Two Types of Quidditism

According to structuralism, all natural properties are individuated by their roles in causal/nomological structures. According to quidditism, at least some natural properties are individuated in some other way. Because these theses deal with the identities of natural properties, this distinction cuts to the core of a serious metaphysical dispute: Are the intrinsic natures of all natural properties essentially causal/nomological in character? I'll argue that the answer is ‘no’, or at least that this answer is more plausible than many critics of quidditism have recognized. In section 1, I distinguish between two versions of quidditism. Bare quidditism holds that worlds with distinct properties and isomorphic structures must be qualitatively identical in the following sense: inhabiting one world would be indistinguishable from inhabiting the other. In contrast, qualitative quidditism allows such worlds to have qualitative differences. In section 2, I discuss an epistemological position that allows us to better understand the sense in which isomorphic structures can be qualitatively distinct. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that qualitative quidditism fares much better than bare quidditism with respect to a number of well-known arguments in the field—both for quidditism and against it.     

What ‘biological racial realism’ should mean

A curious ambiguity has arisen in the race debate in recent years. That ambiguity is what is actually meant by ??biological racial realism??. Some philosophers mean that ??race is a natural kind in biology??, while others mean that ??race is a real biological kind??. However, there is no agreement about what a natural kind or a real biological kind should be in the race debate. In this article, I will argue that the best interpretation of ??biological racial realism?? is one that interprets ??biological racial realism?? as ??race is a genuine kind in biology??, where a genuine kind is a valid kind in a well-ordered scientific research program. I begin by reviewing previous interpretations of ??biological racial realism?? in the race debate. Second, I introduce the idea of a genuine kind and compare it to various notions of natural and real biological kinds used in the race debate. Third, I present and defend an argument for my view. Fourth, I provide a few interesting consequences of my view for the race debate. Last, I provide a summary of the article.     

The Red and The Real

It is often claimed that principles of individuation imply essential properties of the things individuated. For example, sets are individuated by their members, hence sets have their members essentially. But how does this inference work? First I discuss the form of such inferences, and conclude that the essentialist inference is not a purely formal matter: although there is a form which all principles of individuation have in common, it is not true that any statement of that form is a principle of individuation, and hence there is no valid inference based purely on that form. However, I argue that there is a viable version of the essentialist inference nonetheless. The resources for a proper reconstruction of this type of inference can be gathered from reflections upon the role principles of individuation play in the project of the ontologist: such principles turn out to carry a modal weight similar to that of definitions or conceptual truths. It follows that, no matter how austere the ontology, some portion of essentialist modality is inevitable.     

Quiddistic Knowledge

Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know. On route I shall also argue that (i) the main necessitarian arguments do not converge on a single view, (ii) properties are transworld entities that cannot be handled by counterpart theory, and (iii) quiddistic skepticism is merely external world skepticism writ small.     

Computation without Representation

The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational states are individuated within computability theory and computer science. A secondary purpose is to show that existing arguments for the semantic view are defective.     

Shifting ontological boundaries: how Japanese‐ and English‐speaking children generalize names for animals and artifacts

Past research shows that young language learners know something about the different category organizations of animals, objects and substances. The three experiments reported here compare Japanese‐speaking and English‐speaking children's novel name generalizations for two kinds of objects: clear instances of artifacts and objects with ambiguous features suggestive of animates. This comparison was motivated by the very different nature of individuation in the two languages and by the boundary shift hypothesis that proposes that entities that straddle the individuation boundary of a language are assimilated toward the individuated side. The results of the three experiments support the hypothesis. An explanation in terms of mutually reinforcing correlations among language, perceptual properties and category structure is proposed.     

Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Slaves of the Passions</Emphasis>

In this paper, I show how a solution to Lewis?? problem of temporary intrinsics is also a response to McTaggart??s argument that the A-series is incoherent. There are three strategies Lewis considers for solving the problem of temporary intrinsics: perdurantism, presentism, and property-indexing. William Lane Craig (Analysis 58(2):122?C127, 1998) has examined how the three strategies fare with respect to McTaggart??s argument. The only viable solution Lewis considers to the problem of temporary intrinsics that also succeeds against McTaggart, Craig claims, is presentism. This gives us prima facie reason to be presentists. But there is a strategy Craig does not consider-indexing, or relativizing, the copula. In this paper, I show that to the degree that indexing the copula solves the problem of temporary intrinsics, it also shows the invalidity of McTaggart??s argument. The upshot: the copula-indexer needn??t affirm the unreality of time, nor need she embrace presentism.     

Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion.     

Mechanistic probability

I describe a realist, ontologically objective interpretation of probability, ??far-flung frequency (FFF) mechanistic probability??. FFF mechanistic probability is defined in terms of facts about the causal structure of devices and certain sets of frequencies in the actual world. Though defined partly in terms of frequencies, FFF mechanistic probability avoids many drawbacks of well-known frequency theories and helps causally explain stable frequencies, which will usually be close to the values of mechanistic probabilities. I also argue that it??s a virtue rather than a failing of FFF mechanistic probability that it does not define single-case chances, and compare some aspects of my interpretation to a recent interpretation proposed by Strevens.     

Lehrer and the consequence argument

The consequence argument of van Inwagen is widely regarded as the best argument for incompatibilism. Lewis??s response is praised by van Inwagen as the best compatibilist??s strategy but Lewis himself acknowledges that his strategy resembles that of Lehrer. A comparison will show that one can speak about Lehrer?CLewis strategy, although I think that Lewis??s variation is dialectically slightly stronger. The paper provides a response to some standard objections of incompatibilists to the Lehrer?CLewis reply.     

Note on Florensky’s Solution to Carroll’s ‘Barbershop’ Paradox: Reverse Implication for Russell?

Pavel Florensky solves Lewis Carroll??s ??Barbershop?? paradox to support his reasoning in a previous chapter. Our discussion includes a) the problem (which we also refer to as the p paradox), b) Carroll??s solution, c) Bertrand Russell??s solution, d) Florensky??s solution and then e) a material example proffered by Florensky. Both Russell and Florensky disagree with Carroll??s solution, yet, (ostensibly) unbeknownst to themselves they offer the same solution, which is ??p implies not-q??. Given Florensky??s material example, the solution seems to tell us something about the logic of belief. We ask whether Florensky??s example has reverse implications for Russell??s solution.     

Stage theory and proper names

In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and ??persist?? by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ??Socrates?? or ??London??. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take to be the best alternative available for them.     

Determinism and ontology

In the philosophical literature, there are two common criteria for a physical theory to be deterministic. The older one is due to the logical empiricists, and is a purely formal criterion. The newer one can be found in the work of John Earman and David Lewis and depends on the intended interpretation of the theory. In this paper I argue that the former must be rejected, and something like the latter adopted. I then discuss the relevance of these points to the current debate over the hole argument.     

Compatibilism and personal identity

Compatibilists disagree over whether there are historical conditions on moral responsibility. Historicists claim there are, whilst structuralists deny this. Historicists motivate their position by claiming to avoid the counter-intuitive implications of structuralism. I do two things in this paper. First, I argue that historicism has just as counter-intuitive implications as structuralism when faced with thought experiments inspired by those found in the personal identity literature. Hence, historicism is not automatically preferable to structuralism. Second, I argue that structuralism is much more plausible once we accept that personal identity is irrelevant to moral responsibility. This paves the way for a new structuralist account that makes clear what it takes to be the diachronic ownership condition (which is normally taken to be personal identity) and the locus of moral responsibility (which is normally taken to be ‘whole’ person), and helps to alleviate the intuitive unease many have with respect to structuralism.     

Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.6–7 from the Perspective of the De Anima

The notion of a capacity (dunamis) in the sense of a power to bring about or undergo change plays a key role in Aristotle??s theories about the natural world. However, in Metaphysics ?? Aristotle also extends ??capacity??, and the corresponding concept of ??activity?? (energeia), to cases where we want to say that something is in capacity, or in activity, such and such but not, or not directly, in virtue of being capable of initiating or undergoing change. This paper seeks to clarify and confirm a certain view of how Aristotle wishes us to see the relationship between the two uses of ??capacity?? and ??activity??. To that end, I consider also Aristotle??s employment of the terms in the De Anima, which sheds light on the key examples which direct the discussion in Metaph. ??.     

Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble

In Part I, I reflect in some detail upon the free will problem and about the way its understanding has radically changed. First I outline the four questions that go into making the free will problem. Second, I consider four paradigmatic shifts that have occurred in our understanding of this problem. Then I go on to reflect upon this complex and multi-level situation. In Part II of this essay, I explore the major alternative positions, and defend my views, in new ways. Instead of trying to spread over many issues, I present one new argument against compatibilism, which I call ??The Trap??. This tries to explicate the main problem that I find with this position. Then I present an exposition of what we nevertheless need to follow, which I call ??the Appreciation of Agency??. This supports a measure of compatibilism in a more modest form, and opposes hard determinism. On this basis, we can confront the philosophical and practical questions, as to what we ought to believe and how we ought to live, with respect to free will and moral responsibility. This leads to what I call ??The Bubble,?? which addresses the way in which we deal with the tension between the absence of libertarian free will and The Trap, and the crucial need for the Appreciation of Agency. I conclude by reflecting upon three attributes of the free will problem that I consider central, but that have been neglected in the debate: complexity, risk and tragedy.     

Protecting Persons from Animal Bites: the Case for the Ontological Significance of Persons

Eric Olson criticizes Lynne Baker’s constitution account of persons on the grounds that personhood couldn’t be ontologically significant as nothing new comes into existence with the acquisition of thought. He claims that for something coming to function as a thinker is no more ontologically significant than something coming to function as a locomotor when a motor is added to it. He levels two related charges that there’s no principled answer about when and where constitution takes place rather than an already existing object just acquiring new properties. I’ll argue that none of these objections are problems for understanding person to be a substantial kind.

     

An Early Modern Scholastic Theory of Negative Entities: Thomas Compton Carleton on Lacks,Negations, and Privations

Seventeenth century scholastics had a rich debate about the ontological status and nature of lacks, negations, and privations. Realists in this debate posit irreducible negative entities responsible for the non-existence of positive entities. One of the first scholastics to develop a realist position on negative entities was Thomas Compton Carleton. In this paper I explain Carleton's theory of negative entities, including what it is for something to be negative, how negative entities are individuated, whether they are abstract or concrete, and how they affect their subjects. I argue that for Carleton, negative entities are conceived as spatially extended simples that affect their subjects by means of spatial overlap. I also show how Carleton responds to some theological worries about his realism concerning negative entities.     

EMERGENCE, DOWNWARDS CAUSATION AND THE COMPLETENESS OF PHYSICS

The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is to feature in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better equipped to sustain the distinction than dispositional essentialist accounts. Finally, I argue that the additional evidence needed for strong completeness renders the causal argument otiose for any properties amenable to scientific reduction.