Hillel and Confucius: The prescriptive formulation of the golden rule in the Jewish and Chinese Confucian ethical traditions

A prospective convert asked Hillel to teach him the entire Torahwhile standing on one foot. Hillel replied, “What is hateful to yourself, do not do to your fellow man. That isthe whole of Torah and the remainder is but commentary. Go and study it.” (Hillel:Shab. 31; emphasis added)Zigong: “Is there asingle word that can serve as a guide to conduct throughout one’s life?” Confucius said: “Perhaps the word ‘shu’, ‘reciprocity’: ‘Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you’.” (Analects: 15.24; see alsoAnalects. 12 andZhongyong. 13.3; emphasis added)¹     

A comparison of verbal and tangible stimulus preference assessments

Tangible preference assessments were compared with verbal preference assessments for 6 individuals with mental retardation, behavior disorders, or both. In the tangible assessment, items were placed in front of the participant. In the verbal assessment, participants were asked, “Do you want X or Y?” and the items were not present. The two assessments yielded similar high‐preference items for 4 of the 6 participants. The verbal assessment was typically completed in less time than the tangible assessment.     

Choosing when to Die

What would make it the right time for you to die, or the wrong one? In particular, could it be the right time for you to die even if your loved ones want to make the sacrifices needed to prolong your life, because that would cost them too dearly? The worry is that it would be selfish to permit these sacrifies, and wrong for that reason. I think it matters that the sacrifies would occur within a relationship of mutual devotion, and I try to say how it matters. In particular, I argue against some fairly simple views of what constitutes impermissible selfishness in this context, and in favor of approaching such decisions in a different way.     

Responding to indirect speech acts

Indirect speech acts, like the request Do you know the time?, have both a literal meaning, here “I ask you whether you know the time,” and an indirect meaning “I request you to tell me the time.” In this paper I outline a model of how listeners understand such speech acts and plan responses to them. The main proposals are these. The literal meaning of indirect speech acts can be intended to be taken seriously (along with the indirect meaning) or merely pro forma. In the first case listeners are expected to respond to both meanings, as in Yes, I do—it's six, but in the second case only to the indirect meaning, as in It's six. There are at least six sources of information listeners use in judging whether the literal meaning was intended seriously or pro forma, as well as whether there was intended to be any indirect meaning. These proposals were supported in five experiments in which ordinary requests for information were made by telephone of 950 local merchants.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Mystical Experience: Unveiling the Veiled

Mystical experience is not unusual. Nearly half of all Americans report having had one or more mystical experiences. The author looks at how these experiences are moments of knowing—Do they unveil what is hidden?—and at how pastoral theologians and clinicians may help others come to understand their experience. Some thoughts on what this area of study may contribute to pastoral theology and pastoral counseling are also provided.     

Evans on transparency: a rationalist account

Gareth Evans famously observed that he can answer the question ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’ by attending to “precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’” (The varieties of reference, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 225, 1982). I argue that this observation follows from two independently plausible ideas in philosophy of mind. The first is about rationality and consciousness: it is that to be rational is in part to be required to believe that you are in a conscious state if you are in one, at least if various background conditions are met. The second is about consciousness and attention: it is that consciousness in a belief state consists in its subject engaging, to a sufficient extent, in a certain sort of world-directed attention. I also argue that this suggestion is superior to others that have been made in the literature regarding Evan’s observation. 

     

Clergy Work-Related Psychological Health: Listening to the Ministers of Word and Sacrament Within the United Reformed Church in England

Drawing on the classic model of balanced affect proposed by Bradburn (The structure of psychological well-being, Aldine, Chicago, IL, 1969), this study conceptualised poor work-related psychological health in terms of high levels of negative affect in the absence of acceptable levels of positive affect. In order to illuminate self-perceptions of work-related psychological health among a well-defined group of clergy, a random sample of 58 ministers of word and sacrament serving within the west midlands synod of the United Reformed Church in England completed an open-ended questionnaire concerned with the following six guiding questions. Do you enjoy your work? How would you define stress? How would you define burnout? What stresses are there in your ministry? What do you do to keep healthy? What can the church do to enhance the work-related psychological health of ministers? Content analysis highlighted the main themes recurring through these open-ended responses. The conclusion is drawn that ministers of word and sacrament within the United Reformed Church in England are exposed to a number of recurrent recognisable sources of stress. Suggestions are advanced regarding the need for future more detailed research and for the development of more effective pastoral strategies.     

Echo and the Failure of Knowing in Judith Fox’s Photographic Project <Emphasis Type="Italic">I Still Do: Loving and Living with Alzheimer’s</Emphasis>

In relationships ‘I’ and ‘you’ become ‘we’; despite individual differences, couples obtain an interdependent identity due to their shared interactions. During a serious illness, biological and biographical disruptions can put any reciprocal relationship under strain. Through intermedial analysis of Judith Fox’s photographic project, I Still Do: Loving and Living with Alzheimer’s (2009), I will explore ways the couple make sense of illness, how illness is communicated through text and image and also to identify the limits of representation. Here the photographs, I argue, solidify their relationship and echo the stuck-in-the-present state of mind brought on by Alzheimer’s.     

Negative and affirmative precepts

Summary That negative precepts play the critical role in the generalization principle is a consequence of the relationship of negative to affirmative precepts, i.e. that the negative give the essential negative condition for observing the affirmative precept. This relationship in turn is based on the nature of: 1) the negative precept which obliges to inaction and consequently demands action in order to violate it; 2) the affirmative precept which obliges to action and can be violated by inaction. Since action requires agency, and agency involves more responsibility than does the non-agency present in violating affirmative percepts, we conclude that violating negative precepts demands more responsibility and consequently that they oblige more than do affirmative precepts. To emphasize this critical role of agency I shall conclude with an example proposed by Michael Tooley: Imagine a machine which contains two children, John and Mary. If one pushes a button, John will be killed, but Mary will emerge unharmed. If one does not push the button, John will emerge unharmed, but Mary will be killed. In the first case one kills John, while in the second case one merely lets Mary die. Does one seriously wish to say that the action of intentionally refraining from pushing the button is morally preferable to the action of pushing it, even though exactly one person will perish in either case?²⁰ Tooley's judgment on this example indicates that the outcome - in either case one person will perish - is the sole moral determinant (intentions do not enter this case) and that agency of pushing the button is of no moral significance. Yet, if you, the reader, stood before this machine and tried to decide what you should do, the fact of your agency in pushing the button would control your decision. Consider pushing the button. What reason could you have for that action? That otherwise Mary would die. But who can say that Mary's life is more valuable than John's? That Mary will die is no valid reason for pushing the button. But what of saving Mary's life? You can't do that without yourself actively killing John. But if you don't, Mary will die. This is true, but she will not die from your agency, and this is critical to your choice. What a machine may or may not do may or may not be under your control. What you do is under your control, and you may not do evil, not even that good may come of it. Consequently, you would be forced to say: the decision of intentionally refraining from pushing the button is morally preferable to the action of pushing it even though exactly one person perishes in either case.     

12- and 18-Month-Olds Point to Provide Information for Others

Classically, infants are thought to point for 2 main reasons: (a) They point imperatively when they want an adult to do something for them (e.g., give them something; "Juice!"), and (b) they point declaratively when they want an adult to share attention with them to some interesting event or object ("Look!"). Here we demonstrate the existence of another motive for infants' early pointing gestures: to inform another person of the location of an object that person is searching for. This informative motive for pointing suggests that from very early in ontogeny humans conceive of others as intentional agents with informational states and they have the motivation to provide such information communicatively.     

Reflections on the use of patient records: Privacy,ethics, and reparations in the history of psychiatry

One of the most common questions we get asked as historians of psychiatry is “do you have access to patient records?” Why are people so fascinated with the psychiatric patient record? Do people assume they are or should be available? Does access to the patient record actually tell us anything new about the history of psychiatry? And if we did have them, what can, or should we do with them? In the push to both decolonize and personalize the history of psychiatry, as well as make some kind of account or reparation for past mistakes, how can we proceed in an ethical manner that respects the privacy of people in the past who never imagined their intensely personal psychiatric encounter as subject for future historians? In this paper, we want to think through some of the issues that we deal with as white historians of psychiatry especially at the intersection of privacy, ethics, and racism. We present our thoughts as a conversation, structured around questions we have posed for ourselves, and building on discussions we have had together over the past few years. We hope that they act as a catalyst for further discussion in the field.     

Action‐oriented Perception

Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch‐able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q‐able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q‐able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually.     

Competition,Recognition, and Approval-Seeking

Here I support my position in “Do Good Feminists Compete?” against the suggestion that competing with others weakens rather than strengthens one's sense of self.     

Depression and Spirituality in Australian Aged Care Homes

SUMMARY

A national survey of Australian aged care homes has found that between 40% and 60% of high care residents and 25% to 51 % of low care residents are depressed, depending on the method used to assess depression. While this survey did not specifically include items on spirituality, an analysis based the Geriatric Depression Scale question “Do you feel that your life is empty?” provides some insights into the type of person who may benefit from spiritual help.

The view is expressed that those committed to the provision of spiritual care must be more assertive in making the positive contribution to the reduction in depression that empirical research carried out over the last thirty years suggests is possible. The basic step of identifying those who are ready to talk about spiritual matters and who are depressed is offered as a starting point and some ways of doing this are described.     

A comparison of verbal and tangible stimulus preference assessment methods in adults with schizophrenia

Verbal stimulus preference assessments were compared with tangible stimulus preference assessments for four adults with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. In the verbal assessment, participants were asked, ‘Do you want X or Y?’, the items were not present, and the participant chose an item verbally. In the tangible assessment, pairs of items were placed in front of the participant and s/he was asked to choose by approaching the stimuli. The two assessment methods yielded identical highest preference items for three of the four participants and identical lowest preference items for all participants. In addition, the verbal assessment method took less time to complete than the tangible assessment method. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can Multimodal and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy be Reconciled?

The purpose of this article is to determine whether two distinct modes of cognitive-behaviour therapy—Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) and Multimodal Therapy (MMT)—can be reconciled. This quest in the spirit of integrationism is pursued along three lines of inquiry: Do we talk about schools, approaches, or techniques? A reconciliation between MMT and REBT as systems seems not to be feasible, just because of the simple fact that MMT is not a new school with an idiosyncratic theory, whereas REBT is. However, REBT is also a congenial approach consisting of various eclectic techniques, as is MMT. It is explained how the A-B-C format and firing orders of the BASICI.D. modalities stem from an S-O-R model. Furthermore, the circular character of the various modalities (thinking, feeling, and behaving) is recognised both in MMT and in REBT. The techniques used in REBT and MMT overlap for 65–80%, according to a comparative perusal of Ellis's and Lazarus's presentations of preferred techniques. This means that MMT and REBT, as an approach with distinct techniques, “must” be very similar in practice. The conclusion is that philosophically Ellis and Lazarus see eye-to-eye and that MMT and REBT overlap a great deal. But a fusion is not yet at hand. At best the two can be described as two sides of one coin. “When you wake up in the morning, Pooh,” said Piglet at last, “what's the first thing you say to yourself?” “What's for breakfast?” said Pooh. “What do you say, Piglet?” “I say, I wonder what's going to happen exciting today?” said Piglet. Pooh nodded thoughtfully. “It's the same thing,” he said. “What's that?” the Unbeliever asked. “Wisdom from a Western Taoist,” I said. “It sounds like something from Winnie-the Pooh,” he said. “It is,” I said. From The Tao of Pooh Benjamin Hoff (1982)     

On Wittgenstein's Notion of Meaning‐Blindness: Its Subjective,Objective and Aesthetic Aspects

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Narrative and the Stability of Intention

This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self‐understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self‐intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience.     

Faculty Perceptions of College Creativity Courses

If you were going to teach a college-level course in creativity, would you be interested in what other instructors believe about such courses? Would you like to know their views about planned outcomes, evaluation and course content? These are some of the areas addressed in this report. The study orginated discussions at the First National Conference on Creativity in American Colleges and Universities.¹ The conference was promoted by the work of McDonough and McDonough (1987),² and was held in July of 1990 at the Alden B. Dow Creativity Center of the Northwood Institute in Midland, Michigan. It was an exciting opportunity for university-level teachers of creativity to get together and talk. To facilitate discussions, most participants brought with them copies of their course syllabi. Much of the ensuing discussion centered around the purposes of creativity courses, appropriate course experiences, required products, and the evaluation of student participation and learning. While the diversity of opinion of those present soon become clear, many participants were left questioning if the opinions heard and syllabi offered at this conference were representative of what was being done nationally. The present study is born from that question.