Property Designators,Predicates, and Rigidity

The article discusses an idea of how to extend the notion of rigidity to predicates, namely the idea that predicates stand in a certain systematic semantic relation to properties, such that this relation may hold rigidly or nonrigidly. The relation (which I call signification) can be characterised by recourse to canonical property designators which are derived from predicates (or general terms) by means of nominalization: a predicate signifies that property which the derived property designator designates. Whether signification divides into rigid and non-rigid cases will then depend uponwhether canonical property designators divide into rigid and non-rigid ones. But, I shall argue, they do not, and so the only notion of rigidity gained this way is trivial. To show this, I first focus on the kind of canonical property designators which could be thought to be nonrigid, canonical designators such as having the colour of ripe tomatoes which themselves contain non-rigid property designators. An argument to the effect that such complex canonical designators are non-rigid is rebutted, five arguments to the effect that they are rigid are formulated, and finally an explanation of their rigidity based on the general nature of canonical property designators is presented.     

Aristotle on Predication

A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals.     

Propositions, semantic values, and rigidity

Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values.     

A Puzzle about Properties

The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid. But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestion that properties are the semantic values of predicates.     

Against <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Posteriori</Emphasis> Moral Naturalism

A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.     

The Semantics of Rigid Designation

Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators.     

What does syntax say about space? 2-year-olds use sentence structure to learn new prepositions

Children as young as two use sentence structure to learn the meanings of verbs. We probed the generality of sensitivity to sentence structure by moving to a different semantic and syntactic domain, spatial prepositions. Twenty-six-month-olds used sentence structure to determine whether a new word was an object-category name (This is a corp!) or a spatial-relational term (This is acorp my box!). We argue that children rely on the intimate relationship between nouns in sentences and semantic arguments of predicate terms: Noting that a new word takes noun arguments identifies the new word as a predicate term, and directs the child's attention to relations among its arguments.     

Short-term retention of lexical-semantic representations: implications for speech production

Patients with semantic STM deficits have difficulty comprehending sentences that require the retention of several lexical-semantic representations prior to their integration into higher-level propositions (Martin, 1995: Martin & Romani. 1994). In Experiment 1, patients with a semantic retention deficit had difficulty with the same type of constructions in speech production, namely noun phrases with one or two prenominal adjectives. Their performance improved when they could produce the nouns and adjectives in sentence form, which placed smaller demands on lexical-semantic retention. In Experiment 2 these patients were better able to produce syntactically complex sentences than the prenominal adjective phrases having an equal number of content words, indicating that the findings in Experiment 1 could not be attributed to syntactic complexity. These patients produced more pauses in the sentence constructions in Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that the timing of such productions is abnormal. In contrast, patient EA, with a phonological retention deficit, performed better than the patients with a semantic retention deficit on the AN phrases despite having a smaller STM span. She showed no significant benefit of producing sentence compared to phrase constructions, and also made fewer and shorter pauses than the other patients. These findings support the multiple capacities view of verbal working memory and suggest that the same semantic retention capacity used in language comprehension is used in speech production.     

Processing category terms in context: instantiation and the structure of semantic categories

The present study sought to determine if semantic categories processed in context are encoded as particular exemplars. In Experiment 1 we replicated previous results on an extended and modified set of stimuli by showing that when subjects read sentences containing a category term in a context designed to bias encoding toward an atypical exemplar, the atypical exemplar serves as a better retrieval cue than a typical exemplar. In Experiment 2 we tested whether these cued-recall results were due to processes operating at encoding or retrieval. The pattern of semantic interference obtained in a modified Stroop paradigm clearly contradicted the position that readers routinely encode general terms as examples, or "instantiations." In particular, there was significant color-naming interference when typical exemplars served as targets even when preceded by sentences designed to bias encoding toward an atypical exemplar. No significant color-naming interference was generated to atypical exemplars. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that differences between the cued-recall and Stroop results in the first two experiments were due to encoding strategy differences. It was concluded that assigning a referent to a category term is not a routine activity in sentence encoding and that processing category terms entails activation of summary representations.     

Processing and Learning of Japanese Double-Object Active and Causative Sentences: An Error-Feedback Paradigm

Do native speakers always outperform second-language (L2) learners in terms of speech processing accuracy? Surprisingly, the answer to this seemingly obvious question is no according to the study reported here. Indeed, native speakers sometimes make more errors than learners in interpreting their own first-language (L1) speech. In this competition experiment of the double-object active and transitive causative sentence processing strategies, six native Japanese speakers and nine English-speaking learners of Japanese participated. The participants were required to identify the agents of the main lexical verb (“doers”) of a series of Japanese sentences, each consisting of one verb and three noun phrases, in which word order and case-marking cues either competed or were consistent with each other. In the first (pretest) and last (posttest) parts of the study, participants received no feedback about the accuracy of their responses, whereas in the middle part they received immediate feedback. The stimulus sentences were such that a listener could determine the semantic role of noun phrases (actor, causer, or recipient) only by taking into consideration both the case markers and the verb's voice (active vs. causative). Learners of Japanese as a second language (JFLs) demonstrated an evident word order bias. Native Japanese speakers also made surprisingly numerous errors, by imposing the canonical case-marker sequence in reconstructing noncanonical sentences. Indeed some of the native Japanese revealed an even stronger word order bias than the learners, and they committed more errors than learners in interpreting noncanonical word order sentences. The results are explained in terms of the working memory constraint. Directions of further research are discussed.     

Emphasis as a prompt for verbal imitation

Four- and five-yr-old disadvantaged children were read sentences composed of varying numbers of short phrases. The children were asked to repeat each sentence, but the accuracy of their imitations was not differentially reinforced. The teacher stressed (emphasized) certain words as she read each sentence. The proportion of words that were stressed was systematically varied. In general, the children imitated only parts of most sentences. Stress was effective in influencing which parts of a sentence the children would imitate, but only when relatively few words were stressed. Stressing a word increased the probability of a child's imitating that word (and, to a large extent, the entire phrase containing that word) as an inverse function of the proportion of the words that were stressed.     

Relative truth and the first person

In recent work on context-dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call ‘first-person-based genericity’, a form of generalization that is based on an essential first-person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a first-personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display.     

Induction of augmented transition networks

LAS is a program that acquires augmented transition network (ATN) grammars. It requires as data sentences of the language and semantic network representatives of their meaning. In acquiring the ATN grammars, it induces the word classes of the language, the rules of formation for sentences, and the rules mapping sentences onto meaning. The induced ATN grammar can be used both for sentence generation and sentence comprehension. Critical to the performance of the program are assumptions that it makes about the relation between sentence structure and surface structure (the graph deformation condition), about when word classes may be formed and when ATN networks may be merged, and about the structure of noun phrases. These assumptions seem to be good heuristics which are largely true for natural languages although they would not be true for many nonnatural languages. Provided these assumptions are satisfied LAS seems capable of learning any context-free language.     

Two contextualist fallacies

I examine the radical contextualists’ two main arguments for the semantic underdeterminacy thesis, according to which all, or almost all, English sentences lack context-independent truth conditions. I show that both arguments are fallacious. The first argument, which I call the fallacy of the many understandings, mistakenly infers that a sentence S is semantically incomplete from the fact that S can be used to mean different things in different contexts. The second argument, which I call the open texture fallacy, wrongly concludes that a sentence S lacks context-independent truth conditions from the fact that there are circumstances in which the truth value of S would be indeterminate. I do however defend the claim that a certain class of sentences not containing any indexicals do lack context-independent truth conditions, and put forward an argument to that effect. But this argument, as I show, does not generalize to all sentences, and thus fails to support the semantic underdeterminacy thesis.     

Sentence comprehension in Parkinson's disease: the role of attention and memory.

Sentence comprehension is a complex process involving at least attentional, memory, grammatical, and semantic components. We report three experiments designed to evaluate the impairments underlying sentence comprehension difficulties in nondemented patients with Parkinson's disease (PD). In the first experiment, we asked patients to answer simple questions about sentences which varied in terms of grammatical complexity and semantic constraint. We found that PD patients are significantly compromised in their ability to perform this task. Their difficulties became more prominent as grammatical complexity increased, but they were significantly assisted by semantic constraints that limited possible interpretations of a sentence. Analyses of individual patient profiles revealed heterogeneous performance across the group of PD patients and somewhat inconsistent performance for patients across testing sessions. In the second experiment, we tested the possibility that patients' heterogeneous performance on the sentence comprehension task is due to an impairment in memory or attention, cognitive domains known to be compromised in some PD patients. Although PD patients and control subjects differed on one memory measure, there were no significant correlations between attention and memory performance and the results of the sentence comprehension task. In the final experiment, we manipulated the sentences used in the first experiment in a fashion that stressed the need for memory and attention in a sentence. The results indicated that PD patients are significantly compromised in their ability to attend to certain critical grammatical features of a sentence. A regression analysis identified specific grammatical, semantic, and attentional mechanisms as significant contributors to PD patients' overall sentence comprehension, accounting for over 97% of the variance in their performance. We conclude that there are multiple sources of cognitive difficulty underlying PD patients' sentence comprehension impairment.     

SEMANTIC AND PHONOLOGICAL CODING PROCESSES IN SKILLED AND LESS SKILLED READERS' READING OF TEXT

Abstract

Two experiments examine the memory coding processes of skilled and less skilled readers during the reading of connected text. In experiment 1, students read several paragraphs which required a lexical decision about an underlined letter string within a sentence. Underlined letter strings were either synonyms, repeated words, or control words in reference to items in the sentence. Students were later asked to recall words related to their lexical decision, as well as verify the occurrence of sentences from the text. Skilled readers recalled more synonyms than poor readers, whereas no differences emerged between groups in their recall of other types of words related to the lexical task or for the verification of sentences. Experiment 2 procedures were similar to Experiment 1, except that synonyms were replaced with homophones and the sentence verification task included phrases related to the homophones. When compared to less skilled readers, skilled readers recalled more homophones and repeated words, but were more likely to be disrupted in correct verification of sentences with homophones. Taken together, the experiments suggest that along with phonological coding, semantic processing contributes an important amount of variance to deficiencies in the reading of connected text.     

The role of phonology in reading comprehension: Implications of the effects of homophones on processing sentences with referentially dependent categories

Two experiments investigated whether phonological representations are activated in the processing of anaphors in reading, and if they are, whether they play a role in the initial (first-pass) processing of the sentence or in review (second-pass) processes. Subjects made sentence acceptability judgements for sentences that contained either verb-gaps or indefinite and personal pronouns (overt anaphors). All sentences contained homophones. Half of the semantically unacceptable sentences were phonologically plausible if the homophones were inserted in the gap (e.g. The children sleighed in the winter, and the murderer in cold blood) or used as the referent of the pronoun (e.g. There is a sale on at the store and I have one at the boat). The other half of the semantically unacceptable sentences were phonologically implausible. In both experiments, half of the subjects saw the sentences under normal viewing conditions (whole sentence condition); for the other half of the subjects the words of each sentence were presented sequentially in the centre of the video screen at the rate of 250 msec/word (RSVP condition). A large proportion of the phonologically implausible sentences in the first experiment contained phrases in the second clause which resulted in semantic “oddities” (e.g. The children sleighed in the winter, and the murderer in the jar); the sentences in Experiment 2 did not contain such oddities. In Experiment 1 subjects made more errors on the phonologically plausible than implausible unacceptable sentences with both verb-gaps and pronouns in the whole sentence but not in the RSVP condition. There was no effect of phonological plausibility in Experiment 2. As the effect of phonological plausibility was only seen in the whole sentence condition, and only when the sentences contained semantic oddities, these data suggest that phonological information was not used in the first-pass analysis of the sentence, but rather when the subject re-read the sentence to find the referent.     

真值条件内容非实在论

错误论和非事实论是用语义方式表述的两种不同形态的非实在论,当中涉及"真"、"假"、"指称"、"真值条件"这样的语义概念。布高西昂认为,针对真值条件内容概念的错误论和非事实论是内在地不一致的,从而可以先验地予以拒绝。本文详细分析布高西昂的论证,揭示其论证的缺陷,以及分析布高西昂与其批评者达维特之间的争议,消除他们对用于表述非实在论的语义概念的误解,尝试为真值条件内容非实在论给出一致的表述。