Liberalism,Civil Marriage,and Amorous Caregiving Dyads

Recently, the US has joined many European jurisdictions in extending civil marriage to same sex as well as different sex dyads. Many liberals regard this as a development worth entrenching. But a prominent recent liberal challenge to civil marriage claims otherwise. According to this challenge, by defining and conferring civil marriage, the state privileges some relationships over others that serve equally well the important liberal goal of fostering effective liberal citizenship, in violation of a prominent interpretation of the doctrine of state neutrality. Theorists who press this challenge, such as Elizabeth Brake and Tamara Metz, argue that it can be met effectively only by dismantling civil marriage and replacing it with more inclusive state‐maintained arrangements. So far, prominent responses to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage have focused on the special value of either the relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, or the special value of civil marriage itself. In this article, I develop an alternative reply to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage, one focusing instead on the special vulnerabilities of some of the liberally valuable relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, amorous caregiving dyads.     

Conceptions of identity: the challenge of sexual fluidity to Christian notions of marriage

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I consider the concept of identity as foundational to the heteronormative constructions of marriage manifesting in Christian interpretations of the institution. In an attempt to destabilize what I consider the congealing function of identity, I examine current research on sexuality fluidity emerging from Lisa Diamond’s work. I argue that the evidence of sexual fluidity in women challenges stable identity markers characteristic of marriage conceived of within the male–female binary. Sexual fluidity, thus, ultimately disrupts heteronormative claims of Christian marriage.     

Marriage and the Public Good

In this article I seek to address some misunderstandings inarguments about same sex-marriage. I do this by evaluating severalviews on homosexuality and marriage. My central aim is to showthat a rejection of same-sex marriage does not depend upon theview that homosexual acts are immoral or disordered. Rather,one must examine sexual acts in light of public goods that areat stake. I also argue that the Christian understanding of marriageand sexuality offers more than a set of prohibitions againstcertain sexual acts. Rather, it offers reasonable principlesby which to evaluate the relationship between sexual acts andthe public good.     

Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.     

“Love is only between living beings who are equal in power”: On what is alive (and what is dead) in Hegel's account of marriage

The paper develops a conception of marital love as a complex recognitive relation, which I articulate by juxtaposing it against other recognitive relations that figure in Hegel's theory of modern civil society (i.e., respect and esteem). Drawing on Hegel's early writings, I argue that, if love is to provide its unique sort of recognition, it must obtain between “living beings who are equal in power”—a peculiar form of equality that I name (drawing on Stanley Cavell's work) “dynamic equality.” I conclude that it is by Hegel's own lights that we should reject his notorious conception of the sexual difference. However, I also offer reasons why, from Hegel's early 19th century perspective, he could consider the following two conditions as compatible: (1) equality within marriage and (2) sexual hierarchy outside marriage, namely, in civil society.     

“Active faith” in Christian marriage: The challenge of family systems

The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibilities for creating an environment which nurtures active faith in marriage. I intend to do this by examining historical tradition on Christian marriage, and exploring behavioral science for its contribution to the subject. In particular, I will suggest some ways that family systems theory, with its understanding of healthy marriage and family life, can be a transforming element for the study of marriage today.Presented at The Future of the American Church Conference, Washington, D.C., September 22, 1991.     

1.5 Degrees Celsius: The Metamorphosis of the AMERICAN Way of Life,A Transition in Collective Maturation

A concept of civil society that stresses civil society's role in working with the state to achieve more inclusive, democratic polities provides the context for examining the implications for transnational civil society. In particular, the author examines how this perspective emphasizes the importance of the paradox that civil society cannot be understood independently of a relationship to a state. After explaining the nature of this paradox, the author discusses the various ways this paradox affects the potential for transnational civil society to contribute to more inclusionary democracies that reflect new processes in the social construction of citizenship.     

When a child comes out in the latter-days: an exploratory case study of Mormon parents

Under the modern gay rights movement, cultural and societal values regarding sexuality, marriage, and family have rapidly evolved while the fundamental doctrine of monogamous, heterosexual marriage espoused by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has not. Questions arise as to how orthodox Mormon families come to terms with their child coming out in light of the Church’s policy on same-sex marriage and families. This article employs an exploratory case-study method to examine the experience of one such orthodox Mormon family whose child came out as gay. The findings herein suggest that it is possible for families and individuals in these circumstances to develop and maintain loving and supportive relationships in spite of religious differences. These findings better equip academics, professionals, clergy, and families to address the mental health concerns of and create inclusive spaces in families, congregations, and communities for youth who identify as sexual minorities.     

From “Gay Marriage Controversy” (2004) to “Endorsement of Same-Sex Marriage” (2012): Framing Bisexuality in the Marriage Equality Discourse

The current study analyzes the evolution of language used to discuss marriage equality in The New York Times between February and May 2004 and February and May 2012. Specifically, the study examines how sexual orientation labels were used as modifiers for “marriage,” “couples,” and “individuals.” Results indicate that the language evolved from a focus on the sexual orientation label gay in 2004 to a more inclusive language, with same-sex as the predominant modifier for marriage and couples in 2012. Further, while the overall language in The New York Times became more inclusive of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender community at large, bisexual women and men are still largely absent within the marriage equality discourse.     

The Sexual and Theological Ethics of Gay Marriage in France: A Dialectic between Autonomy and Universalism

Abstract

The debate on gay marriage has gathered pace globally and particularly in France. Here, the secularization of marriage as an ‘acte laïque’ has furthered progress towards a political and juridic recognition of gay marriage. The Catholic church (Vatican) has opposed this development in its re-enforcement of Catholic sexual ethics and the distinction it draws between secular and religious definitions of marriage. Complicating this distinction is the perception of a trend towards post-secularism in France where religion is making a return to democratic debates on citizenship and gender, and raising concerns over the status of the civility of the marriage act. The focus of this article is to look at gay marriage from the perspective of contemporary ethical and theological thinking. Specifically, I aim to examine alternative discourses that open up new ways of configuring gay marriage through an examination of concepts of integrity, responsibility and asceticism, and critically the ethical relationship between autonomy and norms.     

TIME FOR LOVE: The Place of Marriage and Children in the Thought of Stanley Hauerwas

In essays written throughout his career, Stanley Hauerwas has unfolded a Christian vision of the marriage bond and the presence of children that seeks insistently to place these seemingly natural bonds within the new family of God that is the church. I examine his understanding, aiming to appreciate the Christian vision displayed while also suggesting that his emphasis on the new thing God does in the church is sometimes allowed to absorb and thereby lose the distinctive significance of the created bonds of marriage and family.     

What Lies Beyond Same‐Sex Marriage? Marriage,Reproductive Freedom and Future Persons in Liberal Public Justification

In this article I consider whether the legalization of sex-same marriage implies a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the 'marriage' business by leveling down to a universal civil union status. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient.     

基于心理控制源视角的女公务员婚姻质量研究

目的:研究女公务员心理控制源和婚姻质量的关系。方法:采用《Olson婚姻质量问卷》和《控制圈量表》对551名女公务员进行调查。结果:不同职级的女公务员心理控制源差异显著,其婚姻质量差异不显著;不同年龄的女公务员心理控制源和婚姻质量差异不显著;影响女公务员婚姻满意度的主要因素是性生活、与亲友的关系、子女和婚姻、业余活动、信仰一致性、经济安排、夫妻交流、人际控制。结论:不同职级的女公务员心理控制源差异显著,其婚姻质量差异不显著;影响女公务员婚姻满意感的主要因素是婚际因素和外界因素,个人因素贡献不显著;基于控制源的视角,人际控制对女公务员婚姻满意度贡献显著,个人实力和社会政治控制对其婚姻满意度贡献不显著。     

Norms,Rules and Steadfast Love: Towards an Inclusive Theology of Intimacy

Abstract

This article argues that defenders of the traditional view that marriage is the necessary condition for sexual experience generally make two important mistakes. First, they underestimate how open to emergent forms marriage actually is. And second, they confuse marriage as a norm for sexual expression with marriage as a rule. This article attempts a simple clarification of this basic distinction and, in so doing, is able to throw considerable fresh light on the place of marriage in the Christian understanding of sexuality. First, there will be some reminders about how adaptable the institution of marriage has actually been and may continue to be. Second, attempts will be made to explain the differences between a norm and a rule. Finally some possibilities and consequences arising from this distinction will be explored. These will provide some promptings towards what is called here ‘an inclusive theology of intimacy’. Radical Christians are cautioned regarding their peremptory search for alternatives to marriage. People inside and outside the churches who reject marriage may be rejecting versions of it which, while undoubtedly historical, simply do not bring to light the possibilities released by what might be called ‘the marital norm’.     

The Divorce of Marriage and Parenthood

Marriage is a template for domestic life and the problems that arise in it. The patterned assumptions that traditionally defined marriage gave substance to the family. These assumptions have become less compelling over the course of a century. In this paper, I suggest how and why this has happened. I focus on the meaning of parenthood and its relationship to marriage. In the course of a century, parenthood has been redefined as a rational choice governed by calculation. As a result, childbearing, pregnancy, marriage and parenthood have been redefined. Their relationships to one another have, to varying degrees, been altered. Marriage is an institutionalized way to care for the babies that once came, inevitably, as a result of sexual intercourse. What becomes of marriage when sex no longer produces babies? The answer is that everything about marriage and the family changes. Such changes help explain the rise of professional family therapy and related fields.     

Samaritanism and Civil Disobedience

In this paper, I defend the existence of a moral duty to disobey the law and engage in civil disobedience on the basis of one of the grounds of political obligation—the Samaritan duty. Christopher H. Wellman has recently offered a ‘Samaritan account’ of state legitimacy and political obligation, according to which the state is justified in coercing each citizen in order to rescue all from the perilous circumstances of the state of nature; and each of us is bound to obey the law, as the state demands, because we each have a responsibility to help rescue others when this assistance is not unreasonably costly. Though Wellman recognizes that there can be reasons for disobeying the law and resisting injustice in otherwise legitimate states, he overlooks the possibility that at least some of these reasons could be Samaritan in nature, grounded in the duty to rescue people from peril. As I shall argue, the Samaritan duty supports obligations to disobey the law, when the law prohibits Samaritan rescues, and to engage in civil disobedience, when unjust laws and practices contribute to endangering people. The discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the Samaritan duty, I articulate my case for Samaritan duties to disobey the law, and duties to engage in civil disobedience when unjust laws, institutions, or practices enable what I call ‘persistent Samaritan perils’. I then examine and respond to several objections to my account: first, that the costs of law-breaking are unreasonable, and thus cannot be morally required; second, that individuals’ particular acts of protest and civil disobedience do not appear to make any difference to the rescue, and thus cannot be required; third, that I stretch the Samaritan duty beyond recognition; and fourth, that the Samaritan duty binds us to help people in need or peril anywhere, not particularly at home. I consider in conclusion the advantages and limits of my account of citizens’ Samaritan duties in the face of injustice.     

Judicial Responses to Civil Disobedience: A Comparative Approach

In this paper, I compare the extent of Anglo-American judicial engagement in response to civil disobedience with that of the French judiciary. I begin by examining what the civil disobedient can realistically expect to achieve in a court of law. I shall argue that his priority should be to require the judge, acting as a mouthpiece for the law, to respond to his complaints. To do this, the civil disobedient must be able to deny liability for the offence he has allegedly committed by urging a different interpretation of the law on the basis of an alternative -- but plausible -- reading of constitutional or human rights. If the civil disobedient can do this, he can claim a victory of sorts, even if his claims are ultimately unsuccessful. But legal culture can present a further barrier. Judges have different roles in different jurisdictions and therein lie further difficulties for the French civil disobedient.     

Legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the United States: a social science perspective

Whether and how civil society should recognize committed relationships between same-sex partners has become a prominent, often divisive, policy issue. The present article reviews relevant behavioral and social science research to assess the validity of key factual claims in this debate. The data indicate that same-sex and heterosexual relationships do not differ in their essential psychosocial dimensions; that a parent's sexual orientation is unrelated to her or his ability to provide a healthy and nurturing family environment; and that marriage bestows substantial psychological, social, and health benefits. It is concluded that same-sex couples and their children are likely to benefit in numerous ways from legal recognition of their families, and providing such recognition through marriage will bestow greater benefit than civil unions or domestic partnerships. Trends in public opinion toward greater support for legal recognition of same-sex couples are discussed.     

Lass die Toten ihre Toten begraben

This article presents a part of Danish church history which has previously suffered from a lack of attention: The story of homosexual pastors in Denmark. I want to show how the discussion on homosexuality and ministry ran in Denmark in the 1970's and 1980's and how homosexual pastors were integrated into the ELCD. Moreover, I will analyse this discussion material from the perspective of the German Pfarrhaustradition and point to the civil side of the Lutheran understanding of ministry – marriage and household – as a crucial reason why homosexual pastors, as well as unmarried heterosexual pastors, have been considered a theological problem. Finally, I will compare the image of the pastor in the Lutheran Pfarrhaustradition with a Catholic understanding of ministry and suggest that both set the pastor apart from the world through regulation of relationships and sexuality.