Freud's metapsychological speculations1

In this paper, the author seeks to analyse the nature and function of metapsychological theory in Freudian psychoanalysis. He shows that Freudian psychoanalytic theory is composed of an empirical part‐the psychology of clinical facts‐and a speculative part‐metapsychology. Freud considers this latter part as being a speculative superstructure of value that is only heuristic, capable of being supplanted by other superstructures of the same type. The author sustains the idea that this metapsychology is the fruit of speculative method, whose foundations were elaborated by philosophers and epistemologists before Freud, including Immanuel Kant and Ernst Mach. He concludes with considerations regarding the future of metapsychological theorisation, presenting criticisms of Freudian metapsychology offered by both philosophers and psychoanalysts, and pointing to the perspective opened by Donald W. Winnicott of a psychoanalysis without metapsychology.     

In search of the elusive nature of clinical psychoanalytic theory

Two case vignettes illustrating different ways of listening to clinical material are presented. The author discusses some limitations of clinical psychoanalytic theory that stem from the fact that primary unconscious processes are, by their very nature, impossible to describe in a language regulated by secondary processes. Hegelian dialectics, first addressed in psychoanalysis by Lacan and later elaborated in the work of Green, as well as the use of paradox by Winnicott and the formalistic approaches of Matte Blanco and Bion, are briefly reviewed as alternative formulas. As psychoanalysts, we are condemned to live with doubt, and neither clinical theories nor metapsychology offer escape from this reality.     

Commentary: Psychodynamics and Social Cognition—Notes on the Fusion of Psychoanalysis and Psychology

ABSTRACT Interest in linking psychoanalysis with scientific psychology waxes and wanes. In part, the difficulties have been caused by the preference of psychoanalysts for Freud's clinical theory (and its emphasis on narrative truth) as opposed to his metapsychology (with its requirement for historical truth). Even though contemporary scientific psychology evolved largely independently of psychoanalysis, the articles on object relations, transference, and defense published in this special issue show that the theory remains a source of inspiration, observations, and hypotheses.     

Oneiric activity and the analytical process A semiotic perspective on Willy Baranger's theory of dreams1

This author reconsiders, from a semiotic perspective, the theoretical and technical ideas developed by Willy and Madeleine Baranger, especially W. Baranger's views on the function of dreams, the status of oneiric symbols and the further clinical‐technical use of dreams in the context of the intersubjective dynamic fi eld, together with the basic unconscious fantasy that emerges in the analytic situation. She attempts to relate the Barangers' ideas to others arising from Peirce's analytic semiotics that would support a triadic conceptualization of dreams. The need to incorporate a pragmatic view of communication and of the processes of production of sense as contributions to dream metapsychology and interpretation in the case of non‐neurotic patients is particularly emphasized. On the basis of the hypothesis of a described series of triads underlying the production and retelling of dreams, the acknowledgment of these produced/told dreams as intentional signs allows the presence of a continuous process of semiosis to be proposed. The author introduces clinical material to illustrate the communicative value of dreams through the textual analysis of the report and accompanying associations of three dreams. Such analysis takes a linguistic pragmatics approach that examines those aspects of meaning not accounted for by a restricted semantic theory.     

Psychoanalysis and self psychology: a metapsychological essay with a clinical illustration

This paper is an attempt to evaluate critically some theoretical and clinical consequences of the psychoanalytic psychology of the self in its broad, supraordinate position. From this either-or position, advocated by Kohut and his followers, self psychology corrodes some of the most central explanatory concepts of psychoanalysis--conflict, transference, and resistance. In an extensive case illustration, I have tried to show the conceptual and technical impoverishment of the self-psychological views with respect to the concepts of organization in conflict, in defense, and in development, and with respect to the role of aggression and to the concepts of transference and resistance. These consequences of the supraordinate self-psychological viewpoint are related to its overt attack on metapsychology, which is linked to an epistemological fallacy as a consequence of the exclusive use of empathy and introspection with grave consequences for our explanatory power, i.e., a fundamental confusion between the realms of content and of function. This also implies an obstacle in the systematic study of self-deception and a threat to psychoanalysis defined as the study of human behavior considered from the viewpoint of conflict. Finally, an attempt is made to integrate the views of Kohut with those of Winnicott and of classical metapsychology.     

Economic analysis, common-sense morality and utilitarianism

Economic concepts and methods are used to throw light on some aspects of common-sense ethics and the difference between it and Utilitarianism. (1) Very few exceptions are allowed to the rules of common-sense ethics, because of the cost of information required to justify an exception to Conscience and to other people. No such stringency characterizes Utilitarianism, an abstract system constructed by philosophers. (2) Rule Utilitarianism is neither consistent with common-sense ethics, nor does it maximize utility as has been claimed for it. The same is true of more recent variants of Utilitarianism. (3) Second best and first best are usually identical in common-sense ethics. They are often identical in Utilitarianism when a moral situation can be represented by a Prisoner's Dilemma. However, problems arise in permissive forms of Utilitarianism when it is not obvious that second best should be applied.The author is indebted to the members of the Staff Seminar of this Department, especially Professor J. E. Spencer, for useful discussions. He has also greatly benefited from the comments of two referees.     

情境交互作用理论体系：辩证心理学与交互行为心理学

摘要 辩证心理学和交互行为心理学是近年对心理学理论建设和方法论改革影响较大的心理学取向,它们可以共同归纳到心理学的情境交互作用理论体系之下。情境交互作用理论体系打破了传统心理学只关注意识、行为和心理机制的单一维度,认为心理学应该关注机体与情境交互作用中的意义。文章对辩证心理学和交互行为心理学的主要观点和主要假设进行了详细阐释。最后对情境作用理论体系对当代心理学的影响和启示进行了说明,可以为未来心理学的发展指明方向。     

Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

The Self and the Integral Interface: Toward a New Understanding of the Whole Person

Of all psychology concepts, perhaps none has a more lengthy history or engendered more controversy and ambiguity than that of the self. Indeed, the self has come to mean so many things that it hardly means anything at all. Consequently, there is currently no single theory integrating all the various meanings of the self concept. Therefore, the primary purpose of this paper is to develop an overarching metapsychology by which all aspects of the self can be understood. To accomplish this purpose, this article engages in a hermeneutic analysis of the self as it appears in cognitive behavior psychology, the psychoanalytic theories of ego and self psychology, and humanistic–existential theories of the self. In so doing, it is possible to identify two principle concepts by which the various aspects of the self can be compared and classified: the conflation frame, the collapsing of entity, intellect, and identity into a single rendering of the self; and the integral interface, the overriding theoretical framework within which each of these aspects of self can be appropriately differentiated and subsumed.     

Moments of Therapeutic Impasse: Commentary on Jody Messler Davies's “Whose Bad Objects Are We Anyway? Repetition and Our Elusive Love Affair with Evil”

Davies contributes to the development of relational theory by formulating and illustrating what occurs during especially difficult moments in an analytic exchange. In understanding enactments, Davies importantly underscores the contribution of both the analyst's and patient's “bad objects.” This author attempts to build bridges between Davies' language and concepts anchored in object relations theory and this author's language and concepts based in contemporary or relational self psychology, including the integration of cognitive psychology. In addition, this author delineates the use of the “empathic,” “othercentered,” and “analyst's self” listening/experiencing perspectives to explicate the case material and to provide alternative understandings and pathways for psychoanalytic work. The thesis set forth is that the use of different listening/experiencing perspectives expands choice for the analyst when working in difficult moments of the clinical exchange.     

Why aggression?2

On the basis of a formalised view of metapsychology, the author briefly considers the problems inherent in the Freudian notion of a death drive or aggressive drive and then goes on to develop a new theoretical conception of aggression. Aggression is understood as an affect, action or affective action and, in relation to these, as an expression of the intensity with which a drive'whether it be the sexual drive with its libidinal cathexes or the self‐preservative drive with its lethic cathexes'seeks to attain its object. In this context the author regards the regulation of closeness and distance with respect to the ‘psychogeometric locus’ of the relevant drive object as being of central importance. She contends that neurotic personalities suffer from specific distortions in the perception of the psychogeometric locus of their drive objects, which may give rise to an intensification of the drive tendencies prevailing in these individuals at any given time so that these tendencies take on an aggressive character. The author presents two clinical vignettes to show how her approach allows aggression and its occurrence to be conceptualised without resorting to the idea of a primary aggressive drive, and draws attention to the resulting technical consequences for interpretation.     

Seduction and the vicissitudes of translation: the work of Jean Laplanche

This paper aims to analyze Jean Laplanche's revision of Freudian metapsychology, which emerged from a critical return to Freud's officially abandoned seduction theory of 1895-1897. Where Freud gradually replaced the model of traumatic seduction with a theory of infantile sexuality and its drives, Laplanche articulates both trauma and sexual drive in a new theory of primal seduction, the fundamental anthropological situation in which human subjectivity is formed. The author concludes by considering Laplanche's modeling of the psychoanalytic situation and his reformulation of transference in relation to mourning and sublimation within the framework of the general theory of seduction.     

Symposium on The Ego and the Id after fifty years. The past and future of ego psychology.

Having six roots in ordinary observation and introspection, ego psychology has a long pre-Freudian history, which influenced Freud's first usages of Ich. His works before 1923 contain much that is substantively ego psychology; The Ego and the Id was not a paradigm change but a consolidation of pre-existing ideas. The structural theory replaced a model (topographic) which Freud actually used very little, especially clinically, and he failed to remedy its gravest methodological faults. The ego-id model is an integral part of metapsychology, and will pass out of use as the latter dies, with no detriment to clinical psychoanalysis.     

INCENTIVES FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THE DEBATE ON METAPSYCHOLOGY3

With a view to establishing an area of metapsychological common ground, the author examines the attempts made by G. S. Klein, Gill and Brenner to interpret Freud's conception of metapsychology. Quoting liberally from the correspondence with Fliess and from works composed at all stages of Freud's career, the author shows that the versions put forward by Klein and Gill do not stand up to scrutiny; the economic aspect on which Freud himself insisted and which Brenner upholds is also found wanting. It is argued that, if the Freudian ‘co‐ordinates’ of metapsychology are to have an epistemological function, they must have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords access. Whereas this is the case with the topographical, dynamic and structural viewpoints, it is not true of the economic aspect. Energies are stated to exist in the representational world only in the form of affects, so that the economic aspect should, in the author's opinion, be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure adduced by Freud, this viewpoint would concentrate on the relations between affects and the other key elements of the representational world to which the other metapsychological parameters relate.     

The Self System: Toward a New Understanding of the Whole Person (Part 2)

Abstract

Of all psychology concepts, perhaps none has a more lengthy history or engendered more controversy and ambiguity than that of the self. Indeed, the self has come to mean so many things that it hardly means anything at all. Consequently, there is currently no single theory integrating all the various meanings of the self concept. Therefore, the primary purpose of this article is to develop an overarching metapsychology by which all aspects of the self can be understood.

To accomplish this purpose, this article engages in a hermeneutic analysis of the self as it appears in cognitive-behavior psychology, the psychoanalytic theories of ego and self psychology, and humanistic–existential theories of the self. In so doing, it is possible to identify three principle concepts by which the various aspects of the self can be compared and classified: the Conflation Frame, the collapsing of entity, intellect, and identity into a single rendering of the self; the Integral Interface, the overriding theoretical framework within which each of these aspects of self can be differentiated and subsumed; and the Integral Axes, the two fundamental tracks by which the individual grows and develops, which consist of self-actualization and self-emancipation.     

Computer Modeling and the Fate of Folk Psychology

Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory – the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior – they disagree strongly about FP's fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psychology. Fodor, however, wagers that FP will be largely preserved and vindicated by scientific investigations of behavior. Recent findings by developmental psychologists, I argue, will push both Churchlandians and Fodorians toward the pessimistic view that FP is a misguided theory that will never be displaced, because it is, so to speak, built into our cognitive systems. I explore the possibility of preserving optimism by rejecting the theory-theory and adopting the simulation theory , a competing view developed by Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman, and Jane Heal. According to simulationists, common-sense interpretation of behavior is accomplished by means of pretense-like operations that deploy the cognitive system's own reasoning capabilities in a disengaged manner. Since on this view no theory-like set of principles would be needed, the simulation theory seems to enjoy a simplicity advantage over the theory-theory. Steven Stich and Shawn Nichols, however, contend that as the cognitive system would require special mechanisms for disengaged operation, the simplicity question cannot be resolved until suitable computational models are developed. I describe a set of models I have constructed to meet this need, and I discuss the contribution such models can make to determining FP's fate.     

建立心理学学科门类及学位类别的分析与展望

摘 要 为了促进中国本土化心理学体系建设和心理学学科的整体发展,从中国与发达国家心理学学科管理制度的比较中发现中国心理学学科归属所存在的问题,并在反思中探讨形成问题的原因。通过心理学在现有学科归属中的局限性,心理学成为独立学科门类的可能性,心理学成为独立学科门类后学科新体系的系统性,心理学成为独立学科门类的社会性四个方面的分析与讨论,研究了使心理学成为独立学科门类与学位类别的必要性与可行性。特别是从建设和谐社会的角度对心理学的学科归属、心理学的未来发展、现代社会发展及心理学与其它学科的广泛联系等需要的讨论中,指出中国心理学在专业设置方面隶属于理学和教育学的不足之处,认为这种隶属关系将会制约心理学的发展和学科成熟。提出应该在现有学位体系中增加心理学学科门类与学位类别,使心理学作为一个与理学和教育学并列的独立学科门类。通过改进学位体系让心理学在更大的学科背景中,建设中国本土心理学自身体系,使心理学研究方法更加多样化,为产生众多边缘学科和更好地发挥社会应用功能创造条件,也为今后心理学发展带来许多发展机遇,并在此基础上为展望心理学未来发展提供新的视角。     

认知神经科学的心理学理论价值

从认知神经科学面临的三个挑战--(1)神经科学是“还原” 的,不能完全解释一个人的心理活动过程;（2）认知神经科学无法真正解释人的心理与行为;（3）认知神经科学只能揭示出神经事件与认知活动或行为活动的相关性--入手来讨论其心理学理论价值,阐明认知神经科学在心理学研究中的重要地位及主流趋势。同时指出,认知神经科学只是心理学学科门类中的一种,它能解决的问题也只限于特定的范围,对它要有科学理性的认识和定位。     

Out of the consulting room and into the world: hermeneutic dialogue, phronesis, and psychoanalytic theory as practice

One of the relics of positivism has been an underappreciation of the moral and ethical dimensions of psychoanalytic theory and practice. In a positivist metapsychology, cure and therapeutic gain were often defined instrumentally, with relatively little consideration given to aspects of human experience (e.g., moral, cultural, spiritual) that did not fit within a positivist framework. Conceptual and paradigmatic shifts in psychoanalysis have occurred, in part, because of the inability of the classical model to provide a language that adequately captures deeply felt human values and beliefs. Aided by hermeneutic and postmodern influences, many contemporary psychoanalytic theories are beginning to focus greater attention on the notion that analytic therapy is empowered by a set of ethical convictions, beliefs, and commitments, which are tied to a certain understanding of the good life. Along these lines, the author argues that developing a fresh understanding of the moral and ethical dimensions of psychoanalysis requires elaborating a new ontology of human subjectivity and social life. The author offers a sketch of how this gargantuan task might be started by integrating psychoanalysis within a hermeneutic perspective on dialogue, by suggesting that it would be helpful to view psychoanalysis as promoting Aristotelian practical wisdom or phronesis, and by rethinking psychoanalytic theory and interpretation as a form of practice.