论道义论与功利论的一个根本区分:正当与善何者优先

道义论与功利论是当代西方规范伦理学的两种基本理论形态.两者的区分可以以正当与善何者优先来界定.一般来说,强调正当优先于善,并不以善来界定正当的理论是道义论理论,而以善优先于正当,并以善来规定正当的理论是功利论理论.     

西方近代正当与善的分离及其伦理学后果

正当与善的关系在西方伦理学发展史上表现出十分复杂的情形.古代伦理思想基本上是以善来规导正当,而伦理学的近代转型则表现在确立正当对善的优先性.在近代,正当的标准是通过理智抽象来赋予个人以自由和平等权利,这使得正当获得了一个从善中分离出来的独立标准.其直接后果是:社会正义成为政治伦理的首要价值,作为心灵品质之好(善)的美德则只有依附于正义原则的地位.现代美德伦理学的复兴,就是试图恢复对美德自身的整体思考.     

论朱熹对"继善成性"说的规范

"继善成性"是易学哲学的重要问题.朱熹解释"继善成性"总体上不是为字义的通顺,而在为他的理学本体论作论证.理上气下的基本原则通过易学的语言进一步得到贯彻.善与性、天与人、未发与已发、天理流行与人物成性等,虽也体现了天人之间的密切关联,但又不能将一般天理与已具形质的人性混淆起来."继善成性"说的优长,就在于它将由天至人的生成序列,解释为一个以天道为本而构筑本性的思辨逻辑,同时兼顾个体形质生成带来的特殊性.而本性只是"存"而非"成",以卫护本然之性纯善无恶的假定.     

外在事物、意志与表象的正确处置——爱比克泰德论自由的哲学界限

爱比克泰德对自由的实现过程有严密的哲学界定.首先,通过对奴隶的哲学理解,强调了自由的绝对性.其次,划分可控制与不可控制的两个领域即意志与外在事物,将自由归入意志领域.再次,以是否贯彻意志自由为标准区分意志的善与恶,指出自由只能由意志的善给予保证.最后,善的具体实践即是对表象的正确处置,而两个领域的划分,要求正确处置表象以服从自然为原则,因此服从自然就意味着实现自由.     

实用主义视野下的功利主义 ——杜威对功利主义道德基础的批判与重构

功利主义道德基础的确立以快乐作为人生的终极目的为前提,并在此基础上建构道德的评价标准.在实用主义者杜威看来,将快乐视为道德的目的及标准会面临诸种责难,因为它无法证明实际所欲的等于值得可欲的、增进快乐的等于值得欲求的、总体的善等于具体的善.由于快乐既不能统一个人行为,也不能提供一种公共善,所以将快乐视为道德基础很难为其合理性提供证明.进而,杜威从作为人的特定功能的个体善与公共善的实现、自我满足与社会满足的统一等视角指出道德标准得以确立的可能基础.     

儒家的"善"观念

儒家论"善"始终围绕着天道人性概念展开,认为符合天道人性的事物才可能是"善"的,反之即为恶,因此,天道人性既是"善"的来源,也是"善"的评价标准.先秦孔孟,以仁释"善",突出"爱人";荀子及汉代儒学家则以"礼"释"善",讲求养人之欲又有所克制;宋明理学家视"天道阴阳"为"善",强调阴阳平衡;明清启蒙思想家释"善"为"中",着重于人欲之各得.这些"善"的内容虽在许多方面彼此存有差异,但始终都以人我和谐目标作为主线一以贯之,反对一方绝对地压倒另一方.     

堕落、善与恶的产生

堕落和天堂的传说属于基督教 ,但它并没有被伦理学思想家作为主题接受 ,伦理学家们脱离了基督教 ,并不想从宗教立场来论证伦理学。如果不承认善与恶的区分已经产生 ,如果不承认善与恶的彼岸或者善与恶之前的存在状态产生于这种区分之前 ,那么伦理学的问题就不可能提出。“善”与“恶”是相对的 ,在很大程度上可以说 ,只有在“恶”产生的情况下 ,只有在“恶”降生时 ,才有“善”的产生。伦理学的基本悖论就在这里。天堂是还没有区分与评价的存在状态。可以这样说 ,世界是从原初对善与恶的不区分 ,经过善与恶的明显的区分 ,又走向为区分的全部…     

“善”语词考源

古籍中“善”语词的用法虽然多种多样的,但它们无不指向“好生活”.“善”语词的本原性意义蕴含于“善”字的内在结构之中.“善”字从“羊”从“菇”,与膳相通,字面意思是竞言羊为美味.其本原性含义包含着俗、神二谛,其世俗谛是古人对以羊肉为代表的美食的称道和希冀,其神学谛则是事神以致吉祥.“善”的伦理义内在地包含于活人与先人的伦理关系对待之中.而羊,在这种关系调解中扮演了一个不可或缺的角色.     

传统美德之善:新时代公民道德建设的基因根脉

中华传统美德是真善美的结合,是新时代公民道德建设的不竭之源.传统美德之善是新时代公民道德素质养成的历史根基.溯善、崇善、敬善的善性温润着现代公民的向德心性;尊礼、明礼、修德的善德催发着现代公民规则意识的生成;履善、持善、导善的善举强化着现代公民的知行合一.中华传统美德的现代转换有其内在的依据、融入机制和实现路径,要从唯物史观的角度把握传统美德之善与新时代公民道德建设的内在联系,从历史与逻辑统一的维度处理好传统与现代的关系.     

论蔡清“气质之性斯即谓之性”的人性论思想

蔡清作为明代理学向气学转化时期的重要人物,在人性问题上也有非常重要的创见。蔡清以阴阳互根为理,认为理是气化流行中之条理,将本体之理转化为气质之理。他认为天地之性只是阴阳五行之理,"阴阳五行之理即便有清浊厚薄",因此天地之性即不是统一的至善之性。阴阳相对而类分,在天也有阴浊之气,也不全是至善,阴浊之气下落到人便是恶。而人性之所以以善为主,盖因阳全阴半,阳为主宰,可以统摄阴。善之不足即是恶,人性中的恶也是善中之恶。每个人由于禀赋天性(气质)之不同,所具有的善性是有高下之分的。但蔡清并未走向彻底的气本论,而是在理本与气本之间出现了一些摇摆,然依然不废其价值。     

Moral philosophy and moral psychology in Mencius

This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius’ moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the ‘virtue ethics’ reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius’ moral theory, in spite of Mencius’ obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory.     

Are early confucians consequentialists?

Various attempts have been made to interpret Confucian ethics in the framework of consequentialist ethics. Such interpretations either treat Mencius theory of moral choice as a kind of act-utilitarianism or attribute to Mencius a rather sophisticated consequentialist moral view. In this paper I challenge such interpretations and try to clarify the nature of the Confucian conception of the good. In order to show that the Confucian good is teleological but non-consequentialist, I will discuss different ways (especially those of John Rawls and Alasdair MacIntyre) of classifying ethical theories and show their bearing on my interpretation of Confucian ethics. I will then discuss the consequentialist (utilitarian) understanding of early Confucians, arguing that without a proper understanding of the overall character of Confucian ethics and its primary concern, no interpretation of the Confucian conception of the good may claim to be adequate.     

Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics

How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere in between. I will then illustrate my claim with my reading of Mencius 6A4, showing that it is superior to readings found in the literature, which typically assume that Mencius is an internalist.     

Before and after Ritual: Two Accounts of Li as Virtue in Early Confucianism

In this article, I probe the nature of Confucian virtue with special focus on ritual propriety (li). I examine two classic, mutually competing accounts of li??as moral virtue and as civic virtue??in early Confucianism by investigating the thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi. My primary aim in this article is to demonstrate how their different accounts of human nature and equally different understandings of the natural state (that is, the pre-li state) led them to the development of two distinctive political theories of virtue in the Confucian tradition. More specifically, they justified the nature of the li on different terms??human/moral on the one hand and civic/political on the other. I conclude by revisiting the contemporary debate on the nature of Confucian ethics from the perspective of early Confucianism represented by Mencius and Xunzi.     

Setting the Record Straight: Confucius’ Notion of Ren

Comparative studies involving early Confucian ethics often appear to assume that it is a unified approach to morality. This essay challenges that assumption by arguing that Confucius had a significantly different conception of ren, commonly viewed as central to Confucian ethics, from that of Mencius. It is generally accepted that ren has two senses: in a narrow sense, it is the virtue of benevolence (or compassion); in a broad sense, it is the all-encompassing ethical ideal. Both senses fail to capture Confucius’ conception of ren, for the narrow sense fits only Mencius’ understanding of ren, while the broad sense lacks emphasis and precision. I propose a third sense of ren, that is, ren as an integral, higher-order virtue with respect as its most salient component. This sense of ren is more in keeping with the textual evidence in the Analects. It played a key role in Confucius’ political-moral thinking and made his doctrine diverge considerably from that of Mencius, who understood ren primarily as compassion.     

Hsun Tzu on Family and Familial Relations

The Confucian tradition is often held to have accorded the family a prominent place in their ethics. This paper distinguishes three different senses in which the family is held to be primary in Confucian morality. It then explores Hsun Tzu's views on the family and familial relations. I argue that, while other early Confucians such as Confucius and Mencius would have held the family to be primary in all three senses, Hsun Tzu held the family to be primary in only one of the three senses. In particular, there is textual evidence that Hsun Tzu holds that one's primary obligation is to the ruler of the state, rather than to the immediate family.     

Confucian Moral Realism

In this paper I construct Confucian moral realism as a metaethical theory that is compatible with, or even derivable from, traditional Confucianism. The paper is at once interpretative and constructive. In my analysis, Confucians can establish the realist's claims on moral properties because they embrace the view of a moralistic universe. Moral properties in Confucian ethics not only are presented as objective, naturalistic properties, but also are seen as ‘causally efficacious’. There are several theses commonly endorsed by contemporary moral realists. I will explain how many of the remarks by Confucius, Mencius, in Yijing, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean can be understood as implicit endorsements of these theses. I will also analyze the theses specific to Confucian moral realism. The paper will end with a brief defense of this form of realism.     

“Athl-Ethics”: Virtue Training in Mencius and Aristotle

The late Zhou of China and the Classical age of Greece both saw great impetus in intellectual thought and were marked by intense warfare. Being closely linked to warfare in antiquity, sports was a vital, commonplace activity whose jargon and practices naturally informed philosophical discourses. One can thus observe convergences between athletics and ethics in texts which took shape in these times and places, a phenomenon which I shall refer to as “athl-ethics.” In this paper, I separately examine and then compare athl-ethic phenomenon in Mencius and in the Nicomachean Ethics. Both texts are rife with sports metaphors. I regard the use of sports-derived imagery as a thin form of athl-ethicism. Sports, however, did more than inspire useful analogies. Physical training and competition were considered occasions for nourishing and practicing virtue. This generated thicker forms of athl-ethicism.     

孟子王道理想的心性向度

王道理想是孟子政治哲学的核心,作为一套超乎现实却又对现实具有普遍导向意义的治国理念,其践行的基石被孟子归结在人的心性之上。立足于“心”孟子提出王道缘起于“仁”,基于“性”孟子断言王道的落实在于“义”;由“心”“性”的统一确立了仁义一体的构想,据此认为,“居仁由义”是王道理想得以向现实转化的基本思路。