Wittgenstein’s ‘Non-Cognitivism’ – Explained and Vindicated

The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’. The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular, hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary, in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical work, at the level of both aims and methods.     

‘Meaning-dawning’ in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks: a Kierkegaardian reading and critique

In this paper, I am going to propose a new reading of Wittgenstein’s cryptic talk of ‘accession or loss of meaning’ (or the world ‘waxing and waning’ as a whole) in the Notebooks that draws both on Wittgenstein’s later work on aspect-perception, as well as on the thoughts of a thinker whom Wittgenstein greatly admired: Søren Kierkegaard. I will then go on to argue that, its merits apart, there is something existentially problematic about the conception that Wittgenstein is advocating. For the renunciation of the comforts of the world that Wittgenstein proposes as a way of coping with the brute contingencies of life seems only to come as far as what Kierkegaard calls ‘infinite resignation’, and this falls far short of the joyful acceptance of existence that appears necessary for inhabiting what Wittgenstein calls a happy world. That is to say, I will show that what Wittgenstein’s proposal lacks is a way of reconnecting with the finite after one has renounced it – the kind of transformation of existence achieved by the person Kierkegaard calls the ‘knight of faith’.     

“An artistic rather than a scientific achievement”: Frege and the Poeticality of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Philosophia - In this article I explore some implications of the correspondence that went on between Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and the logician and mathematician Gottlob Frege...     

What is “the ineffable” exactly? An extensive reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

The ineffable  in Wittgenstein s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is an essential term that has various interpretations. It could be divided into two types, namely, positive and negative, or real and fake. The negative or fake type can be clarified by logical analysis, while the positive or real type can be understood only through philosophical critique. Both the positive and negative types consist of infinity or absoluteness, but the infinity is subject to distinctions in meaning and logic.     

Wittgenstein’s challenge to enactivism

Many authors have identified a link between later Wittgenstein and enactivism. But few have also recognised how Wittgenstein may in fact challenge enactivist approaches. In this paper, I consider one such challenge. For example, Wittgenstein is well known for his discussion of seeing-as, most famously through his use of Jastrow’s ambiguous duck-rabbit picture. Seen one way, the picture looks like a duck. Seen another way, the picture looks like a rabbit. Drawing on some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about seeing-as, I show how Wittgenstein poses a challenge for proponents of Sensorimotor Enactivism, like O’Regan and Noë, namely to provide a sensorimotor framework within which seeing-as can be explained. I claim that if these proponents want to address this challenge, then they should endorse what I call Sensorimotor Identification, according to which visual experiences can be identified with what agents do.

     

Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory and the Distinction between Representing and Depicting

In this paper, I draw attention to the often-overlooked Tractarian distinction between representing (darstellen) and depicting (abbilden), provide a clear account of it and examine how it affects our understanding of the notions of ‘being a picture’, meaningfulness, truth, and falsity in the Tractatus. I also look at the recent debate in the literature on the notion of truth and show that Glock’s claim that the official theory of the Tractatus is to be accounted in terms of obtainment only and deflationary accounts such as Hacker’s derive from a failure to notice the distinction between representing and depicting (in the case of Glock) or a misconception of depicting (in the case of Hacker). Finally, I argue against the idea that either representing or depicting should be dispensed with. Both are necessary for Wittgenstein to account for every case of a proposition being a picture of reality.     

Wittgenstein’s influence on Austin’s philosophy of language

Many philosophers have assumed, without argument, that Wittgenstein influenced Austin. More often, however, this is vehemently denied, especially by those who knew Austin personally. We compile and assess the currently available evidence for Wittgenstein’s influence on Austin’s philosophy of language. Surprisingly, this has not been done before in any detail. On the basis of both textual and circumstantial evidence we show that Austin’s work demonstrates substantial engagement with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In particular, Austin’s 1940 paper, ‘The Meaning of a Word’, should be construed as a direct response to and development of ideas he encountered in Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. Moreover, we argue that Austin’s mature speech-act theory in How to Do Things with Words was also significantly influenced by Wittgenstein.     

Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the transcendental problem

The transcendental problem that obsessed the great Western philosophers such as Kant and Husserl should be, according to Wittgenstein, conceived as a matter of understanding a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from stated rules. Once these rules, regarded as a priori categories by Kant and as eidos and eidetic relations by Husserl, are demonstrated to be no more than the language usages or rules of language-games related to our forms of life, Kant’s transcendental idealism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology no longer have a leg to stand on. Translated by Chen Xin and Zhang Qingxiong from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (10): 68–76     

The Inverted Spectrum,Qualia, and Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis

In “Wittgenstein and Qualia,” Ned Block presents an inversion argument for qualia. Taking Wittgenstein’s notes as the starting point, Block argues that if we admit the possibility of the “innocuous” inverted spectrum, we will have to accept the “dangerous” inverted spectrum, where qualia are ineffable contents of experience contents that cannot be fully captured by public language. In my opinion, Block’s argument merits suspicion as it begs the question. While claiming to oppose the inner arena model like Wittgenstein, he presupposes its validity in his argument. I will finally examine how Wittgenstein dissolves confusion about qualia by the way of grammatical analysis.     

Wittgenstein’s Peculiar Use of “Internal Relation” in Aspect-Seeing

“Internal relation” is a significant term in both Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy. The term is used in relation to many problems, including our topic here, “aspect-seeing.” Some scholars have attempted to present a persuasive interpretation of this terminology; however, Wittgenstein’s remarks on “aspect-seeing” somehow thwart their approaches. The obstacle lies in the relata involved: Which terms are connected by an internal relation in the perception of an aspect? In this paper, I review the existing interpretations and present two proposals, one of which is conservative and the other slightly more radical. I argue that Wittgenstein makes divergent use of the distinction between “internal/external relations,” and that this may reveal the potential ambiguities of the words “internal” and “relation.”     

Language and Extra-linguistic Reality in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya

Relation between language and extra-linguistic reality is an important problem of Bhart?hari’s linguistic philosophy. In the ‘Vākyapadīya,’ this problem is discussed several times, but in accordance with the general perspectivist trend of Bhart?hari’s philosophy each time it is framed through different concepts and different solutions are provided. In this essay, an attempt is undertaken to summarize the variety of different and mutually exclusive views on language and extra-linguistic reality in VP and to formulate the hidden presuppositions on which the actual viewpoints expressed in the kārikās are based. As a result, the following approaches are formulated: (A1) Language is coextensive with external reality. (A2a) Language, designated as kalpanā/vikalpa, is distinct from reality. (A2b) Language refers to the secondary/metaphorical reality (upacārasattā/aupacārikī sattā). (A3) Language and reality somehow correlate, because otherwise, practical/linguistic activity (vyavahāra) would be impossible. The origin of these approaches and their affinities with different schools of Indian philosophy (Nyāya-Vai?e?ika and Buddhist Pramā?avāda) are examined. Approach (A3), according to which correlation between language and reality is functional and not ontological, seems very close to Dharmakīrti’s concept of arthakriyā. This approach accords with Bhart?hari’s perspectivist philosophical strategy. It enabled him to explain how effective linguistic activity is possible, capturing language in its dynamic aspect, without limitative static ontological constructions.     

Maternal Affective Disorder and Children’s Representation of Their Families

Children’s perceptions of family relationship are related to their later emotional and social adjustment. This is of particular relevance in the context of family stressors such as maternal affective disorder. This study investigated the effects of maternal postnatal depression and anxiety on children’s family representations. In our sample of postnatally depressed mothers we also explored marital conflict as mediator between maternal psychopathology and children’s representations. Family drawings of 235 4–5 year-old children (93 control, 53 depressed and 89 anxious) were examined. When compared to controls, children of depressed, but not of anxious mothers, were more likely to draw themselves as less prominent than other family members and to represent a dysfunctional family, less likely to represent themselves with a happy face and showed a greater tendency of drawing bizarre pictures. Marital conflict mediated the association between maternal depression and dysfunctionality in drawings.     

Carnap’s 1934 Objections to Wittgenstein’s Say/Show Distinction

In sections 18 and 73 of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap famously presents what he understands to be decisive objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. However, Carnap has been criticized in recent literature for severely misinterpreting that distinction. Against this criticism it is argued that Carnap reads that distinction as applying to two distinct classes of expressions (Unsinn and sinnlos) that he holds to emerge from his reading of Tractatus 4.1212 and related Tractarian theses. It is then argued that Carnap’s counterexamples to Wittgenstein’s theses are successful given his reading, and that our analysis of his counterexamples puts us in a unique position to reevaluate his conventionalism.     

Hard and Blind: On Wittgenstein’s Genealogical View of Logical Necessity

My main aim is to sketch a certain reading (‘genealogical’) of later Wittgenstein’s views on logical necessity. Along the way, I engage with the inferentialism currently debated in the literature on the epistemology of deductive logic.     

Mind the Gap: Framing of Women’s Success and Representation in STEM Affects Women’s Math Performance under Threat

Interventions designed to combat the negative effects of stereotype threat have primarily taken an individual-based approach. The current study sought to expand upon these strategies by taking a group-based approach to reduce stereotype threat effects. Specifically, we investigated whether the success and numerical representation of women in STEM positively impacts women’s math performance and affective reactions. We hypothesized that 1) women under threat (control) would perform worse than men; 2) there would be a larger performance difference for women than men when exposed to the success and balanced representation of women in STEM compared to the control condition; 3) there would be a larger performance difference for women than men between the balanced condition and the unbalanced condition where women are portrayed as successful, but not equally represented in STEM. For this study, male (n?=?56) and female (n?=?66) U.S. undergraduates from a large southern California state university read information about women’s success and representation in STEM (or no information), completed a math exam under stereotype threat conditions, and then expressed their threat-based concerns. Results revealed that women performed worse than men in the control condition. Women in the balanced condition performed better than women in the control and unbalanced conditions. Men’s performance was unaffected by the balance or imbalance of women in STEM. Women’s affective reactions largely mirrored the performance results. This study provides compelling evidence for using a group-based approach highlighting women’s advances in STEM to alleviate stereotype threat.     

The Leader’s Hypnotic Influence and the Creation of Alternate Reality

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - Psychoanalysis has traditionally been an insular practice by analysts in their offices sequestered from any outside intrusion. However, in recent years a...     

The Chinese Understanding of Wittgenstein’s Mysticism in the Tractatus

Wittgenstein’s mysticism has been one of the focuses of critics and commentators of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Two prevailing readings hold different attitudes towards it. The classical reading commits to the mysticism in the Tractatus, while the therapeutic reading rejects it amid its interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In this paper, I will argue against both by discussing how the Chinese reading understands the Tractatus. I will show that the ineffable in the Tractatus is not any type of mysticism, and that the Chinese reading of the Tractatus is a metaphysical one without any mysticism.