Is unconscious identity priming lexical or sublexical?

We examined unconscious priming in a stem-completion task with both identity and form-related primes. Participants were given exclusion instructions to avoid completing a stem (e.g., ca---) with a briefly flashed masked word (e.g., candy). In Experiment 1, priming of around 7% occurred for both identity (e.g., candy) and form-based (e.g., windy) primes at a 33 ms exposure duration. When examining only trials in which the participants failed to identify the prime, this effect increased to 12% for identity primes, but remained the same for form-based primes. In Experiment 2, priming without prime identification was 9% for identity primes, 4% for homophone primes, and 3% for orthographic control primes. Although identity priming was greater than form priming in both experiments, regression analyses revealed that orthographic and phonological overlap alone between the flashed primes and targets could completely account for unconscious identity priming. Hence, we conclude that masked words may only activate their sublexical orthographic and phonological representations and not their lexical representations.     

Is priming during anesthesia unconscious?

General anesthesia provides an alternative to typical laboratory paradigms for investigating implicit learning. We assess the evidence that a simple type of learning--priming--can occur without consciousness. Although priming has been shown to be a small but persistent phenomenon in surgical patients (Merikle & Daneman, 1996) there is reason to question whether it occurs implicitly due to problems in detecting awareness using typical clinical signs. This paper reviews the published studies on priming during anesthesia that have included a measure of awareness or of anesthetic depth. We conclude that perceptual priming, but not conceptual priming, takes place in the absence of conscious awareness.     

A smart unconscious? Procedural origins of automatic partner attitudes in marriage

The paper examines potential origins of automatic (i.e., unconscious) attitudes toward one’s marital partner. It tests the hypothesis that early experiences in conflict-of-interest situations predict one’s later automatic inclination to approach (or avoid) the partner. A longitudinal study linked daily experiences in conflict-of-interest situations in the initial months of new marriages to automatic evaluations of the partner assessed four years later using the Implicit Associations Test. The results revealed that partners who were initially (1) treated less responsively and (2) evidenced more self-protective and less connectedness-promoting “if-then” contingencies in their thoughts and behavior later evidenced less positive automatic partner attitudes. However, these factors did not predict changes in love, satisfaction, or explicit beliefs about the partner. The findings hint at the existence of a “smart” relationship unconscious that captures behavioral realities conscious reflection can miss.     

Using a short form of the WISC-III: sinful or smart?

This article describes an example of making pediatric neuropsychological assessments more time-efficient. Empirical support, including new data, for the utilization of an eight-subtest short form of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) is reviewed. It is concluded that this short form of the WISC-III is a valid substitute for the complete version under most clinical circumstances, allowing the practitioner to expand on interview, history or more specific neuropsychological tests without adding financial or time burdens to the evaluation.     

Is logic in the mind or in the world?

The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics?     

Is hefting to perceive the affordance for throwing a smart perceptual mechanism?

G. P. Bingham, R. C. Schmidt, and L. D. Rosenblum (1989) found that, by hefting objects of different sizes and weights, people could choose the optimal weight in each size for throwing to a maximum distance. In Experiment 1, the authors replicated this result. G. P. Bingham et al. hypothesized that hefting is a smart mechanism that allows objects to be perceived in the context of throwing dynamics. This hypothesis entails 2 assumptions. First, hefting by hand is required for information about throwing by hand. The authors tested and confirmed this in Experiments 2 and 3. Second, optimal objects are determined by the dynamics of throwing. In Experiment 4, the authors tested this by measuring throwing release angles and using them with mean thrown distances from Experiment 1 and object sizes and weights to simulate projectile motion and recover release velocities. The results showed that only weight, not size, affects throwing. This failed to provide evidence supporting the particular smart mechanism hypothesis of G. P. Bingham et al. Because the affordance relation is determined in part by the dynamics of projectile motion, the results imply that the affordance is learned from knowledge of results of throwing.     

Is the world round or flat? Children's understandingof the earth

Investigation of children's understanding of the earth provides important insights into the origins of children's knowledge, the structure of their concepts, and the development of scientific ideas. Vosniadou & Brewer (1992 Vosniadou, S. and Brewer, W. 1992. Mental models of the earth: A study of conceptual change in childhood. Cognitive Psychology, 24: 535–585. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) proposed that, under the influence of intuitive constraints and observations, children form naïve but coherent mental models of the earth: for example they believe it to be flat, or that we live inside a hollow sphere. To test this claim, 59 children aged 6 – 8 years and 33 adults were given multiple-choice questions and a 3D model selection task. This approach avoided the criticisms of recent studies by providing participants with a full range of possible answers. Even the youngest children preferred scientific responses and so demonstrated some knowledge of the earth. Only 10% of the children showed any evidence of naïve mental models; other participants who gave non-scientific answers were inconsistent and unsystematic. It is argued that intuitive constraints have little or no influence on the development of children's ideas in this domain, and that emerging knowledge of the earth progresses from being fragmented to consistently scientific.     

Towards a new method for bridging the gap between “smart” infants and “dumb” preschoolers

Based on violation-of-expectation (VoE) paradigms, amazing cognitive competencies have been demonstrated in young infants, which could not be shown in toddlers or even preschoolers. This divergence might as much be caused by different research methods as by discontinuities in development. As looking-time measures are not readily applicable to older children, we suggest a new method that is suitable for children from two years of age onwards. In an empirical examination of this method, 26 children aged 2–7 years learned by trial and error to always find a target picture among a pair of pictures. Each target picture was an impossible version of the non-target picture. After reaching a learning criterion, children had to generalize the learned concept to pictures belonging to a different category. Results showed that even the youngest participants reached the learning criterion and were able to apply what they had learned to another category.     

Representation of objects and events: why do infants look so smart and toddlers look so dumb?

Research has demonstrated that very young infants can discriminate between visual events that are physically impossible versus possible. These findings suggest that infants have knowledge of physical laws concerning solidity and continuity. However, research with 2-year-olds has shown that they cannot solve simple problems involving search for a hidden object, even though these problems require the same knowledge. These apparently inconsistent findings raise questions about the interpretation of both data sets. This discrepancy may be resolved by examining differences in task demands.     

Countertransference: Our new royal road to the unconscious?

In this paper I am tracing the history of countertransference and how it has informed the current debate about self‐disclosure as a pivotal instrument of analytic work. Now that the analyst's “subjective factor”; has been understood as a central influence on the analysand and as a vital source of information about the analysand's intrapsychic life, I argue that certain currents in the relational school of psychoanalysis confuse the analyst's subjectivity with his personality. While becoming more “real”; with a patient may enliven a stale analytic dialogue, it ought not be confused with, or take the place of, an analysis of unconscious desires and phantasies. I claim that a two‐person psychology can exist only within a tripartite structure in which the analyst does not lose sight of his complex function of being the carrier, observer, and conveyor of the unconscious currents holding both participants in check.     

Is the Self other to the self? Why does the numinosum feel like another? The relevance of Matte Blanco to our understanding of the unconscious

Using Ignacio Matte Blanco’s approach to the unconscious, this paper attempts to explain why the experience of the Self or the unconscious, for example in dreams, is difficult for the ego to understand. Matte Blanco believes that the logic of the unconscious is radically different from the logic of consciousness. The unconscious uses processes that Matte Blanco refers to as symmetry and generalization. Symmetry means that the converse of any relationship is identical to it, so that asymmetrical relationships are treated as if they were symmetrical. Generalization means that the unconscious treats any object as belonging to a larger class of objects that is a subset of an even larger class which is in turn a subset of a wider class ad infinitum. Hence Matte Blanco’s idea of the unconscious as infinite sets. These unconscious mechanisms, combined with the possibility that the unconscious has more dimensions than consciousness, contribute to the difficulty of understanding dreams, and help to explain why the Self is experienced as other to the ego.     

Is understanding explanatory or objectual?

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.     

Is empathy ear-to-ear or face-to-face?

If counselor and counselee cannot see each other, is the quality of their relationship affected? This study compares the empathy ratings of trained and untrained counselors in three different situations: counseling by telephone, in a confessional-type arrangement, and face-to-face. Although trained counselors scored significantly higher empathic understanding ratings than untrained counselors, there was little difference among the ratings for the three methods used.     

Is perception discrete or continuous?

How does conscious perception evolve following stimulus presentation? The idea that perception relies on discrete processing epochs has been often considered, but never widely accepted. The alternative, a continuous translation of the external world into explicit perception, although more intuitive and subjectively appealing, cannot satisfactorily account for a large body of psychophysical data. Cortical and thalamocortical oscillations in different frequency bands could provide a neuronal basis for such discrete processes, but are rarely analyzed in this context. This article reconciles the unduly abandoned topic of discrete perception with current views and advances in neuroscience.     

Is Affectivity Passive or Active?

In this paper I adopt Aquinas’ explanation of passivity and activity by means of acts remaining in the agent and acts passing over into external matter. I use it to propose a divide between immanent-type and transcendent-type acts. I then touch upon a grammatical distinction between three kinds of verbs. To argue for the activity and passivity of affectivity I refer to the group that includes acts of transcendent-type and whose verbs in both voices possess affective meaning. In the end I focus on cases in which an act of affective f-ing is mirrored in its object as being affectively f-ed.     

Nice or smart? Task relevance of self-characteristics moderates interpersonal projection

Two studies investigated the impact of trait relevance to a specific task on people's projection of their characteristics onto a cooperative partner. We either measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) the relevance of a trait to a specific cooperative task. In both studies, participants first rated themselves on a list of traits. Then they imagined completing a cooperative task with an unknown partner. Finally, they rated the partner on the same list of traits. In Study 1, we found partner ratings to be positively influenced by self ratings and the idiosyncratic measure of trait relevance. In Study 2, participants rated the self and the partner on competence and warmth traits while completing an intellectual or a social task. We found partner ratings to be positively influenced by self ratings more on competence than on warmth in the intellectual task, but more on warmth than on competence in the social task. These results suggest that people project onto others in a way that maximizes their chances to succeed in cooperation.     

Adult age differences in unconscious transference: Source confusion or identity blending?

Eyewitnesses are known often to falsely identify a familiar but innocent bystander when asked to pick out a perpetrator from a lineup. Such unconscious transference errors have been attributed to either identity confusions at encoding or source retrieval errors. Three experiments contrasted younger and older adults in their susceptibility to such misidentifications. Participants saw photographs of perpetrators, then a series of mug shots of innocent bystanders. A week later, they saw lineups containing bystanders (and others containing perpetrators in Experiment 3) and were asked whether any of the perpetrators were present. When younger faces were used as stimuli (Experiments 1 and 3), older adults showed higher rates of transference errors. When older faces were used as stimuli (Experiments 2 and 3), no such age effects in rates of unconscious transference were apparent. In addition, older adults in Experiment 3 showed an own-age bias effect for correct identification of targets. Unconscious transference errors were found to be due to both source retrieval errors and identity confusions, but age-related increases were found only in the latter.