Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense

Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis's four-dimensionalist assertions, the members of each community speak the truth in their respective languages. This follows from an application of the principle of interpretive charity to the two communities.     

Vague Singulars,Semantic Indecision,and the Metaphysics of Persons*

Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications.     

Property Dualism,Epistemic Normativity and the Limits of Naturalism*

This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi‐)epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought‐experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subject’s epistemic norms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of bridging laws between the physical/functional and phenomenal domains. The stronger claim has it that the ontology of property dualism is not properly able to account for the certainty I have of being phenomenally conscious. The problem is viewed as resulting from the neglect of the intensional context involved in a proper representation of the argument for property dualism. It is argued that only a transcendental move can do justice to this certainty I have.     

Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism

In a number of articles Donald Davidson has argued that the charitable nature of his method of radical interpretation rules out the possibility of massive error and thus refutes Cartesian skepticism. The diversity of such arguments and the suggestions that are all being made under the name of the principle of charity have prompted a large body of conflicting responses, adding only to the obscurity of the issues that are generally associated with the question of skepticism. In this paper I propose to consider the debate in a new light by reconstruing the principle of charity as a supervenience constraint on belief attribution. This would help explain some of the puzzling features of Davidson's arguments, like the idea of an omniscient interpreter, and the ensuing commentaries. Having provided an analysis of the limitations of Davidson's arguments, I shall then suggest an alternative explanation of the purported necessity of the principle of charity. Finally, having construed the principle of charity as a supervenience constraint, I shall examine what consequences this construal has for the logical status of the principle itself and its alleged epistemic potentials.     

Heidegger,Art, and the Overcoming of Metaphysics

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of Heidegger's reflections on art as we find them in his essay, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. I begin, in Section 1, by uncovering the fundamental concern that motivates Heidegger's essay. I show that Heidegger's reflections on art are part of his attempt to uncover a path beyond the history of metaphysics. I then suggest, in Section 2, that while Heidegger does think that art may allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, recent interpreters [Dreyfus ( 2005 ), Thomson ( 2011 ), and Young ( 2001 )] have mistook the kind of art that Heidegger has in mind here. The kind of art that can allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, I argue, is not art that simply thematizes and/or reconfigures cultural worlds (as these interpreters have argued). It is instead what Heidegger calls ‘primal poesy’. After discussing the nature of primal poesy, I show in more detail how this kind of art may be capable of getting us beyond the history of metaphysics in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I reconsider the more common reading of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in light of the interpretation I've offered in Sections 2 and 3.     

Language,Ontology, and Metaphysics

Thomas Hofweber's Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics is ambitious, thought‐provoking, and a good read. It expands upon a project he's developed in several previous papers—a project that seamlessly weaves together both metaphysics and metametaphysics. The book is as much about methodology as it is about the substantive conclusions he draws about what there is. As a consequence, it is a long book that covers a lot of ground. Since I cannot do justice to all of it, I hope my fellow symposiasts will take up parts of the book that I neglect. There is a lot of good stuff in there.     

Metaphysics,Intuitions and Physics

Ladyman and Ross (2007) do not think that contemporary metaphysics is in good standing. However, they do think that there is a version of metaphysics that can be made to work – provided we approach it using appropriate principles. My aim in this paper is to undermine some of their arguments against contemporary metaphysics as it is currently practiced. 1     

Leibniz,Whitehead and the Metaphysics of Causation

Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century by Michael Haren Second Edition. Macmillan 1992. Pp. ix + 315.

Being a Philosopher: The History of a Practice by D. W. Hamlyn London and New York: Roudedge 1992. Pp. x + 187. ISBN 0–415–02968–6.

A History of Western Philosophy Vol. 3, Renaissance Philosophy by Brian B. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. 450. Hb £30.00. Pb £8.99.

La Scepsi moderna. Interpretazioni dello scetticismo da Charron a Hume by Gianni Paganini Pp. 528. Cosenza: Edizioni Il Busento 1991. L 60,000.

A History of Modern Political Thought 185 A History of Modern Political Thought, Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx by Iain Hampsher‐Monk Oxford: Blackwell 1992 Pp. xiii + 609 Paperback, £14.99.

Malebranche and Ideas 189 Malebranche and Ideas by Steven M. Nadler New York: Oxford University Press 1992. Pp. 192. ISBN 0–19–507724–5. £35.00

Kantian Aesthetics Pursued by Anthony Savile Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1993, ISBN 0–7486–0439–1

Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski by Peter Simons Kluwer 1992     

Panpsychism,Emergentism and the Metaphysics of Causation

This article uses causation to show that panpsychism and emergentism share far less than most philosophers suppose. It argues that panpsychism has features, among them its rationalism, that force what the article calls a strong account of causation. And that emergentism entails what the article calls a weak account of causation incompatible with any strong account. The article then ventures that panpsychism and emergentism form parts of two wide‐ranging but incompatible metaphysical packages.     

Arrows,Balls and the Metaphysics of Motion

The arrow paradox is an argument purported to show that objects do not really move. The two main metaphysics of motion, the At–At theory of motion and velocity primitivism, solve the paradox differently. It is argued that neither solution is completely satisfactory. In particular it is contended that there are no decisive arguments in favor of the claim that velocity as it is constructed in the At–At theory is a truly instantaneous property, which is a crucial assumption to solve the paradox. If so the At–At theory faces the threat that most of our physical theories turn out to be non-Markovian. Finally it is considered whether all those threats and paradoxes are dispelled if only a new metaphysics of persistence is taken into account, namely four-dimensionalism.