Margaret R. Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter: An Eriksonian Perspective

My perspective on Margaret R. Miles’s Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter is informed by Erik H. Erikson’s life cycle model (Erikson 1950, 1959, 1963, 1964, 1968a, b, 1982; Erikson and Erikson 1997) and, more specifically, by my relocation of his life stages and their accompanying human strengths (Erikson 1964) according to decades (Capps 2008). I interpret Miles’s account of her life from birth to age forty as revealing the selves that comprise the composite Self (Erikson 1968a) that come into their own during the first four decades of the life cycle, i.e., the hopeful, willing, purposeful, and competent selves     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

Rational intuition and understanding

Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001; Ethical intuitionism, 2005; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007) and the Direct Awareness View (Conee, Philos Phenomenol Res 4:847–857, 1998; Bonjour, In defense of pure reason, 1998). Some overlook it; others try to account for it but fail. We can account for the role of understanding in rational intuition by returning to the view of some of the early Rationalists, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. While that view carries a prohibitive cost, it does contain an insight that may help us solve the problem of giving understanding its due.     

Tempo and Temperament: A Music Lesson on the Significance of Time for the Art of Pastoral Care

This article will focus on the relationship between tempo and temperament and the power of music to facilitate healing, especially for individuals who struggle with temperament or mood disorders, by examining briefly how individuals diagnosed with depression may be helped by listening to or performing music as a form of treatment. Current research into the “science” of music is providing concrete evidence for the reality that musicians and music therapists have long intuited to be true–music does have the capacity to facilitate healing by influencing brain activity and altering moods (Cambell and Doman 2011; Levitin 2007, 2008; Mannes 2011; Powell 2010; Pruyser 1983; Rose 2004). Insofar as music is an integral part of most worship traditions, it provides a common ground for conversation that may seem more natural and less formidable to ministers and lay people alike than the structures of conventional counseling or care-giving relationships, especially for those who have a tendency to be suspicious of all things psychological.     

Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education

This essay works to bridge conversations in philosophy of education with decolonial theory. The author considers Margonis?? (1999, 2011a, b) use of Rousseau (1979) and Heidegger (1962) in developing an ontological attitude that counters social hierarchies and promotes anti-colonial relations. While affirming this effort, the essay outlines a coloniality of being at work in Rousseau and Heidegger through thier reliance on the colonial conceptualization of African Americans and Native Americans as savage and primitive. The essay turns to decolonial theory and the work of Maldenado-Torres (Cult Stud 21(2?C3):240?C270, 2007, 2009) to highlight how a decolonial attitude complicates, yet enriches Margonis?? philosophical framework.     

Gender and Leadership: A Frame Analysis of University Home Web Page Images

With calls for (business) leaders to contribute to greater global fairness and social justice (BAWB 2006; Maak and Pless Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 537–550, 2009), this paper considers gender equality on University home web page images as one means of communicating equal access to leadership roles for both men and women. Although there are many paths for leadership development, one important purpose of Universities is to create people who will potentially become leaders in our society (Shapiro 2005). We analyzed the home web pages at 24 leading universities to identify implicit messages about gender roles, building on implicit leadership theory and leadership prototypes. Using an adapted version of Goffman’s frame analysis (1979), our results suggest depiction of gender equality in university home web pages, in contrast to studies of print advertisements (cf., Kang Sex Roles, 37(11/12), 979–996, 1997; Lindner Sex Roles, 51(7/8), 409–421, 2004). Our results also identify specific opportunities to depict greater equity and to continue to expand the potential for both women and men to be seen as being capable and belonging on this leadership path.     

Importing Logics

The novel notion of importing logics is introduced, subsuming as special cases several kinds of asymmetric combination mechanisms, like temporalization [8, 9], modalization [7] and exogenous enrichment [13, 5, 12, 4, 1]. The graph-theoretic approach proposed in [15] is used, but formulas are identified with irreducible paths in the signature multi-graph instead of equivalence classes of such paths, facilitating proofs involving inductions on formulas. Importing is proved to be strongly conservative. Conservative results follow as corollaries for temporalization, modalization and exogenous enrichment.     

Incommensurability,slight pains and God

I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659–688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165–176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God’s non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one’s toe) and Leibniz’s reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz’s general position.     

Beyond Original Sin: A Paradigm Shift for the Age of Neuroscience

In this article I explore the implications of Jesus?? location of the kingdom of heaven in the lived experience of the individual and of the findings of neuroscientific research for a paradigm shift in Christian theology, one that moves us beyond the Adamic myth and belief in original sin. Support for a theological paradigm shift based on lived experience is provided by Capps (1993) and for this particular paradigm shift by Pagels (1989) and Ricoeur (2004). I point out that the doctrine of original sin supports and fosters the negativity bias of the brain and inhibits the resculpting of the brain. Drawing on Hanson??s (2009) evidence in support of the brain??s neuroplasticity (i.e., its capacity to change itself) and on Brach??s (2003) critique of the ??trance of unworthiness,?? I make the case for meditative and mindful awareness practices in Christianity and other religious traditions as proven methods for the resculpting of the brain in order that individuals may experience greater joy, contentment, and awareness of the goodness of life and of God??s creation. A longitudinal neuroscientific research study of Roman Catholic nuns (Newberg and Waldman 2009) provides evidence in support of the role of contemplative prayer and meditation in generating the joy and serenity that Jesus?? allusion to the hidden treasure envisions.     

New Directions for Research on the Role of Parents and Teachers in the Development of Gender-Related Math Attitudes: Response to Commentaries

We frame our response to the commentaries by Cheryan (2011), Lane (2011), and Shapiro and Williams (2011), in terms of two broad points made by Lane (2011). First, we agree that the various constructs that we termed “math attitudes”—including math-gender stereotypes, math anxiety, math self-concepts, and achievement motivation in math—are in fact distinct (Gunderson et al. 2011b). Nevertheless, we argue that investigating common mechanisms underlying the transmission of these constructs from adults to children is a productive approach because it can lead to general interventions to boost children’s performance and dispositions toward math. Second, we argue that research on the development of gender-related math attitudes exists at the intersection of multiple research areas, including research on attitudes (broadly defined), math, gender, social learning, and child development, and that drawing on well-developed theories in these areas can lead to novel research questions and predictions. The three excellent commentaries broaden the scope of our article on gender-related math attitudes to include the transmission of implicit attitudes from adults to children, stereotype threat, and gender roles in math-related careers (Cheryan 2011; Gunderson et al. 2011b; Lane 2011; Shapiro and Williams 2011).     

An Introduction to Issues of Gender in Stalking Research

Stalking research has increased substantially in the past 20?years. This special issue is intended to contribute to this literature by using gender as a focus point in 1) applying new theoretical perspectives that incorporate the role of gender to the study of stalking perpetration (Davis et al. 2010; Duntley and Buss 2010), 2) addressing divergent findings regarding gender in experiences of victims (Sheridan and Lyndon 2010) and perpetrators (Thompson et al. 2010), and 3) furthering the study of how gender influences perceptions of stalking (Cass and Rosay 2011; Dunlap et al. 2011; Sinclair 2010; Yanowitz and Yanowitz 2010). To place this special issue in context of the current state of knowledge on gender and stalking, we review the state of the existing research as it relates to the domains covered by articles present in this issue.     

Psychotherapy as Moral Encounter: A Crisis of Modern Conscience

Psychotherapy can no longer be understood as a morally neutral or value-free practice. Many have argued that psychology is implicitly and inevitably laden with moral assumptions and has a significant impact on the moral and ethical fabric of its clients and surrounding society (Browning 1987; Doherty 1995; Dueck and Reimer 2003; Kelly and Strupp 1992; Rieff 1987, 2006). In this work, the authors highlight the profound identity crises within the field of psychology around the place of morality/ethics in its theories and practices. Chronicling some of the shifts between modern and postmodern theory will allow for a meaningful engagement with this issue. The postmodern shifts in the field have left clinicians ideologically hampered in their ability to attend to the moral dimensions of their clients’ lives. In conclusion, the authors posit a virtue ethics and consider avenues of holistically and meaningfully infusing clinical practice with moral sensibilities.     

Acknowledging Discrimination as a Key to the Gender Pay Gap

I comment again on issues raised in my initial paper in this issue (Lips 2012, this issue) and respond to commentaries by Huffman (2012, this issue), Olson (2012), Stockdale and Nadler (2012) and Tharenou (2012). Even in the light of a large and growing body of evidence for the gender pay gap, a lack of awareness of the gap still exists. This lack of awareness may have roots in system-justification beliefs. Such beliefs can be reinforced by a human capital approach, which may appear to rationalize the gender pay gap by attributing it mainly to the choices individuals make, while downplaying the role of discrimination. Although, as commentators on my original article have pointed out, some researchers who use this model may be aware of its limitations, and some may have moved beyond it because of its limitations, such limitations may not be so obvious to consumers of the research. Thus, a continuing, careful critique of the human capital model, and attention to the impact of cultural gender stereotypes on the variables it encompasses, is warranted. However, as several commentators have also noted, there are other useful ways of analyzing the gender pay gap, such as focusing on institutional variables associated with it or examining it from the perspective of cumulative disadvantage. These too should also be vigorously pursued in the service of understanding and eliminating the gap.     

Spatial attention and conscious perception: the role of endogenous and exogenous orienting

Attention has often been considered to be a gateway to consciousness (Posner, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 91(16), 7398–7403, 1994). However, its relationship with conscious perception (CP) remains highly controversial. While theoretical models and experimental data support the role of attention in CP (Chica, Lasaponara, Lupiáñez, Doricchi, &; Bartolomeo, NeuroImage, 51, 1205–1212, 2010; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, &; Sergent, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 204–211, 2006; Mack &; Rock, Inattentional blindness, 1998), recent studies have claimed that at least some forms of attention—endogenous or top-down spatial attention—are neither sufficient nor necessary for CP (Koch &; Tsuchiya, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 16–22, 2007). In the present experiments, we demonstrate the importance of exogenously triggered attention for the modulation of CP. Weak or null effects were instead observed when attention was triggered endogenously. Our data are discussed in the framework of recent neuropsychological models (Dehaene et al., Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 204–211, 2006), postulating that activity within reverberating frontoparietal networks, as colocalized with spatial--orienting systems, is the brain correlate of consciously processed information.     

Correcting the correction of conditional recency slopes

Farrell (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 324–347, 2010) presented some analyses of free recall data that suggest that recency items initially become more accessible as recall progresses, in contrast to the assumptions of temporal drift models. Moran and Goshen-Gottstein (2013) present some challenges to Farrell’s (2010) analyses of the change in conditional recency across output position in free recall. Simulations using a very basic free recall model that controls conditional recency across recall show that Farrell’s (2010) analyses are not substantially biased, while the procedure proposed by Moran and Goshen-Gottstein introduces a substantial underestimation of the true slopes. The null slopes observed in immediate recall by Moran and Goshen-Gottstein are not informative of the true slopes characterizing the data. Accordingly, Farrell’s (2010) results continue to present a challenge to temporal drift models.     

The Spiritual Well-Being of Elderly People: A Study of a French Sample

The aim of our research was to identify predictors of the spiritual well-being of elderly people. More specifically, we postulated that subjective well-being and its components would be predictors of spiritual well-being, and more so than age and health status. We invited 133 people aged 60–95 to complete a questionnaire that included the French adaptation (Velasco and Rioux in Revue Canadienne des Sciences du Comportement 41(2):102–128, 2009) of Paloutzian and Ellison’s (Loneliness: A sourcebook of current theory, research and therapy, Wiley-Interscience, New York, 1982) Spiritual Well-Being Scale, Ryff and Essex’s (Psychol Aging 7:507–517, 1992) Psychological Well-Being Scale (translated by Lapierre and Desrochers 1997), Salamon and Conte’s (Meas Eval Guid 15(3):194–200, 1982) Life Satisfaction in the Elderly Scale (validated by Rousseau and Dubé in 1993), and the French version (Blais et al. in Can J Behav Sci 21:210–223, 1989) of Diener et al. (J Pers Assess 49:71–75, 1985) Satisfaction with Life Scale. The results only partially confirm our hypothesis, because only satisfaction with life as a whole and two items in “Life Satisfaction in the Elderly Scale” make it possible to predict the spiritual well-being of elderly people. Moreover, neither health status nor age was found to be a significant predictor of spiritual well-being. This research helps understand better the links between the concept of spiritual well-being and that of subjective well-being of elderly people and could contribute to the development of a tool that could take into account the spiritual well-being of elderly people, whether they be believers, agnostic, or atheist.     

Ambivalent Sexism and Religion: Connected Through Values

Sexist attitudes do not exist in a limbo; they are embedded in larger belief systems associated with specific hierarchies of values. In particular, manifestations of benevolent sexism (Glick and Fiske 1996, 1997, 2001) can be perceived as a social boon, not a social ill, both because they are experienced as positive, and because they reward behaviors that maintain social stability. One of the strongest social institutions that create and justify specific hierarchies of values is religion. In this paper, we examine how the values inherent in religious beliefs (perhaps inadvertently) propagate an unequal status quo between men and women through endorsement of ideologies linked to benevolent sexism. In a survey with a convenience sample of train passengers in Southern and Eastern Poland (N?=?180), we investigated the relationship between Catholic religiosity and sexist attitudes. In line with previous findings (Gaunt 2012; Glick et al. 2002a; Ta?demir and Sakall?-U?urlu 2010), results suggest that religiosity can be linked to endorsement of benevolent sexism. This relationship was mediated in our study by the values of conservatism and openness to change (Schwartz 1992): religious individuals appear to value the societal status quo, tradition, and conformity, which leads them to perceive women through the lens of traditional social roles. Adhering to the teachings of a religion that promotes family values in general seems to have as its byproduct an espousal of prejudicial attitudes toward specific members of the family.     

25 years of research on the use of geometry in spatial reorientation: a current theoretical perspective

The purpose of this article is to review and evaluate the range of theories proposed to explain findings on the use of geometry in reorientation. We consider five key approaches and models associated with them and, in the course of reviewing each approach, five key issues. First, we take up modularity theory itself, as recently revised by Lee and Spelke (Cognitive Psychology, 61, 152–176, 2010a; Experimental Brain Research, 206, 179–188, 2010b). In this context, we discuss issues concerning the basic distinction between geometry and features. Second, we review the view-matching approach (Stürzl, Cheung, Cheng, & Zeil, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 1–14, 2008). In this context, we highlight the possibility of cross-species differences, as well as commonalities. Third, we review an associative theory (Miller & Shettleworth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33, 191–212, 2007; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 419–422, 2008). In this context, we focus on phenomena of cue competition. Fourth, we take up adaptive combination theory (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2006). In this context, we focus on discussing development and the effects of experience. Fifth, we examine various neurally based approaches, including frameworks proposed by Doeller and Burgess (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5909–5914, 2008; Doeller, King, & Burgess, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5915–5920, 2008) and by Sheynikhovich, Chavarriaga, Strösslin, Arleo, and Gerstner (Psychological Review, 116, 540–566, 2009). In this context, we examine the issue of the neural substrates of spatial navigation. We conclude that none of these approaches can account for all of the known phenomena concerning the use of geometry in reorientation and clarify what the challenges are for each approach.     

Lucky understanding without knowledge

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge.