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1.
Desheng Zong 《Dao》2010,9(4):445-459
The aim of this essay is to outline a conceptual framework for a type of philosophy (or approach to philosophy) to be herein
called “non-sentential philosophy.” Although I will primarily concern myself with the conceptual coherence of the framework
in this essay, illustrations will be provided to show that the notion has rich implications for comparative studies. In particular,
I believe this theoretical framework will be of interest to those looking for a way to capture the differences between certain
non-Western philosophical traditions—such as Chinese philosophy—and Western philosophy, a tradition in which the sentential
approach is dominant. 相似文献
2.
3.
Salvatore S 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2011,45(3):366-388
This paper provides an analysis of a basic assumption grounding the clinical research: the ontological autonomy of psychotherapy—based
on the idea that the clinical exchange is sufficiently distinguished from other social objects (i.e. exchange between teacher
and pupils, or between buyer and seller, or interaction during dinner, and so forth). A criticism of such an assumption is
discussed together with the proposal of a different epistemological interpretation, based on the distinction between communicative
dynamics and the process of psychotherapy—psychotherapy is a goal-oriented process based on the general dynamics of human
communication. Theoretical and methodological implications are drawn from such a view: It allows further sources of knowledge
to be integrated within clinical research (i.e. those coming from other domains of analysis of human communication); it also
enables a more abstract definition of the psychotherapy process to be developed, leading to innovative views of classical
critical issues, like the specific-nonspecific debate. The final part of the paper is devoted to presenting a model of human
communication—the Semiotic Dialogical Dialectic Theory–which is meant as the framework for the analysis of psychotherapy. 相似文献
4.
Gilead Bar-Elli 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):165-184
That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which
analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification,
respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists.
Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which
is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction
for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched. 相似文献
5.
Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which
generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies
the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless,
since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient
in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories of information transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary
Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer
and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences
of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn. 相似文献
6.
Olivier Massin 《Synthese》2006,151(3):511-517
Rom Harré thinks that the Emergence–Reduction debate, conceived as a vertical problem, is partly ill posed. Even if he doesn’t wholly reject the traditional definition of an emergent property as a property of a collection but not of its components, his point is that this definition doesn’t exhaust all the dimensions of emergence. According to Harré there is another kind (or dimension) of emergence, which we may call—somewhat paradoxically—“horizontal emergence”: two properties of a substance are horizontally emergent relative to each other if they cannot be displayed in the same conditions. Contrary to vertical emergence, horizontal emergence is a symmetrical relation. Harré endorses horizontal emergentism. I argue that this position faces a principled difficulty: it makes it impossible to bind different horizontally emergent discourses in an interesting way. Physics and biology for example become “island” discourses, each speaking of a distinct kind of entities. The only way to ensure that two different discourses can relate to the same entity is to reintroduce verticality into the picture. 相似文献
7.
In a recent paper, Peter Singer suggests that some interesting new findings in experimental moral psychology support what
he has contended all along—namely that intuitions should play little or no role in adequate justifications of normative ethical
positions. Not only this but, according to Singer, these findings point to a central flaw in the method (or epistemological
theory) of reflective equilibrium used by many contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we try to defend reflective equilibrium from Singer’s attack
and, in part, we do this by discussing Singer’s own favoured moral methodology as outlined in his Practical Ethics. Although basing ethics solely on (certain kinds of) intuitions certainly is problematic, we argue, basing it solely on ‘reason’
gives rise to similar problems. The best solution would arguably be one which could strike a balance between the two—but,
we suggest, this is precisely what reflective equilibrium is all about. 相似文献
8.
Andrew F. Smith 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(3):205-219
Stephen Carter argues that biblical literalism is predicated on an epistemological position drastically different than that maintained by mainstream scientists inasmuch as it operates on the basis of a “hermeneutic of inerrancy” with respect to the ideas laid out in the Bible. By relying on considerations offered by Charles Taylor and recent sociological studies, I contend that Carter’s thesis is incorrect. The divide between proponents and opponents of biblical literalism is ethical rather than epistemological. Beyond the philosophical implications of my contention, this displays that deliberative engagement between these parties—which depends on shared epistemological norms—is possible in principle. 相似文献
9.
Andrew Wayne 《Synthese》2012,184(3):341-356
Recent work by Robert Batterman and Alexander Rueger has brought attention to cases in physics in which governing laws at
the base level “break down” and singular limit relations obtain between base- and upper-level theories. As a result, they
claim, these are cases with emergent upper-level properties. This paper contends that this inference—from singular limits
to explanatory failure, novelty or irreducibility, and then to emergence—is mistaken. The van der Pol nonlinear oscillator
is used to show that there can be a full explanation of upper-level properties entirely in base-level terms even when singular
limits are present. Whether upper-level properties are emergent depends not on the presence of a singular limit but rather
on details of the ampliative approximation methods used. The paper suggests that focusing on explanatory deficiency at the
base level is key to understanding emergence in physics. 相似文献
10.
John A. Schuster 《Synthese》2012,185(3):467-499
One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed “physico-mathematics”. This signalled
a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy,
non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related
to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more ’physicalised’, more closely intertwined
with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous
epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes’ physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the
mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases
one could literally “see the causes”. Optics took pride of place within Descartes’ physico-mathematics project, because he
believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes’ early physico-mathematical
program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later
work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an
achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal
knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular
motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system. 相似文献
11.
Aud Sissel Hoel 《Synthese》2011,179(1):75-91
Cassirer’s approach to symbolic mediation differs in some important ways from currently prevailing approaches to meaning and
signification such as semiology and its more recent poststructuralist varieties. Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms offers
a theory of symbols that does not amount to a sign theory or semiology. It sketches out, rather, a dynamic and nonrepresentational
framework in which an alternative notion of difference takes centre stage. In order to make the original features of Cassirer’s
approach stand out, I will compare it with the approach of the perhaps most influential differential thinker of our day, Jacques
Derrida. The philosophy of symbolic forms explicitly prefigures a great many of the insights and concerns of poststructuralism.
Yet, there are some critical differences. Rather than rejecting the concepts of objectivity, identity, and truth on the premises
established by traditional metaphysics, Cassirer chooses to redefine these concepts through a radical conceptual reframing.
The result is a doctrine that—in Derridean parlance—neither jumps beyond the oppositions of metaphysics, nor tries to resolve
them in a Hegelian synthesis—a doctrine, that is, that even though it appeals to origins, cannot so easily be dismissed as
yet another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. 相似文献
12.
The aim of this paper is to suggest that a necessary condition of autonomy has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature:
the capacity to critically reflect on one’s practical attitudes (desires, preferences, values, etc.) in the light of new experiences. It will be argued that most prominent accounts of autonomy—ahistorical as well as history-sensitive—have either altogether
failed to recognize this condition or at least failed to give an explicit account of it. 相似文献
13.
Angela Uchoa Branco 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2009,43(4):350-355
Humans’ tendency to classify and categorize is definitely overspread, but it can be misleading at all fields, including epistemology,
ontology, theory, and analysis of scientific knowledge construction itself. Sanchez and Loredo (IPBS: Integrative Psychological
& Behavioral Science 43:4, 2009—DOI ) in their article on classification of contemporary constructivists fall exactly into such pitfall- even as their effort
to make sense of many outstanding theorists is impressive and intriguing. A further analysis, however, points at the theoretical
trap posed by such endeavor, for models arisen from different epistemological standpoints cannot be compared along the lines
of a simplistic polarity between “objectivism” and subjectivism”. There is much more to be taken into account when a intrinsically
complex subject like constructivism and constructionism epistemological approach and their welcome different versions—perspectives—are
submitted to analysis and critical evaluation. 相似文献
14.
James Beilby 《Sophia》2002,41(1):19-32
There has been much debate in both theological and philosophical circles over the matter of evidentialism—that is, whether
an individual must augment or supplement their belief in God with evidences supportive of that belief. However, what has been
(for the most part) lacking is a discussion which endeavors to integrate theological and philosophical desiderata. In this
paper I will suggest that the framework for such a discussion can be found in the work of St. Augustine—in particular, in
the way he holds together his belief in the sufficiency and necessity of faith and his ample use of evidences for belief in
God. 相似文献
15.
Prodip Sen 《Journal of mathematical psychology》1984,28(3):333-350
This paper attempts to quantify the notion of an individual's desire for autonomy in an organization. It is shown that the basis for this concept can be formulated axiomatically, and a numerical function constituting the “degree” of autonomy can be derived. The relations between the individual's basic preferences, his/her feelings of autonomy, and the individual's performance as an organization member, are also studied. In this connection the loyalty of the member to the organization becomes important, and this notion is also developed axiomatically. 相似文献
16.
Bence Nanay 《Synthese》2010,177(1):91-109
The concept of population thinking was introduced by Ernst Mayr as the right way of thinking about the biological domain,
but it is difficult to find an interpretation of this notion that is both unproblematic and does the theoretical work it was
intended to do. I argue that, properly conceived, Mayr’s population thinking is a version of trope nominalism: the view that
biological property-types do not exist or at least they play no explanatory role. Further, although population thinking has
been traditionally used to argue against essentialism about biological kinds, recently it has been suggested that it may be
consistent with at least some forms of essentialism—ones that construe essential properties as relational. I argue that if
population thinking is a version of trope nominalism, then, as Mayr originally claimed, it rules out any version of essentialism
about biological kinds. 相似文献
17.
David Enoch 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(3):413-438
Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly
speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists.
This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for
it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is,
and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second,
to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of
explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary
explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it. 相似文献
18.
The Universal Right to Education: Freedom,Equality and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Fraternity</Emphasis>
Ylva Bergström 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):167-182
The overall aim of the article is to analyse how the universal right to education have been built, legitimized and used. And
more specifically ask who is addressed by the universal right to education, and who is given access to rights and to education.
The first part of the article focus on the history of declarations, the notion of the universal right to education, emphasizing
differences in matters of detail—for example, the meaning of ‘compulsory’, ‘children’s rights’ or ‘parents’ rights’—and critically
examining the right of the child and the right of the parent in terms of tensions between ‘social rights’ and ‘private autonomy
rights’. Despite differences in detail, the iterations of the universal right to education do share to the full in the idea
of education as such. In the second part the attempt to scrutinize the underlying assumptions legitimizing the consensus on
education, focusing again on the notion of the child. In conclusion I argue that a certain notion of what it is to be a human
being is inscribed within the circle of access to rights and education. These notions of what it means to be a child, a parent,
a citizen or a member of the ‘human family’ are notions of enlightenment and humanity and, to my understanding, aspects of
how democracy is configured around freedom, equality and fraternity. 相似文献
19.
Fernando Birman 《Philosophia》2010,38(4):715-731
I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice
to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of
it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view,
can be best understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which
we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events. 相似文献
20.
Eleonora Cresto 《Synthese》2010,177(1):41-66
I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference
between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology.
The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance, which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual
way. Within this framework, I discuss how agents can rationally shift their credal probability functions so as to consciously
modify some of their contextual acceptances; the present account also allows us to represent how the very set of contexts
evolves. Voluntary credal shifts, in turn, might provoke changes in the agent’s beliefs, but I show that this is actually
a side effect of performing multiple adjustments in the total lot of the agent’s acceptance sets. In this way we obtain a
model that preserves many pre-theoretical intuitions about what counts as adequate rationality constraints on our actual practices—and
hence about what counts as an adequate, normative epistemological perspective. 相似文献