Self-esteem and clarity of the self-concept

This article examines the association between evaluative and knowledge components of the self. Four studies tested the hypothesis that the self-concepts of low-self-esteem (LSE) people are characterized by less clarity or certainty than those of high-self-esteem (HSE) people. LSE Ss exhibited less extremity and self-reported confidence when rating themselves on bipolar trait adjectives (Study 1), less temporal stability in their trait ratings over a 2-month interval (Study 2), less congruence between their self-concepts and their subsequent perceptions of situation-specific behavior and memory for prior behavior (Study 3), and less internal consistency, lower self-rated confidence, and longer reaction times when making me/not me responses to pairs of opposite traits (Study 4). Alternative accounts of the results and the implications of self-concept clarity for understanding the pervasive impact of self-esteem on behavior are discussed.     

Annoyance response of nonsmokers to cigarette smoke

In three experiments, nonsmoking subjects rated their annoyance by task environments while either exposed or not exposed to ambient tobacco smoke. In Exps. 1 and 2 subjects rated annoyance with the environment while exposed to three intensities of noise, and in Exp. 3 subjects rated annoyance while performing multiplication problems under conditions of high and low task motivation. The source of the ambient smoke in Exp. 1 was a smoke pump. For Exps. 2 and 3, the source of the smoke was confederate subjects. No differences in annoyance were obtained in Exps. 1 and 2 as a function of exposure to smoke. Exp. 3 showed that nonsmokers' annoyance to a task environment is dependent upon task motivation and exposure to ambient smoke. In Exp. 3 nonsmokers exposed to smoke were more annoyed than those not exposed under low motivating conditions. When nonsmokers were highly motivated in the task environment those exposed to smoke were significantly less annoyed than those not exposed.     

Implicit memory for new associations: The pictorial influence

A series of experiments was conducted in order to show that implicit memory for new associations is not always dependent on semantic integrative processing during study. The material used in these experiments differed from traditional studies that employed pairs of unrelated words. Instead, targets (words in Exps. 1 and 2 and pictures in Exps. 3 and 4) were encoded in the context of an unrelated picture. The implicit tests used were word-stem completion (Exps. 1, 2, and 3) and picture-fragment identification (Exp. 4). The explicit test was word-stem cued recall (Exps. 1, 2, and 3) and picture-fragment cued recall (Exp 4). For implicit tests, context effects were not obtained using words as targets with a non-integrative semantic-elaboration encoding task (Exp. 1). When an integrative semantic-elaboration encoding task was used, a standard context effect emerged (Exp. 2) for implicit memory. Importantly, with pictures as targets, context effects appeared without integrative semantic encoding (Exps. 3 and 4). However, context effects were obtained for all conditions of cued recall. Results are discussed with regard to the concept of unitization.     

Learning to avoid spiders: fear predicts performance,not competence

We used an immersive virtual environment to examine avoidance learning in spider-fearful participants. In 3 experiments, participants were asked to repeatedly lift one of 3 virtual boxes, under which either a toy car or a spider appeared and then approached the participant. Participants were not told that the probability of encountering a spider differed across boxes. When the difference was large (Exps. 1 and 2), spider-fearfuls learned to avoid spiders by lifting the few-spiders-box more often and the many-spiders-box less often than non-fearful controls did. However, they hardly managed to do so when the probability differences were small (Exp. 3), and they did not escape from threat more quickly (Exp. 2). In contrast to the observed performance differences, spider-fearfuls and non-fearfuls showed equal competence, that is comparable post-experimental knowledge about the probability to encounter spiders under the 3 boxes. The limitations and implications of the present study are discussed.     

Body posture and interpersonal perception in a dyadic interaction: A Big Two analysis

Body posture influences feelings about the self, but little is known about its impact on social cognition more generally. We apply the Big Two framework (Agency/Competence, Communion/Warmth) and study how body posture influences interpersonal perception in a dyadic interaction. In three experiments, we studied dyads with different body postures (Exps. 1 and 2: expanded/restricted; Exp. 3: expanded/neutral). Dyad members worked on a joint task, and rated self and other. Findings showed that participants in an expanded posture rated the self higher and the other lower on agency, whereas those in a submissive (or neutral) posture rated the self lower and the other higher on agency. In Experiment 2, participants in a submissive posture also rated their communion lower. Results are important both for the impact of body posture on interpersonal perception and for context effects in the relationship of Agency versus Communion ratings of self and others.     

Presaccadic attention allocation and express saccades

Express saccades are visually-guided saccades that are characterized by an extremely short latency of about 100 ms. The present experiments tested the hypothesis that a disengagement of visual attention is necessary for the generation of express saccades. All subjects produced large numbers of express saccades in the gap paradigm, in which the fixation stimulus is removed 200 ms before target onset (Exp. 1), but not in the overlap paradigm, in which the fixation stimulus remains on during the entire trial (Exp. 2). By means of peripheral cues (Exps. 3–5) and central cues (Exps. 6–7), visual attention was directed at the target location for the saccade before the actual appearance of the saccade target. In all experiments, the location cues facilitated rather than abolished express saccades. The generation of express saccades was facilitated even when the currently fixated visual stimulus was not removed before target onset (fixation-overlap; Exps. 5–7). The results are explained by the hypothesis that a disengagement of a separate fixation system is necessary for the generation of express saccades, a hypothesis that is in line with current neurobiological findings.     

Defining traits differently for self and others

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.     

Conceptual and physical object qualities contribute differently to motor affordances

Priming studies have demonstrated that an object’s intrinsic and extrinsic qualities (size, orientation) influence subsequent motor behavior thus suggesting that these object qualities ‘afford’ actions that are congruent with the prime. We present four experiments that aim to evaluate the relative effect of conceptual and physical object qualities on action priming. In Experiment 1 equally graspable known and unknown tools are presented as primes. In Experiment 2 the primes depict high versus low graspable unfamiliar tools, and in Experiments 3 and 4 we present simple graspable shapes versus high graspable unfamiliar or familiar tools respectively. In all experiments the (unrelated) task consists of a timed motor response to the direction of a centrally placed arrow that is superimposed on the prime. Whereas tool familiarity reveals no significant difference on reaction time (Exp 1), responses to high graspable unfamiliar tools (Exp 2) and simple graspable shapes (Exps 3 and 4) are significantly faster. We conclude that motor affordances are most readily determined by object qualities that depend on the object’s physical appearance provided by visual information. Conceptual information about the stimuli, such as semantic category or stored knowledge about its function and associated movements, does not appear to produce detectable effects of action priming in this paradigm.     

Predictive inferences take time to develop

In order to determine the time course of inferences about predictable events, predicting or control contexts were presented, followed by a target word (Exps. 1A, B, and C) or a continuation sentence (Exp. 2) that confirmed or disconfirmed the predicted event. Relative to the control condition, under the predicting condition there was facilitation in naming the confirming target words 1500 ms after the onset of the last word in the context (Exp. 1C), but not after 500 ms (Exp. 1A), and only a tendency after 1000 ms (Exp. 1B). In addition, there was facilitation in reading the post-target and final regions of the continuation sentence that confirmed the predicted event, as well as inhibition when the predicted event was disconfirmed, but no effect was observed on the target word itself (Exp. 2). It is concluded that, when the predicted event is highly constrained by the context, predictive inferences are likely to be drawn on-line, but they take time to construct. Received: 14 January 1998 / Accepted: 21 April 1998     

What will I be? The role of temporal perspective in predictions of affect, traits, and self-narratives

This article examined the effect of temporal perspective on the multifaceted future self (i.e., affect, traits, and self-narratives). Participants imagined themselves in the near versus distant future, and subsequently predicted their affect (Experiment 1), traits (Experiment 2), and naturalistic self-concepts (Experiment 3). Drawing from the Construal Level Theory and self-enhancement literatures, we hypothesized and found across three experiments that predictions of one's self in the distant future are more positive than predictions of one's self in the near future. Furthermore, building upon literature on the existence of normative and culturally sanctioned implicit theories of positive growth throughout the life span, we hypothesized and found that increased temporal distance yielded less variable predictions of affect, traits, and self-narratives (all three experiments) and that higher-level attributions mediated the effect of temporal perspective on the positivity of self-narratives (Experiment 3) and that time distance leads to more positive and less variable future selves.     

Limited capacity for contour curvature in iconic memory

We measured the difference threshold for contour curvature in iconic memory by using the cued discrimination method. The study stimulus consisting of 2 to 6 curved contours was briefly presented in the fovea, followed by two lines as cues. Subjects discriminated the curvature of two cued curves. The cue delays were 0 msec. and 300 msec. in Exps. 1 and 2, respectively, and 50 msec. before the study offset in Exp. 3. Analysis of data from Exps. 1 and 2 showed that the Weber fraction rose monotonically with the increase in set size. Clear set-size effects indicate that iconic memory has a limited capacity. Moreover, clear set-size effect in Exp. 3 indicates that perception itself has a limited capacity. Larger set-size effects in Exp. 1 than in Exp. 3 suggest that iconic memory after perceptual process has limited capacity. These properties of iconic memory at threshold level are contradictory to the traditional view that iconic memory has a high capacity both at suprathreshold and categorical levels.     

Practice and incentive motivation in recognition of inverted faces

In each of three experiments, participants received successive daily practice sessions on the task of recognizing inverted faces. In all practice sessions, an initial study series of 25 inverted faces was followed immediately by a test series of 17 pairs of inverted faces. Each test pair comprised a face from the study series and a new face. Completely new sets of faces were used in each session. Recognition of inverted faces did not improve across sessions in Exp. 1 but did improve in Exps. 2 and 3. Unlike Exp. 1, Exps. 2 and 3 employed an explicit incentive for improved performance. These results show that sufficiently motivated participants can become quite proficient at recognizing inverted faces. Implications of the results for the role of expertise at recognition in producing the inversion effect are discussed.     

Speed-accuracy tradeoffs in rapid bimanual aiming movements

Two experiments reported the effect of movement time and knowledge of results on overall spatial errors in rapid simultaneous bimanual aiming movements. In Exps. 1 (n=32) and 2 (n=32), participants used light, aluminum levers oriented vertically in the sagittal plane to make reversal movements over the same distance (20 degrees - 20 degrees or 60 degrees - 60 degrees) or different distances (20 degrees - 60 degrees) in each arm in 250, 350, or 450 msec. to the reversal point. The participants in Exp. 1 were given knowledge of results on the spatial and temporal accuracy for both arms, while in Exp. 2 knowledge of results was provided for one arm only. Strong speed-accuracy tradeoffs were shown for all groups in both experiments, but errors were larger in the different distance movements compared to the same distance groups. Spatial errors were also elevated in Exp. 2 when knowledge of results was not available compared to those conditions where knowledge of results was available. Overall, bimanual speed-accuracy tradeoffs are similar to single arm movements when one moves the same distance in each arm and when knowledge of results is available.     

The “pure-study” learning curve: The learning curve without cumulative testing

The customary assumption in the study of human learning using alternating study and test trials is that learning occurs during study trials and that test trials are useful only to measure learning. In fact, tests seem to play little role in the development of learning, because the learning curve is similar even when the number of test trials varies widely (Tulving, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 6:175-184, 1967). However, this outcome seems odd, because other research has shown that testing fosters greater long-term learning than does studying. We report three experiments addressing whether tests affect the shape of the learning curve. In two of the experiments, we examined this issue by varying the number of spaced study trials in a sequence and examining performance on only a single test trial at the end of the series (a "pure-study" learning curve). We compared these pure-study learning curves to standard learning curves and found that the standard curves increase more rapidly and reach a higher level in both free recall (Exp. 1) and paired-associate learning (Exp. 2). In Experiment 3, we provided additional study trials in the "pure-study" condition to determine whether the standard (study-test) condition would prove superior to a study-study condition. The standard condition still produced better retention on both immediate and delayed tests. Our experiments show that test trials play an important role in the development of learning using both free-recall (Exps. 1 and 3) and paired-associate (Exp. 2) procedures. Theories of learning have emphasized processes that occur during study, but our results show that processes engaged during tests are also critical.     

内隐联想测验中他人重要性对自我心理表征的影响

联合采用联想匹配任务和内隐联想测验（IAT）任务,考察了自我—他人分类中的他人重要性对自我—高奖赏相似性的影响。研究将中性的几何图形与自我、不同重要性的他人（实验一为陌生人,实验二为朋友）建立联结,并将自我（暂时建立联结的图形）高奖赏联合任务与自我低奖赏联合任务下的反应差异（即IAT值）作为自我—高奖赏相似性的指标,结果表明：（1）联想匹配任务中自我和朋友以及自我和陌生人之间都存在显著的自我优势效应;（2）IAT任务中,自我和高奖赏只在他人为朋友的自我—他人分类判断时才具有相似性,而他人为陌生人时二者不具有相似性。这说明他人重要性改变了自我的心理表征。     

内隐联想测验中他人重要性对自我心理表征的影响

联合采用联想匹配任务和内隐联想测验（IAT）任务，考察了自我—他人分类中的他人重要性对自我—高奖赏相似性的影响。研究将中性的几何图形与自我、不同重要性的他人（实验一为陌生人，实验二为朋友）建立联结，并将自我（暂时建立联结的图形）高奖赏联合任务与自我低奖赏联合任务下的反应差异（即IAT值）作为自我—高奖赏相似性的指标，结果表明：（1）联想匹配任务中自我和朋友以及自我和陌生人之间都存在显著的自我优势效应；（2）IAT任务中，自我和高奖赏只在他人为朋友的自我—他人分类判断时才具有相似性，而他人为陌生人时二者不具有相似性。这说明他人重要性改变了自我的心理表征。     

Relational Uncertainty and Cortisol Responses to Hurtful and Supportive Messages from a Dating Partner

This paper evaluates theoretical claims linking relational uncertainty about a relationship partner to experiences of stress during interactions with that partner. Two observational studies were conducted to evaluate the association between relational uncertainty and salivary cortisol in the context of hurtful and supportive interactions. In Study 1, participants (N = 89) engaged in a conversation about core traits or values with a partner, who was trained to be hurtful. In Study 2, participants (N = 89) received supportive messages after completing a series of stressful tasks and receiving negative performance feedback. As predicted, partner uncertainty was associated with greater cortisol reactivity to the hurtful interaction in Study 1. Contrary to expectations, Study 1 results also indicated that self uncertainty was associated with less cortisol reactivity, when self, partner, and relationship uncertainty were tested in the same model. Study 2 revealed that relational uncertainty dampened cortisol reactions to performing poorly on tasks while the partner observed. As predicted, Study 2 also found that partner uncertainty was associated with less cortisol recovery after the supportive interaction, but neither self nor relationship uncertainty was associated with rate of cortisol change during the recovery period.     

Input- and output-monitoring in implicit and explicit memory

Previous experiments have shown that the procedure of questioning subjects retrospectively about the input and output status of information (input and output monitoring) is a useful method for assessing the awareness states of subjects during implicit and explicit memory tasks. The main purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the previous findings could be extended to other implicit and explicit memory tasks. We were especially interested in whether differences in input- and output-monitoring performance can be observed when both the implicit and explicit memory tasks are conceptual ones. In a final test phase, the target items from the study phase and new distractor items were presented. In a recognition-like situation, subjects had to decide whether an item had been presented in the study phase (input status), as well as whether they had produced the item in the memory-test phase (output status). In all three experiments judgments about the input status - but only for those items that had been produced in the implicit or in the explicit memory test - were more precise after explicit than after implicit memory testings. This finding was not influenced by the distinction between perceptual and conceptual-memory tasks (Exp. 1), and was obtained under conditions in which the implicit and the explicit memory tasks were both conceptual and differed only in test instructions (Exps. 2 and 3). These results suggest that not only subjects performing a perceptual test of implicit memory, but also subjects in a conceptual implicit test were less aware of using information from a previous study episode than subjects who received memory instructions. It is concluded that requiring judgments about the input status of information is a good method for assessing subjects test awareness and is preferable to the use of a questionnaire (Exp. 3). In contrast, in all three experiments no differences were found with the output-monitoring measure between implicit and explicit test conditions.