Ānando Brahmeti Vyajānāt

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The nature of Self is ever-blissful, yet we feel constant pains and sufferings in the world. Each one of us is forced to face the worldly...     

On the Propositional Treatment of Anatmavāda in Early Buddhism and Ātmavāda in Hinduism

As propositions, Anatmavāda and ātmavāda are simply negations of one another. Thus whatever serves as a criterion for truth of the one must serve as a criterion for the other. When we treat them both as a priori propositions, I claim that we are unable to determine their truth value. But if we treat them both as a posteriori propositions, I argue, we are only able to determine their truth value if we attain unqualified omniscience. Because the Hindu account of knowing is far more conducive to the idea of unqualified omniscience, we might be tempted to assert that the empirical verification of these doctrines taken as propositions is far more likely in the Hindu tradition than the early Buddhist one. However, 'empirical omniscience' carries us very far from received views, thus I conclude that it makes no sense to treat these doctrines as truth-valued propositions.     

Review of Gareth Sparham (tr.), Abhisamayālaṃ kāra with Vṛ tti and Ālokā

The following article reviews a partial translation of the first chapter of two commentaries on Maitreyanātha’s Abhisamayāla?kāra - the Abhisamayāla?kārav?tti by ārya Vimuktisena, and the Abhisamayālakārālokā by Haribhadra. The publication of these two important commentaries in a single volume is useful in that it allows the reader to compare the similar views of the two commentators (known to Tibetans as the ārya-Hari tradition), yet explore the differences between the longer and shorter versions of Prajñāpāramitā sūtras that they explain. Sparham’s translation style is quite literal, and more technically accurate than that of Edward Conze, the well-known earlier translator of numerous Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Although increased use of subdivision headings from the Abhisamayāla?kāra would have helped readers navigate their way through some of the longer sections, Sparham has nevertheless provided English readers with perhaps the most important contribution to Prajñāpāramitā studies since Conze’s The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, published over 30 years ago.     

Sankara's doctrine of Māyā

Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of māyā which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by ‘superimposition’. Māyā, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self‐explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy.     

Two Theories of Supposition?

In a recent paper Paul Vincent Spade suggests that, although the medieval doctrine of the modes of personal supposition originally had something to do with the rest of the theory of supposition, it became, by the 14th century, an unrelated theory with no question to answer. By contrast, I argue that the theory of the modes of personal supposition was meant to provide a way of making understandable the idea that a general term in a categorical proposition can be used to refer to the individual things that fall under it. Once that idea had been made acceptable, truth conditons for the various forms of categorical proposition could be given without any specific appeal to the ideas of descent and ascent in terms of which the modes had been defined.     

The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

Do People Use Their Implicit Theories of Creativity as General Theories?

This study examines whether people use the general implicit theories of creativity or not when applying them to themselves and others. On the basis of the actor–observer asymmetry theory, the authors propose that conception of creativity would be differently constructed depending on the targets of attention: general, self, and other. Three studies attempted to examine this hypothesis. In the preliminary study, a measure was developed to assess the characteristics that describe general creativity. In Study 1, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses found the conceptual factors of general creativity. In Study 2, the common and specific factors of general, self, and others’ creativity concepts were compared through invariance tests. As a result, it was revealed that the invariance test failed, which means that the general conception of creativity may not be applicable to monitor self and others’ creativity in a consistent way. Implications and limitations of this study are discussed at the end of the study.     

The early Yogācāra theory of no-self

ABSTRACT

I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external objects are formed. In addition, I argue that non-imaginative wisdom can be regarded as an experience during which the CS of the self does not function, such that one only possesses pure sensations without perceptions of external objects. After the repeated experience of non-imaginative wisdom, the CS of the self is changed to the purified CS of no-self. It still supports interactions with the external world, but in a way that does not allow the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love) to arise.

Abbreviations: MS: Mahāyānasa?graha; TS: Tri??ikā-kārikā; TSN: Trisvabhāvanirde?a; VVS: Vi??atikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi     

The Rādhāsoāmī Theory of Subtle Body as an Expression of Religious Inclusivism

This article looks at the yogic theory of subtle body as a hermeneutical and pedagogical tool used by the Rādhāsoāmī (rādhāsvāmī) tradition to construct an inclusivist strategy for appropriating other religious systems. When constructing the theory of surat-?abd-yoga, the Rādhāsoāmīs took the ha?ha yoga of the Nāths as a vital reference point. While rejecting the corporeal techniques of ha?ha yoga, they remained influenced by the Nāth theory of subtle body. A thorough modification and expansion of this theory enabled the Rādhāsoāmīs to construct a historiosophy based on a hierarchy of religious paths. The article discloses various manifestations of the inclusivist strategy in Rādhāsoāmī thought, establishes its historical and structural determinants, and examines the process of development of the theory of subtle body into a hermeneutical tool for interpreting rival paradigms of yoga in a manner that portrays them as inferior.

     

The paradox of negation in Nāgārjuna's philosophy

This essay discusses the paradox of the Nāgārjunian negation as presented in his Vigrahavyāvartani. In Part One it is argued that as the Naiyāyika remarks, Nāgārjuna's speech act ‘No proposition has its own intrinsic thesis’ seemingly contradicts his famous claim that he has no negation whatsoever. In Parts Two and Three I consider the traditional as well as modem responses to this paradox and offer my own. I argue that Nāgārjuna's speech act does not generate a paradox for two reasons: (a) the equivalence thesis of the kind‐?P = ?P is obviously false; and (b) since Nāgārjuna's speech act is situated in the dialogical/conversational universe of discourse as opposed to the argumentative/systematic universe of discourse, the teaching of the non‐intrinsic thesis of all statements that it purports, holds for all statements in its class, including itself. Lastly, it is argued that even though the Nāgārjunian speech act is not a negation situated in the argumentative universe of discourse, it serves both philosophical and soteriological purposes.     

Rāgabodha: A Śābdabodha-Based Framework for a Theory of Rāga

In Indian knowledge traditions, Vyākaraṇa describes the rules for the formation (prakṛti-pratyaya-vibhāga) and use of correct words (sādhuśabda). The Vākya (sentence) is postulated as the primary unit of communication. “śābdabodha” deals with the cognition of sentential meaning. Similarly, in Indian music, every rāga has a lexicon and grammar (rāga-lakṣaṇa): a rāga only allows some notes and not others, and it has rules for constructing phrases—notes to be highlighted, notes to end phrases on, ornamentation, etc. These phrases of the rāga are comparable to “vākya” which when presented with due regard to certain other considerations generate an apprehension of the rāga (rāgabodha). During presentation of a rāga, an artist aims to evoke the rāga-cchāyā or rāga-svarūpa and also an emotive state in the listener. There is a cognitive aspect to the informed listening of a rāga that is parallel to linguistic communication. We seek to understand how these parallels work between śābdabodha and rāgabodha. We postulate that the conditions of expectancy (ākāṅkśā), logical consistency (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) in combination with the theory of sphoṭa provide a framework to explain how a rāga is expounded and cognised.

     

Classifying ℵo-Categorical Theories II: The Existence of Finitely Axiomatizable Proper Class II Theories

Clark and Krauss [1977] presents a classification of complete, satisfiable and _o-categorical theories in first order languages with finite non-logical vocabularies. In 1988 the first author modified this classification and raised three questions about the distribution of finitely axiomatizable theories. This paper answers two of those questions.     

The Religious Function of Jaina Philosophy:AnekāntavādaReconsidered

This paper considers the socio-religious rationale for the Jaina theory of the non-one-sided nature of reality (anekāntavāda). In doing so it rejects the received view thatanekāntavāda's exclusive function is to promote non-violence at the intellectual level. Instead it advances a model which emphasizes the way in whichanekāntavādasustains a real connection between karmic matter and the soul (jīva) and so maintains the rationale for identity defining ascetic practice. The social and religious dangers of one-sided (ekānta) views for the Jaina tradition are demonstrated by a consideration of the Digambara teacher Kundakunda's idiosyncratic use of the two truths model of reality.     

The Arabico-Islamic background of Al-Fārābī's logic

This paper examines al-Fārābī's logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background and attempts to conceptualize what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī's main problems and goals, I shall attempt to reformulate the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) in terms of the ontological and formal characteristics that Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussed the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of AL, I will further propose three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī's logic, in terms of which I will attempt to redefine it: the logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle's logic could be built upon AL, which has a nature contrary to logic. The present paper also contributes to examining our traditional research habits in Arabic studies.     

Vijñaptimātratā and the Abhidharma context of rarly Yogācāra

Contemporary accounts of early Mahāyāna Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the Abhidharma of non‐Mahāyāna schools such as the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda. This paper attempts to locate early Yogācāra philosophical speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates. Certain key Yogācāra concepts such as ālayavijñāna, vijñapti‐mātratā and citta‐mātra are discussed insofar as they relate to pre‐existing concepts and issues found in the Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika schools, with specific reference to the Abhidharmako?a and the corresponding bhāsya of Vasubandhu. Finally, some remarks are made about the, benefits of approaching the history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic position to the early Yogācāra literature.