Remains to be transmitted: Primo Levi's traumatic dream

Drawing on the writings of Primo Levi and the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, the author attempts to conceive psychic trauma as a coalescence of traumas, since this is perhaps the only way to prevent a subject from being forced back into identification with the catastrophic event, whatever that may have been. A recurrent dream of Primo Levi's suggests to the author the way that traumas may have coalesced within Levi. The hope would be to restore the entire significance of what remains from that traumatic event to the speech (parole) of the Other, to the speech of every human, even the most helpless, bruised, or destroyed among us.     

Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency

Isaac Levi has claimed that our reliance on the testimony of others, and on the testimony of the senses, commonly produces inconsistency in our set of full beliefs. This happens if what is reported is inconsistent with what we believe to be the case. Drawing on a conception of the role of beliefs in inquiry going back to Dewey, Levi has maintained that the inconsistent belief corpus is a state of ``epistemic hell'': it is useless as a basis for inquiry and deliberation. As he has also noticed, the compatibility of these two elements of his pragmatist epistemology could be called into question. For if inconsistency means hell, how can it ever be rational to enter that state, and on what basis could we attempt to regain consistency? Levi, nonetheless, has tried to show that the conflict is only apparent and that no changes of his theory are necessary. In the main part of the paper I argue, by contrast, that his attempts to reconcile these components of his view are unsuccessful.The conflict is real andthus presents a genuine threat to Deweyan pragmatism, as understood by Levi. After an attempt to pinpoint exactly where the source of the problem lies, I explore some possibilities for how to come to grips with it. I conclude that Levi can keep his fundamental thesis concerning the role of beliefs in inquiry and deliberation, provided that he (i) gives up the view that the agent can legitimately escape from inconsistency, and (ii) modifies his account of prediction alias deliberate expansion by acknowledging a third desideratum, besides probability and informational value, namely, not to cause permanent breakdown further down the line of inquiry. The result is a position which is more similar to Peter Gärdenfors's than is Levi's original theory, while retaining the basic insights of the latter.     

Guys and Dolls: Relational Life in the Technological Era

This paper asserts the current age as perverse, a social paradigm facilitated by explosive technological progression that is rapidly altering the erotic and social dimensions of human relationship. The author employs psychoanalytic and evolutionary theories to explain the ease with which we humanize machines and dehumanize people. The quest and need for love, which combines both discovery and invention, is framed within Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object. A detailed case is presented of a man who lived with a high-end love doll. The case illustrates his simultaneous need to dehumanize women and humanize the doll, as well as his use of the analyst to help him transition from being with a doll to being with a human partner. Questions regarding technology’s growing impact on the future of relationships are surfaced.     

Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One's Own Actions

Isaac Levi has long criticized causal decisiontheory on the grounds that it requiresdeliberating agents to make predictions abouttheir own actions. A rational agent cannot, heclaims, see herself as free to choose an actwhile simultaneously making a prediction abouther likelihood of performing it. Levi is wrongon both points. First, nothing in causaldecision theory forces agents to makepredictions about their own acts. Second,Levi's arguments for the ``deliberation crowdsout prediction thesis' rely on a flawed modelof the measurement of belief. Moreover, theability of agents to adopt beliefs about theirown acts during deliberation is essentialto any plausible account of human agency andfreedom. Though these beliefs play no part inthe rationalization of actions, they arerequired to account for the causalgenesis of behavior. To explain the causes ofactions we must recognize that (a) an agentcannot see herself as entirely free in thematter of A unless she believes herdecision to perform A will cause A,and (b) she cannot come to a deliberatedecision about A unless she adoptsbeliefs about her decisions. FollowingElizabeth Anscombe and David Velleman, I arguethat an agent's beliefs about her own decisionsare self-fulfilling, and that this can beused to explain away the seeming paradoxicalfeatures of act probabilities.     

On Trygve Braatøy’s concept of analytic love. An assumption on the actuality of one of the pioneers in Norwegian psychoanalysis

Is analysis still a cure of love? And is the analyst’s love and warm feelings for his patient a prerequisite for doing psychoanalysis? Trygve Braatøy addresses these complex matters in his book from 1954. The concept of love and its relation to sexuality is discussed, and how to understand love in the analytic setting. His points of view are compared with Freud’s and those of some second-generation analysts, his Norwegian colleagues and contemporary analysts, as well as modern writers. Braatøy defines himself as a true Freudian, but his clinical theory regarding love and countertransference has strong resemblances to Rank and Ferenczi and his followers, both in Europe and USA. Braatøy sums up that the therapist’s capacity to love and have a surplus of warmth ought to be the most prominent factor when selecting candidates for psychoanalytic training. Braatøy is a modern writer, with his ideas founded on clinical experience and intuition.     

GENDER, JEALOUSY, AND REASON

Abstract— Research has suggested that men are especially bothered by evidence of their partner's sexual infidelity, whereas women are troubled more by evidence of emotional infidelity. One evolutionary account (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992) argues that this is an innate difference, arising from men's need for paternity certainty and women's need for male investment in their offspring. We suggest that the difference may instead be based on reasonable differences between the sexes in how they interpret evidence of infidelity. A man, thinking that women have sex only when in love, has reason to believe that if his mate has sex with another man, she is in love with that other. A woman, thinking that men can have sex without love, should still be bothered by sexual infidelity, but less so because it does not imply that her mate has fallen in love as well. A survey of 137 subjects confirmed that men and women do differ in the predicted direction in how much they think each form of infidelity implies the other, proposing innate emotional differences may, therefore, be gratuitous.     

Practical and scientific rationality: A difficulty for Levi's epistemology

Traditionally scientific rationality has been distinguished from mere practical rationality. It has seemed that it is sometimes rational to accept statements for the purposes of particular practical deliberations even though it would not be rational to count them as having been confirmed by science. Isaac Levi contends that this traditional view is mistaken. He thinks that there should be a single standard of acceptance for all purposes, scientific and practical. The author contends that Levi has given no good reason for identifying scientific with practical rationality. And he argues that Levi's own theory is inconsistent with the thesis that a scientist should use a single standard of acceptance in all his scientific deliberations.     

Response

The theme of love has long been neglected in studies on African myths. The often-heard explanation is that African myths and folktales do not tell stories about love because they primarily express social interests and obligations while love ‐ intended as both emotional imperative and biological drive ‐ is an individual need and feeling. This latter definition relies on a very specific understanding of ‘love’: the Romantic love of 19th century European novels. This paper argues that when love means attraction, affection, passion, and necessity, it turns up as liaisons dangereuses in many African narratives. Love becomes a driving force that generates gender constructions by reinforcing the unity of the couple or by fuelling the struggle between partners. In the case of Kabyle narratives (Algeria),1 conceptualisations of love as well as the relationships between myths and folktales are explored by analyzing formula tales2 and the only known collection of Kabyle Berber myths: those collected by Leo Frobenius, ethnologist and historian of religion, at the beginning of the 20th century and published in the first volume of his Volksmarchen der Kabylen in 1921. The discussion of the relationship between Kabyle myths and folktales touches upon a well-known interpretative problem in the study of religion: the articulation of myth and ritual with history as communities respond to sweeping social, political, and religious changes, such as the coming of Islam, colonization, decolonization, and globalization.     

Love and the therapeutic process

This paper deals with the nature of love that can be present in the person of the therapist as well as how it can express itself in the therapeutic effort. It also takes up certain errors that can occur as a result of the misunderstanding of the terms as well. There are those who lean toward making therapy an overintellectualized process. The point of view is presented that for psychotherapy to have its full value, the emotions need awakening and structuring for the benefit of the patient's individual life contributions as well as for the benefit of those he will associate with during his lifetime.     

The theme of love in Henrik Pontoppidan's Nattevagt (Night watch) and other short novels

The subject of love may not seem an appropriate topic of scientific discourse, for we prefer turning to poetry to learn something meaningful about love. Nonetheless, we find three texts on the subject in Freud's work, all of which underline an internal division in love. He discussed the contrast between the affectionate and sensual aspects of love, while Lacanian writers have supplemented by pointing to the division between pleasure and desire. This article illustrates these concepts with cases taken from the Danish author Henrik Pontoppidan, one of the most prominent Danish writers from the turn of the 19^th century. He is well-known for his novels and for his short novels. One of these, Nattevagt, from 1894, has been read by critics as a marital conflict between the painter Jørgen Hallager and his fragile wife Ursula Branth, who succumbs to the brutality of her husband. The author supplements this simple version of the story with aspects made visible through the idea of an internal division in sexuality, which Freud elaborated into his theory of the death drive around 1920. By way of introduction, a few words are said about Pontoppidan, focusing on the theme of love in his short novels. Following is a brief summary of the plot of Nattevagt. Finally a more detailed reading of the dialogue between the two protagonists, Jorgen and Ursula, opens the way for a psychoanalytic interpretation of the tragic outcome of their love.     

The meaning of money: A psychiatric-psychological evaluation

Summary In summary, we have reviewed some psychoanalytic formulations about the symbolic meanings of money, such as its equation with feces, semen, life, and love. Money becomes a sublimated interest so that we may avoid more primitive desires. Nevertheless, it also is an interest upon which is focused guilty feelings for more basic wishes from the past, so that seeking money is both pleasurable and anxiety-provoking. The helper of suffering humanity who demands money for his services is in a particularly conflicted position. As a result, he finds it necessary to develop a rationalization system that concludes that his demand for money is good for the sufferer. While this is true in some circumstances, it is better to face one's basic selfishness and realistic needs for money. The pastoral counselor experiences a different conflict, faced as he is with his need to be altruistic, and his lack of a good system of rationalization as possessed by the psychiatrist.     

The wish for annihilation in ‘love–death’ as collapse of the need for recognition,in Wagner's Tristan und Isolde

Wagner's Tristan und Isolde holds a central position in Western music and culture. It is shown to demonstrate consequences of interruption of developmental processes involving the need for recognition of subjectivity, resulting in the collapse of this need into the wish for annihilation of self and other through ‘love–death’ [Liebestod]. A close reading of the musical language of the opera reveals how this interruption is demonstrated, and the consequent location of identity outside of language, particularly suitable for expression in music. Isolde's dynamics are presented as distinct from that of Tristan, and in contrast to other interpretations of Tristan and Isolde's love as an attack on the Oedipal order, or as a regressive wish for pre‐Oedipal union. Isolde's Act I narrative locates the origin of her desire in the protagonists' mutual gaze at a traumatic moment. In this moment powerful and contrasting emotions converge, evoking thwarted developmental needs, and arousing the fantasy of redemption in love–death. By removing the magical elements, Wagner enables a deeper understanding of the characters' positions in relation to each other, each with his or her own needs for recognition and traumatic experiences. These positions invite mutual identifications resulting in rising tension between affirmation of identity and annihilation, with actual death as the only possible psychic solution. The dynamics described in the opera demonstrate the function of music and opera in conveying meaning which is not verbally expressible.     

With a Sword Pointing to the East,West, South,and North

In his In Defense of War, Nigel Biggar argues for an account of war based in Christian love. In the process, he opposes Christian pacifists, the British Left, liberal accounts of just‐war, and accounts of just‐war based on self‐defense. Although framed in terms of love, his account pivots around punishment, which is further explicated by a thorough review of the recent war in Iraq, the invasion of which he deems justified. This review compares Biggar's monograph to prior iterations of a love‐based approach to just war by Paul Ramsey and Oliver O'Donovan. Biggar's contributions regarding love, punishment, and policy analysis are recognized, as well as his attempt to carry on the tradition of the ‘mournful warrior’. As a model for the kind of scrutiny that Christian ethicists should bring to bear on serious social issues, Biggar's monograph is excellent. However, the political stance and – largely implicit and unstated – political theology operating behind this book are, in the end, disconcerting.     

Kant on the Emotion of Love

Although recent Kant scholarship has focused on Kant's treatment of various emotions, one that has not received much attention is love. There are three main reasons for this. First, Kant does not have a single, sustained analysis of the emotion of love; what he does say appears scattered throughout his corpus. Second, Kant identifies a number of different kinds of love, and it is not always clear which kinds are emotions or how the different kinds of love are related. Finally, in general Kant is quite critical of the emotion of love, and his critical remarks seem not to fit with the intuitions of some people when it comes to some of the more positive instances of love (e.g., the love a parent has for a child). In this paper I pursue two related aims. First, I identify and sort out the different kinds of love in Kant's writings, and I address a particular difficulty of interpretation, namely the status of love of human beings (Menschenliebe) in Kant's writings. Second, I argue that, despite Kant's criticisms of the emotion of love, he views it as an expression of our unsocial sociability, and it plays a positive and indispensible role in the moral development of human beings.     

Phallic narcissism, anal sadism, and oral discord: the case of Yukio Mishima, Part I

Thus far I have explored Mishima's traumatic childhood and the experiences leading him toward misogyny, phallic narcissism, and the drive to murder his own weakness and sexual vulnerability. Mishima suffered the extraordinary trauma of being separated from his parents and sequestered to the sickroom of a psychotic grandmother for the first twelve years of his life. Intense rage over abandonment and impingement engendered a disgust for femininity and the need to escape feminine messiness through homosexual pursuits. Mishima's entrenched feelings of shame and weakness gave rise to phallic narcissistic tendencies, as he idealized powerful men and eventually strove to become a powerful and beautiful male. In pursuing this erotic masculine image Mishima continued to fantasize about murdering his weak and shameful self-image, and commingled this sadistic impulse with fantasies of sexual merger with murdered love objects. Finally Mishima was the murderer erotically eradicating his sexual vulnerability as both subject and object. His suicide was a repetition of this erotic sadistic fantasy. In a further article I will continue the discussion by examining Mishima's fantasies of murdering beautiful and abandoning love objects. I will also address the complex nature of his ritual suicide as fantasy of rebirth, sexual merger, the murder of toxic introjects, and escape from death, decay, and regression to helpless infancy.     

Dangerous love in mythical narratives and formula tales

The theme of love has long been neglected in studies on African myths. The often-heard explanation is that African myths and folktales do not tell stories about love because they primarily express social interests and obligations while love – intended as both emotional imperative and biological drive – is an individual need and feeling. This latter definition relies on a very specific understanding of ‘love’: the Romantic love of 19th century European novels. This paper argues that when love means attraction, affection, passion, and necessity, it turns up as liaisons dangereuses in many African narratives. Love becomes a driving force that generates gender constructions by reinforcing the unity of the couple or by fuelling the struggle between partners.In the case of Kabyle narratives (Algeria),¹ conceptualisations of love as well as the relationships between myths and folktales are explored by analyzing formula tales² and the only known collection of Kabyle Berber myths: those collected by Leo Frobenius, ethnologist and historian of religion, at the beginning of the 20th century and published in the first volume of his Volksmärchen der Kabylen in 1921.The discussion of the relationship between Kabyle myths and folktales touches upon a well-known interpretative problem in the study of religion: the articulation of myth and ritual with history as communities respond to sweeping social, political, and religious changes, such as the coming of Islam, colonization, decolonization, and globalization.     

Possibility and probability

Conclusion De Finetti was a strong proponent of allowing 0 credal probabilities to be assigned to serious possibilities. I have sought to show that (pace Shimony) strict coherence can be obeyed provided that its scope of applicability is restricted to partitions into states generated by finitely many ultimate payoffs. When countable additivity is obeyed, a restricted version of ISC can be applied to partitions generated by countably many ultimate payoffs. Once this is appreciated, perhaps the compelling character of the Shimony argument will be less overwhelming and the attractiveness of de Finetti's more permissive attitude will become more apparent.I want to push the permissive tendency in de Finetti still further. It seems doubtful that RUIWC should be required as de Finetti apparently suggested. It is also excessively dogmatic and restrictive to require that the credal states of ideally situated rational agents be numerically definite (Levi 1974, 1980). And de Finetti's rejection of objectivism in statistics overreached itself when he dismissed objective probabilities as meaningless metaphysical artefacts (Levi 1986). In this respect, the philosophically most important lessons de Finetti has to teach us are to be found not in his celebrated representation theorem but in his discussions of the relations between 0-probability and possibility, conditional probability and countable additivity. Perhaps, the technical issues involved are remote and pedantic. But the attitude de Finetti sought to inculcate is of profound importance.Thanks are due to Teddy Seidenfeld whose comments have improved this paper substantially. He is not to blame for its lingering defects.     

DECEPTIVE LOVE: Kierkegaard on Mystification and Deceiving into the Truth

This article explains and assesses a particular method of loving others that is espoused by Søren Kierkegaard. In his later works, Kierkegaard advocates a kind of deceptive love whereby one mystifies or deceives another person for that other person's own good. The theological underpinning of this mode of love is found in the imitation of Christ. In other words, just as Jesus adopted an incognito, so also Christians should, at times, appear different or lowlier in order to help others by meeting them where they are. After explaining this form of love, I argue that there are considerable reasons not to follow Kierkegaard in his support of outright deception within personal relationships. I conclude with some brief reflections on whether the deceptive structure of Kierkegaard's own authorship is thereby condemned or whether it can be exonerated.     

A father to love: eros and identification in boys – an emendation of Freud on the male oedipal drama

The relationship between a son and his father is usually characterized as primarily one of rivalry. In this emendation of classic oedipal theory, what has traditionally been referred to as the ‘negative oedipal relation’ is given prominence as a boy’s first emotionally significant relationship in which he initiates affection with another human being, his father. Such love is in the service of identification but is also as important as the template for a male’s later relationships with women (sexual), other men, and his children. A peculiarity of Freud’s relationship with his own father is suggested as the source of oversight of this element of the oedipal drama. A boy’s emotional reactive response to his mother is primarily one of gratitude in response to her love. Proactive loving is first experienced with his father.     

In defence of a faith-like model of love: a reply to John Lippitt’s “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira,Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’

In his major work on love, Works of Love, Kierkegaard clearly and robustly affirms the moral superiority of neighbourly love, and approves preferential love on one condition: that it serve as an instance of neighbourly love. But can an essentially preferential love be an instance of the essentially non-preferential neighbourly love? John Lippitt seems to think it can. In his paper “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’ he defends Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love against my criticism (as presented in my book Kierkegaard on Faith and Love); specifically, against my claim that in using Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love as a framework for understanding preferential love, one fails to account for the latter’s distinctive character. Lippitt claims that I misinterpret Kierkegaard’s position and, using what he calls ‘the God filter’, he attempts to show how adhering to Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love allows one to sustain the distinctiveness (and value) of preferential love. In what follows I will defend my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s position and explain why I take the view he presents in Works of Love to be problematic. Furthermore, in my aforementioned book I offer a Kierkegaardian model of love that does precisely what Lippitt seeks his ‘God filter’ model to do: namely, preserve the distinctiveness of preferential love while allowing its possible coexistence with neighbourly love. Thus, against the background of Lippitt’s criticism I will demonstrate this model again, in hope of clarifying the advantages this view offers.