Families of Adolescent Drug Abusers Are “Rigid”: Are These Families Either “Disengaged” or “Enmeshed,” or Both?

The FACES instrument, based on Olson's Circumplex Model of family functioning, was administered to 96 adolescent drug-abuse clients and their parents. The majority of these families categorized themselves as "disengaged" (rather than "enmeshed") on the cohesion dimension, and as "rigid" (rather than "chaotic") on the adaptability dimension. These findings were unexpected as they were substantially different from published findings on families with other types of problems. Family therapists, utilizing Olson's Clinical Rating Scale for the Circumplex Model, characterized significantly more of these same families as "enmeshed," rather than "disengaged." Possible explanations for the difference between the therapists' perceptions and the families' self-perceptions are discussed.     

“Statistical,” “Practical,” and “Clinical”: How Many Kinds of Significance Do Counselors Need to Consider?

The present article reviews and distinguishes 3 related but different types of significance: “statistical,” “practical,” and “clinical.” A framework for conceptualizing the many “practical” effect size indices is described. Several effect size indices that counseling researchers can use, or that counselors reading the literature may encounter, are summarized. A way of estimating “corrected” intervention effects is proposed. It is suggested that readers should expect authors to report indices of “practical” or “clinical” significance, or both, within their research reports; and it is noted that indeed some journals now require such reports.     

Does Conventional Implicit Association Test of Shyness Measure “Self‐Shyness” or “Others‐Shyness”?

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures implicit associations between attitude targets and attributes. Its structure and procedure facilitate investigation of the strength of associations between one target and attributes relative to that between the other target and the same attributes when two targets are contradictory (e.g., black/white and comfortable/uncomfortable). This structure can cause conceptual complexity about what the IAT measures, particularly when a counter category is not needed. Thus, using the Single‐Target Implicit Association Test (ST‐IAT), which allowed only one target category for pairing with attributes, this paper delineated the association measured in the conventional IAT for shyness: “self‐shy” or “others‐shy.” Seventy‐seven Japanese university students completed the self‐report shyness scale, the conventional IAT, and two ST‐IATs (i.e., self/others as target). Results showed that implicit shyness produced in the conventional IAT significantly and positively correlated with that in the self‐targeted ST‐IAT. Moreover, implicit shyness in the conventional IAT was significantly accounted for by those produced by the ST‐IAT with self as target and those calculated in the ST‐IAT with others as target in opposite directions.     

What Are the “True” Statistics of the Environment?

A widespread assumption in the contemporary discussion of probabilistic models of cognition, often attributed to the Bayesian program, is that inference is optimal when the observer's priors match the true priors in the world—the actual “statistics of the environment.” But in fact the idea of a “true” prior plays no role in traditional Bayesian philosophy, which regards probability as a quantification of belief, not an objective characteristic of the world. In this paper I discuss the significance of the traditional Bayesian epistemic view of probability and its mismatch with the more objectivist assumptions about probability that are widely held in contemporary cognitive science. I then introduce a novel mathematical framework, the observer lattice, that aims to clarify this issue while avoiding philosophically tendentious assumptions. The mathematical argument shows that even if we assume that “ground truth” probabilities actually do exist, there is no objective way to tell what they are. Different observers, conditioning on different information, will inevitably have different probability estimates, and there is no general procedure to determine which one is right. The argument sheds light on the use of probabilistic models in cognitive science, and in particular on what exactly it means for the mind to be “tuned” to its environment.     

Does Freudian Theory Resolve “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”?*

This paper consists of two related parts: I. A detailed critique of Donald Davidson's thesis—in his “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”—that “…any satisfactory [explanatory] view [of irrationality] must embrace some of Freud's most important theses” (p. 290). I argue that this conclusion is doubly flawed: (i) Davidson's case for it is logically ill‐founded, and (ii) its Freudian plaidoyer is also factually false. II. Relatedly, in the second part, I confute the recent arguments given by Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al. to establish that psychoanalytic causal explanations of irrationality are epistemically justified, because they are extensions of the desire‐cumbelief pattern of accounting for intentional actions. As a corollary, it becomes clear that these authors have failed to undermine my epistemological strictures on the foundations of psychoanalysis.     

What's in a Name? The Effects of the Labels “Fat” Versus “Overweight” on Weight Bias1

This research examined the effects of the labels “fat” vs. “overweight” in the expression of weight bias, with the prediction that the label “fat” biases individuals to respond more negatively than does the label “overweight.” In Study 1, participants' attitudes toward people labeled as fat were less favorable than were their attitudes toward people labeled as overweight. In Studies 2 and 3, although participants chose similar‐sized figures to depict fat and overweight targets, weight stereotypes and weight attitudes were more negative toward people labeled as fat than those labeled as overweight. In addition, the endorsement of weight stereotypes mediated the biasing effect of the “fat” label on weight prejudice. Implications of this work for prejudice researchers and for public attitudes are discussed.     

“Quo Vadis” the Scientific Study of New Religious Movements?

The study of new religious movements has been developing in recent decades in an intellectual context in which both religion and its scholarly investigation appear to be more significant and more controversial than seemed to be the case in the earliest decades of SSSR. The present paper recounts the main themes of early work on nrms in the 1970s and 80s and subsequently explores three current areas of conceptual ambiguity and/or intellectual ferment and conflict. Key contemporary issues represent 1) The Boundary Problem or what is a “new religious movement”?; 2) The growing salience of the analysis of catastrophic episodes of mass violence_involving nrms; and 3) Recent claims to the effect that scholars in the sociology of religion and religious studies who do research on nrms have been led by their strong ideological commitment to the defense of religious liberty to take up a defensive attitude toward controversial “cults” to a degree which has undermined objectivity.     

“Prematurity stereotype” in a sample of Dutch mothers: Do researchers suffer from a “prejudiced parent stereotype”?

This paper reports a Dutch replication of North American research on the “prematurity stereotype” among mothers. In a rating task, infants labeled as “premature” were given less favorable scores on a number of dimensions. A questionnaire study also showed negative expectations concerning premature infants. Associations with the mothers' number of children and level of education were found. Methodological problems of this type of research are discussed. To a large extent, the effects found can be ascribed to the “demand characteristics” of the experiment and the normal effects of expectations on perception. It is argued that researchers should not automatically label such behavior as “stereotyping”: There must also be evidence of a failure to adapt expectations in the face of conflicting evidence. Recommendations are made concerning future research in this area, and the importance of providing clear and complete information for the public on the effects of prematurity is stressed.     

Is the “hot‐hands” phenomenon a misperception of random events?

T. Gilovich, R. Vallone, and A. Tversky (1985) asked whether the so-called hot-hands phenomenon – a temporary elevation of the probability of successful shots – actually exists in basketball. They concluded that hot-hands are misperceived random events. This paper re-examines the truth of their conclusion. The present study's main concern was the sensitivity of the statistical tests used in Gilovich et al.'s research. Simulated records of shots over a season were used. These represented many different situations and players, but they always contained at least one hot-hand period. The issue was whether Gilovich et al.'s tests were sensitive enough to detect the hot-hands embedded in the records. The study found that this sensitivity depends on the frequency of hot-hand periods, the total number of shots in all hot-hand periods, the number of shots in each hot-hand period, and the size of the increase in the probability of successful shots in hot-hand periods. However, when the values of those variables were set realistically, on average the tests could detect only about 12% of the hot-hands phenomena.     

“The End of Faith?” Science and Theology as Process

Abstract : A spate of recent books would claim that science's only role vis a vis theology is to discredit it. Sam Harris, in The End of Faith, credits religious faith as the source of much of the violence in today's world. Richard Dawkins, in The God Delusion, views religion as, at best, a profound misunderstanding, and at worst a form of madness. Both find an antidote to such irrationality in science. To Harris and Dawkins religion is a body of accumulated knowledge. However, religion can also be thought of as a process, one based on experience, questions, and results. One group that has systematized such a process is the Society of Friends, or Quakers. The Quaker tradition shows that it is quite possible for religion to rest on experience and questioning, and for these to form the basis for an active and involved faith, one that need never reject science and its findings, but will temper their use with the best wisdom that can be gained from personal and communal experience.     

Do We “do”?

A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has been proposed by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993; cf. Pearl, 2000). The framework takes as fundamental that reasoning from observation and intervention differ. Intervention includes actual manipulation as well as counterfactual manipulation of a model via thought. To represent intervention, Pearl employed the do operator that simplifies the structure of a causal model by disconnecting an intervened-on variable from its normal causes. Construing the do operator as a psychological function affords predictions about how people reason when asked counterfactual questions about causal relations that we refer to as undoing, a family of effects that derive from the claim that intervened-on variables become independent of their normal causes. Six studies support the prediction for causal (A causes B) arguments but not consistently for parallel conditional (if A then B) ones. Two of the studies show that effects are treated as diagnostic when their values are observed but nondiagnostic when they are intervened on. These results cannot be explained by theories that do not distinguish interventions from other sorts of events.     

“Avant‐Garde of What?”: Surrealism Reconceived as Political Culture

However we may judge avant-garde art when we meet it, for us the phenomenon and idea are so present and evident that we do not stop, even momentarily, to wonder if we might be dealing with an illusion or an appearance rather than a reality, with a myth or a superstition rather than a concept.     

Do the “Eyes” Have It? A Program Evaluation of Jane Elliott's “Blue‐Eyes/Brown‐Eyes” Diversity Training Exercise1

The effectiveness of Jane Elliott's well‐known “blue‐eyes/brown‐eyes” exercise in reducing college students’ stereotyping and prejudice was assessed. College students were randomly assigned to either the exercise group or a comparison group. Blue‐eyed and brown‐eyed exercise participants were given discriminatory versus preferential treatment, respectively; a procedure purportedly designed to sensitize participants to the emotional and behavioral consequences of discrimination. Participation in the exercise was found to be associated with White students (a) indicating significantly more positive attitudes toward Asian American and Latino/Latina individuals, but only marginally more positive attitudes toward African American individuals; and (b) reporting anger with themselves when noticing themselves engaging in prejudiced thoughts or actions—negative affect that theoretically could prove to be either helpful or detrimental in promoting long‐term reduction of stereotyping and prejudice.     

How Do “Religion” and “Spirituality” Differ? Lay Definitions Among Older Adults

Research and public interest in religion and spirituality is on the rise. Consequently, there is an increasing need for rigorously obtained information on what individuals mean when they use these terms. This study examined how 64 older adults living in three retirement communities (including one Christian‐based community), a relatively understudied population, conceptualize religion and spirituality. Participants defined “religion” and “spirituality,” and their narrative definitions were coded and compared using a framework derived from Hill et al.'s (2000) conceptualization of religion and spirituality. Despite considerable overlap, participants' definitions differed on several dimensions. Participants were more likely to associate religion than spirituality with personal beliefs, community affiliation, and organized practices. Moreover, spirituality appeared to be a more abstract concept than religion, and included nontheistic notions of a higher power.     

“Could this happen to me?”: Threat‐related state orientation increases position identification with victims of random, “senseless” violence

Two experiments examined the role of threat‐related action‐state orientation in how observers become psychologically involved with victims of violence. Observing incidents of random, “senseless” violence is uniquely threatening to observers because they violate just world beliefs and appear like they could happen to anyone. Because stronger threat‐related state‐oriented individuals are less effective in down‐regulating such threats to the self, they should perceive stronger self‐concerned position identification (i.e., “this could happen to me”) when confronted with random, “senseless” violence. In contrast, no such effects should occur for observers' person identification (i.e., their other‐concerned empathy for the victim). The results of two experiments supported these ideas and ruled out potential alternative explanations based on individuals' just world beliefs, need for cognition, and their attribution strategies. We discuss the importance of threat‐related self‐regulation processes with regard to self‐ and other‐concerned mechanisms through which observers come to care for victims of violence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“Being Religious” or “Being Spiritual” in America: A Zero‐Sum Proposition?

Recent discussions of religious attitudes and behavior tend to suggest—and in a few cases, provide evidence—that Americans are becoming “more spiritual” and “less religious.” What do people mean, however, when they say they are “spiritual” or “religious”? Do Americans see these concepts as definitionally or operationally different? If so, does that difference result in a zero‐sum dynamic between them? In this article, we explore the relationship between “being religious” and “being spiritual” in a national sample of American Protestants and compare our findings to other studies, including Wade Clark Roof’s baby‐boomer research (1993, 2000), 1999 Gallup and 2000 Spirituality and Health polls, and the Zinnbauer et al. (1997) study of religious definitions. In addition to presenting quantitative and qualitative evidence about the way people think about their religious/spiritual identity, the article draws implications about modernity, the distinctiveness of religious change in the recent past, and the deinstitutionalization of religion.