Religious Hatred Laws: Protecting Groups or Belief?

This article examines the issues raised by recent legislation proscribing incitement to religious hatred. In particular, it examines how far arguments for prohibiting racist hate speech apply also to the prohibition of religious hate speech. It identifies a number of significant differences between race and religion. It also examines several questions raised by the prohibition of religious hate speech, including the meaning and scope of religious identity, why that identity should receive special protection, and whether protection should be directed to religious groups as groups or to their individual members. The central argument of the article is that the distinction between protecting religious groups from vilification and protecting their beliefs and practices from criticism—a distinction on which the British Government placed great emphasis in defending its legislation—is unsustainable. That conclusion is supported by the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in cases in which it has upheld the curtailing of freedom of expression for the sake of protecting religion.     

Hate Speech,Dignity and Self-Respect

This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness.     

System-justifying beliefs and psychological well-being: the roles of group status and identity

This research examined the relationship between endorsing system-justifying beliefs and psychological well-being among individuals from ethnic groups that vary in social status. System-justifying beliefs are beliefs that imply that status in society is fair, deserved, and merited; examples of system-justifying beliefs in the United States include the beliefs that hard work pays off and that anyone can get ahead regardless of their group membership. We found that endorsing system-justifying beliefs was negatively related to psychological well-being among members of low-status groups who were highly identified with their group but positively related to well-being among members of low-status groups who were not highly identified with their ethnic group. In addition, we found that endorsing system-justifying beliefs was positively related to well-being among members of high-status groups, especially among members of high-status groups who were highly identified with the group.     

Avoidance of eye gaze by adults who stutter

PurposeAdults who stutter are at significant risk of developing social phobia. Cognitive theorists argue that a critical factor maintaining social anxiety is avoidance of social information. This avoidance may impair access to positive feedback from social encounters that could disconfirm fears and negative beliefs. Adults who stutter are known to engage in avoidance behaviours, and may neglect positive social information. This study investigated the gaze behaviour of adults who stutter whilst giving a speech.Method16 adults who stutter and 16 matched controls delivered a 3-min speech to a television display of a pre-recorded lecture theatre audience. Participants were told the audience was watching them live from another room. Audience members were trained to display positive, negative and neutral expressions. Participant eye movement was recorded with an eye-tracker.ResultsThere was a significant difference between the stuttering and control participants for fixation duration and fixation count towards an audience display. In particular, the stuttering participants, compared to controls, looked for shorter time at positive audience members than at negative and neutral audience members and the background.ConclusionsAdults who stutter may neglect positive social cues within social situations that could serve to disconfirm negative beliefs and fears.Educational objectives: The reader will be able to: (a) describe the nature of anxiety experienced by adults who stutter; (b) identify the most common anxiety condition among adults who stutter; (c) understand how information processing biases and the use of safety behaviours contribute to the maintenance of social anxiety; (d) describe how avoiding social information may contribute to the maintenance of social anxiety in people who stutter; and (e) describe the clinical implications of avoidance of social information in people who stutter.     

Woman‐Hating: On Misogyny,Sexism, and Hate Speech

Hate speech is one of the most important conceptual categories in anti‐oppression politics today; a great deal of energy and political will is devoted to identifying, characterizing, contesting, and (sometimes) penalizing hate speech. However, despite the increasing inclusion of gender identity as a socially salient trait, antipatriarchal politics has largely been absent within this body of scholarship. Figuring out how to properly situate patriarchy‐enforcing speech within the category of hate speech is therefore an important politico‐philosophical project. My aim in this article is twofold: first, I argue that sexist speech, though oppressive, is not hate speech. Second, I argue that misogynistic speech is hate speech, even when it is intradivisional (that is, when it targets only subsets of women). This is important because recognizing that the concept hate speech applies to certain forms of patriarchy‐enforcing speech is another step in clarifying what is wrong with the practice, and how bad it is in relation to other abuses. Consequently, this article provides a more nuanced account of the kinds of expressions that can and should count as instances of hate speech.     

When Authoritarians Confront Prejudice. Differential Effects of SDO and RWA on Support for Hate‐Speech Prohibition

Two nationwide representative studies (N = 653 adolescents; N = 1007 adults) investigated the psychological correlates of the intention to penalize public expressions of prejudice in the form of support for hate‐speech prohibition. We presented participants with preselected examples of hate speech from the Internet and other mass media and assessed their willingness to support the prohibition of public expressions of such remarks. Both studies found that social dominance orientation and right‐wing authoritarianism are positively correlated with outgroup prejudice, but they have differential effects on hate‐speech prohibition. Social dominance orientation was positively related to the acceptance of hate speech, whereas right‐wing authoritarianism was positively related to hate‐speech prohibition. In discussing this counterintuitive finding, we suggest that right‐wing authoritarians are particularly vigilant toward norm violations—and this makes them more punitive toward counternormative expressions of prejudice, such as hate speech.     

Ethos and identity: Expressions and changes in the Israeli Jewish society

Abstract

A fundamental condition for the evolvement of any society is the development of social identity, which confers a sense of belonging and identification. The meaning of social identity is influenced by the ethos that members of a society share. The ethos consists of shared, central societal beliefs that give the society a dominant orientation and characterize it. The societal beliefs that underlie the ethos can change as a result of new, prolonged experiences of the society. Israeli society presents an example of such a process.

During the years of intractable conflict, Israeli society developed societal beliefs of a conflictive ethos that were conducive to successful coping with the conflictive situation. The ethos included beliefs about the justness of the Jews' goals, about security, and about delegitimising the Arabs, together with motifs of positive self-image, patriotism, unity, and peace. These beliefs characterised Israeli Jewish society and contributed meaning to the Israeli social identity. As the peace process developed, the societal beliefs of the conflictive ethos began to change, at least among part of the society members. But as the violent conflict re-erupted in fall 2000, the ethos of conflict is strengthening its standing in the society. The present paper describes the changes in the conflictive ethos with regard to each of the societal beliefs and discusses the implications of these changes for the meaning of the Israeli Jewish identity. Finally, general conclusions regarding the presented conception of social identity are outlined.     

Exposure to hate speech increases prejudice through desensitization

In three studies (two representative nationwide surveys, N = 1,007, N = 682; and one experimental, N = 76) we explored the effects of exposure to hate speech on outgroup prejudice. Following the General Aggression Model, we suggest that frequent and repetitive exposure to hate speech leads to desensitization to this form of verbal violence and subsequently to lower evaluations of the victims and greater distancing, thus increasing outgroup prejudice. In the first survey study, we found that lower sensitivity to hate speech was a positive mediator of the relationship between frequent exposure to hate speech and outgroup prejudice. In the second study, we obtained a crucial confirmation of these effects. After desensitization training individuals were less sensitive to hate speech and more prejudiced toward hate speech victims than their counterparts in the control condition. In the final study, we replicated several previous effects and additionally found that the effects of exposure to hate speech on prejudice were mediated by a lower sensitivity to hate speech, and not by lower sensitivity to social norms. Altogether, our studies are the first to elucidate the effects of exposure to hate speech on outgroup prejudice.

     

Free Speech and Multiculturalism In and Out of the Academy

The debate over hate speech in the United States and the accompanying changes in the political culture of the university provides an opportune case to explore the impact of changing norms of free speech on political tolerance toward unpopular groups. I offer a theory of opinion change that identifies the population groups that should be most susceptible to the new norms against hate speech that originated on college campuses around the country in the 1980s. The predictions from this theory are tested using a battery of tolerance items asked repeatedly in General Social Surveys gathered between 1976 and 2000. The analysis shows that the intellectual campaign against hate speech has significantly reduced support for the free speech rights of racists. This retreat in levels of tolerance is most evident among college students who were educated since the mid-1980s, when debates over multiculturalism and political correctness reached their peak. At the same time, levels of tolerance for nonconformist ideas and lifestyles have remained generally high among today's college students and are almost always significantly higher than the national average. The general stability in aggregate levels of tolerance both in the general population and in various demographic groups only serves to highlight the few dramatic changes that have taken place.     

Stereotypes,Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind1

How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit (roughly, nonconscious or involuntary). This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different mental processes and neural systems. On this basis, some have also argued that interventions to reduce discrimination should combat implicit stereotypes and prejudices separately. We propose an alternative (anti‐Humean) framework. We argue that all putative implicit stereotypes are affect‐laden and all putative implicit prejudices are “semantic,” that is, they stand in co‐activating associations with concepts and beliefs. Implicit biases, therefore, consist in “clusters” of semantic‐affective associations, which differ in degree, rather than kind. This framework captures the psychological structure of implicit bias, promises to improve the power of indirect measures to predict behavior, and points toward the design of more effective interventions to combat discrimination.     

Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?

I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection, and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated. I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected, and that category (4) is protected speech.     

Enhancing the salience of free speech rights increases differential perceived free speech protections for criminal acts against Black versus White targets

Hate crime charges offer enhanced sentences for prejudice‐motivated acts in recognition of the injury that extends beyond the victim to other members of the targeted group. The present study builds upon and extends previous work illuminating how anti‐Black prejudice influences application of free speech protections to justify criminal acts against Black (vs. White) targets, which subsequently reduces support for hate crime charges for the act by investigating the potential effects of environmental cues that increase the salience of free speech rights. The present work tested the main and interactive effects of act target (Black vs. White), anti‐Black prejudice, and the salience of freedom of speech on perceived free speech protections for a prejudice‐motivated criminal act and the consequent influence on support for hate crime charges. Replicating previous findings, greater anti‐Black prejudice predicted more perceived free speech protections for Black‐targeted acts, which predicted less support for hate crime charges. Low‐bias participants viewed Black‐ versus White‐targeted acts as less protected by free speech rights and more deserving of hate crime charges; high‐bias participants viewed the two acts similarly. Making the right to free speech (compared to protections from search and seizure) salient amplified differential perceptions of free speech protections based on prejudice and target group, which predicted support for hate crime charges. This work holds implications for justification processes and highlights the importance of studying culture‐specific values.     

Science at the Supermarket: Multiplication,Personalization and Consumption of Science in Everyday Life

Which is the kind science’s psychological guidance upon everyday life? I will try to discuss some issues about the role that techno-scientific knowledge plays in sense-making and decision making about practical questions of life. This relation of both love and hate, antagonism and connivance is inscribable in a wider debate between a trend of science to intervene in fields that are traditionally prerogative of political, religious or ethical choices, and, on the other side, the position of those who aim at stemming “technocracy” and governing these processes. I argue that multiplication, personalization and consumption are the characteristics of the relationship between science, technology and society in the age of “multiculturalism” and “multi-scientism”. This makes more difficult but intriguing the study and understanding of the processes through which scientific knowledge is socialized. Science topics, like biotech, climate change, etc. are today an unavoidable reference frame. It is not possible to not know them and to attach them to the most disparate questions. Like in the case of Moscovici’s “Freud for all seasons”, the fact itself that the members of a group or a society believe in science as a reference point for others, roots its social representation and the belief that it can solve everyday life problems.     

Philosophy—what is to be done?

Philosophical thinking, in the historically original sense, is simply the human mind in operation, unaided by anything supernatural and unfettered by any human authority or any procedure for reaching some pre-given end. This means that “philosophy” originally included far more than it does now, including all the natural sciences, as well as rational reflection on society, history, and art. What this means for us now is that philosophy must be an essentially outward-facing discipline, open to others. Most importantly, it needs now to be open to the sciences, to practical social reflection, and to its own history. But what philosophy brings to all its reflections is above all a spirit of critical reflection, respect for evidence and argument, and a ruthless honesty that demands of people that they form their beliefs and views of life according to the best reasons and information they have, rather than forming their views according to their wishes or prejudices, or letting them be dictated by authorities or social traditions. In this sense, we are living in an unphilosophical, or even anti-philosophical, age, but this makes it all the more important for philosophy to continue to do its work.     

An essentialism perspective on intercultural processes

Essentialist theories are the beliefs that there are immutable essences underlying observed differences between social groups (e.g. racial group, cultural group). This paper reviews the intergroup dynamics and intrapersonal processes associated with essentialism. It also explores the interplay between the two. By explicating the intricate relationship between these psychological processes, the current paper aims to advance our understanding of intergroup relations and identify their implications for the study of multiculturalism. We posit that although the commonly observed negative intergroup outcomes, such as prejudices and biases, can be the byproducts of basic cognitive processes associated with essentialist theories, the social power dynamics in a given society also play important roles in shaping the relationships between essentialism and intergroup outcomes. We then discuss the implications of this understanding to our increasingly multicultural world.     

Christian and Muslim Anti-Semitic Beliefs

One hundred Muslims and one hundred Christians were administered a battery of tests to determine the nature and extent of anti-Semitic beliefs. The two groups differed considerably in terms of rationale, level, and course of anti-Semitic beliefs. Specifically, differences may be explained via dimensions of personal and social identity. The implications for emotional development and its role in understanding prejudices are discussed.     

Predicting the Importance of Freedom of Speech and the Perceived Harm of Hate Speech

Although freedom of speech is a fundamental value in the United States, individuals vary in the importance they place on it. The purpose of this study was to examine personality and attitudinal factors that may influence an individual's judgments of the importance of freedom of speech and, secondarily, the harm of hate speech. As expected, the importance of freedom of speech was positively related to intellect, individualism, separate knowing, and negatively related to right‐wing authoritarianism. Men rated freedom of speech more important than did women. The perceived harm of hate speech was positively related to intellect and liberalism, and women perceived a greater harm of hate speech than did men.