Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the representation of truth and falsity in human memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both models presume that during information processing a mental representation of the information is stored along with a tag indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model, true information receives a “true” tag and false information receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two source memory experiments in which participants studied true and false trivia statements from three different sources differing in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and 50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed about the source credibility prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this precue group showed improved source memory for both true and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a 20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.     

Right and Righteous: Children's Incipient Understanding and Evaluation of True and False Statements

Two studies examined young children's early understanding and evaluation of truth telling and lying and the role that factuality plays in their judgments. Study 1 (one hundred four 2- to 5-year-olds) found that even the youngest children reliably accepted true statements and rejected false statements and that older children's ability to label true and false (T/F) statements as “truth” and “lie” emerged in tandem with their positive evaluation of true statements and “truth” and their negative evaluation of false statements and “lie.” The findings suggest that children's early preference for factuality develops into a conception of “truth” and “lie” that is linked both to factuality and moral evaluation. Study 2 (one hundred twenty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds) revealed that whereas young children exhibited good understanding of the association of T/F statements with “truth,” “lie,” “mistake,” “right,” and “wrong,” they showed little awareness of assumptions about speaker knowledge underlying “lie” and “mistake.” The results further support the primacy of factuality in children's early understanding and evaluation of truth and lies.     

Rewording the Rules on Disjunctive Probability

Logic is a central and highly useful part of philosophy. Its value is particularly evident when it comes to keeping our thinking about disjunctive probabilities clear. Because of the two meanings of “or” (“just one of these statements is true,” “at least one of these statements is true”), logic can show how the likelihood of a disjunction being true can be determined quite easily. To gauge the chance that one of two or more exclusive alternatives is true, one need only sum up their respective likelihoods. And to know the chance that at least one of two or more compatible alternatives is true, one simply has to figure the chance that it is false that all of them are false!     

Linguistic and emotional-valence characteristics of reading passages for clinical use and research

PurposeFluency assessment in people who stutter (PWS) includes reading aloud passages. There is little information on properties of these passages that may affect reading performance: emotional valance, arousal, word familiarity and frequency and passage-readability. Our first goal was to present an extensive examination of these factors in three commonly used (“traditional”) passages. The second goal was to compare a traditional passage to a new passage, designed to minimize the impact of these properties.MethodsContent words were rated (129 participants) on arousal, valence and familiarity. Other linguistic features were analyzed based on available datasets. This information was used to assess traditional passages, and to construct a new well-balanced passage, made of neutral, low-arousal and highly-familiar words. Readability for all passages was tested using formula-based and CLOZE tests (31 participants). Finally, 26 PWS were evaluated on fluency comparing the commonly used “Rainbow” passage with the novel one.ResultsThe three traditional passages contain a share of emotionally valenced (22-34%), high arousal (15-18%), lower familiarity (6-8%) and polysyllabic (5-9%) content words. Readability was highest for the novel passage (on formula-based scales). Average disfluencies percent for the Rainbow and our novel passage were not significantly different. Yet half of the individuals in this sample showed a large difference between the two passages.ConclusionWe provide detailed information on potential sources of variance using the traditional passages. Knowledge about these characteristics can inform clinical practice (and research). We suggest a combined procedure, using more than one passage to assess stuttering in individual cases.     

Source confusion influences the effectiveness of the autobiographical IAT

We examined the claim that the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) can detect concealed memories. Subjects read action statements (e.g., “break the toothpick”) and either performed the action or completed math problems. They then imagined some of these actions and some new actions. Two weeks later, the subjects completed a memory test and then an aIAT in which they categorized true and false statements (e.g., “I am in front of the computer”) and whether they had or had not performed actions from Session 1. For half of the subjects, the nonperformed statements were actions that they saw but did not perform; for the remaining subjects, these statements were actions that they saw and imagined but did not perform. Our results showed that the aIAT can distinguish between true autobiographical events (performed actions) and false events (nonperformed actions), but that it is less effective, the more that subjects remember performing actions that they did not really perform. Thus, the diagnosticity of the aIAT may be limited.     

Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table evaluation paradigm

Many studies probe for interpretations of < if A then C> by having people evaluate truth-table cases (<A and C>, < A and not-C>, < not-A and C>, < not-A and not-C>) as making the rule true or false, or being irrelevant. We argue that a single case can never prove a general rule to be true, as philosophy of science has taught any researcher. Giving participants the impossible “true” option would therefore bias results away from this response. In Experiment 1 people judged instead whether cases make a rule false, do not make the rule false, or are irrelevant to the rule. The experimental group (N = 44) showed a significant increase in not-false responses compared with true responses of the control group (N = 39). In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental groups judged whether cases make a rule true, corroborate it (i.e., make the rule more plausible, but neither true nor false), make it false, or are irrelevant. There was a significant reduction of irrelevant responses as compared to the default true/false/irrelevant task for the control groups. Even < A and C> cases were often no longer considered to make an < if A then C> rule true and were correctly judged to corroborate (vs. verify) rules. Results corroborate our conceptual analyses of the unsuitable “true” response option and put into question arguments that hinge on the presumed likelihood by which people consider truth contingencies to make a rule “true”.     

Fictional Truth and Make-Believe

The statement “Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” seems true in Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice (even though it may not actually appear in the text) while the statement “Mr. Darcy is a detective” seems false. One explanation for this intuition is that when we read or talk about fictional stories, we implicitly employ the fictional operator “It is fictional that” or “It is part of the story that.” “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” expresses a true proposition while “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy is a detective” does not. Fictive statements can be abbreviated as “In F, P”. Determining what statements are fictionally true in a story requires providing truth conditions for statements of the form “In F, P.” This paper proposes an analysis of truth in fiction and examines the notion of make-believe.     

Les attitudes des élèves envers l’école élémentaire et leur évaluation

Two revised versions of the scale “I Like School” of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), were developed in France upon junior high school pupils and upon fourth and fifth grade level pupils (Psychol Psychométrie 15 (1994) 44–64; Can J Behav Sci 35 (2003b) 50–55). This study presents a validation of an adaptation of these versions of the scale to French elementary school pupils, intitled “Échelle des attitudes des élèves envers l’école élémentaire” (ÉAÉE). Four factors still arise, with an improvement of their internal consistency. Fifth factor is also controlled, named “Funny school, distraction place”. The results indicate acceptable fidelity (internal consistency and test–retest reliability), allow to identify the personal factors, which determine the attitudes towards school and support the convergent validity of the scale.     

Contradictory Information: Too Much of a Good Thing

Both I and Belnap, motivated the “Belnap-Dunn 4-valued Logic” by talk of the reasoner being simply “told true” (T), and simply “told false” (F), which leaves the options of being neither “told true” nor “told false” (N), and being both “told true” and “told false” (B). Belnap motivated these notions by consideration of unstructured databases that allow for negative information as well as positive information (even when they conflict). We now experience this on a daily basis with the Web. But the 4-valued logic is deductive in nature, and its matrix is discrete: there are just four values. In this paper I investigate embedding the 4-valued logic into a context of probability. Jøsang’s Subjective Logic introduced uncertainty to allow for degrees of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. We extend this so as to allow for two kinds of uncertainty—that in which the reasoner has too little information (ignorance) and that in which the reasoner has too much information (conflicted). Jøsang’s “Opinion Triangle” becomes an “Opinion Tetrahedron” and the 4-values can be seen as its vertices. I make/prove various observations concerning the relation of non-classical “probability” to non-classical logic.     

Completion of binary statements by children at three academic levels

This study was designed to examine the strategy employed by school-aged subjects when completing binary statements. Thirty-two incomplete binary statements representing four statement conditions (true affirmative, true negative, false affirmative, and false negative) were administered to 120 children randomly selected from three academic levels. A response-index change model is postulated as representing the strategy employed by these school-aged subjects when completing binary statements. According to this model, the factor that causes response time to differ across the four statement conditions is the number of times the child is required to change the set of his response index. The child begins the task of completing a binary statement by reading and encoding the incomplete statement. He then selects the numeral that corresponds to the adjective “odd” or “even” contained in the predicate of the incomplete statement. The child’s response index is now set to respond with this numeral. What the child does at this point will depend upon the type of statement condition with which he is working. If the child is completing a TA statement, no response-index change is required. He simply gives as his answer the numeral to which his response index is set. If the child is completing an FA statement or a TN statement, one response-index change is required. If the child is completing an FN statement, two response-index changes are required.     

Effects of the putative confession instruction on perceptions of children's true and false statements

The putative confession (PC) instruction (i.e., “[suspect] told me everything that happened and wants you to tell the truth”) during forensic interviews with children has been shown to increase the accuracy of children's statements, but it is unclear whether adults' perceptions are sensitive to this salutary effect. The present study examined how adults perceive children's true and false responses to the PC instruction. Participants (n = 299) watched videotaped interviews of children and rated the child's credibility and the truthfulness of his/her statements. When viewing children's responses to the PC instruction, true and false statements were rated as equally credible, and there was a decrease in accuracy for identifying false denials as lies. These findings suggest that participants viewed the PC instruction as truth‐inducing. Implications for the forensic use of the PC instruction are discussed.     

Schema shifting: Children's cognitive monitoring of the prose-schema interaction in comprehension

Facility in shifting between familiar schemata in a listening comprehension task was examined in children from the third and sixth grades (8 and 11 years old, respectively). The children heard two consecutively presented ambiguous passages about very familiar daily activities. Comprehension of both passages demanded precisely timed activation of a schema appropriate to each passage. Half of the children were not explicitly cued to the passage shift, thus requiring that they spontaneously recognize the need for a schema shift. Analyses of free recall and interview responses showed that although the younger children had more difficulty than the older children, children at both grade levels demonstrated deficiencies in their cognitive monitoring of the prose-schema interaction.     

Fluctuating confidence: the dynamic consequences of true/false affirmatives and denials on how a listener appraises their personal past

The present study examined the mnemonic consequences of true/false denials and affirmatives on how a listener appraises their personal past. To this end, participants (listeners) rated the extent to which they were confident certain events occurred during their childhood. They rated these events both before and after a confederate (speaker) denied or affirmed the occurrence of four different childhood events each, for a total of eight “rehearsed” events. For each set (denials and affirmatives) of events, half were true and half were false. In turn, this created four types of events (two each): true denials, true affirmatives, false denials, and false affirmatives. Additionally, half of the participants were told that the speaker was provided independent information about the veracity of the event’s occurrence (“expert” condition). Overall, listeners were less confident in the occurrence of false denial events, but more so when they believed the speaker to be more knowledgeable of the listeners memories, more confident in false affirmative events and, counter intuitively, more confident in the occurrence of true denial events. These results underscore the importance of a nuanced approach to the mnemonic consequences of true and false denials and affirmations in the course of social interactions.     

The role of imagery in the representation of linear orderings

Two experiments were carried out to investigate whether visual imagery was used in representing transitive linear ordering relationships. Subjects were presented with passages describing either a linear ordering or a set inclusion relationship, while being subjected to either visual or verbal interference. Performance was tested by asking subjects to judge the truth or falsity of statements concerning both the information presented in the passages and inferences that could be drawn from this information. In neither experiment was there any evidence for the linear ordering material being selectively disrupted by the visual interference task, as would have been predicted by the imagery theory. Thus it is concluded that linear orderings are probably not represented as visual images.     

False memories in Lewy‐body disease

Recently, de Boysson, Belleville, Phillips et al. (2011) found that patients with Lewy‐body disease (LBD) showed significantly lower rates of false memories than healthy controls, using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) experimental procedure. Given that this result could be explained by the practically null rate of true recognition in the LBD group (0.09), we decided to replicate the study by de Boysson et al. (2011), but including a new condition that would maximize the true recognition rate (and analyze its effect on the rate of false memories). Specifically, in a DRM experiment, we manipulated (within subjects) two study and recognition conditions: in the “immediate” condition, both the LBD patients and the control group of healthy older people received a different recognition test after each study list (containing twelve words associated with a non‐presented critical word), while in the “delayed” condition (similar to the one in de Boysson et al., 2011), the participants received the entire series of study lists and then took only one recognition test. The results showed that, in both samples, the “immediate” condition produced higher corrected rates of both true and false recognition than the “delayed” condition, although they were both lower in the LBD patients, which shows that these patients are capable of encoding and recognizing the general similitude underlying information (gist memory) in the right conditions.     

The Intrinsic Quantum Nature of Nash Equilibrium Mixtures

In classical game theory the idea that players randomize between their actions according to a particular optimal probability distribution has always been viewed as puzzling. In this paper, we establish a fundamental connection between n-person normal form games and quantum mechanics (QM), which eliminates the conceptual problems of these random strategies. While the two theories have been regarded as distinct, our main theorem proves that if we do not give any other piece of information to a player in a game, than the payoff matrix—the axiom of “no-supplementary data” holds—then the state of mind of a rational player is algebraically isomorphic to a pure quantum state. The “no supplementary data” axiom is captured in a Lukasiewicz’s three-valued Kripke semantics wherein statements about whether a strategy or a belief of a player is rational are initially indeterminate i.e. neither true, nor false. As a corollary, we show that in a mixed Nash equilibrium, the knowledge structure of a player implies that probabilities must verify the standard “Born rule” postulate of QM. The puzzling “indifference condition” wherein each player must be rationally indifferent between all the pure actions of the support of his equilibrium strategy is resolved by his state of mind being described by a “quantum superposition” prior a player is asked to make a definite choice in a “measurement”. Finally, these results demonstrate that there is an intrinsic limitation to the predictions of game theory, on a par with the “irreducible randomness” of quantum physics.     

小学4～6年级儿童数学应用题表征模型的使用研究

该研究考察了小学4～6年级学生在数学应用题中理解阶段和执行阶段使用表征模型的情况,研究运用实验法对某普通小学的158名4～6年级学生进行了应用题改写任务和缩写任务.结果表明：（1）学生在理解阶段更多地选择情境条件,使用情境模型来表征问题;在执行阶段较少选择情境条件,转而使用问题模型来表征问题;（2）随着年级的升高,相对于优等生来说,其他学生在缩写任务中对情境条件的选择数量越来越少,而优等生在这方面一直都做得很好.差等生识别多余条件的能力并没有随着年级的升高而发生改变,而优等生却在不断增强.     

Perceptions of sexual harassment as a function of sex of rater and incident form and consequence

The purpose of this study was to investigate differences in perceptions of two “severity dichotomies” present in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on sexual harassment. Alale and female undergraduates (N = 198), from a predominately white midwestern university, were given one of four statements based on these guidelines, varying “form” (physical/verbal) and “consequence” (economic injury/hostile environment) of the behavior. Analysis of variance results showed females rated the incident as more definitely sexual harassment and as affecting perfonnance more than did males. Participants reading “economic injury” statements rated them as having more effect on the victim’s job status than did those reading “hostile environment” statements. A multivariate analysis of variance revealed significant “consequence” and “sex” effects on several factors: A significant three-way interaction showed that males rated statements less negatively than did females, especially when the statement described “physical” behavior with “hostile environment“ consequences. Cluster analysis results are also presented.