A new dialectical theory of explanation

This paper offers a dialogue theory of explanation. A successful explanation is defined as a transfer of understanding in a dialogue system in which a questioner and a respondent take part. The questioner asks a special sort of why-question that asks for understanding of something and the respondent provides a reply that transfers understanding to the questioner. The theory is drawn from recent work on explanation in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in expert systems, but applies to scientific, legal and everyday conversational explanations.     

Functional explanation,consequence explanation,and Marxism

I argued in Karl Marx's Theory of History that the central claims of historical materialism are functional explanations, and I said that functional explanations are consequence explanations, ones, that is, in which something is explained by its propensity to have a certain kind of effect. I also claimed that the theory of chance variation and natural selection sustains functional explanations, and hence consequence explanations, of organismic equipment. In Section I I defend the thesis that historical materialism offers functional or consequence explanations, and I reject Jon Elster's contention that game theory can, and should, assume a central role in the Marxist theory of society. In Section II I contrast functional and consequence explanation, thereby revising the position of Karl Marx's Theory of History, and I question whether evolutionary biology supports functional explanations. Section III is a critique of Elster's views on functional explanation, and Sections IV and V defend consequence explanation against metaphysical and epistemological doubts. A concluding section summarizes my present understanding of the status of historical materialist explanations.     

Kreisel,the continuum hypothesis and second order set theory

Summary The major point of contention among the philosophers and mathematicians who have written about the independence results for the continuum hypothesis (CH) and related questions in set theory has been the question of whether these results give reason to doubt that the independent statements have definite truth values. This paper concerns the views of G. Kreisel, who gives arguments based on second order logic that the CH does have a truth value. The view defended here is that although Kreisel's conclusion is correct, his arguments are unsatisfactory. Later sections of the paper advance a different argument that the independence results do not show lack of truth values.     

Einstein's theory of theories and types of theoretical explanation

In this paper I draw on Einstein's distinction between “principle” and “constructive” theories to isolate two levels of physical theory that can be found in both classical and (special) relativistic physics. I then argue that when we focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e. explanations of physical laws, the two leading views on explanation, Salmon's “bottom‐up” view and Kitcher's “top‐down” view, accurately describe theoretical explanations for a given level of theory. I arrive at this conclusion through an analysis of explanations of mass—energy equivalence in special relativity.     

Dissonance reduction and causal explanation in a forced compliance situation

In a free choice forced compliance situation, subjects had to perform a tedious task. Then, just before having to evaluate the task's interest, certain subjects were provided an arbitrary positive feedback regarding their performance, others a negative feedback and others no information at all concerning their performance. Afterwards, all subjects were administered a questionnaire concerning their theories of causal explanations, which enabled us to compute an externalization score. Evaluation of the task was affected by the feedback's nature: Subjects who received the negative feedback found the task more interesting. Causal theories, however, were only affected by actual performance: the most efficient subjects were those who presented the more external orientation of causal theories. These results are in agreement with the radical conception of dissonance theory.     

Aggression,violence, and the death of a Dutch soccer hooligan: A reversal theory explanation

In March 1997, an aggressive and violent confrontation took place between more than 3000 rival soccer hooligans in the small town of Beverwijk in the Netherlands. In the prearranged and well‐organized confrontation, a 35 year‐old man was beaten and stabbed to death and others were seriously wounded. In this paper, the details of what happened at Beverwijk and the response of the Dutch authorities, including the subsequent arrest and conviction of the main perpetrators, are reviewed. In addition, the psychological approach of reversal theory [Apter MJ. 1992. The Dangerous Edge. New York: The Free Press] is used to answer several unresolved questions about the motivation of the Dutch soccer hooligans involved in the aggressive behavior and violent fighting at Beverwijk. Aggr. Behav. 28:1–10, 2002. © 2002 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Models for a paraconsistent set theory

In this paper the existence of natural models for a paraconsistent version of naive set theory is discussed. These stand apart from the previous attempts due to the presence of some non-monotonic ingredients in the comprehension scheme they fulfill. Particularly, it is proved here that allowing the equality relation in formulae defining sets, within an extensional universe, compels the use of non-monotonic operators. By reviewing the preceding attempts, we show how our models can naturally be obtained as fixed points of some functor acting on a suitable category (stressing the use of fixed-point arguments in obtaining such alternative semantics).