Basic Personal Values,Core Political Values,and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis

We theorize that political values express basic personal values in the domain of politics. We test a set of hypotheses that specify how the motivational structure of basic values constrains and gives coherence to core political values. We also test the hypothesis that core political values mediate relations of basic personal values to voting demonstrated in previous research. We measured the basic personal values, core political values, and vote of Italian adults both before (n = 1699) and after (n = 1030) the 2006 national election. Basic values explained substantial variance in each of eight political values (22% to 53%) and predicted voting significantly. Correlations and an MDS projection of relations among basic values and political values supported the hypothesized coherent structuring of core political values by basic values. Core political values fully mediated relations of basic values to voting, supporting a basic values—political values—voting causal hierarchy.     

When implicit fails: Explicit but not implicit attitudes predict choices of decided and undecided voters

IntroductionA recent study (Friese et al., 2012) involving two major political elections in the US and Germany reported that voting behavior was better predicted by explicit than implicit attitudes for both decided and undecided voters and that when voting behavior was predicted by implicit attitudes, the prediction was better for decided than undecided voters.ObjectiveWe conducted a comparable study for the 2012 French presidential election using voter volatility as a measure of voter decidedness, in order to test the generalizability of the findings of Friese et al. (2012).MethodParticipants’ voting intention, explicit and implicit attitudes towards the candidates Sarkozy and Hollande were collected during the 2 weeks separating the two rounds of the election.ResultsOur findings confirm that explicit attitudes outperform implicit attitudes when predicting voting choice, but not that the relationship between implicit attitudes and voting intention is moderated by voter decidedness.ConclusionFurther research is needed in order to test whether the moderation of implicit attitudes by voter decidedness is a robust finding or not.     

Predicting the Vote: Implicit Attitudes as Predictors of the Future Behavior of Decided and Undecided Voters

Two studies assessed the predictive validity of implicit political attitudes in relation to voting behavior. In Study 1 , we demonstrated the validity of the adopted measure (i.e., the IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998 ) with a sample of voters who clearly sided with one of the opposing parties. In Study 2 , implicit political preferences were measured in a sample of undecided voters one month before the election, and actual voting behavior was assessed immediately after the election. Results demonstrated that implicit political attitudes were good predictors of future voting behaviors. These findings support the hypothesis of the presence of embryonic attitudes even in the case of those voters who at the explicit and conscious level deny any preference for one of the two opposing candidates.     

Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and Political Choice

Voters' political choices have presumably come to depend more on their personal preferences and less on their social characteristics in Western democracies. We examine two aspects of personality that may influence political choice, traits and personal values, using the Five Factor Model of personality traits and the Schwartz (1992 ) theory of basic personal values. Data from 3044 voters for the major coalitions in the Italian national election of 2001 showed that supporters of the two coalitions differed in traits and values, largely as hypothesized. Center-left voters were higher than center-right voters in the traits of friendliness and openness and lower in energy and conscientiousness. Regarding values, center-left voters were higher than center-right voters in universalism, benevolence, and self-direction and lower in security, power, achievement, conformity, and tradition. Logistic regressions revealed that values explained substantial variance in past and future voting and in change of political choice, trumping personality traits. We discuss explanations for the primacy of values and implications for the social cognitive view of personality.     

Republican Voters Prefer Candidates Who Have Conservative‐Looking Faces: New Evidence From Exit Polls

Research shows people share common political facial stereotypes: They associate faces with political ideologies. Moreover, given that many voters rely on party affiliation, political ideology, and appearances to select political candidates, we might expect that political facial stereotypes would sway voting preferences and, by extension, the share of votes going to each candidate in an election. And yet few studies have examined whether having a stereotypically conservative‐looking (or liberal‐looking) face predicts a candidate's vote shares. Using data from U.S. election exit polls, we show that the Republican voters within each state are more likely to vote for a candidate (even a Democrat) the more that person has a stereotypically Republican‐looking face. By contrast, the voting choices of the Democratic voters within each state are unrelated to political facial stereotypes. Moreover, we show that the relationship between political facial stereotypes and voting does not depend on state‐level ideology: Republican voters in both right‐leaning (“red”) and left‐leaning (“blue”) states are more likely to vote for candidates with conservative‐looking faces. These results have several important practical and theoretical implications concerning the nature and impact of political facial stereotypes, which we discuss.     

The curious,context‐dependent case of anger: Explaining voting intentions in three different national elections

Collective action is typically studied in social protest contexts and predicted by different motivations (i.e., ingroup identification and efficacy beliefs, and outgroup‐directed anger). Assuming that voting to some extent reflects a form of collective action, we tested whether these three different motivations predicted voting in Dutch, Israeli, and Italian national election contexts. Based on previous meta‐analyses on voting and collective action, we hypothesized that identification with and efficacy beliefs regarding this party would motivate voting across the different elections (i.e., context‐independent effects). As for anger, we predicted more context‐dependent effects, depending on whether the anger is targeting the previous government or at the political system at large. Results were largely in line with predictions, showing the relatively context‐independent motivational power of party identification and efficacy beliefs, and clearly context‐dependent effects for anger. Specifically, we found little support for a similar motivational power of anger targeting previous government policies, but anger targeting politics in general demotivated Dutch and Israeli participants to vote (interpreted as an expression of political cynicism), while curiously motivating Italian participants to vote (interpreted as a desire for system change from “old” to “new” politics). We discuss these findings in the context of voting in national elections, and recommend further integration of the voting and social protest literatures.     

Deliberation from Within: Changing One's Mind During an Interview

This article examines whether a public opinion survey can improve the quality of political attitudes. More specifically, we argue that simply positioning a summary attitudinal question after a balanced series of relevant items can increase people's ability to answer in a way that better reflects their underlying interests, values, and predispositions. By manipulating the location of the vote preference question in two separate national election campaign surveys, we find that there are fewer undecided respondents when the question is asked at the end of the survey rather than early on, that some people are changing their mind during the questionnaire, that a larger set of determinants is structuring late‐survey vote choice, and that voting preferences based on the later question are a better predictor of the actual vote. The findings carry important lessons for students of deliberation and of citizen decision making.     

What Determines Voting Behaviors of Muslim Minorities in Europe: Muslim Identity or Left-Right Ideology?

Voting is key to political integration of immigrant-background minorities, but what determines their voting preferences remains unclear. Moreover, dual-citizen minorities can vote differently in their country of residence and origin. Using a representative survey of Turkish-Muslim minorities in two cities in Belgium (N = 447, M_age = 36.3), we asked whether left-right ideology or religious identity predicted their voting in their country of residence and origin, besides typical predictors of right-wing voting (i.e., efficacy, deprivation, and authoritarianism). Authoritarianism, low political efficacy, and high deprivation predicted voting for right-wing parties in Turkey, whereas the latter two, surprisingly, predicted voting for the left in Belgium. Latent class analyses of their religious practices distinguished “moderate” versus “strict” Muslims. While “strict” Muslims voted for right-wing parties in Turkey, ideology did not predict their voting. Conversely, in Belgium, while Muslim identity did not predict their voting, ideology did. Analyzing their combined effects, “moderate” Muslims voted based on their ideology—right-leaning voting for the right, whereas “strict” Muslims voted according to their interests as a disadvantaged minority in Belgium—thus voting for the left—or as a devout Muslim in Turkey—thus voting for the right. Our results elucidate processes underlying the voting behaviors of European-Muslim minorities.     

Does personality matter? Openness correlates with vote choice,but particularly for politically sophisticated voters

Though psychologists show that personality predicts socio-political attitudes, political scientists caution that most voters are incapable of such disciplined voting. We integrate these competing traditions by arguing that personality correlates with vote choice, but primarily among the politically sophisticated. Utilising two nationally-representative datasets (Study 1: n = 6518; Study 2: n = 17434) from two countries (New Zealand and the United States, respectively), we show that Openness to Experience is inversely associated with conservative vote choice (Studies 1–2) and socio-political attitudes (Study 2). As predicted, these relationships were particularly robust among the politically sophisticated. These studies provide a much-needed qualification to the literature and demonstrate the benefits of using an interdisciplinary approach when examining the personality correlates of socio-political attitudes.     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

Mediational role of values in linking personality traits to political orientation

Two studies use the Five Factor Model of traits and Schwartz's (1992 ) theory of basic personal values to assess the mediational role of values in linking traits to voting choice and left-right ideology. Both left- and right-wing voters showed distinctive traits and values that were congruent with their ideologies. Structural equation modelling supported a hypothesized full mediation model. Individuals' traits of openness, conscientiousness and agreeableness explained significant variance in the politically relevant values of security and universalism, and these self-reported values, in turn, explained the voters' political orientations. These findings held across age (adolescents and adults) and were corroborated using both cross-sectional and longitudinal data.     

Personality Foundations of Ideological Divide: A Comparison of Women Members of Parliament and Women Voters in Italy

Empirical research is crucial for understanding the personality foundations of political preferences in modern democracies. However, few studies have addressed the personality of top politicians using standard methods to assess basic traits and personal values. In the current research, traits and values of 106 female members of the Italian Parliament were assessed in accordance with the Five‐Factor Model of personality and Schwartz's taxonomy. The same variables were measured in a sample of 864 voters taken from the general population. We investigate the extent to which differences in traits and values contribute to ideological orientation of politicians and voters of rival coalitions. A similar pattern of relations was found in both groups. Yet, traits and values contributed to partisanship of politicians much more than to political preferences of voters. Whereas values fully mediated the contribution of traits to voting, energy/extraversion and agreeableness contributed to political partisanship both directly and indirectly, through values.     

Predicting the Vote through Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: A Field Research

Using the data collected by Itanes on a sample of the Italian population, representative according to the main sociodemographic variables, we analyzed the relations between voting intention, explicit and implicit political attitudes, and voting behavior. Participants (N = 1,377) were interviewed twice, both before and after the 2006 Italian National Election. The implicit attitudes (measured using the IAT) were substantially as effective as voting intention, and more effective than the explicit attitudes towards the main Italian political leaders, in forecasting the Election official results. When used to predict participants' voting behavior, the IAT added a significant, although slight, power to voting intention and explicit attitude. Inconsistency between explicit and implicit attitudes exerted a negative influence on the probability of having decided one's voting behavior in the preelectoral poll; however, among undecided participants, it did not significantly influence the probability of delaying one's voting decision and that of actually casting a valid vote. Limits and possible developments of this research are discussed.     

Beyond de Tocqueville: The roles of vertical and horizontal individualism and conservatism in the 2004 U.S. presidential election

Individualism is a fundamental value to U.S. culture and democracy. We differentiate the horizontal from vertical dimension of individualism to predict voting in the 2004 presidential election. Horizontal individualism (HI) values equality and uniqueness, whereas vertical individualism (VI) values competition and achievement. In line with the value-expressive function of attitudes and voter–politician congruency principles, we show how and when HI and VI affect voters' attitudes and voting. A pilot study revealed that VI correlated with vote; those who scored higher on VI were more likely to vote for Bush. Study 1 replicated these findings with a broader sample and a regression approach. The influence of individualism was less predictive than VI in both studies. In Study 2, we proposed that the effect of VI and HI values on voting decisions is mediated by political conservatism, which in turn predicts voters' trait assessment of candidates and voting decision. Path analysis of the data from a national survey supported our expectation among respondents with high political involvement, the context in which value-expressive attitudes are more pronounced. Taken together, these studies advance our theoretical understanding of HI, VI, and individualism, as well as the process underlying the effect of values on decisions.     

A Leader Who Sees the World as I Do: Voters Prefer Candidates Whose Statements Reveal Matching Social-Psychological Attitudes

Politicians are increasingly able to communicate their values, attitudes, and concerns directly to voters. Yet little is known about which of these signals resonate with voters and why. We employ a discrete choice experiment to investigate whether and which social-psychological attitudes predict how adult British voters respond to corresponding attitudinal signals communicated by candidates in hypothetical social media posts. For all attitudes studied, covering social feelings (trust, collective nostalgia), social perceptions (nationalism, populist sentiment), and social commitments (national identification, authoritarianism, egalitarianism), we find that participants are much more likely to vote for candidates who signal proximity to their own attitudinal position and less likely for candidates who signal opposing views. The strongest effects were observed for national identification, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism, indicating the importance of commitment to a shared group and to particular principles for distributing power and resources within and between groups. We further demonstrate that social-psychological attitudes are not acting as mere proxies for participants' past votes or left–right ideology. Our results extend adaptive followership theory to incorporate preferences concerning intragroup coordination and intergroup hierarchy, while highlighting the social-psychological dynamics of political communication that may transcend the concerns of particular election cycles.     

Personality,Ideological Attitudes,and Group Identity as Predictors of Political Behavior in Majority and Minority Ethnic Groups

Prior research on personality and politics has largely investigated relationships using national samples from North America and Europe. In contrast, we used multigroup path analysis to assess how Big Five personality, ideological attitudes (RWA, SDO), and group identities (National and Ethnic Identification) predicted right versus left Political Behavior (party support, past voting, present voting intention) across majority and minority ethnic groups in a New Zealand national sample (N = 6,333). The effects of personality on ideological attitudes and group identities were mostly invariant across ethnic groups and consistent with prior findings. In contrast, the effects of ideological attitudes on Political Behavior varied across ethnic groups being moderately strong for the European majority but nonsignificant for the minorities. Group identities had little effect on Political Behavior. We discuss cultural and contextual factors that might account for this disconnect between ideology and politics among the minority ethnic groups.     

Men of Honor Don't Talk: The Relationship Between Masculine Honor and Social Activism Against Criminal Organizations in Italy

Criminal organizations have a strong influence on social, political, and economic life in Italy and other parts of the world. Nonetheless, local populations display collective passivity against organized crime, a phenomenon known as omertà. Omertà is linked to the concepts of honor and masculinity. That is, in order to fit ideological constructions of manliness, individuals should display indifference toward illegal activities and should not collaborate with legal institutions. In two studies, we investigated the link between endorsement of a masculine honor ideology and collective action intentions against criminal organizations (antimafia). Study 1 (N = 121) involved a Northern Italian sample, and Study 2 (N = 301) involved a Southern Italian sample. Across studies, results showed that endorsement of masculine honor ideology was associated with lower willingness to engage in social activism against criminal organizations. This relationship was mediated by attitudes toward criminal organizations (Study 1 and 2) and, in line with the notion of omertà, by lower levels of collective motive and more anxiety about interacting with police (Study 2). Directions for future research are discussed.     

Regulatory Fit and Voting1

The problem of many democracies is low voter turnout. One reason is the voting procedure, which only allows voting for a party or candidate. Introduction of voting against could bring more voters to the polls. The concept of regulatory focus ( Higgins, 1998 ) suggests that people who focus on prevention would vote more eagerly if they are given the opportunity to blackball disliked candidates. This article describes 2 studies that verify this hypothesis. In the first study, over two thirds of participants declared that they would vote more willingly if they had a “for or against” choice at the election. The second study shows that the “pro or anti” formula is especially attractive to participants with a prevention regulatory focus.     

Ambivalent Versus Univalent Voters: Perceived Media Influences and Third-Person Perceptions

By differentiating “ambivalent” from “univalent” voters, this study argues that ambivalent voters need information to reach a decision, which implies they are more open to persuasion through media coverage than are univalent voters. In turn, they may infer that election coverage exerts a greater influence on them, resulting in smaller self–other perceptual discrepancies in terms of their coverage susceptibility. Conversely, univalent voters have made their voting choices early during the campaign; for them, only when the intended influence seems desirable does the perceived influence of campaign news on them increase, leading to a smaller self–other perceptual gap. In other words, ambivalent voters engage in motivated inferences to reduce their ambivalence-aroused discomfort, whereas univalent voters engage in motivated inferences to avoid dissonance. The results of a survey conducted during the official campaign for the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election support these predictions, demonstrating the utility of categorizing voters as ambivalent or univalent when examining the perceived effects of election campaign news.     

What Can Political Psychology Learn from Implicit Measures? Empirical Evidence and New Directions

Implicit measures have become very popular in virtually all areas of basic and applied psychology. However, there are empirical and theoretical arguments that might raise doubts about their usefulness in research on political attitudes. Based on a review of relevant evidence, we argue that implicit measures can be useful to identify distal sources of political preferences in domains where self‐presentation may bias self‐reports (e.g., influence of racial attitudes on voting decisions). In addition, implicit measures of proximal political attitudes can contribute to the prediction of future political decisions by virtue of their capability to predict biases in the processing of decision‐relevant information (e.g., prediction of voting behavior of undecided voters). These conclusions are supported by research showing that implicit measures predict real‐world political behavior over and above explicit measures. The reviewed findings suggest that implicit measures may serve as a useful supplement to improve the prediction of election outcomes. Open questions and potential directions for future research are discussed.