 1996) short-term cued recall paradigm showed that recall in short-term memory is cue driven. In critical trials, the participants studied two blocks of four words each and were required to forget the first block while remembering the second block. A foil in the first block (e.g., orange) was related to a target (e.g., carrot) in the second block. Proactive interference (PI) was evident when a retrieval cue was used that subsumed the foil and the target (e.g., type of juice), but not when a cue was used that subsumed only the target (e.g., type of vegetable). Four experiments were performed to examine the extent to which contextual organization in the foil block would enhance or diminish the foil's efficacy in creating PI. A novel condition was included in which the words in the foil block were studied in a phonologically related context but the target was cued semantically, and vice versa with a semantic context and phonological cue. There were no differences in recall accuracy between conditions with and without contextual organization, but reliable increases in foil intrusions were observed when contextual organization was present. Contextual organization enhanced the foil, rather than diminished it, but the strengthened foil generated PI only when the cue subsumed the foil and the target and had no effect when the cue subsumed only the target. The results are consistent with a cue-driven retrieval interpretation of short-term recall.     

Does delaying judgments of learning really improve the efficacy of study decisions? Not so much

A widely held assumption in metamemory is that better, more accurate metamemory monitoring leads to better, more efficacious restudy decisions, reflected in better memory performance--we refer to this causal chain as the restudy selectivity hypothesis. In 3 sets of experiments, we tested this hypothesis by factorially manipulating metamemory monitoring accuracy and self-regulation of study. To manipulate monitoring accuracy, we compared judgments of learning (JOLs) made contemporaneously with a delayed retrieval attempt to JOLs either made at a delay without attempting retrieval or made immediately after study; in previous studies, delayed retrieval-based JOLs have robustly predicted recall with greater relative accuracy than have the other JOL types. To manipulate self-regulation of study, in Experiments 1A-1C and 2A-2C, we compared conditions in which participants' restudy selections were honored with conditions in which they were completely or randomly dishonored; in Experiments 3A-3C, we randomly honored or dishonored half of the restudy selections and half of the nonselections. Results revealed that the benefit of delayed, retrieval-based JOLs for final memory performance was due largely to the selection of more items for restudy rather than to better discriminations between items that would benefit more versus less from restudy. In most cases, gains in recall due to greater self-regulation of study did not increase with better monitoring accuracy; when they did, the effect was extremely small. The surprising conclusion was that restudy decisions were not very much more efficacious under conditions that yield greater monitoring accuracy than under those that do not.     

Metamemory for narrative text

In this experiment, we investigated metamemory for narrative text passages. Subjects read two stories and made memory predictions for the idea units in one and rated the importance of ideas in the other. Half of the subjects were asked to recall the story immediately after reading the passages and half were asked to recall 1 week later; half received passages with single inconsistent idea units and half received passages with corresponding consistent idea units. All subjects made confidence judgments about the accuracy of their recall. Subjects’ prediction ratings were related to recall, as shown by significant prediction accuracy quotients. Importance ratings were related to recall on the delayed test but not on the immediate test. Memory prediction ratings predicted recall better than did importance ratings. The absolute level of memory predictions did not differ with delay, but subjects did give higher confidence judgments on an immediate than on a delayed test. Subjects recalled the inconsistent idea better than the consistent idea for one story but not for the other. For both stories, subjects predicted that they would remember the inconsistent ideas better, suggesting that they have avon Restorff-type view, rather than a schema view, of memory. We conclude that subjects can predict their memory for the idea units in narrative text.     

More than a feeling: Emotional cues impact the access and experience of autobiographical memories

Remembering is impacted by several factors of retrieval, including the emotional content of a memory cue. Here we tested how musical retrieval cues that differed on two dimensions of emotion—valence (positive and negative) and arousal (high and low)—impacted the following aspects of autobiographical memory recall: the response time to access a past personal event, the experience of remembering (ratings of memory vividness), the emotional content of a cued memory (ratings of event arousal and valence), and the type of event recalled (ratings of event energy, socialness, and uniqueness). We further explored how cue presentation affected autobiographical memory retrieval by administering cues of similar arousal and valence levels in a blocked fashion to one half of the tested participants, and randomly to the other half. We report three main findings. First, memories were accessed most quickly in response to musical cues that were highly arousing and positive in emotion. Second, we observed a relation between a cue and the elicited memory’s emotional valence but not arousal; however, both the cue valence and arousal related to the nature of the recalled event. Specifically, high cue arousal led to lower memory vividness and uniqueness ratings, but cues with both high arousal and positive valence were associated with memories rated as more social and energetic. Finally, cue presentation impacted both how quickly and specifically memories were accessed and how cue valence affected the memory vividness ratings. The implications of these findings for views of how emotion directs the access to memories and the experience of remembering are discussed.     

Memory and metamemory performance in older adults: One deficit or two?

In two separate experiments, three groups of older adults (50-80 years old) were shown lists of forename-surname pairs. At test subjects were cued with the surname and asked whether they knew the forename (prospective evaluation). Subjects attempted recall for those items they claimed to know and rated their confidence in their answer (retrospective evaluation). In Experiment 1 subjects saw the name list on 5 successive occasions and attempted recall after each. The older subjects recalled fewer items, but there were no age differences on retrospective memory evaluation. There was a marginally significant age effect on the prospective memory evaluation, which on closer inspection appeared to be a scaling effect related to recall performance. Experiment 2 verified this conclusion in a sample of older adults taking part in a training study extended over many weeks. The main implication of this work is that studies that compare metamemory accuracy in groups that differ in baseline memory performance should be careful before drawing conclusions about metamemory independently of memory performance.     

Processes leading to confidence and accuracy in sentence recognition: a metamemory approach

We propose that memory confidence is based on the processes and products of the just-completed memory task, along with the participants' metamemory beliefs about the relation of these processes and products to memory accuracy. We tested this metamemory approach to confidence by having participants carry out a simple recognition memory task with deceptive and nondeceptive items. The deceptive items were sentences that contained a possible synonym substitution, thus allowing errors based on gist memory. For nondeceptive items, high confidence was associated with high accuracy. For deceptive items the relationship reversed; high confidence was associated with low accuracy. A memory process questionnaire was developed that provided more differentiated phenomenal reports than the traditional know/remember distinction. For nondeceptive items, metamemory beliefs tended to be valid indicators of accuracy, but for deceptive items involving unconscious reconstructive memory processes, they tended to be invalid indicators of memory accuracy. The overall results lend strong support for our metamemory approach to memory confidence.     

Processes leading to confidence and accuracy in sentence recognition: A metamemory approach

We propose that memory confidence is based on the processes and products of the just-completed memory task, along with the participants’ metamemory beliefs about the relation of these processes and products to memory accuracy. We tested this metamemory approach to confidence by having participants carry out a simple recognition memory task with deceptive and nondeceptive items. The deceptive items were sentences that contained a possible synonym substitution, thus allowing errors based on gist memory. For nondeceptive items, high confidence was associated with high accuracy. For deceptive items the relationship reversed; high confidence was associated with low accuracy. A memory process questionnaire was developed that provided more differentiated phenomenal reports than the traditional know/remember distinction. For nondeceptive items, metamemory beliefs tended to be valid indicators of accuracy, but for deceptive items involving unconscious reconstructive memory processes, they tended to be invalid indicators of memory accuracy. The overall results lend strong support for our metamemory approach to memory confidence.