Scientific reasoning in a real‐world context: The effect of prior belief and outcome on children's hypothesis‐testing strategies

The impact of event outcome and prior belief on scientific reasoning was investigated within a real‐world oral health context. Participants (N= 144; ranging from 3 to 11 years) were given hypothesis‐testing tasks and asked to explain their answers. Participants were presented with information that was either consistent or inconsistent with their own beliefs. Each task consisted of scenarios in which the outcome was either good or bad oral health. When the information was belief consistent and the outcome was good, or when the information was belief inconsistent and the outcome was bad, children were more likely to choose scientifically appropriate tests of the stated hypothesis (i.e. manipulate only one variable). Evidence‐based explanations were associated with scientifically appropriate choices in the good‐outcome, belief‐inconsistent scenario and the belief‐consistent, bad‐outcome scenario. Participants' performance on these tasks is explained by considering the plausibility of causal variables. A control of variables strategy was used to test hypotheses in cases in which the evidence was consistent with participants' beliefs and knowledge of causal mechanisms. In contrast, when the evidence was inconsistent with participants' beliefs, children chose to manipulate behaviours likely to lead to a positive health outcome. These findings demonstrate that context and prior knowledge interact to play an important role in children's scientific reasoning.     

Differences in brain information transmission between gifted and normal children during scientific hypothesis generation

The purpose of the present study was to investigate differences in neural information transmission between gifted and normal children involved in scientific hypothesis generation. To investigate changes in the amount of information transmission, the children’s averaged-cross mutual information (A-CMI) of EEGs was estimated during their generation of scientific hypotheses. We recorded EEG from 25 gifted and 25 age-matched normal children using 16 electrodes on each subject’s scalp. To generate hypotheses, the children were asked to observe 20 “quail eggs” that gave rise to questions. After observation, they were asked to generate a scientific hypothesis—a tentative causal explanation for the questions evoked. The results of this study revealed several distinguishing brain activities between gifted and normal children during hypothesis generation. In contrast to normal children, gifted children showed increased A-CMI values between the left temporal and central, between the left temporal and parietal, and between the left central and parietal locations while generating a hypothesis. These results suggested that gifted children more efficiently distribute the cognitive resources essential to cope with hypothesis generation.     

Differences in brain information transmission between gifted and normal children during scientific hypothesis generation

The purpose of the present study was to investigate differences in neural information transmission between gifted and normal children involved in scientific hypothesis generation. To investigate changes in the amount of information transmission, the children's averaged-cross mutual information (A-CMI) of EEGs was estimated during their generation of scientific hypotheses. We recorded EEG from 25 gifted and 25 age-matched normal children using 16 electrodes on each subject's scalp. To generate hypotheses, the children were asked to observe 20 "quail eggs" that gave rise to questions. After observation, they were asked to generate a scientific hypothesis--a tentative causal explanation for the questions evoked. The results of this study revealed several distinguishing brain activities between gifted and normal children during hypothesis generation. In contrast to normal children, gifted children showed increased A-CMI values between the left temporal and central, between the left temporal and parietal, and between the left central and parietal locations while generating a hypothesis. These results suggested that gifted children more efficiently distribute the cognitive resources essential to cope with hypothesis generation.     

Multivariate Familial Analysis of Cognitive Measures in the Colorado Family Reading Study

Multivariate path analysis is employed to examine the etiologies of variation and covariation of three composite cognitive measures in the Colorado Family Reading Study: reading ability, symbol-processing speed, and spatial/reasoning. Measures of phenotypic assortative and cross-assortative mating are incorporated in a multivariate analysis of familial resemblance within nuclear families. Phenotypic variances and covariances are partitioned into components due to familial (genetic and/or family environmental) influences and to specific, nontransmissible environmental influences in families with a reading-disabled child as well as families with children of normal reading ability. Comparable moderate familial influences are found across family type for all three composites and the phenotypic correlations between traits are largely due to familial influences.     

Differential relations between general cognitive ability and interest‐vocation fit

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the interrelationship of general cognitive ability and vocational interest in the context of person‐vocation fit. Drawing on evidence of systematic differences in the average cognitive complexity of occupational domains and the tenets of the gravitational hypothesis, we propose a set of hypotheses specifying that, depending on the dominant interest type, general ability can be either positively or negatively associated with interest‐vocation fit. Analysis of a large longitudinal dataset showed that general cognitive ability was significantly correlated with interest‐vocation fit, and that the direction of the correlation changed in accordance with the cognitive complexity of the occupational domain.     

Accommodating Surprise in Taxonomic Tasks: The Role of Expertise

This paper reports a psychological study of human categorization that looked at the procedures used by expert scientists when dealing with puzzling items. Five professional botanists were asked to specify a category from a set of positive and negative instances. The target category in the study was defined by a feature that was unusual, hence situations of uncertainty and puzzlement were generated. Subjects were asked to think aloud while solving the tasks, and their verbal reports were analyzed. A number of problem solving strategies were identified, and subsequently integrated in a model of knowledge‐guided inductive categorization. Our model proposes that expert knowledge influences the subjects' reasoning in more complex ways than suggested by earlier investigations of scientific reasoning. As in previous studies, domain knowledge influenced our subjects' hypothesis generation and testing; but, additionally, it played a central role when subjects revised their hypotheses.     

Religion is natural,atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by‐product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics     

Components of quantitative reasoning: General and group ability factors

In this study we tested the hypothesis that quantitative reasoning performance is a function of specific processing components as well as general cognitive abilities such as working memory capacity, reasoning, and verbal comprehension. Subjects were administered tests of these three ability factors as well as tests designed to measure three components thought to underlie algebra word problem solving: problem-type identification, decomposition and sequencing, and problem translation. Confirmatory factor analyses indicated good fits for our models of the general ability factors and the word-problem-solving components. Further analyses indicated that the word-problem-solving components added substantially to the more general cognitive abilities in explaining variance in arithmetic reasoning and math knowledge test scores obtained from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. We conclude that although general cognitive ability and/or working memory are certainly important ingredients of quantitative reasoning, specific processing components suggested by cognitive theory are at least as important determinants of performance.     

Precocious quantitative cognition in monkeys

Basic quantitative abilities are thought to have an innate basis in humans partly because the ability to discriminate quantities emerges early in child development. If humans and nonhuman primates share this developmentally primitive foundation of quantitative reasoning, then this ability should be present early in development across species and should emerge earlier in monkeys than in humans because monkeys mature faster than humans. We report that monkeys spontaneously make accurate quantity choices by 1 year of age in a task that human children begin to perform only at 2.5 to 3 years of age. Additionally, we report that the quantitative sensitivity of infant monkeys is equal to that of the adult animals in their group and that rates of learning do not differ between infant and adult animals. This novel evidence of precocious quantitative reasoning in infant monkeys suggests that human quantitative reasoning shares its early developing foundation with other primates. The data further suggest that early developing components of primate quantitative reasoning are constrained by maturational factors related to genetic development as opposed to learning experience alone.     

Concept Discovery in a Scientific Domain

The scientific reasoning strategies used to discover a new concept in a scientific domain were investigated in two studies. An innovative task in which subjects discover new concepts in molecular biology was used. This task was based upon one set of experiments that Jacob and Monod used to discover how genes are controlled, and for which they were awarded the Nobel prize. In the two studies reported in this article, subjects were taught some basic facts and experimental techniques in molecular biology, using a simulated molecular genetics laboratory on a computer. Following their initial training, they were then asked to discover how genes are controlled by other genes. In Study 1, subjects found no evidence that was consistent with their initial hypothesis. Subjects then set one of two goals for conducting experiments and evaluating data. One goal was to search for evidence consistent with the current hypothesis (and they did not attend to the features of discrepant findings); none of the subjects who only had this goal succeeded at discovering how the genes were controlled. Other subjects in Study 1 used a different goal: Upon noticing evidence inconsistent with their current hypothesis, these subjects set a new goal of attempting to explain the cause of the discrepant findings. Using this goal, a subset of these subjects discovered the correct solution to the problem. Study 2 was conducted to test the hypothesis that subjects' goals of finding evidence consistent with their current hypothesis blocks consideration of alternate hypotheses and generation of new goals, it was predicted that if subjects could achieve their initial goal of discovering evidence consistent with their current hypothesis, they would then attend to particular features of discrepant evidence and solve the problem. To test this prediction, an additional mechanism of genetic control that was consistent with subjects' initial goal was added to the genes. Here, subjects had to discover two mechanisms of control: one mechanism consistent with their current hypothesis, and one inconsistent with their hypothesis. Twice as many subjects reached the correct solution in Study 2 than in Study 1. The findings of the two studies indicate that goals provide a powerful constraint on the cognitive processes underlying scientific reasoning and that the types of goals that are represented determine many of the reasoning errors that subjects make.     

Why should we try to think like scientists? Scientific reasoning and susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases

This paper examines whether scientific reasoning skills predict people's susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. We used the recently developed Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) because it measures the ability to read and evaluate scientific evidence. Alongside the SRS, 317 participants aged 18–30 years completed measures of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability to ascertain whether the SRS contributes specifically to susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. Scientific reasoning correlated positively with dispositions towards analytic thinking and cognitive ability and negatively with dogmatism, epistemically suspect beliefs, and susceptibility to cognitive biases. Most importantly, it emerged as a significant predictor, contributing to susceptibility to both cognitive biases and epistemically suspect beliefs over and above the other cognitive predictors. These results provide the first empirical evidence that scientific reasoning ability is an important factor in protecting against epistemically suspect beliefs and in aiding better decision making among the non-scientific population.     

Attachment and preschool children's understanding of maternal versus non‐maternal psychological states

There is growing evidence that insecurely attached children are less advanced in their social understanding than their secure counterparts. However, attachment may also predict how individual children use their social understanding across different relationships. For instance, the insecure child's social‐cognitive difficulties may be more pronounced when the psychological states of an attachment figure are being considered. In the current study, forty‐eight 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were asked about their mothers' emotions and false beliefs, as well as those of non‐attachment figures. The Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) was administered to assess children's attachment representations. Children's SAT scores predicted their overall performance on the false belief and causes of emotion tasks, even after controlling for age and verbal ability. More interestingly, however, children with high scores on the Avoidance dimension of the SAT experienced greater difficulty understanding maternal false beliefs relative to those of an unfamiliar adult female. Thus, although attachment insecurity may hinder social‐cognitive development in general, the findings suggest that there are more specific effects as well. Attachment representations that are characterized by high levels of avoidance appear to interfere with children's ability to fully engage their social‐cognitive skills when reasoning about maternal mental states.     

Dual Space Search During Scientific Reasoning

The purpose of the two studies reported here was to develop an integrated model of the scientific reasoning process. Subjects were placed in a simulated scientific discovery context by first teaching them how to use an electronic device and then asking them to discover how a hitherto unencountered function worked. To do this task, subjects had to formulate hypotheses based on their prior knowledge, conduct experiments, and evaluate the results of their experiments. In the first study, using 20 adult subjects, we identified two main strategies that subjects used to generate new hypotheses. One strategy was to search memory and the other was to generalize from the results of previous experiments. We described the former group as searching an hypothesis space, and the latter as searching an experiment space. In a second study, with 10 adults, we investigated how subjects search the hypothesis space by instructing them to state all the hypotheses that they could think of prior to conducting any experiments. Following this phase, subjects were then allowed to conduct experiments. Subjects who could not think of the correct rule in the hypothesis generation phase discovered the correct rule only by generalizing from the results of experiments in the experimental phase.
Both studies provide support for the view that scientific reasoning can be characterized as search in two problem spaces. By extending Simon and Lea's (1974) Generalized Rule Inducer, we present a general model of Scientific Discovery as Dual Search (SDDS) that shows how search in two problem spaces (an hypothesis space and an experiment space) shapes hypothesis generation, experimental design, and the evaluation of hypotheses. The model also shows how these processes interact with each other. Finally, we interpret earlier findings about the psychology of scientific reasoning in terms of the SDDS model.     

Belief in Pseudoscience,Cognitive Style and Science Literacy

Most studies of superstitious belief have focused on paranormal phenomena, but this study extended existing findings to non‐paranormal pseudoscience by exploring links between belief and dual‐process thought (cognitive ability and intuitive‐analytical thinking styles). In the present study, Japanese participants (N = 264; 188 women, 76 men; mean age = 25.0; range = 18–81) completed questionnaires on cognitive style and ability and level of beliefs and science literacy. Results showed that belief in paranormal and non‐paranormal pseudoscience correlated positively; after controlling for demographic variables, level of science literacy and cognitive ability, both analytic and intuitive cognitive styles positively predicted paranormal belief. Belief in non‐paranormal pseudoscience associated positively with analytic, but not intuitive style. These results follow the dual‐process view of belief perseverance; however, analytic style affected beliefs oppositely from previous studies. This discrepancy might emerge from Western and Eastern cultural differences in reasoning. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?

Inductive reasoning requires exploiting links between evidence and hypotheses. This can be done focusing either on the posterior probability of the hypothesis when updated on the new evidence or on the impact of the new evidence on the credibility of the hypothesis. But are these two cognitive representations equally reliable? This study investigates this question by comparing probability and impact judgments on the same experimental materials. The results indicate that impact judgments are more consistent in time and more accurate than probability judgments. Impact judgments also predict the direction of errors in probability judgments. These findings suggest that human inductive reasoning relies more on estimating evidential impact than on posterior probability.     

因果变化模式与因果联结强度在幼儿因果推理中的作用

对93名幼儿进行了五种因果变化模式的因果推理题目的测试。结果表明:(1)在不同的因果变化模式下,被试进行因果推理的成绩存在差异,且在对于这五类题目的掌握上具有一定的顺序。(2)被试在同样因果变化模式题目的表现之间具有较高的相似性,而在因果联结强度相同的题目之间则具有显著的差异。(3)被试对于各题目回答的正确率并不随原因与结果联结次数的增多而提高。(4)即使是在观察到的刺激完全一致的情况下,被试的回答仍会因因果变化模式的差异及主试对于题目解释的不同而存在差别。     

The moral, epistemic, and mindreading components of children’s vigilance towards deception

Vigilance towards deception is investigated in 3- to-5-year-old children: (i) In Study 1, children as young as 3 years of age prefer the testimony of a benevolent rather than of a malevolent communicator. (ii) In Study 2, only at the age of four do children show understanding of the falsity of a lie uttered by a communicator described as a liar. (iii) In Study 3, the ability to recognize a lie when the communicator is described as intending to deceive the child emerges around four and improves throughout the fifth and sixth year of life. On the basis of this evidence, we suggest that preference for the testimony of a benevolent communicator, understanding of the epistemic aspects of deception, and understanding of its intentional aspects are three functionally and developmentally distinct components of epistemic vigilance.     

Story Remembering Among Children

Abstract

The hypothesis that belief in the paranormal is related to reasoning errors was tested. College students were administered the Belief in the Paranormal Scale (Jones, Russell, &; Nickel, 1977) and a syllogistic reasoning test. A slight but statistically significant correlation was observed between BPS scores and the number of errors made on the reasoning test. This relationship was larger but not significantly so for reasoning items with paranormal content than for symbolic content. An a priori comparison indicated that the relationship between BPS scores and reasoning errors was significantly greater for problems that required subjects to determine the validity of hypotheses given statements of evidence than for problems that required subjects to determine the validity of deduced empirical predictions given hypotheses. Thus, belief in the paranormal among college students was very moderately correlated with reasoning ability and was observed most clearly when the reasoning problems contained paranormal content and when they required subjects to determine the validity of hypotheses given evidential statements.     

The link between logic,mathematics and imagination: evidence from children with developmental dyscalculia and mathematically gifted children

This study examined performance on transitive inference problems in children with developmental dyscalculia (DD), typically developing controls matched on IQ, working memory and reading skills, and in children with outstanding mathematical abilities. Whereas mainstream approaches currently consider DD as a domain‐specific deficit, we hypothesized that the development of mathematical skills is closely related to the development of logical abilities, a domain‐general skill. In particular, we expected a close link between mathematical skills and the ability to reason independently of one's beliefs. Our results showed that this was indeed the case, with children with DD performing more poorly than controls, and high maths ability children showing outstanding skills in logical reasoning about belief‐laden problems. Nevertheless, all groups performed poorly on structurally equivalent problems with belief‐neutral content. This is in line with suggestions that abstract reasoning skills (i.e. the ability to reason about content without real‐life referents) develops later than the ability to reason about belief‐inconsistent fantasy content.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90DWY3O4xx8