The world is either digital or analogue

We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi’s argument. In the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens.     

On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism

We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. In Sects. 3–5, I subject reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of evidential support to various counterexamples. In Sect. 6, I show that the most promising ways to address these counterexamples aren’t very promising.     

Logical truth in modal languages: reply to Nelson and Zalta

Does general validity or real world validity better represent the intuitive notion of logical truth for sentential modal languages with an actuality connective? In (Philosophical Studies 130:436–459, 2006) I argued in favor of general validity, and I criticized the arguments of Zalta (Journal of Philosophy 85:57–74, 1988) for real world validity. But in Nelson and Zalta (Philosophical Studies 157:153–162, 2012) Michael Nelson and Edward Zalta criticize my arguments and claim to have established the superiority of real world validity. Section 1 of the present paper introduces the problem and sets out the basic issues. In Sect. 2 I consider three of Nelson and Zalta’s arguments and find all of them deficient. In Sect. 3 I note that Nelson and Zalta direct much of their criticism at a phrase (‘true at a world from the point of view of some distinct world as actual’) I used only inessentially in Hanson (Philosophical Studies 130:436–459, 2006), and that their account of the philosophical foundations of modal semantics leaves them ill equipped to account for the plausibility of modal logics weaker than S5. Along the way I make several general suggestions for ways in which philosophical discussions of logical matters–especially, but not limited to, discussions of truth and logical truth for languages containing modal and indexical terms–might be facilitated and made more productive.     

Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism

Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for the truth of past‐directed propositions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking is implausible because it requires the existence of cross‐temporal supervenience relations, which are anathema to presentism.     

What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms,policies and perspectives

Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In Sect. 2 I consider van Fraassen’s argument for construing empiricism as a stance, and look at some responses to it. In Sect. 3 I outline my conception of stances as perspectives or ways of seeing, and explain how stances so understood may be justified. I illustrate this conception by way of a discussion of the model pluralist position with respect to the units of selection debate in biology, and suggest that on the model pluralist view different perspectives on the units of selection, such as the gene’s eye view, are in fact van Fraassian stances. In Sect. 4 I discuss the view put forward by Teller and Chakravartty among others that stances should be understood as epistemic policies, and argue that it is consistent with the conception of stances as perspectives. In the final section I criticise Rowbottom’s attempt to assimilate stances to Kuhnian paradigms. I argue that he has overlooked some important disanalogies between stances and paradigms, so that the comparison obscures more than it reveals.     

What skilled typists don’t know about the QWERTY keyboard

We conducted four experiments to investigate skilled typists’ explicit knowledge of the locations of keys on the QWERTY keyboard, with three procedures: free recall (Exp.?1), cued recall (Exp.?2), and recognition (Exp.?3). We found that skilled typists’ explicit knowledge of key locations is incomplete and inaccurate. The findings are consistent with theories of skilled performance and automaticity that associate implicit knowledge with skilled performance and explicit knowledge with novice performance. In Experiment?4, we investigated whether novice typists acquire more complete explicit knowledge of key locations when learning to touch-type. We had skilled QWERTY typists complete a Dvorak touch-typing tutorial. We then tested their explicit knowledge of the Dvorak and QWERTY key locations with the free recall task. We found no difference in explicit knowledge of the two keyboards, suggesting that typists know little about key locations on the keyboard, whether they are exposed to the keyboard for 2 h or 12 years.     

Against representations with two directions of fit

The idea that there are representations with a double direction of fit has acquired a pride of place in contemporary debates on the ontology of institutions. This paper will argue against the very idea of anything at all having both directions of fit. There is a simple problem which has thus far gone unnoticed. The suggestion that there are representations with both directions of fit amounts to a suggestion that, in cases of discrepancy between a representation and the world, both should change—the representation and the world. But that would merely amount to another discrepancy, and so both should change again, ad infinitum. The paper will first elucidate the notion of a “direction of fit” and clarify how the criticism to be presented here differs from earlier criticisms (Section 1).The next section sheds some light on why and how acts and attitudes with both directions of fit have seemed to play a part in explaining the existence of institutional reality (Section 2). The next sections present the argument against any representations with both directions of fit, relying on a normative understanding of the distinction. The argument will have three steps (Sections 3, 4, and 5). The section that follows shows that the criticism also applies to the dispositional understanding of the notion of a direction of fit (Section 6), and then the paper asks whether a third kind of reading would be available (Section 7) and whether the infallibility of the relevant representations would be of help (Section 8). Finally, the paper assesses briefly the consequences of dropping the notion of two directions of fit (Section 9).     

Erratum to: Perseverance as an intellectual virtue

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal traits and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance that places perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual virtues, including courage. These connections highlight the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive account of such virtues.     

Perseverance as an intellectual virtue

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal characters and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance that places perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual virtues, including courage. These connections highlight the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive account of such virtues.     

The mental wormhole: Internal attention shifts without regard for distance

Attention operates perceptually on items in the environment, and internally on objects in visuospatial working memory. In the present study, we investigated whether spatial and temporal constraints affecting endogenous perceptual attention extend to internal attention. A retro-cue paradigm in which a cue is presented beyond the range of iconic memory and after stimulus encoding was used to manipulate shifts of internal attention. Participants?? memories were tested for colored circles (Experiments 1, 2, 3a, 4) or for novel shapes (Experiment 3b) and their locations within an array. In these experiments, the time to shift internal attention (Experiments 1 and 3) and the eccentricity of encoded objects (Experiments 2?C4) were manipulated. Our data showed that, unlike endogenous perceptual attention, internal shifts of attention are not modulated by stimulus eccentricity. Across several timing parameters and stimuli, we found that shifts of internal attention require a minimum quantal amount of time regardless of the object eccentricity at encoding. Our findings are consistent with the view that internal attention operates on objects whose spatial information is represented in relative terms. Although endogenous perceptual attention abides by the laws of space and time, internal attention can shift across spatial representations without regard for physical distance.     

Top-down constraint on recognition memory

Can recognition memory be constrained “at the front end,” such that people are more likely to retrieve information about studying a recognition-test probe from a specified target source than they are to retrieve such information about a probe from a nontarget source? We adapted a procedure developed by Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 12:852–857, 2005) to address this question. Experiment 1 yielded evidence of source-constrained retrieval, but that pattern was not significant in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 (nor in several unpublished pilot experiments). In Experiment 5, in which items from the two studied sources were perceptibly different, a pattern consistent with front-end constraint of recognition emerged, but this constraint was likely exercised via visual attention rather than memory. Experiment 6 replicated both the absence of a significant constrained-retrieval pattern when the sources did not differ perceptibly (as in Exps. 2, 3 and 4) and the presence of that pattern when they did differ perceptibly (as in Exp. 5). Our results suggest that people can easily constrain recognition when items from the to-be-recognized source differ perceptibly from items from other sources (presumably via visual attention), but that it is difficult to constrain retrieval solely on the basis of source memory.     

Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference

I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point out that there is an analog of Moore’s Paradox for inference; and I suggest that explaining this phenomenon is a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. Boghossian’s Taking Condition derives its plausibility from the fact that it apparently explains the analog of Moore’s Paradox. Second, in Sect. 3, I show that neither Boghossian’s, nor Broome’s, nor Wright’s account of inference meets my condition of adequacy. I distinguish two kinds of mistake one is likely to make if one does not focus on my condition of adequacy; and I argue that all three—Boghossian, Broome, and Wright—make at least one of these mistakes.     

Presentation-order effects for aesthetic stimulus preference

For preference comparisons of paired successive musical excerpts, Koh (American Journal of Psychology, 80, 171?C185, 1967) found time-order effects (TOEs) that correlated negatively with stimulus valence??the first (vs. the second) of two unpleasant (vs. two pleasant) excerpts tended to be preferred. We present three experiments designed to investigate whether valence-level-dependent order effects for aesthetic preference (a) can be accounted for using Hellstr?m??s (e.g., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 5, 460?C477, 1979) sensation-weighting (SW) model, (b) can be generalized to successive and to simultaneous visual stimuli, and (c) vary, in accordance with the stimulus weighting, with interstimulus interval (ISI; for successive stimuli) or stimulus duration (for simultaneous stimuli). Participants compared paired successive jingles (Exp. 1), successive color patterns (Exp. 2), and simultaneous color patterns (Exp. 3), selecting the preferred stimulus. The results were well described by the SW model, which provided a better fit than did two extended versions of the Bradley?CTerry?CLuce model. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed higher weights for the second stimulus than for the first, and negatively valence-level-dependent TOEs. In Experiment 3, there was no laterality effect on the stimulus weighting and no valence-level-dependent space-order effects (SOEs). In terms of the SW model, the valence-level-dependent TOEs can be explained as a consequence of differential stimulus weighting in combination with stimulus valence varying from low to high, and the absence of valence-level-dependent SOEs as a consequence of the absence of differential weighting. For successive stimuli, there were no important effects of ISI on weightings and TOEs, and, for simultaneous stimuli, duration had only a small effect on the weighting.     

Breaking through the attentional window: Capture by abrupt onsets versus color singletons

Theeuwes (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 11:65?C70, 2004) proposed that stimulus-driven capture occurs primarily for salient stimuli that fall within the observer??s attentional window, such as when performing a parallel search. This proposal, which is supported by some studies, can explain many seemingly discrepant results in the literature. The present study tested this proposal using a modified precuing paradigm. Search mode was manipulated via target?Cdistractor similarity in color space. In the parallel search condition, the orange target ??popped out?? from a set of distantly colored distractors (blue and green). In the serial search condition, the orange target was more difficult to find amongst a set of similarly colored distractors (yellow and red). In Experiments 1 and 2, cue validity effects for irrelevant-color singleton cues were greater under parallel than under serial search, at least partially replicating previous studies favoring the attentional-window account (e.g., Belopolsky, Zwaan, Theeuwes, & Kramer, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 14:934?C938, 2007). We found the opposite pattern, however, for capture by abrupt onsets (Experiments 3 and 4), in which case capture effects were actually greater under serial search. In sum, parallel search appears to facilitate capture by color singletons, yet to inhibit capture by abrupt onsets.     

Strength cues and blocking at test promote reliable within-list criterion shifts in recognition memory

In seven experiments, we explored the potential for strength-based, within-list criterion shifts in recognition memory. People studied a mix of target words, some presented four times (strong) and others studied once (weak). In Experiments 1, 2, 4A, and 4B, the test was organized into alternating blocks of 10, 20, or 40 trials. Each block contained lures intermixed with strong targets only or weak targets only. In strength-cued conditions, test probes appeared in a unique font color for strong and weak blocks. In the uncued conditions of Experiments 1 and 2, similar strength blocks were tested, but strength was not cued with font color. False alarms to lures were lower in blocks containing strong target words, as compared with lures in blocks containing weak targets, but only when strength was cued with font color. Providing test feedback in Experiment 2 did not alter these results. In Experiments 3A–3C, test items were presented in a random order (i.e., not blocked by strength). Of these three experiments, only one demonstrated a significant shift even though strength cues were provided. Overall, the criterion shift was larger and more reliable as block size increased, and the shift occurred only when strength was cued with font color. These results clarify the factors that affect participants’ willingness to change their response criterion within a test list.     

Escaping the recent past: Which stimulus dimensions influence proactive interference?

Proactive interference occurs when information from the past disrupts current processing and is a major source of confusion and errors in short-term memory (STM; Wickens, Born, & Allen, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2:440–445, 1963). The present investigation examines potential boundary conditions for interference, testing the hypothesis that potential competitors must be similar along task-relevant dimensions to influence proactive interference effects. We manipulated both the type of task being completed (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and dimensions of similarity irrelevant to the current task (Experiments 4 and 5) to determine how the recent presentation of a probe item would affect the speed with which participants could reject that item. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 contrasted STM judgments, which require temporal information, with semantic and perceptual judgments, for which temporal information is irrelevant. In Experiments 4 and 5, task-irrelevant information (perceptual similarity) was manipulated within the recent probes task. We found that interference from past items affected STM task performance but did not affect performance in semantic or perceptual judgment tasks. Conversely, similarity along a nominally irrelevant perceptual dimension did not affect the magnitude of interference in STM tasks. Results are consistent with the view that items in STM are represented by noisy codes consisting of multiple dimensions and that interference occurs when items are similar to each other and, thus, compete along the dimensions relevant to target selection.     

Investigating the speed–accuracy trade-off: Better use deadlines or response signals?

Deadlines (DLs) and response signals (RSs) are two well-established techniques for investigating speed–accuracy trade-offs (SATs). Methodological differences imply, however, that corresponding data do not necessarily reflect equivalent processes. Specifically, the DL procedure grants knowledge about trial-specific time demands and requires responses before a prespecified period has elapsed. In contrast, RS intervals often vary unpredictably between trials, and responses must be given after an explicit signal. Here, we investigated the effects of these differences in a flanker task. While all conditions yielded robust SAT functions, a right-shift of the curves pointed to reduced performance in RS conditions (Experiment 1, blocked; Experiments 2 and 3, randomized), as compared with DL conditions (Experiments 1–3, blocked), indicating that the detection of the RS imposes additional task demands. Moreover, the flanker effect vanished at long intervals in RS settings, suggesting that stimulus-related effects are absorbed in a slack when decisions are completed prior to the signal. In turn, effects of a flat (Experiment 2) versus a performance-contingent payment (Experiment 3) indicated that susceptibility to response strategies is higher in the DL than in the RS method. Finally, the RS procedure led to a broad range of slow responses and high accuracies, whereas DL conditions resulted in smaller variations in the upper data range (Experiments 1 and 2); with performance-contingent payment (Experiment 3), though, data ranges became similar. Together, the results uncover characteristic procedure-related effects and should help in selection of the appropriate technique.     

The effects of interleaving versus blocking on foreign language pronunciation learning

Many studies have shown that students learn better when they are given repeated exposures to different concepts in a way that is shuffled or interleaved, rather than blocked (e.g., Rohrer Educational Psychology Review, 24, 355–367, 2012). The present study explored the effects of interleaving versus blocking on learning French pronunciations. Native English speakers learned several French words that conformed to specific pronunciation rules (e.g., the long “o” sound formed by the letter combination “eau,” as in bateau), and these rules were presented either in blocked fashion (bateau, carreau, fardeau . . . mouton, genou, verrou . . . tandis, verglas, admis) or in interleaved fashion (bateau, mouton, tandis, carreau, genou, verglas . . .). Blocking versus interleaving was manipulated within subjects (Experiments 1–3) or between subjects (Experiment 4), and participants’ pronunciation proficiency was later tested through multiple-choice tests (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or a recall test (Experiment 3). In all experiments, blocking benefited the learning of pronunciations more than did interleaving, and this was true whether participants learned only 4 words per rule (Experiments 1–3) or 15 words per rule (Experiment 4). Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

The influence of flankers on race categorization of faces

Context affects multiple cognitive and perceptual processes. In the present study, we asked how the context of a set of faces would affect the perception of a target face??s race in two distinct tasks. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants categorized target faces according to perceived racial category (Black or White). In Experiment 1, the target face was presented alone or with Black or White flanker faces. The orientation of flanker faces was also manipulated to investigate how face inversion effect would interact with the influences of flanker faces on the target face. The results showed that participants were more likely to categorize the target face as White when it was surrounded by inverted White faces (an assimilation effect). Experiment 2 further examined how different aspects of the visual context would affect the perception of the target face by manipulating flanker faces?? shape and pigmentation, as well as their orientation. The results showed that flanker faces?? shape and pigmentation affected the perception of the target face differently. While shape elicited a contrast effect, pigmentation appeared to be assimilative. These novel findings suggest that the perceived race of a face is modulated by the appearance of other faces and their distinct shape and pigmentation properties. However, the contrast and assimilation effects elicited by flanker faces?? shape and pigmentation may be specific to race categorization, since the same stimuli used in a delayed matching task (Experiment 3) revealed that flanker pigmentation induced a contrast effect on the perception of target pigmentation.