Epistemic Motivation and the Structure of Moral Intuition: Dispositional Need for Closure as a Predictor of Individualizing and Binding Morality

Moral foundations theory argues that morality encompasses both group‐preserving binding concerns about in‐group loyalty, authority and purity and individualizing concerns about harm avoidance and fairness. Although studies have examined the relationship between sociopolitical attitudes and the moral foundations, the relationship between individual differences in epistemic motivation—as indexed by need for cognitive closure—and moral intuition remains unexplored. Given the role of groups in providing epistemic security, we hypothesized that the need for closure would be most strongly related to support for the foundations most central to the regulation of group ties, that is, the binding foundations as opposed to the individualizing ones. Data from three samples provided evidence for this. Unpacking this pattern, we also found that those high in need for closure endorsed all foundations, whereas those low in need for closure emphasized only the individualizing ones. Finally, we found that the relationship between need for closure and the binding foundations was mediated by right‐wing authoritarianism, an orientation closely linked to a desire for the preservation of conventional in‐group morality. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Liberal–conservative dimension of moral concerns underlying political faction formation in Taiwan

Moral foundations theory provides a framework for understanding the traditional liberal–conservative dichotomy in political factions. Typically, factions on the liberal side are more concerned with individualizing foundations—including care/harm and fairness/cheating—for the protection of individual rights and welfare whereas factions on the conservative side are concerned with both individualizing and binding foundations—including loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation—for the maintenance of existing social ethics. Our research extended this framework to the analysis of Taiwanese political factions, which are not distributed conspicuously along the liberal–conservative line but instead on whether Taiwan should become a legally independent state or unify with the People's Republic of China (Mainland China). Our results indicate that despite the scarce use of the terms liberal or left and conservative or right in common communication, a liberal–conservative dimension underlies the Taiwanese political spectrum. Specifically, supporters of Taiwan independence exhibit liberal‐like moral concerns whereas supporters of China unification and the status quo demonstrate conservative‐like moral concerns. Moreover, indirect effects exist through moral foundations from political factions to stances on social issues; this is especially prevalent in the case of Taiwan independence camp's clear support for the legalization of same‐sex marriage, a stance resulting from anti‐authoritarian moral and political characteristics.     

Moral Foundations and Heterogeneity in Ideological Preferences

Scholars have documented numerous examples of how liberals and conservatives differ in considering public policy. Recent work in political psychology has sought to understand these differences by detailing the ways in which liberals and conservatives approach political and social issues. In their moral foundations theory, Haidt and Joseph contend the divisions between liberals and conservatives are rooted in different views of morality. They demonstrate that humans consistently rely on five moral foundations. Two of these foundations—harm and fairness—are often labeled the individualizing foundations, as they deal with the role of individuals within social groups; the remaining three foundations—authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity—are the binding foundations as they pertain to the formation and maintenance of group bonds. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek demonstrate that liberals tend to disproportionately value the individualizing foundations, whereas conservatives value all five foundations equally. We extend this line of inquiry by examining whether different types of liberals and conservatives value the moral foundations to varying degrees. Using survey data (n = 745), we rely on a mixed‐mode latent class analysis and identify six ideological classes that favor unique social and fiscal policy positions. While most of the respondents belonging to these classes self‐identify as conservative, they endorse the moral foundations in varying degrees. Since our findings demonstrate considerable heterogeneity with respect to ideology and moral preferences, we conclude by encouraging scholars to consider this heterogeneity in detailing the motivational and psychological foundations of ideological belief.     

Between cultural relativism and liberal ethnocentrism: What does Saudi Arabia tell us about cultural variation in moral identity and prejudice?

Cultural conceptions of morality are grounded in diverse moral foundations, but moral identity research often assumes that individualizing concerns are the universal basis for morality. Moral identity scales grounded only in individualizing foundations risk liberal ethnocentrism, to the extent that binding foundations emphasized in collectivist cultures are overlooked. Three hundred and ninety-five Saudi Arabian and UK participants completed prejudice and moral identity measures, which either narrowly measured only individualizing foundations or broadly measured both binding and individualizing foundations. The broader measure had greater power to predict prejudice scores in both countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Generally, moral identities grounded in individualizing foundations predicted less prejudice, while moral identities grounded in binding foundations predicted higher prejudice in both countries. Individualizing measures of moral identity may assess ethnocentric concepts, but recognizing morality grounded in binding considerations may taint the category of moral identity with self-concepts that are associated with greater—not less—ethnocentrism.     

The Dimensions of Generalized Prejudice within the Dual-Process Model: the Mediating Role of Moral Foundations

In our study we investigated how individualizing and binding moral foundations partially mediate the relationship between the attitudinal clusters of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), and the dimensions of generalized prejudice. We found that binding moral foundations partially mediate the association between RWA and negative attitudes towards dissident and dangerous groups, while individualizing moral foundations had a positive relationship with the evaluations of all three clusters of dissident, dangerous, and derogated outgroups, and partially mediated the effects of both SDO and RWA. Based on these results we claim that intergroup attitudes are at least partly determined by moral concerns, and different personal needs activate or inhibit different moral concerns. Furthermore, while individualizing moral foundations seem to have a universal prejudice reducing effect, the effect of binding foundations is selective, increasing prejudice principally against dangerous and derogated outgroups that threaten one’s personal need for security and certainty.     

The Moral Foundations of Human Rights Attitudes

Human rights are claimed to be innate and based on moral principles. Human rights attitudes have been shown to be related to political ideology, but there have been few studies investigating their relationship with morality. Using moral foundations theory, we examine whether morals can predict human rights attitudes across two studies. The first study used questionnaires to show that human rights are based exclusively on individualizing moral foundations; however, increases in individualizing and decreases in binding foundations predict increases in human rights endorsement. Moral foundations also mediated the relationship between political identification and human rights. Both individualizing and binding foundations performed a role in explaining the lower endorsement of human rights by conservatives as compared to liberals. The second study used textual analysis of newspaper articles to show that human-rights-related articles contained more moral language than other articles, in particular for the individualizing foundations. Conservative newspapers had a greater use of binding foundations in human rights articles than liberal newspapers.     

Replacing the Moral Foundations: An Evolutionary‐Coalitional Theory of Liberal‐Conservative Differences

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains liberal‐conservative differences as arising from different moral intuitions, with liberals endorsing “individualizing” foundations (Harm and Fairness) and conservatives also endorsing “binding” foundations (Authority, Respect, and Purity). We argue these labels misconstrue ideological differences and propose Evolutionary‐Coalitional Theory (ECT) as an alternative, explaining how competitive dynamics in the ancestral social environment could produce the observed ideological differences. We test ECT against MFT across three studies. Study 1 shows the so‐called “binding” orientation entails the threat‐sensitivity and outgroup antagonism predicted by ECT; that is, an authoritarian motive. Similarly, Study 2 shows the so‐called “individualizing” orientation is better described as a universalizing motive, one reflecting a broader set of moral commitments (e.g., to nature) and a broader sociality than the egocentrism implied by MFT. Study 3 provides a factor analysis reducing “binding” to authoritarianism and “individualizing” to universalism, with the latter loading against social dominance orientation (SDO). A hierarchical regression then provides additional evidence for ECT, showing this dominating motive (SDO) accounts for variance in conservatism that MFT leaves unexplained. Collectively, these three studies suggest that ECT offers a more accurate and precise explanation of the key psychological differences between liberals and conservatives.     

The concept of attitude

Current conceptions of attitude do not adequately distinguish between attitudes and factual beliefs on the one hand, or between attitudes and preferences on the other. To hold an attitude is to ascribe an objective moral property to the attitude‐object; however, the conception of such properties rests on an incoherent theory of relations as constitutive of their terms, and the belief in them has only pseudo‐cognitive content. Moralism, or the maintaining of attitudes, is a special technique for disguising and promoting interests. Attitudes serve as rationalizations for concealed or unconscious impulses and are themselves defended by further rationalizations. These considerations call into question some common techniques of attitude‐assessment. Some apparent exceptions, namely ‘aesthetic attitudes’ and ‘authentic values’, reveal themselves to be either (a) factual beliefs about aesthetic properties or about human motivation respectively, (b) preferences, or (c) moral attitudes as defined. Moralism is not essential to socialization and is inimical to the ‘social feelings’.     

Moral foundations,worldviews, moral absolutism and belief in conspiracy theories

In the present research, we examined whether individual differences in basic moral concerns might be related to a greater endorsement of conspiracy theories. Building on the notion that conspiracy theories often deal with super‐individual relevant events in which a group perspective is central, we proposed that individual differences in moral concerns pertaining to group‐ and community‐concerns (i.e., binding moral foundations) rather than to individual well‐being (i.e., individualising moral foundations) would be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We further hypothesised that such relations would be totally mediated by beliefs in a dangerous world and by embracing moral absolutism. We found support for these predictions in two community samples (Ns: 319; 514). Theoretical implications were discussed.     

Deep Alignment with Country Shrinks the Moral Gap Between Conservatives and Liberals

Moral foundations theory suggests that relative to liberals, conservatives care more about values that are believed to bind group members together: loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation. In contrast, we propose that individuals who are deeply aligned (“fused”) with their group should display elevated commitment to group‐oriented moral values, regardless of their political orientation. The results of three studies supported this hypothesis. The tendency for conservatives to endorse the binding foundations more than liberals only emerged among weakly and moderately fused Americans. In fact, liberals strongly fused with the United States endorsed “binding” foundations more than average conservatives and to the same extent as strongly fused conservatives. These results indicate that to fully understand moral prerogatives, one must consider the nature of the connections people form to the group, as well as their political orientation.     

Effects of concerns about pathogens on conservatism and anti-fat prejudice: are they mediated by moral intuitions?

Threat perceptions are associated with politically conservative attitudes. Research has also found that specific forms of threat perception (e.g., concerns about pathogens) are associated with functional reactions (e.g., anti-fat prejudice). Recently, moral intuitions have been implicated in explaining political orientation: Liberals tend to place greater weight on "individualizing foundations" (justice and care concerns) in particular, whereas conservatives tend to place high weight on "binding foundations" (loyalty, respect, and purity concerns) as well. A recent study attempted to integrate the above strands of research by showing that the effect of threat perceptions on conservatism is mediated by a tendency to place relatively greater weight on the binding foundations. The present study was intended to replicate and extend past research by testing (a) whether concerns about pathogens predict conservatism and anti-fat prejudice and (b) whether those effects are mediated by a tendency to place relatively greater weight on the binding foundations.     

A Factor Analytic Investigation of the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire

ABSTRACT

Threat perceptions are associated with politically conservative attitudes. Research has also found that specific forms of threat perception (e.g., concerns about pathogens) are associated with functional reactions (e.g., anti-fat prejudice). Recently, moral intuitions have been implicated in explaining political orientation: Liberals tend to place greater weight on “individualizing foundations” (justice and care concerns) in particular, whereas conservatives tend to place high weight on “binding foundations” (loyalty, respect, and purity concerns) as well. A recent study attempted to integrate the above strands of research by showing that the effect of threat perceptions on conservatism is mediated by a tendency to place relatively greater weight on the binding foundations. The present study was intended to replicate and extend past research by testing (a) whether concerns about pathogens predict conservatism and anti-fat prejudice and (b) whether those effects are mediated by a tendency to place relatively greater weight on the binding foundations.     

Moral variables before and after a court‐mandated psychological treatment of men convicted of violence against their partners: Evolution and relationship with sexist attitudes

Assuming that some moral variables can play a role in explaining intimate partner violence (IPV) and its treatment, this study explores the evolution of the relationship between some moral variables, which have recently been connected to IPV, and sexist attitudes in 160 men convicted of violence against the partner. The general hypothesis is that the moral variables can change during psychological treatments, and therefore be intervention targets, because they are related to more traditional variables in the field of IPV, such as sexist attitudes. To test this idea, we took pretreatment and posttreatment measures on moral variables (moral absolutism and moral foundations) and sexist attitudes (benevolent and hostile sexism) and analyzed their relationships and their changes after the completion of a prescribed psychological treatment. The results showed that (a) the moral variables were significantly correlated with the sexist attitudes before and after the treatment; (b) the men convicted of violence against the partner held with less certainty their general beliefs about morality and their particular beliefs about the binding moral foundations (in‐group, authority, and purity) after the unspecific psychological treatment; and (c) their moral absolutism before the treatment predicted the remaining sexist attitudes after the treatment. Practical implications can be drawn to better understand this kind of prevalent violence and eventually to improve the psychological treatments.     

Salience of Anti-Abortion Beliefs and Commitment to an Attitudinal Position: On the Strength,Structure, and Predictive Validity of Anti-Abortion Attitudes1

The role of beliefs in attitude formation and the impact of commitment to an attitude on its predictive validity were studied in the context of anti-abortion attitudes. Undergraduates (N= 152), identified as pro-choice or pro-life, expressed their beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and restriction preferences with respect to making abortion illegal. In addition, they indicated their commitment to their positions and their willingness to distribute a pro- or anti-abortion petition. Salient beliefs—identified in a pilot study—were found to predict attitudes, intentions, restriction preferences, and petition choice significantly better than nonsalient beliefs. Salient beliefs also discriminated significantly between pro-choice and pro-life respondents, providing useful information about the cognitive underpinnings of anti-abortion attitudes. In addition, accuracy of predictions increased significantly with commitment, even when attitude extremity was statistically controlled. These findings support the summation theory of attitude (Fishbein, 1963) and demonstrate the importance of attitude strength in determining the structure and predictive validity of attitudes.     

Evangelical Elites’ Anti‐Homosexuality Narratives as a Resistance Strategy Against Attribution Effects

While attribution theory expects that beliefs about the origins of homosexuality are directly related to beliefs about the moral acceptability of homosexual behavior, we use content analysis of the popular evangelical magazine Christianity Today to show that evangelical elites have developed a series of anti‐homosexuality narratives that allow them to resist attribution effects. In particular, we find that even when evangelical elites have expressed belief in the physiological origins of homosexuality, such as the influence of genetics and/or prenatal hormones, their negative beliefs about the moral acceptability of homosexual behavior have not varied. We argue, then, that evangelical elites’ anti‐homosexuality narratives provide them with a strategy for influencing rank‐and‐file evangelicals, so that while allowing for a diversity of beliefs about the origins of homosexuality, rank‐and‐file evangelicals still have a viable mechanism for connecting these beliefs—whatever they may be—to negative beliefs about the moral acceptability of homosexual behavior. Our findings thus extend attribution theory, illuminate the potential power of moral narratives, and amplify the need for future research.     

Moral Foundations Theory and the Psychology of Charitable Giving

Moral foundations theory proposes that intuitions about what is morally right or wrong rest upon a set of universal foundations. Although this theory has generated a recent surge of research, few studies have investigated the real-world moral consequences of the postulated moral intuitions. We show that they are predictably associated with an important type of moral behaviour. Stronger individualizing intuitions (fairness and harm prevention) and weaker binding intuitions (loyalty, authority, and sanctity) were associated with the willingness to comply with a request to volunteer for charity and with the amount of self-reported donations to charity organizations. Among participants who complied with the request, individualizing intuitions predicted the allocation of donations to causes that benefit out-groups, whereas binding intuitions predicted the allocation of donations to causes that benefit the in-group. The associations between moral foundations and self-report measures of allocations in a hypothetical dilemma and concern with helping in-group and out-group victims were similar. Moral foundations predicted charitable giving over and above effects of political ideology, religiosity, and demographics, although variables within these categories also exhibited unique effects on charitable giving and accounted for a portion of the relationship between moral foundations and charitable giving. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

Feedlot veterinarians' moral and instrumental beliefs regarding antimicrobial use in feedlot cattle

This cross‐sectional survey research study examined the role moral beliefs play in predicting behavioural beliefs and attitudes and the role that subjective norms play in predicting moral beliefs. Using a self‐administered questionnaire, one hundred and three feedlot veterinarians completed measures of behavioural beliefs, referent others, perceived constraints and moral beliefs regarding recommendations to use antimicrobials in four situations (i.e. acutely sick cattle, chronically sick cattle, at‐risk cattle and high‐risk cattle). Regression analysis and F‐tests indicate moral beliefs as contributing significant increases in R² to models predicting behavioural beliefs regarding antimicrobial use in each situation. In addition, subjective norms contribute a significant increase in R² in models predicting moral beliefs in each of the four situations. The results indicate the effects of moral beliefs on behavioural beliefs are somewhat contingent on the condition; that is the level of risk associated with treating cattle with antimicrobials, the level of risk of not doing so, and the effectiveness of the antimicrobial in situations such as acute illness or being at‐risk of illness. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do cultural values predict individuals' moral attitudes? A cross‐cultural multilevel approach

This study examined whether cultural values predict individuals' moral attitudes. The main objective was to shed light on the moral universalism and relativism debate by showing that the answer depends on the moral issues studied. Using items from the Morally Debatable Behaviours Scale (MDBS) fielded in the World Value Survey (WVS), we found that moral issues can be differentiated cross‐culturally into attitudes towards (1) dishonest–illegal and (2) personal–sexual issues. Drawing upon evolutionary and cultural theories, we expected that the former moral domain is not related to cultural values, whereas the latter is influenced by cultural conceptions of the self (i.e. independent versus interdependent selves). We used multilevel modelling with Schwartz' cultural values as the independent variables and the two moral domains as assessed through the MDBS as dependent variables to test our hypothesis. After controlling for individual‐level differences in moral attitudes as well as the socio‐economic development of countries, our findings confirmed that attitudes towards dishonest–illegal issues were not related to cultural values whereas attitudes towards personal–sexual issues were predicted by the Autonomy–Embeddedness value dimension. We conclude that our study sheds not only light on the universalism and relativism debate, but also on the discriminant validity of cultural values. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychological variables underlying political orientations in an old and a new democracy: A comparative study between Sweden and Latvia

This study examines in detail the psychological variables underlying ideological political orientation, and structure and contents of this orientation, in Sweden and Latvia. Individual political orientation is conceptualized on two dimensions: acceptance vs. rejection of social change and acceptance vs. rejection of inequality. Swedish (N = 320) and Latvian (N = 264) participants completed measures of political orientation, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), self vs. other orientation, tolerance for ambiguity, humanism and normativism, core political values, system justification, as well as moral foundations questionnaire and portrait values questionnaire. The results showed that the relation among the measured variables was similar in both samples. Swedish participants showed stronger endorsement of egalitarian attitudes and social values, whereas we found more self‐enhancing and socially conservative values and attitudes among the Latvian participants.     

A Clash of Civilizations? Preferences for Religious Political Leaders in 86 Nations

Huntington claimed that today's major conflicts are most likely to erupt between religiously defined “civilizations,” in particular between Christianity and Islam. Using World Values Surveys from 86 nations, we examine differences between Christians and Muslims in preferences for religious political leaders. The results suggest a marked difference between Muslims and Christians in their attitudes toward religious politicians, with Muslims more favorable by 20 points out of 100. Devoutness, education, degree of government corruption, and status as a formerly Communist state account for the difference. Little support is found for the clash‐of‐civilizations hypothesis. Instead, we find that a clash of individual beliefs—between the devout and the secular—along with enduring differences between the more developed and less developed world explains the difference between Islam and Christianity with regards to preferences for religious political leaders.