A Parable, A Pearl and “Popular”? How the Broadway Musical Wicked—Especially Elphaba’s Character—May Assist Adolescent Girls to Claim Their Uniqueness

In this essay I provide a brief exegesis of the parable of the ??pearl of great price?? (Matthew 13:45?C46) as an introduction to an examination of Elphaba??s character in the Broadway musical Wicked [as distinguished from her character in Gregory Maguire??s novel, Wicked (1996)] and the potential value this character has for pastoral care with adolescent girls who struggle with the need to belong as well as the need to be themselves. I argue that Wicked may be understood as a twenty-first century parable that appeals to many, adults and adolescents alike, but it is especially appealing to teenage girls because it ??taps into a certain teenage angst?? (Zinoman 2005) that relates to the quest for popularity, a first true love, and beauty makeovers. Elphaba??s seriousness has a certain kind of spiritual nature which may be related to her green skin (James 1984, p. 160) that may encourage adolescent girls to adopt their own spiritual natures and enable them to claim their own voices even as Elphaba finally ??defies gravity?? and learns to fly.     

Beyond Original Sin: A Paradigm Shift for the Age of Neuroscience

In this article I explore the implications of Jesus?? location of the kingdom of heaven in the lived experience of the individual and of the findings of neuroscientific research for a paradigm shift in Christian theology, one that moves us beyond the Adamic myth and belief in original sin. Support for a theological paradigm shift based on lived experience is provided by Capps (1993) and for this particular paradigm shift by Pagels (1989) and Ricoeur (2004). I point out that the doctrine of original sin supports and fosters the negativity bias of the brain and inhibits the resculpting of the brain. Drawing on Hanson??s (2009) evidence in support of the brain??s neuroplasticity (i.e., its capacity to change itself) and on Brach??s (2003) critique of the ??trance of unworthiness,?? I make the case for meditative and mindful awareness practices in Christianity and other religious traditions as proven methods for the resculpting of the brain in order that individuals may experience greater joy, contentment, and awareness of the goodness of life and of God??s creation. A longitudinal neuroscientific research study of Roman Catholic nuns (Newberg and Waldman 2009) provides evidence in support of the role of contemplative prayer and meditation in generating the joy and serenity that Jesus?? allusion to the hidden treasure envisions.     

The Parable of the Squirrel: Alleviating the Anxiety of Agoraphobia

This article focuses on agoraphobia, one of the anxiety disorders, and draws on William James (James 1890/1905), the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association 2000) and Aaron T. Beck and Gary Emery (1985) to present and explore the psychodynamics of agoraphobia, including its behavioral manifestations, the personality features that may predispose a person to become agoraphobic, and the factors that may precipitate its emergence at a particular time in one??s life. A parable concerning a squirrel having difficulty crossing the street frames the discussion.     

Margaret R. Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter: An Eriksonian Perspective

My perspective on Margaret R. Miles’s Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter is informed by Erik H. Erikson’s life cycle model (Erikson 1950, 1959, 1963, 1964, 1968a, b, 1982; Erikson and Erikson 1997) and, more specifically, by my relocation of his life stages and their accompanying human strengths (Erikson 1964) according to decades (Capps 2008). I interpret Miles’s account of her life from birth to age forty as revealing the selves that comprise the composite Self (Erikson 1968a) that come into their own during the first four decades of the life cycle, i.e., the hopeful, willing, purposeful, and competent selves     

Semantic plasticity and epistemicism

This paper considers the connections between semantic shiftiness (plasticity), epistemic safety and an epistemic theory of vagueness as presented and defended by Williamson (1996a, b, 1997a, b). Williamson explains ignorance of the precise intension of vague words as rooted in insensitivity to semantic shifts: one??s inability to detect small shifts in intension for a vague word results in a lack of knowledge of the word??s intension. Williamson??s explanation, however, falls short of accounting for ignorance of intension.     

Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education

This essay works to bridge conversations in philosophy of education with decolonial theory. The author considers Margonis?? (1999, 2011a, b) use of Rousseau (1979) and Heidegger (1962) in developing an ontological attitude that counters social hierarchies and promotes anti-colonial relations. While affirming this effort, the essay outlines a coloniality of being at work in Rousseau and Heidegger through thier reliance on the colonial conceptualization of African Americans and Native Americans as savage and primitive. The essay turns to decolonial theory and the work of Maldenado-Torres (Cult Stud 21(2?C3):240?C270, 2007, 2009) to highlight how a decolonial attitude complicates, yet enriches Margonis?? philosophical framework.     

The (Un)bearable Educational Lightness of Common Practices: On the Use of Urban Spaces by Schoolchildren

The present paper is about the author??s current research on children??s education in urban contexts. It departs from the rising offer of programmes for school children in out-of-school contexts (e.g. museums, libraries, science centres). It asks what makes these practices educational (and not just interesting, entertaining and/or audience building). Based on Biesta (2006a, 2010) theory of education, the author frames and analyses the educational characteristics of, and possibilities of articulating, in and out-of-school educational practices. This paper aims at understanding if the occasional outing from primary school premises promotes interruptions in the humanist foundations of school. In order to analyse relations between different institutions and professionals (to be) engaged in educational activities and programmes, Nóvoa (2002, 2009) essays will be brought to the discussion, namely his conception of the ??Public Space of Education????as a space where culture, education, arts, sports and leisure are shared responsibilities, and where diverse institutions are networked aiming towards societal pluralism. I argue for the possibility of using cities?? public spaces as contexts with a worldly quality to complexify children??s education. Nevertheless, I draw attention to the unbearable educational lightness that these practices may carry if they do not go beyond the praise of chance; as well as to their unsustainable weight if they perpetually repeat school??s normal orders and add up rational discourses.     

Keith Lehrer on the basing relation

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer??s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311?C313, 1971). We show that Lehrer??s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer??s account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer??s own account is more plausible.     

Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability

Pereboom has formulated a Frankfurt-style counterexample in which an agent is alleged to be responsible despite the fact that there are only non-robust alternatives present (Pereboom, Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: essays on the importance of alternative possibilities, 2003; Phil Explor 12(2):109–118, 2009). I support Widerker’s objection to Pereboom’s Tax Evasion 2 example (Widerker, J Phil 103(4):163–187, 2006) (which rests on the worry that the agent in this example is derivatively culpable as opposed to directly responsible) against Pereboom’s recent counterarguments to this objection (Pereboom 2009). Building on work by Moya (J Phil 104:475–486, 2007; Critica 43(128):3–26, 2011) and Widerker (Widerker 2006), I argue that there is good reason to measure the robustness of alternatives in terms of comparative, rather than non-comparative likelihood of exemption, where the important factor for blame is whether the agent is “doing her reasonable best” to avoid blameworthy behaviour. I maintain that an agent only ever appears responsible when alternatives are robust in this sense. In Pereboom’s examples, both Tax Evasion 2, and his more recent version, Tax Evasion 3 (Pereboom 2009), I maintain the robustness of the alternatives, so understood, is unclear. We can clear up any ambiguity by sharpening the examples, and the result is that the agent appears responsible when the alternatives are made clearly robust, and does not appear responsible when alternatives appear clearly non-robust. The comparative nature of our judgements about blame, I maintain helps to explain the continuing appeal of the “leeway-incompatibilist” viewpoint.     

Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29:228?C247, 2005). Pereboom??s case, a variant of what are known as ??Frankfurt cases,?? is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom??s example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples.     

Indeterminism is a modal notion: branching spacetimes and Earman’s pruning

The paper defends an Aristotelian notion of indeterminism, as rigorously formulated in the framework of branching space-times (BST) of Belnap (1992), against criticism by Earman??s (2008) based on a model-theoretic characterization of indeterminism. It delineates BST branching against the background provided by Earman??s (2008) distinction between individual versus ensemble branching. Partly in order to motivate our responses to Earman, it describes a construction of physically motivated BST models, in which histories are isomorphic to Minkowski spacetime. Finally it responds to Earman??s criticisms leveled against BST by addressing a topological issue, the question of an actual future, the past/future asymmetry, and some semantical questions.     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

Discussions with Bocheński concerning Soviet Marxism–Leninism, 1952–1986

Boche??ski??s lucid, unpartisan, and judiciously critical discussion of Soviet Marxism?CLeninism in his book Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (1950) filled a major gap in our understanding of that influential movement. Prior to its publication there had been only two works on the subject in English, John Somerville??s Soviet Philosophy (1946) and the Handbook of Philosophy (1949), edited and adapted by Howard Selsam from the Kratkij filosofskij slovar?? (2nd ed. 1940). Both are marked by strong partisanship and ideological bias. Somerville is uncritically pro-Soviet and abjectly Stalinist. Selsam, although he tones down the adulation of Marx, Stalin et al. of the KFS, retains that work??s abuse of such ??reactionary?? and ??idealist?? thinkers as Plato and such ??reactionary?? and ??bourgeois?? thinkers as Hegel. The benign influence of Boche??ski??s work increased with the publication of the English translation, Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism, in 1963.     

The Logical Form of Interventionism

This paper argues that, notwithstanding the remarkable popularity of Woodward??s (2003) interventionist analysis of causation, the exact definitional details of that theory are surprisingly little understood. There exists a discrepancy in the literature between the insufficient appreciation of the logical details of interventionism, on the one hand, and the amount of theoretical work interventionism is expected to do, on the other. The first part of the paper distinguishes four significantly different readings of the logical form of Woodward??s analysis and identifies the two readings that best capture Woodward??s intentions in (2003) and (2008a), respectively. In the second part, I show that these different readings are not clearly kept apart in the literature, and, moreover, that neither of them can do all the work that interventionists would like the theory to do.     

Incommensurability,slight pains and God

I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659–688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165–176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God’s non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one’s toe) and Leibniz’s reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz’s general position.     

Lucky understanding without knowledge

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge.     

Importing Logics

The novel notion of importing logics is introduced, subsuming as special cases several kinds of asymmetric combination mechanisms, like temporalization [8, 9], modalization [7] and exogenous enrichment [13, 5, 12, 4, 1]. The graph-theoretic approach proposed in [15] is used, but formulas are identified with irreducible paths in the signature multi-graph instead of equivalence classes of such paths, facilitating proofs involving inductions on formulas. Importing is proved to be strongly conservative. Conservative results follow as corollaries for temporalization, modalization and exogenous enrichment.