The power of powerless speech: The effects of speech style and task interdependence on status conferral

Two studies examine the effects of speech styles and task interdependence on status conferral judgments. In both studies, participants were exposed to an individual who used either a powerful or powerless speech style in a low or high task interdependence group, and made judgments about the amount of status to confer to the individual. When task interdependence was low, participants conferred more status to powerful speakers, whereas when interdependence was high, participants conferred more status to powerless speakers. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrated that speech styles influenced trait inferences about the speaker (agency and communality), but these traits were weighted differently in status conferral judgments across groups. These findings provide insight into both the relationship between observed behaviors and status positions and the decision process underlying status conferral judgments.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.     

Sensitizing Potential Jurors to Variations in Eyewitness Evidence Quality Using Counterfactual Thinking

Jurors often have difficulty evaluating eyewitness testimony. Counterfactual thinking is a type of mental simulation that informs causal inference. Encouraging jurors to think counterfactually about eyewitness factors may sensitize them to these factors' causal influence on eyewitness identification and testimony accuracy, improving their overall judgments (such as verdicts). One hundred twenty‐one undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario containing either high‐quality or low‐quality eyewitness evidence and to evaluate eyewitness factors adopting either their default or a counterfactual mindset via a question‐order manipulation. Logistic regressions and analyses of variance revealed that a counterfactual mindset lowered perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and guilty verdicts (compared with the default mindset) when the evidence was poor; a counterfactual mindset, however, did not increase perceptions of accuracy and guilty verdicts when evidence was strong. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying these effects and identify several potential avenues for future research.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always Persuasive1

This study investigates the impact of different types of expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In two hypothetical court cases involving eyewitnesses, expert testimony was presented that was either sample-based (presenting the results of a research program on eyewitness identification) or person-based (presenting information about the particular eyewitness under consideration); the expert either offered causal explanations for his unreliability claim or failed to do so. Two additional control groups (with and without eye-witness identification) were not presented with any expert testimony. The results indicate that subjects who had been confronted with an expert statement made more lenient judgments about the offender but did not discount the eyewitness identification completely. Sample-based information had a moderate impact on the subjects' judgments, regardless of whether or not causal explanations were given. Person-based testimony was the most influential type of expert advice when a causal explanation was provided but the least influential one when no reasons were given. The practical (international differences in admissibility of expert testimony) and theoretical implications (processing of base-rate information) of these findings are discussed.     

The Relationship Between Powerless Speech,Agentic Behavior,and Amount of Talk

Abstract

In this experiment, the relationship between powerless speech, agentic behavior (task initiation), and amount of talk in an interaction was examined. Participants were 104 British students paired for discussion either with a professor (low-status condition) or with another student (same-status condition). The results showed no significant relationship between a powerless speech style and the initiation of discussion questions. Also, there was generally no significant relationship between the use of powerless speech style and amount of talk produced, except among female students: Female participants who engaged in powerless speech most frequently spoke fewer words. A significant positive relationship was found between those who initiated questions most frequently and spoke the most words.     

The Influence of Eyewitness Nonidentifications on Mock-Jurors' Judgments of a Court Case1

Two experiments examined the effect of an eyewitness nonidentificution on mock-jurors' verdicts in robbery cases, as well as the effects of number of identifying eyewitnesses and status of the identifying witness (victim or bystander). Subjects read court case summaries that included variable eyewitness evidence and constant alibi, circumstantial, and character evidence. In Experiment 1, frequency of guilty verdicts was significantly less when an eyewitness testified in court that the defendant was not the perpetrator, even when this nonidentification opposed two positive identifications. In Experiment 2, a low guilty rate was again associated with the presence of a nonidentifier, but only when the nonidentifier actually testified in court and stipulated that the defendant is “not the man.” On the average, 70% of the jurors delivered guilty verdicts when both the victim and bystander gave identifying testimony, whereas 12.5% delivered guilty verdicts when the bystander gave opposing nonidentifying testimony. Guilty rates were unaffected by the identifying eyewitness' status and (in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1) were higher when there were two (vs. one) identifying eyewitnesses.     

The Evaluative Consequences of Hedges,Hesitations, and Intensifies Powerful and Powerless Speech Styles

This article examines the separate and combined impact of hedges, hesitations, and intensifiers on perceptions of authoritativeness, sociability, character, and similarity, and the extent to which messages containing one or more of these language variables differs from a “prototypically” powerless message in evaluative consequences. A “prototypically” powerless message is one that contains not only hedges, hesitations, and intensifiers, but also contains polite forms and meaningless particles, such as “oh, well” and “you know.” Two studies indicated that hedges and hesitations individually affected perceptions of authoritativeness and sociability, but interactions among the variables were not found in the studies. Furthermore, only high intensifiers/low hedges/low hesitations and low intensifiers/low hedges/low hesitations messages differed significantly from the “prototypically” powerless message. The second study revealed that speaker status interacted to affect evaluative consequences. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the power of speech style construct.     

Juror Underutilization of Eyewitness Nonidentifications: A Test of the Disconfirmed Expectancy Explanation1

The impact of two types of eyewitness testimony on mock jurors' judgments was explored. A crime eyewitness either testified that the defendant definitely was the robber (identification), definitely was not the robber (nonidentification), or that they weren't sure if he was or was not the robber (control). An alibi eyewitness testified that the defendant either definitely was at the alibi location (identification), definitely was not at the alibi location (nonidentification), or he wasn't sure if the defendant was or was not at the alibi location (control). Strength of case was also manipulated. Results show that crime eyewitness identifications and alibi eyewitness nonidentifications were underutilized. A crime eyewitness by alibi eyewitness interaction revealed that within the crime eyewitness identification condition alibi identification was underutilized whereas with the other two crime eyewitness conditions, alibi nonidentification information was underutilized. The results supported a disconfirmed expectancy explanation.     

Solving the eyewitness problem

Faulty eyewitness testimony is a major source of wrongful convictions. Four solutions are examined to safeguard against mistaken testimony having undue impact: (1) to overturn any conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, (2) to require that an attorney be present at any pretrial identification procedure, (3) to allow an expert to testify during the trial about factors of perception and memory that could affect a witness's accuracy, and (4) to have the judge deliver a cautionary instruction to the jury, admonishing them to carefully scrutinize eyewitness testimony, or to educate them about such testimony. Each alternative is discussed within the context of psychological research and legal cases.     

A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony

We compared what 160 U.S. judges, 57 law students, and 121 undergraduates know and believe about factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Judges were no more knowledgeable than were undergraduates, and both groups were less knowledgeable than were law students. For all 3 groups, increased knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with beliefs that might reduce wrongful convictions. Participants in all 3 groups underestimated what potential jurors know about eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that increasing judges' knowledge of eyewitness testimony might help them to reduce wrongful convictions and to more accurately assess when eyewitness experts are needed. The results also suggest that law schools need to do a better job of educating law students about eyewitness testimony.     

An Archival Study of Eyewitness Memory of the Titanic's Final Plunge

A handful of real-life studies demonstrate that most eyewitnesses accurately recall central details (i.e., the gist of what happened) from traumatic events. The authors evaluated the accuracy of archival eyewitness testimony from survivors of the Titanic disaster who witnessed the ship's final plunge. The results indicate that most eyewitness testimony (15 eyewitnesses of 20) is consistent with forensic evidence that demonstrates that the Titanic was breaking apart while it was still on the ocean's surface. Despite the methodological limitations of archival research, the authors provide evidence from a single-occurrence traumatic event (with a large-scale loss of life) that the majority of eyewitnesses accurately recall central details.     

Polygraph Testimony and Juror Judgments: A Comparison of the Guilty Knowledge Test and the Control Question Test1

The present experiment investigated the impact of the Control Question Test (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) on the verdicts of mock jurors. Although studies have indicated that polygraph evidence has little influence on jurors' verdicts (Cavoukian & Heselgrave, 1980; Spanos, Myers, Dubreuil, & Pawlak, 1992–1993), no research has previously distinguished between the different types of polygraph tests and their impact on juror verdicts. In the present study, jurors were shown a videotape of a simulated rape-murder trial that contained either CQT polygraph evidence, GKT polygraph evidence, or no polygraph evidence. No differences were found among the 3 conditions for either jury verdicts or individual juror verdicts, and jurors tended to rate both forms of polygraph testimony below other forms of equally suspect evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, in its influence on their decision-making process.     

Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis

This experiment examines the influence of expert psychological testimony on juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors viewed versions of a videotaped trial, rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and rendered verdicts. In the absence of expert testimony jurors were insensitive to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence without making them more skeptical about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Few differences emerged between the experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors.     

Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgments: The Effects of Harm Information and Witness Demeanor1

Victim impact testimony (i.e., testimony concerning the harmful consequences on the victim's surviving family) was examined to determine its effect on the sentencing judgments of mock jurors. Undergraduate students (N= 293) watched a videotaped murder trial simulation, rendered verdicts, and made sentencing judgments. During the penalty phase of the trial, participants were either given no victim impact testimony, or they were given victim impact testimony that varied both the severity of the harm information (mild harm/ severe harm) and the demeanor of the witness (low affect/high affect). The results indicate that information concerning the harm experienced by the victim's relatives, not the affective demeanor of the witness, influenced sentencing judgments. Implications for the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) are discussed.